Teleological Account Research Articles

Extended human agency: towards a teleological account of AI

This paper analyzes human-machine interrelation concerning artificial neuronal networks (ANNs) from a teleological point of view. The paper argues that AI cannot be understood adequately in terms of subjectivity or objectivity but rather as a new kind of teleological relationship that holds between human and artificial performances of intelligence. Thereby, AI is understood as an enactivist extension of human agency, both in instrumental and moral terms. This hybrid account will be distinguished from four alternative accounts of human-machine relations: (i) the simulation account, according to which AI simulates human rationality; (ii) the instrumentalist account, according to which AI is just a tool; (iii) the anthropomorphic account, according to which AI is human-like; and (iv) the indifference account, according to which AI will merge with human rationality due to technological progress. Against these four accounts, the paper argues for a teleological account of AI as extended human agency that is part of the human lifeworld. By focusing on the teleological interrelation of socially grounded databases and algorithms, the paper finally develops an account of responsible AI that considers its specific relatedness with human actions, purposes, and intentions by means of language. Understanding human-machine relations in terms of extended agency finally allows to tackle the question of how to avoid the problems of AI bias and opacity.

Communal reception of the spirit’s gifts of grace: re-imagining a decolonised Church of England theological education

ABSTRACT In this article, I examine the three classical models of theological education: paideia, Wissenschaft, and professional training within the context of the Church of England’s expectations for theological education as expressed through the new Formation Framework. Drawing on the publications from Eerdman’s series ‘Theological Education Between the Times’, I critically examine the three models through the lens of whiteness and argue that the classical models can each be used to oppress and exclude people of colour. In response, I offer a re-imagining of how the Church of England might think about a de-colonised theological education as the communal reception of the Spirit’s gifts of grace. I use this descriptive and teleological account to offer a renewed vision for the three classical models, showing how professional training might be re-orientated by a theological education focused on the Spirit’s grace; Wissenschaft might be re-purposed through the concept of receiving gifts; and paideia might be revived through the intentional formation of racially, socially, vocationally and denominationally diverse communities.

What is narrativity?

AbstractIn recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained increasing attention. It is widely accepted that humans are storytelling creatures, that stories shape our self‐conception, and that we fail to be agents without a narrative framework. While there is less agreement on what constitutes a narrative, it is generally understood to be more than a chronological listing of life events; it is also an account of the explanatory relationships among these events—a story of how events lead to other events. However, specifying the nature of this explanatory relationship has proven difficult. As critics have pointed out, narrativists often resort to simplistic notions of narrative when faced with criticism. The concept of narrative explanation needs to be elaborated in a way that is both substantive enough to exclude trivial behaviours from being considered narratives and nonrestrictive enough to accommodate ordinary lives that may not be particularly story‐like. In this paper, I review existing accounts of narrative explanation and propose a teleological account, according to which narratives consist of goal‐directed explanations of a sequence of events. I argue that a teleological account of narrative explanation can be a fruitful way to clarify the concept of “narrative” in the context of the narrative self by addressing the most common objections.

Organisational teleology 2.0: Grounding biological purposiveness in regulatory control

AbstractThis paper critically revises the organisational account of teleology, which argues that living systems are first and foremost oriented towards a goal: maintaining their own conditions of existence. It points out some limitations of this account, mainly in the capability to account for the richness and complexity of biological systems and their purposeful behaviours. It identifies the reason of these limitations in the theoretical grounding of this account, specifically in the too narrow notion of closure of constraints, focused on self‐production. It proposes to ground an organisational account of biological teleology in the capability of living system not just to produce and replace their parts, but to control their own internal dynamics and behaviours in such a way as to maintain themselves. This theoretical framework has two advantages. It better captures the distinctive features of biological organisations and consequently the richness and active nature of their purposeful behaviours. By doing so, it makes it possible to apply this framework beyond minimal theoretical models to real biological cases.

The Dignity of Truth: Arendt on Lying and Truth-Telling in Politics

In “History of the Lie: Prolegomena,” Derrida criticizes Arendt’s commitment to the “great resiliency” of factual truth against all lies in her essay “Truth and Politics,” claiming that she reintroduces a teleological account of history that clashes with her anti-totalitarian and anti-systematic thinking. By focussing on her understanding of truth-telling as action, this article shows that Arendt does not turn truth into a permanently stable ground for politics. Instead, Arendt’s theory of self-deception constitutes a lie capable of ending all truth. Set in opposition to the nihilism of self-deception, Arendt understands truth-telling as an exemplary act that preserves the possibility of truthfulness and future actions.

Can we imagine a new telos for democracy in a non-teleological world?

