Terms Of Game Theory Research Articles

Random Walk Analysis in Antagonistic Stochastic Games

This article deals with two “antagonistic random processes” that are intended to model classes of completely noncooperative games occurring in economics, engineering, natural sciences, and warfare. In terms of game theory, these processes can represent two players with opposite interests. The actions of the players are manifested by a series of strikes of random magnitudes imposed onto the opposite side and rendered at random times. Each of the assaults is aimed to inflict damage to vital areas. In contrast with some strictly antagonistic games where a game ends with one single successful hit, in the current setting, each side (player) can endure multiple strikes before perishing. Each player has a fixed cumulative threshold of tolerance which represents how much damage he can endure before succumbing. Each player will try to defeat the adversary at his earliest opportunity, and the time when one of them collapses is referred to as the “ruin time”. We predict the ruin time of each player, and the cumulative status of all related components for each player at ruin time. The actions of each player are formalized by a marked point process representing (an economic) status of each opponent at any given moment of time. Their marks are assumed to be weakly monotone, which means that each opposite side accumulates damages, but does not have the ability to recover. We render a time-sensitive analysis of a bivariate continuous time parameter process representing the status of each player at any given time and at the ruin time and obtain explicit formulas for related functionals.

The interaction between matter and a field’s single-mode as a quantum game

We introduce a game admitting both classical and quantal players. Strategies are determined by the initial conditions of the associated dynamical system, whose time evolution is characterized by the existence of attractors that represent the possible results of the game. The physics associated to the interaction between matter and a single-mode of an electromagnetic field within a cavity is cast in these game theory terms.

Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma

A cartel is socially not desirable. But is it a normative problem? And has merger control reason to be concerned about tacit collusion? Neither is evident once one has seen that the members of a cartel face a problem of strategic interaction. It is routinely analysed in terms of game theory. Much less frequently, however, an obvious parallel is drawn. For cartel members, the formation of the cartel and cartel discipline are a public good. Making the parallel explicit is elucidating both at the theoretical and at the experimental levels. The paper contrasts oligopoly theory with public goods theory, and oligopoly experiments with public goods experiments.

NOTES ON SELECTION PRINCIPLES IN TOPOLOGY (I): PARACOMPACTNESS

G. Gruenhage gave a characterization of paracompactness of locally compact spaces in terms of game theory ([6]). Starting from that result we give another such characterization using a selective version of that game, and study a selection principle in the class of locally compact spaces and its relationships with game theory and a Ramseyan partition relation. We also consider a selective version of paracompactness.

The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries: Strategy and Equity Issues

This paper interprets the Kyoto Protocol in terms of game theory with special emphasis on its implications for developing countries. What should be the role and strategy of these countries, especially India, in its implementation and future negotiations?

