This article argues that the formation of the second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is a case of déjà vu for China and that, despite its engagement with the new Taliban-led government, Beijing will be unable to meet its geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and national security goals in the country. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, similarly to the situation under the first IEA, the Taliban are finding it difficult to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The security situation will remain perilous due to persistent attacks by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) group. Secondly, and also just as during the first IEA, the Taliban cannot be relied upon as allies in China’s “war on terror”. This is due to the Taliban’s ideological beliefs, decades of ties with the Uyghur militants in Afghanistan and concerns about reputational damage if it breaks links with Islamist groups or undertakes counterterrorism operations against these groups, damage which may undermine the second IEA.