Thabo Mbeki Research Articles

Dr. Mark A. Wainberg (1945-2017): Provocateur, Activist, and Champion for AIDS Care and Research.

Dr. Mark A. Wainberg (1945-2017): Provocateur, Activist, and Champion for AIDS Care and Research.

Mono-Causal and Multi-Causal Theories of Disease: How to Think Virally and Socially about the Aetiology of AIDS

In this paper, I utilise the tools of analytic philosophy to amalgamate mono-causal and multi-causal theories of disease. My aim is to better integrate viral and socio-economic explanations of AIDS in particular, and to consider how the perceived divide between mono-causal and multi-causal theories played a role in the tragedy of AIDS denialism in South Africa in the early 2000s. Currently, there is conceptual ambiguity surrounding the relationship between mono-causal and multi-causal theories in biomedicine and epidemiology. Mono-causal theories focus on single, typically microbial, sources of illness and are most concerned with infectious diseases. By contrast, multi-causal theories allow for multiple factors to underpin a disease’s aetiology, including socio-economic and behavioural factors, and they usually focus on chronic non-communicable diseases. However, if these theories are taken to be strictly distinct, this prevents the inclusion of both microbial and socio-economic factors in a single explanation of any particular disease. This strict distinction became a problem when trying to explain the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in southern Africa and ultimately contributed to the tragedy of AIDS denialism in South Africa. In tandem with viewing how the perceived divide between multi-causal and mono-causal theories underpinned AIDS denialism, I examine Thabo Mbeki’s specific role, while acknowledging that AIDS is being deprioritised on a broader international level. Overall, I will demonstrate that any long-term plan to eliminate AIDS will require viral and socio-economic factors to be considered simultaneously and that such a theoretical approach requires a clearer understanding of the underlying concepts of disease aetiology.

Radical Centres

This article compares and contrasts two monumental architectural ensembles: Walter Sisulu Square of Dedication in Kliptown, Johannesburg, opened in 2005 by President Thabo Mbeki; and The Palace of Culture and Science, a Stalinist skyscraper ‘gifted’ to Warsaw by the Soviet Union in 1955.This architectural juxtaposition serves as the point of departure for the article's two, interconnected key themes: an inquiry into the complex continuities and contradictions between the political and economic reconfigurations experienced by South Africa after 1994 and Poland after 1989; and an exploration into what the author defines as the ‘political morphology’ of monumental architecture.The bulk of the article is concerned with a critical investigation into how scholars conceive of the relationship between the morphological (spatial, geometric and aesthetic) characteristics of built form, and their political or economic correlates. Must there be – as the scholarly consensus suggests – an intrinsic connection between democracy and architectural humility, and between authoritarianism and monumentality?

Fighting for life in a time of AIDS denial

Wild discusses how Glenda Gray helped lead the fight against human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in South Africa. The 1990s brought democracy to South Africa--but also an explosion in HIV infections. More than 1.5 million of the country's 38-million population were infected with HIV when apartheid ended and Nelson Mandela came to power in 1994. By 2000, 1 in 5 pregnant women were HIV-positive with about 70,000 infected babies born each year. Under Mandela, Gray had been on the side of the government. She was drafting South Africa's plan to tackle HIV and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), including the roll-out of nationwide treatment. But in 1999 the political landscape shifted. A new president, Thabo Mbeki, had prejudices about science. Mbeki's line was that poor nutrition, rather than HIV, was the cause of AIDS. Suddenly she found herself at loggerheads with the very officials she had been working well with for years--except now they were advocating beetroot and garlic to prevent AIDS.

The fall of an African president: How and why did the ANC unseat Thabo Mbeki?

The entry of the ANC into the arena of democratic politics provoked a dilemma for the party leadership that is familiar to political parties in a new democracy: how, if at all, should the party reform its internal organization to compete in a new electoral environment? This article draws on interviews with senior members of the ANC to develop a theory that describes how the ‘modernization’ of the ANC under President Thabo Mbeki led to his electoral defeat at the party's national conference in 2007. It contends that the process of modernization reduced systematically the role of the party's activist base in the policy-making process, creating a motive to replace the President, but left intact the role of activists in the selection of the party's leadership, which in turn provided an opportunity to replace the President at the party's national conference. The President's opponents exploited ruthlessly this opportunity by enlarging and mobilizing the party membership, using a clientelistic appeal for support, to deliver a resounding victory for their champion, Jacob Zuma. This type of clientelistic competition, which has become routine inside the ANC, undermined the democratic legitimacy of the party and its capacity to govern in the public interest.