OPTIMERING VAN WISSELBOUSTELSELS / THE OPTIMISATION OF ROTARY CROP SYSTEMS

Different types of crops are planted in winter grain regions. These crops can be planted in even more combinations. Crops that are planted on the same land in successive years do influence one another. In this situation the problem of which sequence of crops to plant arises. If appropriate assumptions are made, this problem can be solved with linear programming (LP). The complexity of this problem, however, increases dramatically with an increase in the number of crops as well as the number of years considered. Another problem with this formulation is how to choose the boundary conditions. Furthermore the solution to this problem is degenerate. In practice it is found that farmers prefer a cycle of crops in a rotary crop system, because it simplifies the management of the system. If the assumption is made that a farmer uses a cycle of at most three years, the problem of the boundary conditions is solved. If the dual formulation of this problem is considered it is evident that the problem has a specific structure. The structure of the problem as well as the fact that the solution to the problem is highly degenerate can be exploited to simplify the solution of the problem substantially. If the correct selection of solutions from this degenerate dual problem is chosen this selection can be used to formulate a simplified model in terms of strategies for the farmer. If the problem is formulated in terms of these strategies, the problem is further reduced to an LP with one constraint (the knapsack problem), which makes it possible to solve this problem by hand for a relative large number of crops in the rotary crop system. These strategies can also be used to solve a more generalised problem. Consider nature to be a player in Game Theory. The strategies of nature can be defined in many ways. The amount of rain per annum, for example, could be strategies used by nature to play a game against the farmer. The farmer in return can then use his strategies and the knowledge of Game Theory to maximise his profit. The problem can be generalised further if it is formulated in terms of Game Theory. In this generalisation the Game Theory model is expanded to incorporate a number of different situations with the use of extra constraints. The first of these situations is to incorporate other enterprises with the rotary crop system. The farmer could, for instance want the solution to contain at least a certain amount of feed for his cattle. The second situation is when the farmer has knowledge of the weather patterns, which implies for the Game Theory model that the farmer has knowledge of his opponent's strategies. Both these situations are incorporated in the model. Finally, a case study is presented in which the use of the model is demonstrated. Relevant data from the Swartland region are used. A dry year, an average year and a wet year were used as strategies for nature. The solutions drawn from these data were confirmed with a farmer from the region, who agreed that the solutions appear to be reasonable if it is compared to what is found in practice. The most frequently chosen strategies were the ones that contain wheat and clover. The solutions indicate that a farmer should plant less clover and more grain if it is a dry year, whilst it is better to increase the amount of clover planted if the rainfall is higher.

Sustainable network advantages: a game theoretic approach to community-based health care coalitions.

Health care organizations often enter into a cooperative arrangement to create safety-net programs and coordinate care. Maintaining effective cooperation in such alliances poses special problems that can be examined using network analysis and explained in game theory terms. A mental health coalition case study is presented using network analysis and game theory interpretations. Had a positive-sum game approach been applied to the coalition's initial design, its subsequent suboptimal performance might have been averted. The application of network analysis plus a game theoretic paradigm has significant implications for improving both the design and the coordination of such coalitions.

Kenas Binmoras: socialinis kontraktas lošimų teorijos kontekste

Straipsnyje analizuojamas Keno Binmore'o sumanymas pritaikyti tarpdisciplininės racionalaus pasirinkimo teorijos laimėjimus politinėje filosofijoje, performu/uojant lošimų teorijos terminais garsųjį Johno Rawlso „pirminės pozicijos” konstruktą, ir socialinę dinamiką suprasti kaip sprendimo paiešką totaliniame Gyvenimo Lošime pasitelkus naujai interpretuotą teisingumo kriterijų. Pabrėžiama, kad griežta asmeninių ir empatinių preferencijų perskyra yra būtina Rawlso modelio adaptavimo sąlyga. Šią, taip pat ekonominio ir socialinio laiko perskyrą mėginama suprobleminti ir taip atkreipti dėmesjį nepakankama Binmore'o koncepcijos nuoseklumą.

Rationalizing Strategy: Game Theory in Management Pedagogy and Practice

Since the 1980s, game theory has become a standard feature of man agement school curricula, treated extensively in textbooks and core courses in managerial economics and competitive strategy. It promises a formal and rational set of procedures for formulating decisions in situations of dynamic interaction. I suggest that the appeal, and key symbolic effect of game theory is not due to its actual influence on the decisions reached. Rather, it is due to the reframing of deci sions and the contexts in which they are made, in terms of the framework of game theory. When strategic action is formulated and justified in terms of game theory, the theory serves as a kind of sociodicy, a social theory which justifies suffering as a necessary evil. I suggest that the increased appeal of game theory since the 1980s has to do with changes in the social organization and man agerial culture of corporations.

Cheating as a mixed strategy in a simple model of aggressive communication

The possibility that frequency-dependent cheating can persist in an evolutionarily stable communication system has frequently been proposed. Although there is empirical evidence for this idea, however, it has not been investigated in terms of game theory. In the present paper I show for a simple symmetric game that cheating can be part of a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Furthermore, despite the widespread assumption that cheaters must be rare, I show that most of the population can be cheaters, while the signalling system remains evolutionarily stable. Consequences for signalling theory and experiments to detect such mixed ESS are discussed.

