Beardsley's indifference to the work's artist is also apparent in the substance of the philosophical positions he develops. He is at pains to downplay the relevance for aesthetic appreciation of knowledge of the artist's intentions, experiences, or feelings, and to emphasize how the aesthetically relevant regional properties of the aesthetic object have an autonomous, objective status, as I now explain. Beardsley believes that if the intention is successful, the marks of this will already be apparent in the work, and if the artist failed in his or her intention, knowledge of the intention may be relevant to judging the artist but is not pertinent to discovering and assessing what is in the work (pp. 17-28; also see pp. 457-460). On either score, then, criticism can proceed without reference to the artist's intentions. External signs of the artist's intentions-as in diaries or pronouncements-may provide indirect confirmation for what is internally present in the work, but where the two conflict, it is the external evidence that must be rejected. In addition, Beardsley provides nonintentional accounts of features of works of art for which one would have expected an artist's intentions to be crucial. For instance, his analysis of pictorial representation-a genus with depiction and portrayal as species-is nonintentio al. He analyzes depiction in terms of visual similarity between a pictorial design and members of a class of objects or events (pp. 271272). Portrayal is of particulars and comes in two kinds, physical and nominal (pp. 273-278). A picture is a physical portrayal of its sitter if it resembles that sitter. It is a nominal portrayal of a particular person or object if it has a title naming that individual and contains no features incompatible with that individual's depiction, either as he or she appears or, if the individual is fictional, as he or she is described. A given painting might be a depiction of a woman, a phy ic l portrayal of its actual model, and, via its title, a nominal portrayal of Venus. In a similar vein, Beardsley regards symbolism in literature as ge erated through repetition and salience, not artists' intentions (pp. 406-407). Also, a poem is i onic if competent critics find it so, even if irony was explicitly not intended by the poet (p. 26). When e turns to musical expressiveness, Be rdsley declares the composer's emotions irrelevant (pp. 326-339). Music's expressiveness depends on neither the composer's feelings nor the listener's affective response. Where it is joyous, music does not express anyone's joy, and while the dynamic pattern of music can be iconic with the form of affective processes and experiences, it does not symbolize or refer to these since it is neither a conventional nor a natural sign of the emotions. Musical expressiveness res des in regional qualities of the music itself. Though the characterization of these as joyful involves metaphor, such metaphors make an objective reference to musical features that can be described in technical