Tadeusz Mazowiecki Research Articles

W okowach „demokratycznego centralizmu” – przypadek Stronnictwa Demokratycznego w PRL

In the grip of “democratic centralism” – the case of The Democratic Party in The People Republic of Poland
 So – called “democratic centralism”, originally created by W. Lenin, was the main principle used by the communist party (PPR/PZPR) in Poland after the World War II to control the society and its organizations. One of them was a Democratic Party established in the 1939 by the politicians and activists rooted in the left – oriented independence movement, of whom Marshall Józef Piłsudski said to has been the icon and the undisputed leader. After the war the Democratic Party was enslaved by the communists and became the part of the rule system. It was said to be the representative of the systematically vanishing middle class (craftsmen, merchants, intelligence), due to the thesis of Stalin concerning the raging class struggle. Until the fall of the totalitarian system in 1989 the Democratic Party officially supported the communists who overwhelmed every aspect of political reality. That is why the phenomenon of political realism was not involved in its policy despite of being the part of the official propaganda. Nevertheless, in the party structures dwelled the resistance that headed for the independence, of whom Karol Głogowski or Przemysław Górny were the leaders. The Democratic Party conversed in 1989 and supported the first democratic government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

Democracy’s Long March Through the Institutions of a People’s Republic

Abstract Poland’s struggle for freedom following the Second World War culminated in the Contract Sejm and the Eastern Bloc’s first non-communist government. This paper recognizes that this victory was the result of the strength of the public in fighting totalitarian communism as well as the Polska Zjednoczona Partía Robotnicza’s (PZPR) weakness. However, I argue that political pressure from the Allies post-Yalta gave space to groupings from the pre-war Polska Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL), Stronnictwo Pracy (SP) and Polska Partía Socjalistyczna (PPS) to create facts on the ground and a bottom-up democratic element which was, against all odds, able to transition into the PRL’s official coalition parties. Over time, that element developed to the point where by the 1980s the satellite parties had created enough autonomy from the PZPR that allowed them to push their own agendas, as noted by, for example, Frederic Zalewski. Ultimately, that ’autonomization" led these parties to leave the Front Jednosci Narodowej (FJN) and join the Solidarity-led National Unity government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. We consider four loose periods of post-war political history of Poland’s official political factions (Stronnictwa): the 1945-50 period of "Developing Opposition Breathing Space"; 1951-56 of "Fighting for Independent Political Lives"; 1956-84 "Top Down Cooperation with the PZPR, Bottom Up Agitation for Political Freedom"; 1984-89 "Increasingly Autonomous in a People’s Democracy." We consider the role of pre-war leaders in developing Poland’s political institutions, the role of London party members in the newly created Communist political parties, and the experience that members of Solidarity, the Round Table and the Mazowiecki government took from the official parties. We conclude that what is sometimes known as the "Polska droga do socjalizmu" in fact reflected a surprising democratic element even within the ranks of the official political structure.

Book Review: “Syndrome of a Peacock and a Parrot. 20 years of Political Transformation in Poland” [Syndrom pawia i papugi. 20 lat transformacji ustrojowej Polski], ed. Marek Sokołowski, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010, pp. 264

In Poland’s most recent history, year 2009 was a time to celebrate a special anniversary. Twenty years ago, events that started a political transformation in Poland took place. They were connected with the Round Table Talks, elections to the so-called Contract Sejm and the fact that Tadeusz Mazowiecki became the Prime Minister. In 2009 Poland also celebrated 70th anniversary of II World War, 10th anniversary of its admission to NATO and 5th anniversary of joining the European Union. The celebrations of these events involved exhibitions, conferences and scientific seminars. Articles were written and television networks broadcast interviews and documentaries about the recent historical events that happened in Poland’s history.