Development of Quantitative Methods For Spill Response Planning: A Trajectory Analysis Planner

In planning for response to oil spills, a great deal of information must be assimilated. Typically, geophysical flow patterns, ocean turbulence, complex chemical processes, ecological setting, fisheries activities, economics of land use, and engineering constraints on response equipment all need to be considered. This presents a formidable analysis problem. It can be shown, however, that if an appropriate set of evaluation data is available, an objective function and appropriate constraints can be formulated. From these equations, the response problem can be cast in terms of game theory or decision analysis and an optimal solution can be obtained using common scarce-resource allocation methods. The optimal solution obtained by this procedure maximizes the expected return over all possible implementations of a given set of response options. While considering the development of an optimal spill response, it is useful to consider whether (in the absence of complete data) implementing some subset of these methods is possible to provide relevant and useful information for the spill planning process, even though it may fall short of a statistically optimal solution. In this work we introduce a trajectory analysis planning (TAP) methodology that can provide a cohesive framework for integrating physical transport processes, environmental sensitivity of regional sites, and potential response options. This trajectory analysis planning methodology can be shown to implement a significant part of the game theory analysis and provide `minimum regret' strategy advice, without actually carrying out the optimization procedures.

Knowledge, Equilibrium and Convention

There are two general classes of social conventions: conventions of coordination, and conventions of partial conflict. In coordination problems, the interests of the agents coincide, while in partial conflict problems, some agents stand to gain only if other agents unilaterally make certain sacrifices. Lewis' (1969) pathbreaking analysis of convention in terms of game theory focuses on coordination problems, and cannot accommodate partial conflict problems. In this paper, I propose a new game-theoretic definition of convention which generalizes previous game-theoretic definitions (Lewis 1969, Vanderschraaf 1995), and which can be used to characterize norms of justice in partial conflict situations. I argue that the key structural property necessary for a social arrangement to be a convention is that it be conditionally self-enforcing, in the sense that: (i) each agent has a decisive reason to follow her end of the arrangement given that she expects all to do likewise, (ii) given a different set of expectations, some agents would have had a decisive reason to deviate, and (iii) these facts are common knowledge. This leads to a definition of convention as a strict correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) together with appropriate common knowledge conditions. Examples are given in which it is shown how this more general account of convention can be used to analyze norms of justice as well as coordination problems.

Deception and sexual strategy in psychopathy

Clinically, psychopaths are characterized by a number of features, including the habitual use of deception in social exchanges and a history of short-term, unstable sexual relationships. These characteristics can be understood within an evolutionary framework, in terms of game theory and sexual strategies theory, respectively. However, the nature and extent of this deceptive and sexual behavior in relation to psychopathy have not been well-described. Forty-seven heterosexual men were recruited from the community and assessed for psychopathy, their use of deception in sexual and non-sexual contexts, and their sexual histories. There were significant correlations between psychopathy and the two measures of deception, and between the use of sexual deception and some indicators of sexual experience and interest. Psychopathy was not related to the relative use of sexually deceptive tactics against female vs male targets, or the relative use of tactics judged to be effective vs ineffective. This finding, along with the partial correlations involving psychopathy and the two measures of deception, suggests that psychopathy is related to a general tendency to deceive.

Theories of Bargaining Delays

Contract negotiations over wages are sometimes accompanied by strikes; similarly in legal contexts, settlements of damage claims may require lengthy negotiations. These and other costly delays in resolving disputes are the subject of the studies described in this article. Formulations in terms of game theory indicate that procedural features can allow delays, but the main cause may be informational disparities between the parties. Several models are described and related to data about strikes.

Reputation Pays: Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing Political Profit from Credibility*

The article provides a general account of information problems in politics and games, and an analytical exploration of reputation effects in politics in terms of game theory. It is shown. by three game theoretical examples, that reputation effects may in some circumstances lie of essential importance in determining optimal choices.

