Teleological Function Research Articles

Teleological Functional Explanations: A New Naturalist Synthesis.

The etiological account of teleological function is beset by several difficulties, which I propose to solve by grafting onto the etiological theory a subordinated goal-contribution clause. This approach enables us to ascribe neither too many teleofunctions nor too few; to give a unitary, one-clause analysis that works just as well for teleological functions derived from Darwinian evolution, as for those derived from human intention; and finally, to save the etiological theory from falsification, by explaining how, in spite of appearances, the theory can allow for evolutionary function loss.

The Child and the Imagination: Understanding and Responding to the World

This article discusses the use of the imagination in contemporary children's ministry models, drawing out conflicting approaches. Theological explanations of the imagination are then considered before proposing that the imagination has an input–output function. The input of the imagination works as a form of worldview glue giving it an eschatological, epistemological, and teleological function. The output of the imagination is a response to the input and therefore must be carefully managed.

Efficient mechanisms

ABSTRACT A distinguishing feature of neural computation and information processing is that it fits models that describe the most efficient strategies for performing different cognitive tasks. Efficiency determines a distinctive sense of teleology involving optimal performance and resource management through a specific strategy. I articulate this kind of teleology and call it efficient teleological function. I argue that efficient teleological function is compatible with mechanistic explanation and, most likely, neural computational mechanisms are efficiently functional in this sense. They are members of a distinctive class of computational mechanisms whose efficiency is intertwined with their functionality. This is illustrated by widely discussed approaches to mind, such as Barlow’s efficient coding hypothesis or the ones associated with the so-called “predictive mind”, which propose that the brain employs highly efficient coding strategies to save energy resources that are critical to the organism’s survival.

The power to believe for reasons

ABSTRACT An influential view of believing for reasons holds that the reasons for which we believe are causes of our believing. This view has well-known difficulties accounting for the problem of deviant causal chains. I diagnose these difficulties and argue that the problem arises for the causal view because it uses an impoverished set of resources. I offer a novel causal account of believing for reasons that avoids the problem of causal deviance by appealing to teleological resources such as abilities and aims. Believing for reasons is the exercise of an ability characterized in terms of its causal powers and its teleological function: that of sensitivity to normative epistemic reasons. This theory is a kind of ‘believer-centered’ account of believing for reasons, and I contrast it with other prominent believer-centered accounts in the literature. I argue that other believer-centered accounts either cannot solve the problem of causal deviance or they cannot explain how a common sort of rational failure is possible.

Mechanisms of Congenital Malformations in Pregnancies with Pre-existing Diabetes.

Fetuses of diabetic mothers are at increased risk for congenital malformations. Research in recent decades using animal and embryonic stem cell models has revealed many embryonic developmental processes that are disturbed by maternal diabetes. The aim of this review is to give clinicians a better understanding of the reasons for rigorous glycemic control in early pregnancy, and to provide background to guide future research. Mouse models of diabetic pregnancy have revealed mechanisms for altered expression of tissue-specific genes that lead to malformations that are more common in diabetic pregnancies, such as neural tube defects (NTDs) and congenital heart defects (CHDs), and how altered gene expression causes apoptosis that leads to malformations. Embryos express the glucose transporter, GLUT2, which confers susceptibility to malformation, due to high rates of glucose uptake during maternal hyperglycemia and subsequent oxidative stress; however, the teleological function of GLUT2 for mammalian embryos may be to transport the amino sugar glucosamine (GlcN) from maternal circulation to be used as substrate for glycosylation reactions and to promote embryo cell growth. Malformations in diabetic pregnancy may be not only due to excess glucose uptake but also due to insufficient GlcN uptake. Avoiding maternal hyperglycemia during early pregnancy should prevent excess glucose uptake via GLUT2 into embryo cells, and also permit sufficient GLUT2-mediated GlcN uptake.

Are There Teleological Functions to Compute?