ABSTRACT Many political and economic forces are driven by the desire to eliminate democratic plurality in today’s political juncture. Democratic republicanism itself in its contemporary forms has failed to address many of the daunting moral, political, economic, social, technological, and ecological challenges we face today. It is argued that to fulfill its essence of egalitarian freedom and social justice, democratic republicanism must first decouple from the global neoliberal capitalist regime and secondly embrace some form of postcapitalist and posthumanist orientation guided by a new attractor, a teleological approach anchored in a new telos of superhumanity. Democracy without a telos of superhumanity is a democracy in name only. It is time to lay our teleophobia aside and propose a strong teleological account in the vein of a Buddhist no-self doctrine at the heart of the onto-politico-economy.

Biological Purposes Beyond Natural Selection: Self-Regulation as a Source of Teleology1

AbstractSelected-effects theories provide the most popular account of biological teleology. According to these theories, the purpose of a trait is to do whatever it was selected for. The vast majority of selected-effects theories consider biological teleology to be introduced by natural selection. We want to argue, however, that natural selection is not the only relevant selective process in biology. In particular, our proposal is that biological regulation is a form of biological selection. So, those who accept selected-effects theories should recognize biological regulation as a distinctive source of biological teleology. The purposes derived from biological regulation are of special interest for explaining and predicting the behavior of organisms, given that regulatory mechanisms directly modulate the behavior of the systems they regulate. This explanatory power, added to the fact that regulation is widespread in the biological world, makes the idea that regulation gives rise to its own form of teleology a substantial contribution to the debate on biological teleology.

Alasdair MacIntyre and Adam Smith on markets, virtues and ends in a capitalist economy

AbstractIn recent decades, Alasdair MacIntyre has developed a style of moral philosophy and an argument for Neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics that has deeply influenced business ethics. Most of the work inspired by MacIntyre has dealt with individual and organisational dimensions of business ethics rather than the market economic environment in which individuals and organisations operate. MacIntyre has been a fierce critic of capitalism and economics. He has read Adam Smith an advocate of selfish individualism, rule‐based ethics and the banishment of teleology. This reading is seriously defective, and Smith in fact offers much of what MacIntyre calls for in economics. MacIntyre's ethical framework can be made more powerful and useful to business ethicists by incorporating Smithian insights, especially Smith's account of market virtues and teleological account of markets as extended cooperation directed towards the common good of wealth creation. Aside from issues of the interpretation of MacIntyre and Smith, this analysis opens new pathways for dialogue between business ethicists and economists.

Teleology and mechanism: a dialectical approach

The paper proposes a dialectical approach to our understanding of the relation between teleology and mechanism. This approach is dialectical both in form and content. In form, it proposes a contemporary interpretation of Hegel’s metaphysical account of teleology. This account is grounded in a dialectical methodology, which consists in scrutinizing the inherent limitations of a theoretical position that lead it to suppress itself and evolve into a better one. I apply the same methodology to the function debate. For Hegel, teleology can be understood in three main variants, which can be fruitfully mapped onto the three main positions in the function debate, the key conceptual distinction being whether teleological principles are understood as extrinsic or intrinsic. When it comes to autonomous systems, i.e. systems that embody the regime of Geist, extrinsic functionality must be grounded in intrinsic functionality. My approach is dialectical also in content, insofar as it concludes that intrinsic functional ascriptions rely on the relation of co-determination between the parts and the whole of a system, as well as between the system and its environment.

Teleology and function in non-living nature

There’s a general assumption that teleology and function do not exist in inanimate nature. Throughout biology, it is generally taken as granted that teleology (or teleonomy) and functions are not only unique to life, but perhaps even a defining quality of life. For many, it’s obvious that rocks, water, and the like, are not teleological, nor could they possibly have stand-alone functions. This idea - that teleology and function are unique to life - is the target of this paper. I begin with an overview of McShea’s field theoretic account of teleology. I start with the field theoretic account because it presents a promising analysis of teleological systems. It is promising because, in not making any assumptions about life’s special status in teleological systems, it avoids counterexamples that have problematized other accounts. I then consider some of the prominent efforts that some have made to avoid ascribing functions or teleology to some form of inanimate nature. In my assessment, none of the efforts are successful. I conclude by offering mineral evolution as a case study to show how inanimate nature can be both teleological and functional. The evolution of mineral species reveals that teleology and function extend to inanimate nature, and that teleology and function come in degrees.

Kant’s anti-humanism: An outline

Kantian ethics is widely associated with a dictum stating that the human being possesses an absolute value. This position is famously articulated by Kant in the formula of the categorical imperative which states that each person should always be treated as an ultimate end – not as a mere means. Arguably, we face here a good prima facie case for reckoning Kant among the humanists. In spite of this, I argue – contrary to the popular view – that Kant’s ethical theory should be understood as “nomocentric”, and to that extent as anti-humanistic. Obviously, human beings are special for Kant in a morally important way, but their unique significance is not due to their nature as such, but consists solely in their capacity to fulfil the demands imposed on them by the moral law. While establishing this thesis, I discuss various examples of anti-humanistic pronouncements from Kant’s texts, ranging from the pre-critical period up to the late writings, and thereby show that e.g. Kant’s (in)famous insistence on the claim that saving an innocent human life does not justify a white lie (On the Right to Lie From Philanthropy, 1797) is anything but a slip of the pen on Kant’s part. In thecourse of the argument I also emphasise the subjective component to all teleology in Kant including the teleological account of the categorical imperative, and suggest that Kant’s apparent ambivalence towards humanism is rendered intelligible by paying close attention to his dualistic anthropology.

