THE development of the British state in the twentieth century, James Cronin has recently suggested, was limited rather than rising inexorably, constrained both by the ‘anti-state logic’ of the Conservatives' appeal to the taxpaying public, and by the ‘self-denying tendencies inherent in the unique structure of the British state’, most obviously the role of the Treasury and its allies in the City in limiting spending. As a result, he suggests, priority was given to the interests of taxpayers rather than to the beneficiaries of expenditure on welfare. Such an emphasis on limitations to the expansion of the state carries a normative assumption that the state could and should have been bigger, yet the share of GNP taken in taxation in Britain was not noticeably lower than in other countries. Indeed, the striking feature of the British fiscal system in the first half of the twentieth century is not so much the level of taxation as its structure , with a high reliance on direct taxation of personal income and profits, a narrow base of indirect taxes, and a low level of social security contributions from employers and workers. The precise way in which revenue was extracted was an important influence on the form of the state, helping to define the boundaries between the central and local state, and between the state, market and voluntary organizations. Influences, of course, worked in two directions: the wider institutional structure influenced the tax system as well as being shaped by it.
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