TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Research Articles

The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: What went wrong and what lessons are universal?

After a short summary of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this paper discusses “what went wrong” by illustrating the problems of the specific layers of defense-in-depth (basic strategy for assuring nuclear safety) and “what lessons are universal.” Breaches in the multiple layers of defense were particularly significant in respective protection (a) against natural disasters (first layer of defense) as well as (b) against severe conditions, specifically in this case, a complete loss of AC/DC power and isolation from the primary heat sink (fourth layer of defense). Confusion in crisis management by the government and insufficient implementation of offsite emergency plans revealed problems in the fifth layer of defense.By taking into consideration managerial and safety culture that might have relevance to this accident, in the author's view, universal lessons are as follows:a)Resilience: the need to enhance organizational capabilities to respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn in changing conditions, especially to prepare for the unexpected. This includes increasing distance to cliff edge by knowing where it exists and how to increase safety margin.b)Responsibility: the operator is primarily responsible for safety, and the government is responsible for protecting public health and environment. For both, their right decisions are supported by competence, knowledge, and an understanding of the technology, as well as humble attitudes toward the limitations of what we know and what we can learn from others.c)Social license to operate: the need to avoid, as much as possible regardless of its probability of occurrence, the reasonably anticipated environmental impact (such as land contamination), as well as to build public confidence/trust and a renewed liability scheme.

Investigation and Research on Depth Distribution in Soil of Radionuclides Released by the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident

ABSTRACTThe accident of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant occurred by the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake on 11 Mar. 2011. It is estimated that totally 1.2-1.5x1016 Bq for 137Cs and 1.5-1.6x1017 Bq for 131I were released until the beginning of Apr. and those radionuclides (RN) were deposited on soil surface and forest etc. widely around Fukushima Pref. This work was carried out as one of the investigations for making the distribution maps of radiation dose rate and soil contaminated by RNs which the MEXT promotes. The Geoslicer investigation on the depth distribution of RNs in soil was performed after 3 months from the accident. The investigation was conducted at 11 locations in Nihonmatsu City, Kawamata Town and Namie Town, and soil samples of depth 50 cm to 1 m were taken. Both of 134Cs and 137Cs were detected in all investigated locations, and 129mTe and 110mAg were detected only in locations where radiation dose rates are high. At many locations investigated, radiocaesium more than 99 % distributed within a depth of 10 cm in soil in the surface layer. On the other hand, RNs tended to distribute to deeper part in soil at locations that are supposed to have been used as farmland than in soil in the surface layer, and radiocaesium more than 99 % in soil at locations that are supposed to have been used as farmland also distributed within a depth of around 14 cm. The apparent diffusion coefficients (Da) of RNs derived from penetration profiles near the surface layer showed a tendency to be higher in soil at locations that are supposed to have been used as farmland (Da=0.1-1.5x10-10 m2/s) than in soil in the surface layer (Da=0.65-4.4x10-11 m2/s), and most Da-values were nearly 10-11 m2/s. The distribution coefficients (Kd) by a batch method were in the range of Kd=2,000-61,000 ml/g for Cs and Kd=0.5-140 ml/g for I. Although the Kd-values are different between cation (Cs+) and anion (I-), the Da-values (134Cs, 137Cs, 129mTe and 110mAg) were similar levels. This is considered to be due to that the Da-values were controlled by dispersion by flow of rain water.

Italian decommissioning in the post-referendum era

The accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant materially reverberated, with its emotional impact, on the preparation of a new nuclear policy in Italy. Italians, wishing to decide directly on the electric power source for their country, applied for a referendum procedure aimed at abrogating the newly enacted legal framework1 which would have paved the way for an Italian nuclear renaissance. The referendum on the repeal of nuclear power passed on 12-13 June 2011.

A Life in Fukushima-shi after the Accident in the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station ; Possibility of Removal of Radio Active Species Using Fiber Materials

A Life in Fukushima-shi after the Accident in the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station ; Possibility of Removal of Radio Active Species Using Fiber Materials

東京電力福島第一発電所の事故に起因した食品からの線量推計

東京電力福島第一発電所の事故に起因した食品からの線量推計