Teleological Explanations Research Articles

Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature (review)

Reviewed by: Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature Miira Tuominen Mariska Leunissen. Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xiii + 250. Cloth, $85.00. Mariska Leunissen’s study focuses on teleology in Aristotle’s theory and practice of science. She proceeds from Aristotle’s general defense of teleology (chapter 1) to a more detailed discussion of how teleology works in the science of soul (chapter 2), of animal parts (chapter 4), and of cosmology (chapter 5). She also argues that Aristotle’s study of animal parts is a demonstrative science, in accordance with the model of the Posterior Analytics (chapter 3). In the brilliant final chapter 6, Leunissen argues for a new view of how final causes figure in scientific syllogisms: not as middle terms but as major terms that are the predicates of the conclusions of scientific demonstrations. The middle terms then pick out the causal features that bring about the final cause. The book is of outstanding quality. The level of scholarship is very high, the solutions convincing and well argued, and the whole engaging. The highlights, I find, are Leunissen’s distinction between primary and secondary teleology and her discussion of the final cause in scientific syllogisms. The former enables her, among other things, to give a more independent role to material necessity than has previously been argued, while at the same time preserving its compatibility with teleology: not all material necessity is subordinated to teleology, but rather on its own it produces residue—selected and retained teleologically by nature—from which nature then produces functional animal parts. Such parts are not strictly necessary for the animal’s substantial being and are thus not conditionally necessary, but they have a function and serve the animal’s good. By means of the latter, Leunissen manages to integrate Aristotle’s examples of teleological explanation and inquiry into his theory of scientific demonstration. One of the general conclusions of the study is that biology, not mathematics, was Aristotle’s central model for science and that his scientific practice in fact follows his theory: the practice is more rigorous in searching for patterns of teleological explanation realized through material, efficient, and formal causes, and the theory more flexible than has often been supposed. Leunissen’s discussion operates with a distinction between cause and explanation, briefly commented on at the beginning of chapter 1 (10, n. 2). In that context, correctly taking Aristotle as a realist concerning both cause and explanation, Leunissen contends that the answers given to “why” questions will be explanatory and hence productive of scientific knowledge “if they pick out real causes.” She argues that whereas teleology for Aristotle enjoys explanatory priority, other cause-types are causally prior. One might then ask whether such a distinction between explanatory and causal priority coincides with Aristotle’s distinction between what is prior to us and prior in nature. Leunissen’s conclusion offers a closer account of cause and explanation and a partially affirmative answer. The view that final causes occur in the conclusions of demonstrations is coupled with their being “closer to us” (211), that is, better known to us in Aristotle’s distinction. Therefore, final causes provide us with starting points for the discovery of causally prior factors, that is, the middle terms of scientific demonstrations that are further away from us and hence, supposedly, better known in nature. However, ends and functions are also identified as being “prior in nature,” whereas formal, efficient, and material causes are prior in generation (214). This indicates that the correspondence with Aristotle’s distinction is not quite complete. [End Page 611] The discussion also invites some speculation about such teleological principles as “nature does nothing in vain.” Leunissen argues convincingly (especially in section 4.2) that Aristotle uses them as heuristic tools for searching for the causally primary factors, but that they do not occur as premises of demonstrations—being formally unsuited for that as well (not being of the form ‘A of B’). However, Aristotle also supposes that such principles produce adequate results in the search for causes, and Leunissen grants that they are “generalizations over . . . the observed outcomes...

Teleology and Theology: The Cognitive Science of Teleology and the Aristotelian Virtues of Techneand Wisdom

Recent research in cognitive science has shown that humans innately prefer teleological explanations. Children even go so far as to hypothesize the existence of a deity in order to justify teleological explanations. Aristotle also believed in the importance of teleology for human psychology. This paper investigates the convergence of ideas from the cognitive science of teleology with the Aristotelian understanding of teleology visible in the virtues of techne and wisdom. I argue that Aristotelian psychology and ethics is gaining empirical support, and that this could have important implications for science, philosophy, and theology.