Pence, Putin, Mbeki and Their HIV/AIDS-Related Crimes Against Humanity: Call for Social Justice and Behavioral Science Advocacy.

Indiana, a large rural state in the Midwestern United States, suffered the worst North American HIV outbreak among injection drug users in years. The Indiana state government under former Governor and current US Vice President Mike Pence fueled the HIV outbreak by prohibiting needle/syringe exchange and failed to take substantive action once the outbreak was identified. This failure in public health policy parallels the HIV epidemics driven by oppressive drug laws in current day Russia and is reminiscent of the anti-science AIDS denialism of 1999-2007 South Africa. The argument that Russian President Putin and former South African President Mbeki should be held accountable for their AIDS policies as crimes against humanity can be extended to Vice President Pence. Social and behavioral scientists have a responsibility to inform the public of HIV prevention realities and to advocate for evidence-based public health policies to prevent future outbreaks of HIV infection.

‘Past History Has Not Been Forgotten’: The ANC/ZAPU Alliance – the Second Phase, 1978–1980

The apparent camaraderie displayed by Presidents Jacob Zuma and Robert Mugabe, and President Thabo Mbeki’s ‘tilt’ towards Mugabe in electoral controversies in Zimbabwe, have created the impression among many in South Africa that the African National Congress (ANC) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were allies in the struggle against apartheid. The history of the ANC/Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) alliance has been neglected. This article focuses on the almost unknown second phase of the alliance in 1978–80 and its consequences. The history of ZAPU, which lost the struggle for power in Zimbabwe in 1980, has been largely erased, while the ANC has no reason to celebrate an alliance which bedevilled its relationship with independent Zimbabwe for many years. This article reconstructs the story of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) participation with the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) in Zimbabwe in the year or so before the Lancaster House talks in 1979. It then examines the consequences of the alliance for the relationship with ZANU during the 1980s. The second half of the article looks, largely from an ANC perspective, at what was seen by participants as the negative influence of ZIPRA training methods, as transmitted to MK members in ZIPRA camps in Zambia, and by MK veterans of the Zimbabwe war in the Angolan camps, on the political culture of MK. It discusses the allegedly apolitical and anti-intellectual impact of the toyi-toyi, and of songs or chants, such as ‘kill the Boer, kill the farmer’, which were seen as in conflict with the non-racial ethos of the ANC. The article looks finally at the continuing relevance of this anti-intellectual culture, and of Zimbabwean models, in South Africa today.

Leadership Qualities to Foster a Sustainable South African Democracy

A democracy requires leaders who demonstrate skills that will strengthen the dispensation, set an example and gain respect, nationally and internationally. Since 1994, South Africa (SA) has had three presidents, each responsible for shaping the country according to his own unique approach. Their leadership has played a crucial role in determining the future of the country over the past 23 years, some areas have been strengthened, but unfortunately others have become weaker than before. It seems that President Nelson Mandela focused on reconciliation. The approach of Thabo Mbeki, his successor, was strategically different in that it focused on the realization of the importance of economic development and wealth creation. During the consequent Zuma era, the concept of leadership was transformed to focus on charisma and populism.
 The aim of this paper is to review the fundamental, prevailing leadership approaches in SA in the period since the country became a democracy in 1994. The challenges facing South African leaders will be clustered in two themes, namely leadership and economy. Against this backdrop, a theoretical, yet practical discussion is conducted in an attempt to answer the following question: What fundamental leadership qualities are required to ensure a sustainable democracy in the Southern African context?