Transformations in the Ownership of The Szczecin and Świnoujście Seaports Authority between 1991 and 2000

Transformations in the ownership of state owned companies in Poland a! er 1989 played a pivotal role in the general political transformation which took place in Poland at that time. Those ownership changes were an essential element of the political transformation of Poland. The process of transforming the country’s economy from central economic planning to free market economy was started by Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government. On October 9, 1989, the Council of Ministers accepted a document Guidelines and Directions of Poland’s Economic Policy which aimed at stabilizing the country’s economy and at transforming its economic system. " e stabilization programme was supposed to be implemented by January, 1990.3 " e second stage of the governmental plan was planned for the years 1990–1991 and one of its main tenets was a transformation of ownership rights. Krzysztof Lis, the government’s plenipotentiary for ownership transformation, was responsible for the organization and legislation of the process of privatizing Polish economy. T. Mazowiecki’s cabinet prepared both a draft for the new amendment of the legal act concerning state owned companies and a dra! of a new act about privatizing state owned companies.

The twentieth anniversary of fundamental market reforms in Poland : What have weachieved; what have we learnt?

Th e second festival Days of Poznań University of Economics (PUE) marking the anniversary of granting the university status took place on 20–21 January 2010. Th e PUE Days 2010 was a special event as the celebration coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the introduction of fundamental economic reforms in Poland. Th e PUE welcomed a special guest – Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, a holder of the PUE honorary doctorate, the prime author of the stabilization program and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in charge of economic policy in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki twenty years ago. Professor Balcerowicz delivered a lecture on “Economic transformation in Eastern Europe: Conclusions aft er 20 years of experience”, and held a meeting with students during which he talked about the current economic crisis and its impact on the Polish economy. Professor Marian Gorynia, the President of the University, chaired a debate in the main Auditorium entitled “Polish economic transformation 20 years later” during the PUE Days. Th e speakers included Professors Bogusław Fiedor, Stanisław Gomułka, Krzysztof Jajuga, Tadeusz Kowalski, Witold Orłowski, and Andrzej Wojtyna. An exhibition presented publications by the PUE researchers focused on the market reforms of 1989–1990 was also held in the main University building.

The twentieth anniversary of fundamental market reforms in Poland : What have weachieved; what have we learnt?

Th e second festival Days of Poznań University of Economics (PUE) marking the anniversary of granting the university status took place on 20–21 January 2010. Th e PUE Days 2010 was a special event as the celebration coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the introduction of fundamental economic reforms in Poland. Th e PUE welcomed a special guest – Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, a holder of the PUE honorary doctorate, the prime author of the stabilization program and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in charge of economic policy in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki twenty years ago. Professor Balcerowicz delivered a lecture on “Economic transformation in Eastern Europe: Conclusions aft er 20 years of experience”, and held a meeting with students during which he talked about the current economic crisis and its impact on the Polish economy. Professor Marian Gorynia, the President of the University, chaired a debate in the main Auditorium entitled “Polish economic transformation 20 years later” during the PUE Days. Th e speakers included Professors Bogusław Fiedor, Stanisław Gomułka, Krzysztof Jajuga, Tadeusz Kowalski, Witold Orłowski, and Andrzej Wojtyna. An exhibition presented publications by the PUE researchers focused on the market reforms of 1989–1990 was also held in the main University building.

The twentieth anniversary of fundamental market reforms in Poland : What have weachieved; what have we learnt?

Th e second festival Days of Poznań University of Economics (PUE) marking the anniversary of granting the university status took place on 20–21 January 2010. Th e PUE Days 2010 was a special event as the celebration coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the introduction of fundamental economic reforms in Poland. Th e PUE welcomed a special guest – Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, a holder of the PUE honorary doctorate, the prime author of the stabilization program and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in charge of economic policy in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki twenty years ago. Professor Balcerowicz delivered a lecture on “Economic transformation in Eastern Europe: Conclusions aft er 20 years of experience”, and held a meeting with students during which he talked about the current economic crisis and its impact on the Polish economy. Professor Marian Gorynia, the President of the University, chaired a debate in the main Auditorium entitled “Polish economic transformation 20 years later” during the PUE Days. Th e speakers included Professors Bogusław Fiedor, Stanisław Gomułka, Krzysztof Jajuga, Tadeusz Kowalski, Witold Orłowski, and Andrzej Wojtyna. An exhibition presented publications by the PUE researchers focused on the market reforms of 1989–1990 was also held in the main University building.