Size assessment and alternative fighting tactics in Elaphrothrips tuberculatus (Insecta: Thysanoptera)

Elaphrothrips tuberculatus males fight each other and defend individual egg-guarding females. Larger males win fights and secure females more successfully than smaller males. Fights are characterized by three tactics: parallel bouts, stabbing and flipping. Males assess the relative sizes of their opponents during parallel bouts, in which two males line up side-to-side and hit at each other with their abdomens. Small males avoid fighting large ones. Stabbing occurs when a male climbs onto his opponent's back, grasps him with his enlarged, armed forelegs and squeezes. When defenders were larger than challengers, they stabbed their opponents more frequently, and when challengers were larger or the males were of similar size, either the challengers or both males stabbed. Flipping, a tactic in which a male quickly lifts his abdomen into the air, is apparently a defensive behaviour performed to avoid being stabbed. This tactic was used most frequently by small challenger males. Fights that included multiple parallel bouts and stabbing occurred when males were of similar size. However, such escalation was more probable between two small males than between two large males. This may be because fights between small, poorly armed males involve lower injury risk and higher net resource value than fights between large males. The data are interpreted in terms of game theory, and whether these fights qualify as wars of attrition or hawk-dove contests.

ECONOMICS, ETHICS, AND THE PROBLEM OF BUILDING PEACE

To build peace it is necessary to convert what Hirshleifer (1976) has called “meta‐constitutional” politics among nations into “constitutional” politics. To predict the eventual elimination of meta‐constitutional politics and to suggest some steps that may hasten the process, Boulding's (1945) and North's (1981) explanations of the rise of civilization are combined with Coase's (1937) and Cheung's (1978) insights into organization theory and with Alchian's (1950) analysis of prediction that does not rely on rational behavior. The argument can be summarized in terms of game theory where technology, education, and population growth change the perceived payoff matrices.

Briefing Paper: What Economists can learn from Game Theory

Game theory is a branch of mathematics which analyses interdependent decision‐making. It attempts to explain how decision‐makers might take into account the likely response of others in formulating their own decisions. It has long been applied to microeconomics especially to the theory of the firm under oligopoly where the firm, in devising its pricing and production strategy, will take into account the likely reactions of other firms within the industry. More recently it has been appreciated that many situations in macroeconomics can be analysed in terms of game theory. For example, if one country introduces import controls, how will others react? If one country tries to control inflation by adopting a tough monetary policy, or tries to reflate, what will other countries do? How will exchange rate speculators respond to the government's announcement that it will not intervene in currency markets? Will they believe the government or will they adopt actions which will eventually force the government to intervene? How will markets respond if the government changes its macro‐economic strategy? In some cases the “players” are the government and the business community, in other cases one government may be playing against another. In this Briefing Paper we introduce some ideas and results from game theory and show how they can be applied to macroeonomics as well as microeconomics.

Information and evolution of the economy

The geographical evolution of the economy requires reproduction of the existing structure as well as change. Both ordering within and variety outside the constraints are involved and are measured by entropy. Equiprobability, independence, compartmentalization and alphabet size are examined, sometimes in game theory terms. Evolution is a continual throwing up of possible innovations in spatial economic organization, those accepted increasing income. Entropy of inefficiency is thus maintained, freedom of choice in consumption replacing choice in activity. Innovations covarying in space-time with the existing structure are likely to be accepted. Communications theory can express these ideas.

INFORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMY

ABSTRACT The geographical evolution of the economy requires reproduction of the existing structure as well as change. Both ordering within and variety outside the constraints are involved and are measured by entropy. Equiprobability, independence, compartmentalization and alphabet size are examined, sometimes in game theory terms. Evolution is a continual throwing up of possible innovations in spatial economic organization, those accepted increasing income. Entropy of inefficiency is thus maintained, freedom of choice in consumption replacing choice in activity. Innovations covarying in space‐time with the existing structure are likely to be accepted. Communications theory can express these ideas.