Evolution and Design: Teleological Explanations in Biology

Evolution and Design: Teleological Explanations in Biology

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS AND ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA: WHAT'S IN A COMMENTARY?

Abstract A study of testimonia for Alexander's lost commentary on Aristotle's De anima can shed new light on his interpretation of Aristotle. Two cases are discussed. (1) Alexander reads De anima 3.12 (434b3–8) as applying teleological explanation of soul's powers to the souls of heavenly bodies, which in his own treatise De anima he excludes from the scope of psychology. Inclusive reading agrees with Alexander's position in other writings and must be his considered view. (2) Philoponus reports a Platonist (probably Numenius') exegesis of De anima 2.2 (413b11–13). Alexander's argument against it, with parallels in his other psychological writings, provides evidence that his controversial definition of soul as a power supervenient on elemental mixture is due, in part, to his polemic against Platonist readings of Aristotle's theory of soul and soul's powers.

Gli errori della natura: la mettrie e lucrezio

In Systčme d'Epicure (1750), La Mettrie presents a hypothesis on the origin and evolution of animals which owes much both to the fifth book of Lucretius's poem and to Montaigne's Apologie de Raimond Sebond. Claiming that Nature's operations are as unintentional and as amoral as the play of children, the French physician argues against all teleological explanations of the physical constitution of living beings (man included). Nature's first attempts at creating individual beings must therefore have been characterized by frequent mistakes, some of which are still to be seen in a few monstruous cases. Evolution is assured only through a process of trial and error, where the elimination of "unfit" combinations is due to the inability of specific animals to reach adulthood and give birth to offspring. The perfection of a living being is not to be evaluated by means of comparisons to a preexisting model but depends instead on the intensity of this being's sexual needs, which compel it to seek pleasure and to develop its mental skills.

Children’s Intuitive Teleology: Shifting the Focus of Evolution Education Research

Abstract Research has shown that children usually provide teleological explanations for the features of organisms and artifacts, from a very early age (3–4 years old). However, there is no consensus on whether teleological explanations are given in the same manner for non-living natural objects as well. The present study aimed to document the teleological explanations of 5- to 8-year-old children for particular features (color and shape) of organisms, artifacts and non-living natural objects. In addition, it was examined if there was any correlation between these explanations and children’s explanations for the usefulness of those features. Our results indicate a developmental shift in children’s teleological explanations, from a non-selective teleology in pre-school to a selective one in the second grade. In the latter case, children provided teleological explanations mostly for the shape of the feet of organisms and for the shape of artifacts, whereas pre-school children provided teleological explanations for non-living natural objects as well, both for the color and for the shape in all cases. Our results are not conclusive and further research is required, including a larger spectrum of students, since teleology is one of the most important conceptual obstacles in understanding evolution that persists even into adulthood. We conclude by proposing a particular research program for this purpose.

Is that what Bayesians believe? Reply to Griffiths, Chater, Norris, and Pouget (2012).

Griffiths, Chater, Norris, and Pouget (2012) argue that we have misunderstood the Bayesian approach. In their view, it is rarely the case that researchers are making claims that performance in a given task is near optimal, and few, if any, researchers adopt the theoretical Bayesian perspective according to which the mind or brain is actually performing (or approximating) Bayesian computations. Rather, researchers are said to adopt something more akin to what we called the methodological Bayesian approach, according to which Bayesian models are statistical tools that allow researchers to provide teleological explanations of behavior. In our reply we argue that many Bayesian researchers often appear to be make claims regarding optimality, and often appear to be making claims regarding how the mind computes at algorithmic and implementational levels of descriptions. We agree that some Bayesian theorists adopt the methodological approach, but we question the value of this approach. If Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience are only designed to provide insights into teleological questions, we expect that many readers have misunderstood, and hence there is a pressing need to clarify what Bayesian theories of cognition are all about.