The twentieth anniversary of fundamental market reforms in Poland : What have weachieved; what have we learnt?

Th e second festival Days of Poznań University of Economics (PUE) marking the anniversary of granting the university status took place on 20–21 January 2010. Th e PUE Days 2010 was a special event as the celebration coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the introduction of fundamental economic reforms in Poland. Th e PUE welcomed a special guest – Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, a holder of the PUE honorary doctorate, the prime author of the stabilization program and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in charge of economic policy in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki twenty years ago. Professor Balcerowicz delivered a lecture on “Economic transformation in Eastern Europe: Conclusions aft er 20 years of experience”, and held a meeting with students during which he talked about the current economic crisis and its impact on the Polish economy. Professor Marian Gorynia, the President of the University, chaired a debate in the main Auditorium entitled “Polish economic transformation 20 years later” during the PUE Days. Th e speakers included Professors Bogusław Fiedor, Stanisław Gomułka, Krzysztof Jajuga, Tadeusz Kowalski, Witold Orłowski, and Andrzej Wojtyna. An exhibition presented publications by the PUE researchers focused on the market reforms of 1989–1990 was also held in the main University building.

The twentieth anniversary of fundamental market reforms in Poland : What have weachieved; what have we learnt?

Th e second festival Days of Poznań University of Economics (PUE) marking the anniversary of granting the university status took place on 20–21 January 2010. Th e PUE Days 2010 was a special event as the celebration coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the introduction of fundamental economic reforms in Poland. Th e PUE welcomed a special guest – Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, a holder of the PUE honorary doctorate, the prime author of the stabilization program and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in charge of economic policy in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki twenty years ago. Professor Balcerowicz delivered a lecture on “Economic transformation in Eastern Europe: Conclusions aft er 20 years of experience”, and held a meeting with students during which he talked about the current economic crisis and its impact on the Polish economy. Professor Marian Gorynia, the President of the University, chaired a debate in the main Auditorium entitled “Polish economic transformation 20 years later” during the PUE Days. Th e speakers included Professors Bogusław Fiedor, Stanisław Gomułka, Krzysztof Jajuga, Tadeusz Kowalski, Witold Orłowski, and Andrzej Wojtyna. An exhibition presented publications by the PUE researchers focused on the market reforms of 1989–1990 was also held in the main University building.

The twentieth anniversary of fundamental market reforms in Poland : What have weachieved; what have we learnt?

Th e second festival Days of Poznań University of Economics (PUE) marking the anniversary of granting the university status took place on 20–21 January 2010. Th e PUE Days 2010 was a special event as the celebration coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the introduction of fundamental economic reforms in Poland. Th e PUE welcomed a special guest – Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, a holder of the PUE honorary doctorate, the prime author of the stabilization program and the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in charge of economic policy in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki twenty years ago. Professor Balcerowicz delivered a lecture on “Economic transformation in Eastern Europe: Conclusions aft er 20 years of experience”, and held a meeting with students during which he talked about the current economic crisis and its impact on the Polish economy. Professor Marian Gorynia, the President of the University, chaired a debate in the main Auditorium entitled “Polish economic transformation 20 years later” during the PUE Days. Th e speakers included Professors Bogusław Fiedor, Stanisław Gomułka, Krzysztof Jajuga, Tadeusz Kowalski, Witold Orłowski, and Andrzej Wojtyna. An exhibition presented publications by the PUE researchers focused on the market reforms of 1989–1990 was also held in the main University building.