The rhetoric of Pan-Africanism and the debate on African identity in South Africa: President Thabo Mbeki’s contribution

This article draws out the implications of the debate on African identity in post-apartheid South Africa within the context of former President Mbeki’s Pan-African reflections on the African Renaissance in his quest to include South Africa in two power games. Firstly, President Mbeki aims to insert South Africa into the politics of the African continent since it (South Africa) is seen by many on the continent as a ‘coconut’ (a derogatory term implying that the person is black on the outside, but white on the inside). Secondly, President Mbeki is also making a concerted effort to have South Africa join the global economic race after decades of isolation. A brief history of Pan-African thinking on the ideal/idea of an African cultural and intellectual revival sets the stage for subjecting Mbeki’s speech ‘I am an African’, as well as a journalistic piece by Mmusi Maimane, now the leader of the opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, to a rhetorical and critical discourse analysis (CDA). These two South African politicians inhabit positions at opposing extremes of the political landscape. The purpose of a CDA is to critically lay bare the unexamined assumptions which inform the political rhetoric locked up in the text. The analysis demonstrates that embedded in both texts is an overall message of inclusiveness rather than exclusivity.

Book Review: The Thabo Mbeki I Know

Review of the edited volume: Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu and Miranda Strydom (eds), The Thabo Mbeki I Know, Johannesburg: Pan Macmillan South Africa, 2016, ISBN 9781770103412; ebook: ISBN 9781770103429, 576 pp.

HAITI, MBEKI AND CONTEMPORARY IMPERIALISM

This article examines a generally unremarked aspect of Thabo Mbeki's presidency & his affirmation of the Haitian Revolution as an event of global import, and, in the face of considerable pressure, his support for the right of contemporary Haitians to determine their own future. It begins with a brief account of the Haitian Revolution, goes on to offer a sketch of the long attempt to contain the Revolution, outlines what has been at stake in recent Haitian politics, and its international reception, and then describes the positions taken by Mbeki with regard to Haiti.

The African Renaissance versus the South African Renaissance?

When Nelson Mandela was sworn in as president on 10 May 1994, South Africa enjoyed an unprecedented global standing. Much of the international community, particularly Western states, saw the new South Africa as well equipped to play a dynamic and dominant role on the continent; promoting conflict resolution, economic development, and acting as a standard-bearer for democracy and human rights.Yet, throughout the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, South Africa has failed to deliver on this early promise. Its continental primacy has been circumscribed by its own reluctance to lead, combined with widespread African hostility to its economic expansion, antipathy towards its democratic ideals and scepticism about its suitability as Africa’s global representative. With an onerous domestic agenda, as it continues to tackle the profound socio-economic legacies of apartheid, and with its military power also on the wane, South Africa must now adapt to an emerging multipolarity on the continent. This transition – which may produce a new concert of African powers working in constructive collaboration or lead to fragmentation, discord and gridlock – is likely to determine Africa’s prospects for decades to come.This Adelphi book squarely challenges the received wisdom that South Africa is a dominant power in Africa. It explores the country’s complex and difficult relationship with the rest of the continent in the post-apartheid era and examines the ways in which the country has struggled to translate its economic, military and diplomatic weight into tangible foreign policy successes and enduring influence on the ground. The conclusions of this book will be valuable to academics, policymakers, journalists, and business leaders seeking to understand the evolution and trajectory of South African policy in Africa.

The plight of the South African National Defence Force

When Nelson Mandela was sworn in as president on 10 May 1994, South Africa enjoyed an unprecedented global standing. Much of the international community, particularly Western states, saw the new South Africa as well equipped to play a dynamic and dominant role on the continent; promoting conflict resolution, economic development, and acting as a standard-bearer for democracy and human rights.Yet, throughout the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, South Africa has failed to deliver on this early promise. Its continental primacy has been circumscribed by its own reluctance to lead, combined with widespread African hostility to its economic expansion, antipathy towards its democratic ideals and scepticism about its suitability as Africa’s global representative. With an onerous domestic agenda, as it continues to tackle the profound socio-economic legacies of apartheid, and with its military power also on the wane, South Africa must now adapt to an emerging multipolarity on the continent. This transition – which may produce a new concert of African powers working in constructive collaboration or lead to fragmentation, discord and gridlock – is likely to determine Africa’s prospects for decades to come.This Adelphi book squarely challenges the received wisdom that South Africa is a dominant power in Africa. It explores the country’s complex and difficult relationship with the rest of the continent in the post-apartheid era and examines the ways in which the country has struggled to translate its economic, military and diplomatic weight into tangible foreign policy successes and enduring influence on the ground. The conclusions of this book will be valuable to academics, policymakers, journalists, and business leaders seeking to understand the evolution and trajectory of South African policy in Africa.