Are Biological Traits Explained by Their ‘Selected Effect’ Functions?

ABSTRACT The selected effects or ‘etiological’ theory of Proper function is a naturalistic and realist account of biological teleology. It is used to analyse normativity in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of medicine, and elsewhere. The theory has been developed with a simple and intuitive view of natural selection. Traits are selected because of their positive effects on the fitness of the organisms that have them. These ‘selected effects’ are the Proper functions of the traits. Proponents argue that this analysis of biological teleology has the unique advantage that the selected effect function of a trait is also a causal explanation of the trait: the trait exists because it performs this function. We show, however, that selected effect functions as currently defined explain the existence of traits only under highly restrictive assumptions about evolutionary dynamics. In many common scenarios in which traits evolve by natural selection, selected effect functions do not explain those traits. This is because definitions of selected effect function extract from any evolutionary scenario only the information that would be explanatorily relevant in the simple evolutionary scenario implicit in those definitions. When applied to more complex scenarios, selected effect functions omit the key information that is explanatorily relevant in those scenarios. The assumptions required for selected effect functions to be explanatory are particularly unlikely to hold in the domain that its proponents care most about—the evolution of representation. A more adequate selected effects theory of Proper functions may be possible, but will require much greater attention to the structure of actual evolutionary explanations.

Resolving teleology’s false dilemma

Abstract This paper argues that the account of teleology previously proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not, it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr’s modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not, in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this, we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical position regarding free will that is known in the contemporary literature as ‘compatibilism’. This position maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its actions are internal, when the agent itself is the deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict between teleology and causal determinism.

Practical Magic: Shapeshifting As Survival Tactic

This article argues for a decolonising, democratic engagement with environmental knowledges formed outside the academy in the Global South. Drawing upon Bruno Latour's claim that our contemporary environmental precarity was first trialled upon colonised peoples, I argue that historically remote – and even conceptually obscure – African popular knowledges should be treated as forms of theory in their own right. Sigmund Freud's teleological account of animism – inspired by Edward Burnett Tylor – saw animism as an evolutionary stage in the development of universal reason. Refusing Freud's and Tylor's perspectives, I argue instead that indigenous animism presages the imminent crisis in global food security. In this sense, animism is an early stage in the teleology of environmental precarity. Retranslating an indigenous song, 'The Broken String', from the nineteenth century Southern African Bleek-Lloyd archive, I show that the /Xam language engineered animist techniques and linguistic protocols for securing food and water. Specifically, /Xam was a template for transmutation – a language that instructed polyvalent conversions between species and lifespans. These versatile changes were geared towards the community's survival of catastrophic environmental change. Faced with their own colonial disposability, the /Xam opted to metamorphose and live on. Accordingly, the indigene's 'magical' metamorphoses were straightforward strategic gambles with life and death amid scant survival options. As forerunners of our own global moment, the /Xam prompt us to identify 'animistically' with our object-world. I argue that /Xam 's shapeshifting poetics might lead us to derive replenishing registers of address for our world. Furthermore, institutionalising new protocols of embodiment, as the /Xam once did, might help us to order the urgent task of replenishing our planet, by allowing environmental political interest and global species' behaviours to iterate themselves through us.

Practical Magic: Shapeshifting As Survival Tactic

This article argues for a decolonising, democratic engagement with environmental knowledges formed outside the academy in the Global South. Drawing upon Bruno Latour's claim that our contemporary environmental precarity was first trialled upon colonised peoples, I argue that historically remote – and even conceptually obscure – African popular knowledges should be treated as forms of theory in their own right. Sigmund Freud's teleological account of animism – inspired by Edward Burnett Tylor – saw animism as an evolutionary stage in the development of universal reason. Refusing Freud's and Tylor's perspectives, I argue instead that indigenous animism presages the imminent crisis in global food security. In this sense, animism is an early stage in the teleology of environmental precarity. Retranslating an indigenous song, 'The Broken String', from the nineteenth century Southern African Bleek-Lloyd archive, I show that the /Xam language engineered animist techniques and linguistic protocols for securing food and water. Specifically, /Xam was a template for transmutation – a language that instructed polyvalent conversions between species and lifespans. These versatile changes were geared towards the community's survival of catastrophic environmental change. Faced with their own colonial disposability, the /Xam opted to metamorphose and live on. Accordingly, the indigene's 'magical' metamorphoses were straightforward strategic gambles with life and death amid scant survival options. As forerunners of our own global moment, the /Xam prompt us to identify 'animistically' with our object-world. I argue that /Xam 's shapeshifting poetics might lead us to derive replenishing registers of address for our world. Furthermore, institutionalising new protocols of embodiment, as the /Xam once did, might help us to order the urgent task of replenishing our planet, by allowing environmental political interest and global species' behaviours to iterate themselves through us.

