Teams Of Soldiers Research Articles

Infrastructure-Free Collaborative Indoor Positioning Scheme for Time-Critical Team Operations

Indoor localization is the key infrastructure for indoor location-aware applications. In this paper, we consider an emergency scenario, where a team of soldiers or first responders perform time-critical missions in a large and complex building. In particular, we consider the case where infrastructure-based localization is not feasible for various reasons such as installation/management costs, a power outage, and terrorist attacks. We design a novel algorithm called the collaborative indoor positioning scheme (CLIPS), which does not require any pre-existing indoor infrastructure. Given that users are equipped with a signal strength map for the intended area for reference, CLIPS uses this map to compare and extract a set of feasible positions from all positions on the map when the device measures signal strength values at run time. Dead reckoning is then performed to remove invalid candidate coordinates, eventually leading to only correct positions. The main departure from existing peer-assisted localization algorithms is that our approach does not require any infrastructure or manual configuration. We perform testbed experiments and extensive simulations, and our results verify that our proposed scheme converges to an accurate set of positions much faster than existing noncollaborative solutions.

The perception of team engagement reduces stress induced situation awareness overconfidence and risk-taking

Much research has examined how stress restricts objective Situation Awareness (SA). Little research, however, has focused on SA overconfidence, the notion that an individual may grasp a situation when in fact they do not. Even less SA research has examined the motivational and emotional states of individuals operating in teams in stressful environments. Expanding on recent data suggesting that stress creates SA overconfidence, not simply SA loss, the present experiment manipulated stress levels and the perception of team engagement, which is thought to be a positive motivational state of task-related well-being. Teams of Soldiers were tested in a virtual combat scenario testing shared risk-taking, objective (i.e., collaborative ability to answer SA probes), and subjective SA. Results indicated that the mere perception of above average team engagement reduced stress induced SA overconfidence and risk-taking of teams. These results suggest simple, virtually costless strategies for improving elements of SA that may impact the behavior of teams and potentially improve their decision-making.

The load carriage index (LCI) - adjusting the load carried by the soldier according to body composition measurements

Lean body (LBM), strongly correlates with absolute maximal oxygen uptake (VO2max), has been shown to predict load carriage performance [1]. In contrast, fat is considered dead mass (DM) that reduces mobility and effectiveness of the carrier[2,3]. Lyons et al. proposed that the ratio LBM to DM can indicate the ability to carry loads [3]. We aimed to study the ability to better distribute the loads to be carried by a team of soldiers by using a load carriage index (LCI) rather than relying only on percentage of bodyweight.

Collaborative Tools and Shared Mental Models

This paper reports on an experiment conducted to measure collaboration tool usage and shared mental models in Army Command and Control. Several teams of soldiers participated in a two-week simulation experiment. During the simulation, the run was stopped and participants completed a 5-minuted on-line questionnaire in which they were asked to rate their workload and other teammates workload as well as provide information on the collaboration tools used during the last hour of the exercise. Shared mental models was measured using congruency between each person's rating of their own workload and their teammates perception of their workload. Overall, using the same collaboration tool, irrespective of the tool type, to communicate between team members lead to higher shared mental models.

"Petrus": Patterns of Prophylactic Murder in Indonesia

In early January 1984 the Indonesian foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, disclosed in Jakarta that both the government of the United States and the Vatican had expressed their deep concern over the summary killings during the previous year of an estimated three to four thousand criminals by various special death squads.' These squads, though precisely identified thus far, have been widely suspected of being officially sanctioned 'hit' teams of soldiers and policemen, operating under direction of the Indonesian government.2 At about the same time Mochtar disclosed that in conversations with the visiting Netherlands foreign minister, Hans van den Broek, confirmation had been given the latter that the wave of recent death squad killings was not a policy of the Indonesian government. Mochtar, under the probing questions of Indonesian newsmen, at first denied that the killings had been discussed at all with van den Broek. But then, in a seeming contradiction, he said that the Dutch foreign minister had also expressed the hope that the Indonesian government will be able to solve the of the killings. When journalists pressed him as to just how the problem of the killings might be solved, Mochtar somewhat testily retorted: ask me? Why don't you ask the security authorities? He suggested the press try to ask the Armed Forces Commander too about the matter.3