On the Historicity of Scientific Objects

The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons. Knowledge claims, as well as the methods and practices that give rise to them, have changed over time. Historians and philosophers of science have amply documented the historicity of epistemic practices. Forms of explanation and argumentation, methods for acquiring knowledge, epistemic categories and values have been shown to vary considerably over time. Think, for instance, of the shift from the teleological explanations favored by Aristotelian natural philosophy to the mechanical explanations espoused by seventeenth-century natural philosophers; or of the transition from the ancient ideal of certain knowledge, based on apodeictic

Mechanism and purpose: A case for natural teleology

This paper develops a naturalised account of teleological explanation. Any such account must be consistent with the completeness of mechanism. The account I offer of teleological explanation is adapted from a prominent approach to the understanding of causal-mechanistic explanations. In order to give a scientific explanation—whether it be mechanistic or teleological—one must provide two things: (i) an invariance relation and (ii) and an elucidating description. In a causal-mechanistic explanation there is an invariance relation between the mechanism and the effect. The elucidating description illustrates how the mechanism produces the effect. In a teleological explanation the invariance holds between the goal (effect) and the means (cause). The elucidating description illustrates the way the means conduces to the goal. Mechanistic and teleological explanations are both complete in their own right, and they are mutually autonomous. One cannot replace the other without explanatory loss. It follows, then, that some natural phenomena—those that contribute to goals—are susceptible of more than one complete, autonomous explanation. Teleology thus demonstrates the falsity of Jaegwon Kim’s Explanatory Exclusion Principle.

Teaching About Adaptation: Why Evolutionary History Matters

Adaptation is one of the central concepts in evolutionary theory, which nonetheless has been given different definitions. Some scholars support a historical definition of adaptation, considering it as a trait that is the outcome of natural selection, whereas others support an ahistorical definition, considering it as a trait that contributes to the survival and reproduction of its possessors. Finally, adaptation has been defined as a process, as well. Consequently, two questions arise: the first is a philosophical one and focuses on what adaptation actually is; the second is a pedagogical one and focuses on what science teachers and educators should teach about it. In this article, the various definitions of adaptation are discussed and their uses in some textbooks are presented. It is suggested that, given elementary students’ intuitions about purpose and design in nature and secondary students’ teleological explanations for the origin of adaptations, any definition of adaptation as a trait should include some information about its evolutionary history.

Children’s Teleological Intuitions: What Kind of Explanations Do 7–8 Year Olds Give for the Features of Organisms, Artifacts and Natural Objects?

Research has shown that children usually provide teleological explanations for the features of organisms from a very early age (3–4 years old). However, it is not clear if teleology is applied selectively for organisms, or if it is generally applied to other objects as well (artifacts and non-living natural objects). The present study examined whether 7–8 year old students provided teleological explanations for particular organisms, artifacts and natural objects. We investigated whether children's familiarity with these objects influenced the types of explanations they gave. Finally, we also investigated correlations between 'teleology' and 'usefulness' in children's explanations. The results indicate that 7–8 year olds are able to distinguish between living and non-living entities, as well as that they provide teleological explanations mostly for organisms and artifacts. This may have important implications for biological education, since teleological explanations in classrooms are likely to pose important conceptual obstacles to the development of a scientific understanding of evolution.

Traces of Good in Plotinus's Philosophy of Nature: Ennead VI.7.1-14

The paper explores Plotinus's discussion in VI.7 of the place of teleological explanations in biology. The paper's main claim is that although Plotinus argues in the first three chapters that the use of teleological explanations is incompatible with the priority of Intellect over the physical world, his ultimate aim is not to prohibit the appeal to notions such as utility and benefit in the study of nature. Rather, in the first fourteen chapters of the treatise Plotinus attempts to show that not only animal organs, but their utility and benefits as well have their origin in Intellect.