South Africa's image problem in Africa

When Nelson Mandela was sworn in as president on 10 May 1994, South Africa enjoyed an unprecedented global standing. Much of the international community, particularly Western states, saw the new South Africa as well equipped to play a dynamic and dominant role on the continent; promoting conflict resolution, economic development, and acting as a standard-bearer for democracy and human rights.Yet, throughout the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, South Africa has failed to deliver on this early promise. Its continental primacy has been circumscribed by its own reluctance to lead, combined with widespread African hostility to its economic expansion, antipathy towards its democratic ideals and scepticism about its suitability as Africa’s global representative. With an onerous domestic agenda, as it continues to tackle the profound socio-economic legacies of apartheid, and with its military power also on the wane, South Africa must now adapt to an emerging multipolarity on the continent. This transition – which may produce a new concert of African powers working in constructive collaboration or lead to fragmentation, discord and gridlock – is likely to determine Africa’s prospects for decades to come.This Adelphi book squarely challenges the received wisdom that South Africa is a dominant power in Africa. It explores the country’s complex and difficult relationship with the rest of the continent in the post-apartheid era and examines the ways in which the country has struggled to translate its economic, military and diplomatic weight into tangible foreign policy successes and enduring influence on the ground. The conclusions of this book will be valuable to academics, policymakers, journalists, and business leaders seeking to understand the evolution and trajectory of South African policy in Africa.

South Africa in Africa: The challenges of the new multipolarity

When Nelson Mandela was sworn in as president on 10 May 1994, South Africa enjoyed an unprecedented global standing. Much of the international community, particularly Western states, saw the new South Africa as well equipped to play a dynamic and dominant role on the continent; promoting conflict resolution, economic development, and acting as a standard-bearer for democracy and human rights.Yet, throughout the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, South Africa has failed to deliver on this early promise. Its continental primacy has been circumscribed by its own reluctance to lead, combined with widespread African hostility to its economic expansion, antipathy towards its democratic ideals and scepticism about its suitability as Africa’s global representative. With an onerous domestic agenda, as it continues to tackle the profound socio-economic legacies of apartheid, and with its military power also on the wane, South Africa must now adapt to an emerging multipolarity on the continent. This transition – which may produce a new concert of African powers working in constructive collaboration or lead to fragmentation, discord and gridlock – is likely to determine Africa’s prospects for decades to come.This Adelphi book squarely challenges the received wisdom that South Africa is a dominant power in Africa. It explores the country’s complex and difficult relationship with the rest of the continent in the post-apartheid era and examines the ways in which the country has struggled to translate its economic, military and diplomatic weight into tangible foreign policy successes and enduring influence on the ground. The conclusions of this book will be valuable to academics, policymakers, journalists, and business leaders seeking to understand the evolution and trajectory of South African policy in Africa.

Tentative hegemony from Mandela to Zuma

When Nelson Mandela was sworn in as president on 10 May 1994, South Africa enjoyed an unprecedented global standing. Much of the international community, particularly Western states, saw the new South Africa as well equipped to play a dynamic and dominant role on the continent; promoting conflict resolution, economic development, and acting as a standard-bearer for democracy and human rights.Yet, throughout the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, South Africa has failed to deliver on this early promise. Its continental primacy has been circumscribed by its own reluctance to lead, combined with widespread African hostility to its economic expansion, antipathy towards its democratic ideals and scepticism about its suitability as Africa’s global representative. With an onerous domestic agenda, as it continues to tackle the profound socio-economic legacies of apartheid, and with its military power also on the wane, South Africa must now adapt to an emerging multipolarity on the continent. This transition – which may produce a new concert of African powers working in constructive collaboration or lead to fragmentation, discord and gridlock – is likely to determine Africa’s prospects for decades to come.This Adelphi book squarely challenges the received wisdom that South Africa is a dominant power in Africa. It explores the country’s complex and difficult relationship with the rest of the continent in the post-apartheid era and examines the ways in which the country has struggled to translate its economic, military and diplomatic weight into tangible foreign policy successes and enduring influence on the ground. The conclusions of this book will be valuable to academics, policymakers, journalists, and business leaders seeking to understand the evolution and trajectory of South African policy in Africa.

