V IEWED some three decades later the constitutional problems posed by the Scopes case appear in a somewhat different light than they did to the participants on the scene at the time. The Tennessee antievolution law represented a last-ditch effort in a head-on collision between fundamentalist religion and science. It was an attempt to employ governmental power directly to curb the teaching of a scientific theory. In our time a more sophisticated adjustment between religion and science almost universally prevails. It is unlikely that any religious group could muster political power for an outright suppression of the teaching of science. Current efforts by religious groups to use the power of state take a different form. Mostly they involve either efforts to secure fringe benefits for religious schools, such as free transportation, lunches, or school buildings; or to use the public school system for inculcation of religious values through purely religious activity, such as Bible reading, recital of the Lord's Prayer, or the display of religious symbols. Today it is doubtful that there would be much support for a frontal attack upon scientific theory, and the attitude of the courts would certainly reflect this atmosphere. On the other hand, today most people would be far more concerned, and more divided, over the broader issue of the manner in which government should exercise control over education and the formation of public opinion generally. This issue was, of course, vigorously debated at the time of the Scopes trial. But the problem is now seen in a broader context and, the religion-science controversy apart, it is found much more complex and threatening. The penetration of government into more and more aspects of modern life, including the field of mass communication; the increasing dependence of higher education and scientific research upon government support; the many forms of pressure toward political, intellectual and social conformity-these and other factors raise grave issues as to the proper role of the government in controlling communication and molding thought and expression in a democratic society. In short today the religious issue, in the form presented by the Tennessee statute, seems fairly clear cut, but many would be puzzled and doubtful over the constitutional lines to be drawn around the efforts of the state to control the flow of ideas in the educational system and through other channels of communication. In addition today the constitutional tools for dealing with the issues of