Christopher Gill, Tim Whitmarsh and John Wilkins (eds), Galen and the World of Knowledge

The 13 contributions gathered in this volume are based on a conference with the same title held in Exeter in 2005. The aim of this volume, as well as that of the conference, is to study Galen as an ‘intellectual’ by examining his ‘world of knowledge’, which is broadly defined as both the sophisticated Hellenised culture Galen responded to and the body of knowledge Galen created through his intellectual activities and treatises (p. 8). The reader will find a collection of familiar and respected names in ancient medicine and Galenic studies (Boudon-Millot, Flemming, Lloyd, Manetti, Nutton, Tieleman, van der Eijk and von Staden), as well as some relatively new names added to the mix (Chiaradonna, Gleason and König). The first four chapters pertain to Galen's relationship to his intellectual culture. Nutton brings to light the similarities between Galen's erudition and that of other Greek literati in his discussion of what Galen's scattered quotations and allusions to medical, philosophical and literary works reveal about the actual contents of Galen's library. Although lacking an adequate treatment of periautologia as it relates to the rhetorical situation Galen faced in writing an auto-bibliographical work, König provides a much-needed discussion of the rhetorical conventions of Galen's self-presentation in his prefatory remarks by comparing Galen's preface in On the Order of My Own Books with those of Nicomachus' Enchiridion and Quintilian's Orator's Education. Added to these are Flemming's and Gleason's chapters which offer some interesting speculations as to the philosophical traditions and social influences that contributed to Galen's conception of the Demiurge found in many of his teleological explanations of the formation of the human body and, respectively, the socio-psychological effects of Galen's anatomical demonstrations on his audiences.

How biological is human history? Kant's use of biological concepts and its implications for history as moral anthropology

This article concerns a specific shift in Kant's use of biological concepts in his theory of history. As I argue in the first section, biological concepts play an important role in Kant's early theory of history. However, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant explicitly separates history from biology: history and biology become fundamentally different forms of teleological explanation. In the second section, I examine Kant's reasons for the separation of history from biology. I conclude with a discussion of the moral implications of this modification in his historical writings.Kant's main concern in his philosophy of history is the intelligibility of history. How should history be understood, given the fact that it appears to be a mere amalgam of contingent human actions?The reason why historical facts are so confusing and unsystematic is that human behaviour is not fully determined by any particular factor. It is underdetermined by animal instinct, but it is not completely guided by principles of reason either. To address this randomness, philosophers of history must actively search for coherent structures. They must look for concepts and assumptions that help them to grasp the phenomena in a systematic way. Kant suggests that assuming a predisposition which unfolds throughout history is inevitable in this regard. A predisposition is understood as a natural tendency of the human species, which is initially hidden but manifests itself gradually and continually.

The RussianAufklärer: Tolstoi in Search of Truth, Freedom, and Immortality

Lev Tolstoi, in his dunking about life, death, freedom, and immortality, drew significandy on the German philosophical tradition from Leibniz and Moses Mendelssohn to Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, as Lina Steiner argues in this article. Herder, who tried to salvage rationalism by getting away from the mechanistic metaphysics of the French Enlightenment and reintroducing the teleological explanation of nature, was a particularly important influence on Tolstoi. Herder's view of life, including both individual life and the life of community, as organic Bildung underlay the artistic conception ofWar and Peace, Tolstoi's first major fictional narrative. Tolstoi continued to develop this organicist paradigm in his later sociopolitical, religious, and aesthietic writings.

Darwin’s Rehabilitation of Teleology Versus Williams’ Replacement of Teleology by Natural Selection

Williams argued that Darwin replaced teleology by natural selection. This article argues that this idea is based on a misunderstanding of Darwin’s critique of the argument from design. Darwin did not replace teleology by evolutionary explanations but showed that we can understand teleology without referring to a Designer. He eliminated the concept of design and rehabilitated Aristotelian teleological explanations. The implication is that adaptations should not be investigated as if designed, but with the help of both teleological and evolutionary explanations. It is argued that elaborations of teleological explanations enable us to reconcile evolutionary theory and other fields in science.