I analyze a tension at the core of the mechanistic view of computation generated by its joint commitment to the medium independence of computational vehicles and to computational systems possessing teleological functions to compute. While computation is individuated in medium-independent terms, teleology is sensitive to the constitutive physical properties of vehicles. This tension spells trouble for the mechanistic view, suggesting that there can be no teleological functions to compute. I argue that, once considerations about the relevant function-bestowing factors for computational systems are brought to bear, the tension dissolves: physical systems can have the teleological function to compute.

The functions of institutions: etiology and teleology

Institutions generate cooperative benefits that explain why they exist and persist. Therefore, their etiological function is to promote cooperation. The function of a particular institution, such as money or traffic regulations, is to solve one or more cooperation problems. We go on to argue that the teleological function of institutions is to secure values by means of norms. Values can also be used to redesign an institution and to promote social change. We argue, however, that an adequate theory of institutions should not be ‘moralized’ in that they should not be defined in terms of the values they are supposed to promote.

Precursors for performance: a model for an unrealised production

ABSTRACTThis article discusses an unrealised production of Verdi’s opera Simon Boccanegra, directed by John Dexter and designed by Jocelyn Herbert, and scheduled for the 1984/85 season at the Metropolitan Opera in New York. The objects generated by the creative process, now held in the Jocelyn Herbert Archive at the National Theatre, London, are considered as ‘precursors for performance’, objects from which new objects can be produced. The set model for the production is a rich source of information about the collaboration between Dexter and Herbert, while notebooks, personal recollections and correspondence indicate how models were used in the conversation between Herbert and scenic artists. Rather than focusing on the teleological function of the archive in showing how an artist arrived at a final design, this approach provides a way of thinking about the generative potential of archival materials.

Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history (Swampman). In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation.

Value of the constitutional teleology and constitutional legitimacy of the political and ideological diversity (pluralism): doctrine and practice

The article examines the legal nature and mission the constitutional teleology, the role of teleological function of the constitution in the Soviet and modern Russian legal system, the concept and types of constitutional legitimacy, the relationship of constitutional legitimacy and political and ideological foundations of the constitutional system, the nature and limitations of the principles of political pluralism, multi-party system and ideological pluralism.

Function of dynamic models in systems biology: linking structure to behaviour.

BackgroundDynamic models in Systems Biology are used in computational simulation experiments for addressing biological questions. The complexity of the modelled biological systems and the growing number and size of the models calls for computer support for modelling and simulation in Systems Biology. This computer support has to be based on formal representations of relevant knowledge fragments.ResultsIn this paper we describe different functional aspects of dynamic models. This description is conceptually embedded in our "meaning facets" framework which systematises the interpretation of dynamic models in structural, functional and behavioural facets. Here we focus on how function links the structure and the behaviour of a model. Models play a specific role (teleological function) in the scientific process of finding explanations for dynamic phenomena. In order to fulfil this role a model has to be used in simulation experiments (pragmatical function). A simulation experiment always refers to a specific situation and a state of the model and the modelled system (conditional function). We claim that the function of dynamic models refers to both the simulation experiment executed by software (intrinsic function) and the biological experiment which produces the phenomena under investigation (extrinsic function). We use the presented conceptual framework for the function of dynamic models to review formal accounts for functional aspects of models in Systems Biology, such as checklists, ontologies, and formal languages. Furthermore, we identify missing formal accounts for some of the functional aspects. In order to fill one of these gaps we propose an ontology for the teleological function of models.ConclusionWe have thoroughly analysed the role and use of models in Systems Biology. The resulting conceptual framework for the function of models is an important first step towards a comprehensive formal representation of the functional knowledge involved in the modelling and simulation process. Any progress in this area will in turn improve computer-supported modelling and simulation in Systems Biology.

Teleosemantics: Etiological Foundations

AbstractTeleosemantics is a naturalistic research programme in the philosophy of mind and language. Its ambition is to achieve a reduction, first, of mental content to teleological function; second, of teleological function to non‐teleological notions. This article explores the second step, particularly as envisaged by Millikan’s etiological theory of function.