Leszek Kolakowski (1927–2009)

Leszek Kolakowski (1927–2009) Nadia Diuk, Richard Pipes, George Weigel, Abbas Milani, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jerzy Szacki, and Carl Gershman The eminent Polish philosopher, Leszek Kolakowski, who had a major influence on the development of the Polish democratic opposition, died on 17 July 2009. A memorial symposium entitled "Democracy, Totalitarianism, and the Culture of Freedom" was held in his honor at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C., on October 15. Kolakowski had been a founding member of the Journal of Democracy's Editorial Board and had spoken at several major NED conferences. His thinking influenced the Endowment's strategy in Central and Eastern Europe. The event was introduced by NED president Carl Gershman and moderated by former U.S. national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Other speakers included NED vice-president Nadia Diuk, longtime director of NED programs in Central Europe and Eurasia; Richard Pipes, Baird Professor Emeritus of History at Harvard University; George Weigel, Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center; and Abbas Milani, Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University. A second memorial symposium was held on October 24 at the University of Warsaw, organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation. Moderated by Aleksander Smolar, it featured as speakers Jerzy Szacki, professor emeritus of the University of Warsaw; philosophy professor Jan Andrzej Kłoczowski, O.P.; and Jerzy Jedlicki, professor at the Historical Institute at the Polish Academy of Sciences. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the former prime minister of Poland (1989–91), sent an audio message. At the conclusion, Carl Gershman presented NED's Democracy Service Medal to Kolakowski's widow, Tamara Kolakowska, and read a tribute that accompanied it. A video of the NED symposium is available at www.ned.org/events/kolakowski.html, and an audio recording of the Warsaw symposium is available at www.batory.org.pl/debaty/Kolakowski.htm. Selected excerpts from speeches at these two events appear below: Nadia Diuk: In an article entitled "In Stalin's Countries: Theses on Hope and Despair," Kolakowski dissected the operations of what he called alternately the communist social system, bureaucratic socialism, socialist despotism, or monopolistic power. Even though he was referring to the Soviet model of socialism, his analysis of the way a totalitarian regime seeks to exercise power relates to all kinds of despotisms and thus is decidedly [End Page 184] relevant today. "The natural need of despotism," he wrote, "is to terrify individuals while depriving them of the means of organized resistance." He elaborated further, applying his well-honed skills in dialectical reasoning: "If this concentration of power is a source of strength, it also conceals weaknesses." This was his main thesis: the paradox that the more a regime tries to assert control over political and social life, the weaker it becomes, "deprived of plasticity and self-regulatory devices," as he put it. He had thus turned Marxist dialectics on its head. . . . By poking holes in the totalitarian monolith and highlighting weaknesses in the system, Kolakowski identified areas where opponents of the system could work and how society could organize in its own self-defense. These ideas were elaborated further by Jacek Kuroń, who added the idea of "self-organization" by society, and Adam Michnik, who took this analysis further in his essay "The New Evolutionism." The notion was gradually being accepted that engaged citizens could reclaim the public space monopolized by the regime and that social and cultural activities could take place outside of the officially sanctioned realm, bypassing the "leading role" of the Communist Party and other state-controlled instruments. . . . Even after martial law was imposed at the end of 1981, the Polish opposition continued its newly adopted strategy of building parallel structures underground, by establishing a thriving underground press, a flying university, and many publishing houses, and gaining the moral authority that had been lost by the ruling elite, all in accordance with Kolakowski's original thesis. Kolakowski wrote many other pieces about the Polish opposition, and also on the unique role of the Polish nation and its intellectuals, and in later years he warned, "The victory of democracy is by no means assured—there are various noncommunist forms of tyranny." But his analysis of the...

Into the Breach: The Designation Speech and Expose of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Poland's Transition from Communism

(2008). Into the Breach: The Designation Speech and Expose of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Poland's Transition from Communism. Advances in the History of Rhetoric: Vol. 11-12, No. 1, pp. 359-427.