The Darwin/Gray Correspondence 1857–1869: An Intelligent Discussion about Chance and Design

The nature and place of teleological explanation in evolutionary biology is a central topic, as is the nature and place of chance, randomness, and accident. But these topics are often treated as if they had no connection to each other. This was not always the case. In this paper I explore an intense discussion between Charles Darwin and American botanist Asa Gray, carried on in correspondence and in publications, about the compatibility of chance and teleology in Darwin's theory.

The PPE enterprise: Common Hobbesian roots and perspectives

Conceptualizing behavior decision theoretically as being ‘pulled’ (by an expected future) is fundamentally different from conceptualizing it as ‘pushed’ (or determined by past conditions according to causal laws). However, the fundamental distinction between teleological and non-teleological explanations not withstanding, decision-theoretic and evolutionary ‘ways of world making’ lead to strikingly similar forms of political, philosophical, and economic models. Common Hobbesian roots can account historically for the emergence of such a common ‘PPE’ outlook, while a game-theoretic framework of indirect evolution can accommodate the fundamental methodological tension between teleological and non-teleological approaches or the ‘humanities’ and the ‘science’ traditions in PPE’s disciplines.

Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions

Both philosophers and psychologists have argued for the existence of distinct kinds of explanations, including teleological explanations that cite functions or goals, and mechanistic explanations that cite causal mechanisms. Theories of causation, in contrast, have generally been unitary, with dominant theories focusing either on counterfactual dependence or on physical connections. This paper argues that both approaches to causation are psychologically real, with different modes of explanation promoting judgments more or less consistent with each approach. Two sets of experiments isolate the contributions of counterfactual dependence and physical connections in causal ascriptions involving events with people, artifacts, or biological traits, and manipulate whether the events are construed teleologically or mechanistically. The findings suggest that when events are construed teleologically, causal ascriptions are sensitive to counterfactual dependence and relatively insensitive to the presence of physical connections, but when events are construed mechanistically, causal ascriptions are sensitive to both counterfactual dependence and physical connections. The conclusion introduces an account of causation, an “exportable dependence theory,” that provides a way to understand the contributions of physical connections and teleology in terms of the functions of causal ascriptions.

Ethical equitation: Capping the price horses pay for human glory

Ethical equitation is nowadays coming into sharp focus in equestrian culture. Concerns surround the ethics of sports based on controlling an animal's locomotory responses and in using animals such as horses in sport in general. Anthropomorphically labeled misinterpretations of the responses of trained horses, such as the use of terms like “mad,” “lazy,” “keen,” and “stubborn,” may be detrimental to optimal equine welfare. Similarly, the concept of the “equine athlete” may imply an ill-informed teleological explanation of the motives of the horse in sport. Despite problems in identifying the happy horse, rewarding optimal welfare and the absence of critical stress responses in performance horses is an important step forward. Horse racing is the source of many welfare concerns because of the use of the whip and the physical dangers to horses involved in hurdle racing and steeplechasing. The use of the whip in racing is controversial and, because it does not always lead to acceleration, problematic. There is a pressing need for learning theory to be adopted in all equestrian pursuits, because such an approach would obviate the need for whips, punishment, and the use of fear in escape learning. In other disciplines, practices such as hyperflexion and soring have a significant potential to compromise the welfare of the horse in sport. The future of horse sports should involve abandoning the mandatory use of primitive control devices, such as curb bits, that have a real potential to cause harm. International governing bodies and national equestrian federations ought to proceed with removing any requirements to use curb bits and judges should reward riders who use the most humane control devices at the higher levels of competition. Finally, horse breeding should also be scrutinized under an ethical spotlight. Selecting horses on the basis of temperament has inherent risks, including lowered motivation of riders and trainers to refine their training skill set, which may also lead to significant wastage. Pure breeding risks the health and welfare of horses owing to increases in homozygous deleterious genes expressing themselves.