THIS PAPER EXAMINES intergovernmental relations in Thailand by focusing on the linkages between the central government and 118 municipal government units. While the concept of intergovernmental relations usually refers to relationships among relatively autonomous units of government within federal systems, here it refers to relationships among central and local governmental units within a unitary system. This usage not only relates the Thai case to general theories of intergovernmental relations, but it also raises some new questions and provides a useful framework for analyzing data heretofore absent in the literature on Thai politics and administration. Intergovernmental relations are political. They determine who gets what, when, and how; they center on the competition for power, influence, and authority; and they generate and resolve conflicts over important group and societal values. Consequently, understanding intergovernmental relations in Thailand also requires understanding the political behavior of key actors involved in central-local interactions. This essay attempts to contribute to such an understanding. It begins by analyzing the political and administrative origins, ambiguities, and strategies of intergovernmental relations in reference to the behavior of Thai officials. Based upon this analysis, it concludes that Thai intergovernmental relations are characterized by continuous central administrative leveling of local political processes. Viewed from the perspectives of high-level administrators, central government strategies are expected to create greater stability and predictability in intergovernmental relations. These strategies are aimed at dominating local
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