Poland: Continuity and Change

During the years of the Polish People's Republic, the secret political police occupied a prominent role. Their mandate was extensive and their influence pervasive. As a result, the transformation of the secret services became a fundamental political and constitutional task following the anti-Communist opposition's assumption of power in 1989. The fate of the secret service's archives and the problems of lustration--the identification of secret collaborators--became part and parcel of this transformation. But in Poland, as elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc, this process was not carried out consistently. Political Conditions The nature of Poland's peaceful social change was undoubtedly the major determinant of the country's future course. The activists of Solidarity had gained power with the June 1989 political victory of the Citizens' Committee bloc. However, even those partially free elections were the result of a settlement arrived at during the Roundtable talks the same year. Offering the presidency to General Wojciech Jaruzelski was also an informal part of this settlement. General Czeslaw Kiszczak, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Jaruzelski's most trusted colleague, was the initiator of the talks as well as the guarantor of the negotiated terms. Since 1956, a civilian entity known as Security Service (SB) had existed within the framework of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). The SB functioned as a secret political police, simultaneously conducting intelligence and counterintelligence operations. For decades, the SB operated with broad powers, largely free of oversight or restraint. In the 1980s, however, the MSW began to scrutinize the power and reach of the civilian civil services. The result was the enactment of certain legal provisions in an attempt to regulate the SB's activities. (1) Legal rules, however, would end up playing only a minor role in deciding the future of an agency that, by the 1980s, was operating under its own supervision, beholden only to the formal oversight by the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). (2) By 1989, the SB had become one of the most important power structures in the Polish state. Most of the SB's 24,000 functionaries were well-trained professionals with logistical support from the governmental administration. The SB's huge archival resources, accumulated throughout the decades, and its network of thousands of secret collaborators (some of them strategically placed within the ranks of the opposition), also constituted major factors in the agency's position of power. The SB's political dominance remained largely unchanged despite the tumultuous events of June 1989. This was ensured by the elevation of General Kiszczak, Jaruzelski's confidante, to a preeminent position in the new, post-Communist political order. During Kiszczak's tenure as Minister of Internal Affairs in the administration of Tadeusz Mazowiecki (July 1989-May 1990), no structural or personnel changes took place in the MSW. Indeed, of all the officials in this branch of government, only Krzysztof Kozlowski, the former deputy editor of the influential Tygodnik Powszechny Catholic weekly, had not held a Communist Party identity card earlier. (Kozlowski would be promoted to Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in February 1990.) Nor were there any changes in the area of the military special services, which functioned as Administration II of the General Staff of the Polish People's Army (intelligence) and Military Internal Service (WSW, or counterintelligence and military police). Not many people were aware of how often the military special services were used to combat the opposition and to penetrate Polish political circles. But these elements enjoyed a special trust from General Jaruzelski, and General Kiszczak had come from their ranks. A revolution in the special services was certainly hard to accomplish. For many months, even under the new political conditions that prevailed after the summer of 1989, the special services were supervised by the same people that had led them earlier in the struggle against the anti-Communist opposition. …

History and Memory: The Revolutions of 1989-91

During the years 1989–91, people had the impression that they were living through political events comparable in scope and importance to the French and American Revolutions. With the downfall of communism, decades of Cold War and the threat of global annihilation came to an end, and the bipolar world was consigned to the past. For some, this meant “the end of history” in a philosophical sense: the disappearance of a plausible alternative to a liberal democratic order. For others, by contrast, it meant that history was just opening its doors, enabling previously suppressed countries, nations, and continents to regain their ability to shape their own destiny. Still others feared that the political changes would lead to cataclysms: chaos, anarchy, civil war, ethnic conflict, and the threat that “rogue states” or terrorist gangs would use weapons of mass destruction. The bipolar world, it was noted, had at least brought a certain order and predictability. Articles appeared prophesying the return of the demons of the past. It was recalled that World War I, World War II, and the Cold War had all begun in that part of Europe that lies between East and West, the meeting point of great empires and great religions: Western Christianity, the Orthodox Church, and Islam. The peaceful revolutions of a decade ago fascinated the entire world. Their heroes were “the people,” “the nation,” and “civil society,” along with intellectuals who invoked the language of “truth,” “morality,” and “human rights.” It seemed that an old dream was about to be realized— Aleksander Smolar is senior research fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris and chairman of the board of the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw. He served as a political advisor to Polish prime ministers Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Hanna Suchocka. His essay “Poland’s Emerging Party System” appeared in the April 1998 issue of the Journal of Democracy. This essay was translated from the Polish by Magdalena Potocka.

