This a book with a chip on its shoulder; I suspect that its author, Michael Ghiselin, carrying a whole log. On the one hand, we are reminded constantly of Ghiselin's genius. He never has an idea which not revolutionary, which does not challenge orthodoxy, which has not thrown light on the appalling consequences of many years of obfuscation and mistake. Even on the first page of the Preface we are told of an idea which is now recognized as a major contribution to the philosophy of biology, and to evolutionary theory as well. Further down the same page we are promised an entire system of metaphysics, and the discerning reader will note the deliberate echo of Ghiselin's title with those of two of the classics of the synthetic theory. Yet, on the other hand, throughout there the subtheme of genius unrecognized, talent unappreciated. While lesser men have gone on to fame and fortune, Michael Ghiselin has labored without full appreciation. Even the blurb on the back cover, by Ghiselin's friend and long-time supporter, the philosopher David Hull, picks up on this theme. As important as Michael Ghiselin's work has been, he an excellent example of someone who really has not received the attention and acclaim that his work deserves. In fact, staying for the moment with the back cover, the evidence that Michael Ghiselin has done very nicely in the recognition stakes. Not only has he been awarded the Pfizer Prize of the History of Science Society for the best book of the year (in 1970 for his The Triumph of the Darwinian Method), but a few years after, he got a MacArthur Prize for genius. Moreover, going back now into the book, the evidence that if the world at large decided totally to ignore Michael Ghiselin, it have very good reason. A more constant stream of petty nastiness and invective be hard to imagine. Everyone, friend and foe, comes in for some mean or hurtful jibe. Philip Kitcher, a philosopher with formidable mathematical skills, told that he does not know what a set is. Ernst Mayr, to whom incidentally the book dedicated, accused of serious unclarity. I-for let me admit that I am not exempt-am apparently so awful a thinker that Ghiselin would be happy to agree that when Ruse studies the human species, his work not science (p. 129). Adrian Desmond, one of our most distinguished historians of nineteenth-century evolutionary biology, labeled an anti-evolutionist (in the broad sense, whatever that might mean). Even David Hull slighted: the important papers in which he took up cudgels for Ghiselin do not find their way into the bibliography. All in all, Michael Ghiselin comes
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