occurred immediately preceding and for several weeks after President Carter's December 15, 1978, announcement was rudely disconcerting. This essay discusses the factors which led to the announcement, and some developments in Taiwan since mid-December. Events since recognition suggest that the pre-normalization ambiguity was a relevant variable in avoiding at least some dangerous international situations in East Asia. If not two Chinas, then one China divisible or one China two governments provided an equilibrium which many argue should have been changed only when there were benefits to be gained in terms of American interests or international stability. One must assume that Peking's interests in formalizing its American relations were dominated by Chinese competition with the USSR. If this was the case, its strategy existed largely separate from the Taiwan question. One consideration Peking and Washington chose to ignore was the manner in which normalization and the Taiwan question were to be handled. This appeared to exemplify a sharply diminished American commitment to a steadfast ally, thereby reducing American credibility in Asia and throughout the world. The PRC achieved the maximum take and the minimum give. Normalization showed the PRC's diplomatic toughness and shrewdness. This was even more important than a further slippage of American prestige. Peking's commitment to normalization quickened after the Sino-