The Ottoman Diplomats on Eighteenth-Century Poland: Contempt or Discouragement?

In 1990, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first non-communist Polish prime minister beg n his peech in the European Council quoting an old tra dition, still present in the Polish collective memory, according to which every audience of foreign envoys at the 19th-century Ottoman court be gan with the proclamation ambassador of Lehistan has not come yet. Mazowiecki's statement was a clear allusion to Poland's wish, after 40 years of the Iron Curtain, to be allowed to join the European Council. Leaving this aside, let us focus on this tradition, which I myself also heard from my father many years ago. Even if not true, it reflects the hopes which Poles shared for over 100 years. It is not an accident that the greatest Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz, died in a shabby house at in Is tanbul, while trying to gain Ottoman support for the Polish cause during the Crimean war. Polish children still learn about Jozef Bern, the hero of the Polish uprising in 1830 and a chief commander of the Hungarian up rising in 1848, though it is hard to find in their textbooks that the same Jozef Bern later on accepted Islam and died as Murad Pa?a in distant Aleppo. In a lecture at Princeton University given in spring 1991, Roderic Davi son stressed the importance of the fate of Poland in shaping the mentality of the 19th-century Ottoman diplomats. In the 19th century, however, not much could have been done in Istanbul to influence the political situation in Eastern Europe, apart from some symbolic gestures towards Polish refugees. One century earlier Poland had still existed as an independent state which, though weakened and corrupt, could have been influenced and used by Ottoman diplomacy. Already in the 1660s the eminent Russian statesman, Afanasij Ordin Nascokin, saw the three main strategic goals for the Russian empire: reaching the Baltic coast, reuniting old Rus' by incorporating Belorussian and Ukrainian lands into Russia and, finally, opening the Black Sea. By the mid-18th century the first goal had already been accomplished at the cost of Sweden. The second had to be achieved at the cost of Poland and the third at that of the Ottomans and their Crimean allies.

The Polish Ombudsman and the Transition to Democracy

A great deal has happened since the first Polish Commissioner for Citizens' Rights Protection discussed the role of her office in this journal in January 1990.1At that time, the communist regime had given place to Eastern Europe's first non-communist government, led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, after the elections of June 1989. Following the Polish United Workers' Party's defeat then, communism collapsed throughout Eastern Europe. Poland itself has since moved somewhat shakily towards a pluralist democratic regime, with a directly elected president and two chambers of Parliament in which multi-party systems now operate. However, despite some suggestions that the institutions created during the communist period should be swept away after communism fell, several of them have made the transition to the new liberal-democratic State. These institutions include three that were created by the Jaruszelski regime during the 1980s in order to try to win back its fading popular legitimacy: the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC), the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) and the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights Protection (CCRP), or Ombudsman. Since the fall of communism, the need for administrative adjudication has both changed and become greater, especially because there has not yet been any agreement on a new Polish constitution. The number of complaints sent to the CCRP's office rose from 22,764 in 1990 to 29,273 in 1993. This short article gives an account of the principal developments in the Commissioner's role since 1990. Professor Letowska was replaced in the office in 1991 by Professor Tadeusz Zielinski, from the University of Krakow, and the change in incumbent has produced significant changes in practice as well as continuity.

Robotnik: A Short History of the Struggle for Worker Self-Management and Free Trade Unions in Poland, 1944-1981.

Tracing the Polish labour movement over four decades, from the early strikes in Lodz to the success of the Gdansk shipyard strikes, this study of solidarity stresse that the events of the 1980s had their origins as far back as 1944. Stefanic places the crushing of solidarity and the declaration of Martial Law in December 1981 within the framework of Polish history. A postscript brings the story up to the summer of 1989 and the arrival of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the country's first non-communist Prime Minister since 1939.

