Territorial Interest Representation Research Articles

Politics Without Meso-Level? No Politics at the Meso?

The paper examines the role of meso-level governance in the Hungarian political system focusing on the county self-governments. The objective of the author is to introduce the consequences of the lack of meso-level politics for the backslide of the democratic system. The paper focusing on Hungarian counties seeks to explore the three-decade-long process leading to the progressive elimination of these bodies from the public power arena. The Hungarian case demonstrates how the overall administrative and political centralisation process has contributed to the hollowing-out of meso-level political actors. The Hungarian case study underlines the complex interrelations between the macro-political system, and the territorial political governmental arenas from the aspect of the centre and periphery power relations. Many European regional governments are not only platforms for territorial interest representation but also a counterweight to the central level contributing to the quality and stability of democratic governance. The study reviewing the situation of Hungarian counties draws on the author’s previous empirical research experiences and is a part of the ongoing research on governance issues of peripheral areas1. The results of the analyses discuss the implications of the hollowing-out of county governments on the electoral and party system, the modification of the institutional channels of interest representation. The Hungarian example appears to corroborate the analogy with the theory of second order elections. The theory of second order elections recognized the impact on the turnout and electoral preferences based on the changing role of different governance levels, by the same token, it seems that the weakening power position of the meso contributes to the decline of political competition and publicity by minimizing the interest of the public in general. The objective of the present study is to enrich the assessment of the relationship between territorial governance and democracy with some analytical options by demonstrating the implications of the “second order nature” of the meso.

Beyond Second Chambers: Alternative Representation of Territorial Interests and Their Reasons

Abstract The paper contends that bicameral systems, irrespective of their differences in composition and powers, are unfit to represent territorial interests in the national decisionmaking process, except in some residual cases. What subnational entities seek is participation rather than representation. This is why alternative, executive-based institutions in which also the national government is present are mushrooming and second chambers are ineffective as territorial bodies. Furthermore, there is a clear trend to move from bicameralism to bilateralism, meaning that instead of taking advantage of ineffective multilateral institutions, strong subnational units try to channel their claims through bilateral instruments. Overall, the unresolved dilemma of subnational representation has little to do with the architecture of second chambers and rather lays in the tension between individual and collective representation.

Government within governance? Polish rural development partnerships through the lens of functional representation

Functional interest representation, which relates to the representation of discrete sectoral or professional interests, is a fundamental concept underpinning the organisational methodology of EU governance and programmes such as LEADER. The policy rationalisation of LEADER is premised on creating alliances between diverse functional interests so that development can be approached in an integrated way. However, the analytical vantage point of the governance and rural development literature heretofore has been dominated by theories of territorial interest representation with comparatively less focus on the importance of functional interest representation sui generis. A prevalent research emphasis has been on interactions between partners and development outcomes of LEADER partnerships. Little research effort has been devoted to discerning the primary functional interests of those who become involved in LEADER partnerships in the first instance, and there is an absence of clear criteria by which sectoral representatives are classified. Our article, presenting empirical research undertaken in post-socialist Poland, presents an analysis of the membership composition of all LEADER LAG decision-making committees nationally, identifying the dominant sectoral affiliations of members. Next we examine the extent to which the thresholds stipulated by EU rules in order to promote balanced representation of statutory, private and third sector interests are actually achieved. We find that while many LEADER partnerships officially appear to adhere to balanced tri-partite membership, more than half of all partnerships are in reality prone to domination or monopolisation by statutory actors. We draw from qualitative interviews to identify explanatory factors for partnerships’ failure to represent diverse functional interests. Tensions between territorial and functional interest representation are highlighted and we find that embedded structures within territories can, through relational dynamics such as professional dependency, tokenism and clientelism, impede the realisation of governance processes.

A Time for Boldness? Exploring the Space for Senate Reform

It was thirty years ago this past March that Alberta’s Select Special Committee on Upper HouseReform released its influential 1985 report that helped to reframe discussions on Senate reformand popularize proposals for a “Triple-E” Senate. The Committee’s report built on the work ofa Canada West Foundation task force that argued eff ective regional representation in Parliament requires a Senate that is equal (in terms of provincial representation), elected, and effective (in terms of its legislative powers). The Alberta Committee’s Report popularized these ideas and helped to frame the Senate reform debate in terms of commitments to electoral democracy and rebalancing federalism, especially in terms of the representation of territorial interests at the federal level.