Thabo Mbeki’s African developmental agenda through Pan-Africanism and the African renaissance

ABSTRACTIn 1996, the then South African deputy president thabo Mbeki opened parliament with his since then acclaimed ‘I am an African’ speech. Subsequently, Mbeki publicly persuaded Africans to embrace and advance the concept of an African renaissance for Africa’s development. While Mbeki’s African renaissance project was welcomed on the one hand; on the other, it was anticipated that it would be an elitist project. In this article, it is argued that to the contrary, the African renaissance as pursued by Mbeki has sought to benefit ordinary Africans in a practical sense. This article uses a historical narrative approach so as to give a historical context against which Mbeki’s African renaissance emerged, highlighting the successes, failures, constraints, setbacks and challenges that he had to confront. the argument is that African intellectuals and academics who correctly point out the absence of a mass-based African renaissance movement must not stand apart and merely point fingers, but must be actively engaged in the realisation of the African renaissance ideals.

The frozen rhetoric of AIDS denialism and the flourishing claims of a cure: A Comparative analysis of Thabo Mbeki and Yahya Jammeh’s rhetoric

ABSTRACTThis article compares and contrasts the frozen rhetoric of Thabo Mbeki’s Aids denialism and Yahya Jammeh’s flourishing claims of a cure for HIV/Aids. While Jammeh invoked Allah as the source of his herbal therapy, Mbeki employed what scientists referred to as pseudoscience to justify his claim. In the final analysis, whereas Mbeki’s denialist rhetoric froze in South Africa, Jammeh’s cure rhetoric continues to flourish in the Gambia. First, the rhetorical situation in both countries is appraised. Next, antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) and alternative therapies, which are at the center of the polemics, are placed in dialogue before the dynamic subject is located at the critical junctures of space, power and the dominant truth games, where the subject shapes the same truth games that shape the subject. Accordingly, the outcomes of the ARVs debate in South Africa and the Gambia flowed from the interactions of space, power and the prevailing truth games in relation to the subject.

NEPAD: Talking from the South, governing from the West

ABSTRACTThe formation of the New Partnership for African Development (NePAD) in 2001 at the African Union (AU) Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, marked the advent of what is regarded as a novel development strategy crafted by Africans for Africa. Rooted in former South African President thabo Mbeki’s call for an African renaissance, the initiative seeks to trigger the continent’s economic development by encouraging African states to explore the prevailing international economic order or globalisation. this article explores NePAD’s capacity to foster economic development in Africa, assesses the reasons for its establishment, reviews its mandate and examines institutional mechanisms for achieving its goals. the article takes issue with the ‘westernisation’ of the ‘discourse’ of Africa and calls for the revitalisation of NePAD’s strategy for sustainable African development.

AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS: QUIET DIPLOMACY AND SOUTH AFRICA’S DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TOWARDS ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe is not just a foreign policy issue for South Africa; it has become a domestic policy concern. Political, socio-economic and cultural issues have coalesced in a manner that have forced the Zimbabwe question onto the domestic agenda, and South Africa has opted to respond to the Zimbabwe challenge by way of the foreign policy strategy of as a form of solutions for African problems. This policy was associated with South Africa's former president, Thabo Mbeki, but contrary to popular perceptions, the Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma governments also supported this strategy,even though they claimed that they distanced themselves from it. Six years after Mbeki's departure as head of state, and into the Jacob Zuma-led presidency, the claim that there was a fundamental break with the policy of quiet diplomacy by Zuma, and that his administration pursued a fundamentally different strategy to that of his predecessor, was far-fetched. This article considers the concept of quiet diplomacy, initially seen as a form of African containment, representing methods used to first try and stop conflicts from spiralling out of control; secondly by reversing the effects of conflicts; and thirdly by rolling back conflicts by means of peaceful settlements of disputes or peace settlements; after which a country could be stabilised politically, and socioeconomically. The analysis then traces Jacob Zuma's approach towards Zimbabwe and how his new administration came to endorse and support the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA), which they inherited from the Mbeki government, despite the rhetoric calling for a different approach.