Purposiveness in nature: Hegel and Spinoza on anthropomorphism and backward causation

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel’s relation to Spinoza’s account of teleology by discussing Spinoza and Hegel’s stance to two straightforward objections against teleological views of reality: the anthropomorphism objection and the backward causation objection. I show that both argue against a teleological account that would be committed to the anthropomorphism objection by raising the same argument: such a divine intelligence would lack what it desires to realize. I then argue that their dealing with the backward causation objection differs. Whereas Spinoza finds the backward causation objection against natural purposiveness to be valid, Hegel uses this objection to build his own case: natural purposiveness obtains to a different aspect of reality than effective causality. In contrast, Spinoza defends the backward causation objection because he believes there is only one fundamental principle that reality is subject to. Not only has the issue of Spinoza and Hegel’s relationship on teleology been neglected, I also argue that such a discussion can prove illuminating with respect to Hegel’s stance to monism, as, in contrast to Spinoza, Hegel must assume that there are different fundamental principles governing reality and not merely one.

The design stance, intentional stance, and teleological beliefs about biological and nonbiological natural entities.

Teleology involves an appeal to function to explain why things are the way they are. Among scientists and philosophers, teleological explanations are widely accepted for human-made artifacts and biological traits, yet controversial for biological and nonbiological natural entities. Prior research shows a positive relationship between religiosity and acceptance of such controversial teleological explanations. Across three large online studies, we show that the relationship between religiosity and teleological acceptance cannot be explained by acceptance of objectively false explanations. Furthermore, we show that anthropomorphism and a belief in supernatural agents each independently predict teleological acceptance. In contrast, the tendency to inhibit intuitively appealing, yet incorrect responses to simple reasoning problems was associated with lower teleological acceptance. These results provide strong support for an intention-based account of teleology, and further contribute to the existing literature which situates teleological reasoning within a dual-process framework. Several avenues of future research are discussed, including the need to dissociate implicit and explicit measures of teleological belief, and the need for a greater focus on cross-cultural variation in teleological beliefs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

A Tale of Excluding the Middle

he paper discusses a number of interconnected points concerning negation, truth, validity and the liar paradox. In particular, it discusses an argument for the dialetheic nature of the liar sentence which draws on Dummett’s teleological account of truth. Though one way of formulating this fails, a different way succeeds. The paper then discusses the role of the Principle of Excluded Middle in the argument, and of the thought that truth in a model should be a model of truth.

Teleological Foundations of Moral Language in MacIntyre’s Philosophical Project

The paper focuses on MacIntyre’s account of teleology and the role of teleology in explaining value language and grounding ethical normativity. It isolates three distinct albeit interrelated notions of teleology emerging gradually from Macintyre’s philosophical project. It investigates how moral language is explained and moral norms justified on the bases of these three articulations of the teleological motif. It subjects the weakness of this reasoning to criticism.

Humeanism and the epistemology of testimony

A contemporary debate concerning the epistemology of testimony is portrayed by its protagonists as having its origins in the eighteenth century and the respective views of David Hume and Thomas Reid. Hume is characterized as a reductionist and Reid as an anti-reductionist. This terminology has been widely adopted and the reductive approach has become synonymous with Hume. In Sect. 1 I spell out the reductionist interpretation of Hume in which the justification possessed by testimonially-acquired beliefs is reducible to the epistemic properties of perception, memory and inductive inference. This account of testimony is taken to be found in the section ‘On Miracles’ of Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. In Sect. 2 I introduce the distinction between global and local reductionism, and Coady’s interpretation of Hume as a global reductionist. He takes Hume’s position to be untenable. The rest of the paper explores alternative interpretations of Hume. Section 3 develops a local reductionist interpretation of Hume on testimony. It is argued, though, that such an approach is unstable and, in response, Sect. 4 turns to anti-reductionism in its contemporary forms and in Reid’s teleological account. In Sect. 5 I argue for an anti-reductionist account of Hume, one drawn from his discussion of the testimony of history in the Treatise of Human Nature, thus moving away from the usually exclusive focus upon the discussion of miracles in the first Enquiry, upon which the reductionist interpretation is based. Given the standard meaning of ‘Humeanism’ in the current debate, my interpretation amounts to the claim that Hume is not a Humean with respect to testimony.