Just after midnight on March 24, 1989 the tankship Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef inPrince William Sound, Alaska. The consequences of the accident were the loss of 258 000 barrels of crude oil resulting in substantial environmental and economic loss. The vessel possessed the best technologies available to the tanker industry and was the pride of the Exxon fleet. However, the complexity and the potential catastrophic consequences of using these new technologies is leading to the examination of a more critical element: the human factor. It has been determined that approximately 65% of catastrophic marine-related accidents have been the result of compounded human and organizational errors (HOE) during operations. Consequently, tanker operators and regulatory agencies have begun to realize the importance of examining the critical human factor element in tankship operations. Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) procedures using influence diagramming are currently being developed to examine the effects of HOE in marine-related accidents. This paper examines (1) the human and organizational elements which led to the grounding of ExxonValdez, (2) structuring of the accident cause-effect relationships into an analytical framework, (3)methods for probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of HOE in the accident, (4) changes in operational and regulatory policy in post-Exxon Valdez era, and (5) methods for determining HOE management alternatives for future tanker operations.