A Communist Comeback? The Dissolution of Solidarity

A Communist Comeback?The Dissolution of Solidarity Aleksander Smolar (bio) The Polish parliamentary elections of 19 September 1993 had two winners: the party known as the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (or SdRP, which led an electoral coalition called the Alliance of the Democratic Left, or SLD), and the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL). Although each had just finished comprehensively refurbishing its facade, the old colors still peeked forth from beneath the fresh paint. In the former case, they were those of the old communist party, formally known as the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP); in the latter, they belonged to the United Peasants' Party, a longtime satellite of the PUWP. The parties most directly descended from Solidarity suffered a bitter setback. The trade union itself lost all its seats in the national legislature. The Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), which has played an important role in the making of economic policy over the last few years, met with the same fate. The post-Solidarity Right, broken up into a congeries of quarreling factions, was swept out of office: conservative and "national" parties (the ones most closely linked to the Catholic Church) all went down the tubes. The Democratic Union (UD)—the party of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronistaw Geremek, Jacek Kuroñ, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, and most of the former dissidents—was relegated to a distant third place behind the two front-runners. Only one party descended from Solidarity scored a clear success: the Union of Labor, led by Ryszard Bugaj, Karol Modzelewski, and Zbigniew Bujak. But this resolutely leftist group had deliberately broken with the heritage [End Page 70] of Solidarity, and, letting bygones be bygones, so to speak, had opened its ranks to former communists. Not counting the German minority, which has a handful of guaranteed seats, the only other two parties to exceed the threshold (5 percent of the total nationwide vote for parties and 8 percent for coalitions) required to win seats in the Sejm, the lower house of Poland's bicameral parliament, were the rightist-populist Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR), endorsed by President Lech Watłęsa. (See Table 1 on the following page for fuller results of the 1993 elections.) The euphoria of 1989 was short-lived. Everybody quickly realized that creating basic democratic structures, building a modern economy, and reweaving the social fabric of Eastern and Central Europe would not be easy. Alarming forecasts filled the air. From whence was danger expected to come? Two answers dominated Polish politics, one typically given by the Right, and the other by the Left. In the eyes of the Right, the threat was embodied by the nomenklatura of the former PUWP. Despite the recent changes, it had retained its grip on the economy and the provincial power structures. The secret-police files it controlled would allow it to blackmail whomever it pleased, and its ties abroad—especially with Moscow—would be maintained. Russia might be in a bad way at the moment, to be sure, but one day it might well recover its capacity to threaten the independence of Poland. The labor-union weekly Tygodnik solidarność, a large group of Solidarity activists, plus politicians like Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczyński and Jan Olszewski were among those who stated this view most clearly. To the Left, on the other hand, democracy in Poland seemed to be menaced above all by an explosive mixture of nationalism wedded to populism, authoritarianism, clericalism, and nostalgia for the precommunist past. This vision was put forth most powerfully in the pages of the influential daily paper Gazeta wyborcza, whose editor-in-chief Adam Michnik has long guided the way in which certain sectors of public opinion in both Poland and the West perceive the problems of the postcommunist world. These competing evaluations of the problems and hazards facing Poland led to the policies that in turn brought about the current situation. The Right's insistence on seeing all problems as flowing unfailingly from a mythical plot hatched by the old nomenklatura has not helped rightists to understand the process by which a large part of the population has turned away from their brand...