Do dreams really guard sleep? Evidence for and against Freud's theory of the basic function of dreaming

“A dream is invariably an attempt to get rid of a disturbance of sleep by means of a wish-fullfilment, so that the dream is a guardian of sleep”. Sigmund Freud (1940/1953) According to the classic theory framed by Sigmund Freud, the basic and teleological function of dreaming is to protect sleep from disruption (Freud, 1900/1953); a quite rational hypothesis since sleep constitutes a vital need for living species (Kryger et al., 2011). This aspect of Freud's dream model—which as a whole is considered as the initial cornerstone of psychoanalysis (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988)—leads to two empirically testable conjectures, thus allowing its scientific examination: (1) arousal during sleep triggers dreaming; and (2) non-dreaming causes sleep disruption. We review here the experimental, medical, and neuropsychological data which allow testing these two conjectures; in this paper, the term “significant” denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level.

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF PRODUCING A MODERN TEXTBOOK

Making and using high quality textbooks is one of the most important aspects of an education system. Textbooks are one of the main teaching aids and entail a number of key requirements that must be met in the course of their drafting and design. With this regard, the article will analyse the basic pedagogical determinants of production and utilisation of the textbook in modern pedagogicaleducational reality. It will, in particular, deal with the extent to which a textbook is defined by the relevant curricula, and the extent to which the teleological function of textbooks is achieved by means of didactic, graphic design and technical, linguistic and health-hygienic formatting. It will also briefly touch upon the role of textbooks in the teacher’s choice of a teaching method and structure of classes in the context of contemporary approaches to the educational process.

Gum chewing as an adjunct to use of medications

Gum chewing as an adjunct to use of medications

Individualism and the Nature of Syntactic States

It is widely assumed that the explanatory states of scientific psychology are type-individuated by their semantic or intentional properties. First, I argue that this assumption is implausible for theories like David Marr's [1982] that seek to provide computational or syntactic explanations of psychological processes. Second, I examine the implications of this conclusion for the debate over psychological individualism. While most philosophers suppose that syntactic states supervene on the intrinsic physical states of information-processing systems, I contend they may not. Syntatic descriptions must be adequately constrained, and the most plausible such constraints appeal to a system's teleological function or design and hence to its history. As a result, physical twins may not realize the same syntactic states.

Wide content individualism

Wide content and individualist approaches to the individuation of thoughts appear to be incompatible; I think they are not. I propose a criterion for the classification of thoughts which captures both. Thoughts, I claim, should be individuated by their teleological functions. Where teleological function is construed in the standard way-according to the aetiological theory-individuating thoughts by their function cannot produce a classification which is both individualistic and consistent with the principle that sameness of wide content is sufficient for sameness of psychological state. There is, however, an alternative approach to function, the relational theory, which is preferable on independent grounds. A taxonomy of thoughts based on these functions reconciles wide content with individualism. One consequence of individuating thoughts in this way is that intentional content is context sensitive. I discuss some of the implications of context sensitive content.

Fiat vita, pereat veritas Nietzsche's Untimely Reflections on Hegel's Dialectic of History

You will indulge me if I begin with a commonplace. The term “history” is an ambiguous expression which can be taken either in the sense of res gestae or in the sense of rerum gestarum memoria. According to the former meaning, it refers to the phenomenon itself, the past course of human events, whereas, according to the latter meaning, it denotes the representation of this phenomenon.German allows Hegel to mark the difference in terms of the relation between Geschichte and Historie. He also speaks of “objective” and “subjective” history in this connection. Yet by suppressing the brute opacity of language in favour of its teleological function, he is able to turn a blind eye to history's semiotic double game, the free play between literal and figural meaning within the linguistic sign. Hegel thus propounds the view that identity and difference at the level of the signifier are ultimately recuperated as expressive moments or alienations of the signified, the pure idea of History on its circular journey to itself. Linguistic signs are capable of meaning, according to Hegel, precisely because of their dialectical structure. The proliferation of meaning in language through the play of words is not random and anarchic but guided systematically by the invisible hand of spirit.