The Limits of Territorial Interest Representation in the European Union

According to the literature on lobbying, actors gain access to European policy-making in return for information and expertise. It is often assumed that territorial actors will be in a position to provide such information by virtue of being the implementing authorities. By contrast, this article argues that there is a need to examine further to what extent regions are able to use channels of interest representation and to supply information, what kind of channels they use and how they frame their message. For this purpose, it examines the strategies of seven legislative regions in two concrete policy cases. In particular, it argues that the seven regions rely predominantly on mediated channels of interest representation as their capacity and willingness to use unmediated channels of interest representation is limited. Secondly, it argues that regions tend to use technical language over politicised language in lobbying to avoid overt conflict, especially with national governments or other regions from the member state, but that their ability to produce extensive (technical) expertise is also very limited.

Book Review: Europe: Functional and Territorial Interest Representation in the EU

Book Review: Europe: Functional and Territorial Interest Representation in the EU

Territorial interest representation in the European Union: actors, objectives and strategies

When studying the ever increasing mobilization of territorial authorities in the EU context, the literature has used the term ‘subnational’ as shorthand for very different actors, with the most typical distinction made between regional and local government. In this article we propose an alternative dichotomy. We suggest that ‘stronger’ regions actually share much in common with ‘stronger’ associations of local governments, while ‘weaker’ regions exhibit a number of similarities with ‘weaker’ associations and individual local authorities. We illustrate our findings using evidence gathered from a survey of 103 regional offices in Brussels as well as interview data of 149 officials working in five different European countries. We draw on existing research in this field, as well as our own data, to take stock of key understandings around territorial interest representation and present a series of propositions concerning (1) the objectives of subnational actors, distinguishing financial from regulatory mobilization, and (2) the strategies and representation channels used by these authorities.

Paradiplomats Against the State

Literature on substate mobilization in Europe has provided some useful insights into the factors and mechanisms shaping territorial interest representation in Brussels. Although recent studies have enhanced our understanding of the determinants of cooperative and bypassing paradiplomacy, those underpinning conflict have remained rather obscure. Using a new data set with information on more than 100 substate offices in Brussels, this article sheds some light on the determinants of conflict between member state diplomacy and substate paradiplomacy. It argues that they are very different from those of bypassing and cooperation and that resource richness and diplomatic accreditation significantly affect its frequency. These findings not only are robust to multilevel modeling and nonparametric bootstrapping but also are of theoretical import as they highlight that devolution and party political incongruence fail to affect the frequency of conflict in Brussels.

You do what you have to do? Salience and territorial interest representation in EU environmental affairs

Although the determinants of territorial mobilization at the level of the European Union (EU) have been examined since the 1990s, the analysis of the interaction between regional and state interest representation has been rather neglected. This article focuses on a single policy area – environmental affairs – in order to evaluate the impact of policy-specific preference intensity (salience) on state–region relationships in Brussels. Using original survey data, I demonstrate that greater salience tends to increase cooperative interest representation and to decrease state-bypassing interest representation. This finding shows how important salience configurations are in the strategic interactions between state and non-state players in the EU arena.

Governing the Metropolis: Towards Kinder, Gentler Democracies

Based on a review of experiences in Lyons, Stuttgart and London, this article reflects upon the implications of metropolitanisation for democracy. It examines the institutional set-up of metropolitan authorities, the election procedures of representatives as well as dynamics of decision-making within them. In spite of contrasted institutional settings, political logics and territorial interest representation are present in policy-making at the metropolitan level to a strikingly similar extent. This results in power-sharing strategies among the major political forces and a move away from majoritarian towards more consensual patterns of decision-making.

Strategies of Territorial and Functional Interests: Towards a Model of European Interest Intermediation?

Research on interest representation in EU governance has addressed different kinds of actors in somewhat different and independent discourses. This contribution will start from the specific requirements is demanding as well as opportunities the European multi-level system is offering to territorial and functional interest representation. The main question will be whether differentiations or similarities can be found in the comparison of functional and territorial interest representation. The contribution will elaborate on this question in the following section and assume that there are more similarities than differences within the use of strategies by territorial and functional interests. The contribution elaborates two explanations for the similarities and differences found. Empirical evidence is given in the second part of the contribution. It will be shown that we even find convergence within territorial and functional interest intermediation and how actors have learned from each other. In addition it will be revealed that other factors than the type of interest are responsible for persistent differences. A third short chapter points out that both types of interests work with complementary strategies to succeed within the European multi-level system. All in all, the contribution will speculate about whether it is possible to identify certain elements of a European model of interest intermediation across the different actor categories.