History, Reality, and Central Europe's Security

HISTORY, REALITY, AND_______ CENTRAL EUROPE'S SECURITY Petr Lunak Pcoland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have, throughout their histories, been mere "grains of dust" between two great millstones: Russia and Germany. These countries have been affected by both friction and harmony between their powerful neighbors, who repeatedly subjugated them by military means. Poland was first carved up by Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the 1790s; in 1939 it was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union; it then fell under Soviet domination. What is today Czechoslovakia was first divided between German-dominated Austria and Magyar-dominated Hungary; it was occupied by Germany during the Second World War and then became a satellite of the Soviet Union. For Hungary the twentieth century began in 1919 at Versailles, when it was deprived ofits empire. Budapest's World War II alliance with Hitler was motivated by the desire to renew its empire; it resulted first in German and then Soviet occupation, confirmed by the invasion of 1956. How does history affect the actions ofthe Central Europeans? Some see it as a key of interpretation for the present and the future. Poland, Hungary , and Czechoslovakia, they claim, should look into the past for a way to avoid a repetition of decades of traumatic non-history under alien domination . However, others claim that history can deceive rather than guide. They argue that the historical experience of the region is negative, a curse that should be forgotten, for it cannot explain and change current realities. Petr Lunak is a recent graduate of SAIS (M.A., 1992). 129 130 SAISREVIEW This article traces the efforts ofHungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia to find their foreign policy identities in an atmosphere in which reliance on history and its refusal awkwardly coexist. A Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation? The following historical parallel can be seductive: After the First World War Central European nations attained independence because Germany and Austria-Hungary had been defeated, and the Russians were distracted by their revolution. However, an attempt to stabilize the region through an alliance system with the French failed, and World War II put an end to the independence ofPoland and Czechoslovakia. In 1941 Czechoslovak President Benes and Polish Prime Minister Sikorski began negotiations on a possible postwar confederation of Czechoslovakia and Poland in order to prevent history from repeating itself. The talks were soon interrupted, however, by Stalin. The idea of a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation was revived by Andrzej Kozminski in late December 1989. Kozminski argued that the region's security would be augmented by such a move, and that the opportunity was not to be missed, as was done in 1943.1 This proposal was repeated by Zbigniew Brzezinski in January 1990 and gained considerable attention, particularly in the Polish parliament. Senator Jerzy Rusecki said: "I think that the concept is interesting and right. I back it also because the Czechs and Slovaks are closest to us among Slavic nations, they are our kinsmen."2 The idea of a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation had the full support of Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski,3 but Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki did not express any particular enthusiasm for the plan. Prague's reaction was not as favorable Warsaw's. Before his visit to Poland, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier said: This is a proposal brought in by an American political scientist of Polish origin. I myself do not think, and hardly any Poles do, that we can resolve our situation by creating some kind of Polish-Czechoslovak confederation. Our problems are absolutely different.4 1.Gazeta Wyborcza, December 28, 1989, p. 3. 2.Some deputies and senators went even further. Senator Stanislaw Hoffmann proposed that "a union ofcountries ofBulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary should counterbalance other economic and political forces in Europe." FBIS-EEU, January 11, 1990, p. 58. 3.See the Mazowiecki's interview in Zycie Warszawy, January 20, 1990, p. 2. 4.Lidova demokracie, January 8, 1990, p. 3. HISTORY, REALITY AND CENTRAL EUROPE'S SECURITY 131 After Prague's cold reaction, Polish attitudes toward the proposal began to change. Solidarity leader Lech Walesa called it "a proposal from another era."5 Bronislaw Geremek, who was personally in favor of the plan, acknowledged that the differences between Czechoslovakia and...

The Poverty of 'Anti-Politics'

NEAR THE END of this book David Ost remarks mat, AD those who talk about the 'death of communism' miss the essential point: as reform proceeds apace, the slogans of Marxism will come into vogue once again. (213) Such has not come to pass — at least no yet The reforms have certainly proceeded apace. Since coming to power the Solidarity government, in alliance with the International Monetary Fund, has implemented monetarism, fought to outlaw abortion, and made religious education all but compulsory in Poland's schools to mention just a few of its more notable policies. The 'slogans of Marxism', however, have not come into 'vogue'. Rather, the Polish people have disposed of one of the central figures of Solidarity, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and have elevated a Canadian non-entity, Stanislaw Tyminski, whose previous political experience included the fringe right Canadian Libertarian Party, to the status of Lech Walesa's main political rival. Given this remarkable turn of events, the question that must be asked of Ost's writings, (or, indeed, any number of works written on the subject of Solidarity and the transformation of Poland over the past decade) is how well they allow us to understand the events which have taken place in that country since March of 1989. In order to fairly answer this question a rather lengthy exposition of Ost's thesis is in order.