Syllogistic Reasoning Task Research Articles

Is adolescence believed to be a period of greater risk taking than adulthood?

ABSTRACT Little is known about adolescents’ own beliefs regarding their level of risk taking or regarding peer influence on the latter. This is an important matter given that beliefs influence judgements and decisions. With the present study, we aimed to study adolescents’ and adults’ beliefs about adolescents’ risk taking compared to adults’ risk taking, and beliefs about peer influence on risk taking. To this end, an experimental design was used. A cross-sectional study included 56 adolescents and 43 adults, who completed a questionnaire asking about adolescents’ and adults’ risk-taking propensity and a syllogistic reasoning task designed to indirectly study these beliefs. Both direct and indirect measures indicated that adolescents perceived adolescence as a period of higher risk taking compared to adulthood, and believed peer presence to promote this effect. Adults perceived this detrimental effect of peers to be present irrespective of age. We discuss the implications of these results in terms of social representation.

Political ideology and environmentalism impair logical reasoning

People are more likely to think statements are valid when they agree with them than when they do not. We conducted four studies analyzing the interference of self-reported ideologies with performance in a syllogistic reasoning task. Study 1 established the task paradigm and demonstrated that participants’ political ideology affects syllogistic reasoning for syllogisms with political content but not politically irrelevant syllogisms. The preregistered Study 2 replicated the effect and showed that incentivizing accuracy did not alleviate these differences. Study 3 revealed that syllogistic reasoning is affected by ideology in the presence and absence of such bonus payments for correctly judging the conclusions’ logical validity. In Study 4, we observed similar effects regarding a different ideological orientation: environmentalism. Again, monetary bonuses did not attenuate these effects. Taken together, the results of four studies highlight the harm of ideology regarding people’s logical reasoning.

Response Patterns to a Syllogistic Categorical Reasoning Task with Abstract Groups

The current study examined response patterns of young adults (N = 861) to a particular syllogism with abstract categories that contained the fallacy of the undistributed middle. Participants had to evaluate all given conclusions. Results showed that, despite being invalid, conclusions that used the word “some” were more likely to be selected as valid or possible compared to conclusions that used “all” or “none”. In addition, we also analyzed participants’ solutions to the task at the individual level (i.e., all evaluations to conclusions that contained the end terms). The aim was to detect dominant patterns. Results showed five dominant patterns. The significance of these findings and limitations are discussed.

Role of the Hippocampus During Logical Reasoning and Belief Bias in Aging.

Reasoning requires initial encoding of the semantic association between premises or assumptions, retrieval of these semantic associations from memory, and recombination of information to draw a logical conclusion. Currently-held beliefs can interfere with the content of the assumptions if not congruent and inhibited. This study aimed to investigate the role of the hippocampus and hippocampal networks during logical reasoning tasks in which the congruence between currently-held beliefs and assumptions varies. Participants of younger and older age completed a series of syllogistic reasoning tasks in which two premises and one conclusion were presented and they were required to decide if the conclusion logically followed the premises. The belief load of premises was manipulated to be either congruent or incongruent with currently-held beliefs. Our whole-brain results showed that older adults recruited the hippocampus during the premise integration stage more than their younger counterparts. Functional connectivity using a hippocampal seed revealed that older, but not younger, adults recruited a hippocampal network that included anterior cingulate and inferior frontal regions when premises were believable. Importantly, this network contributed to better performance in believable inferences, only in older adults group. Further analyses suggested that, in older adults group, the integrity of the left cingulum bundle was associated with the higher rejection of believable premises more than unbelievable ones. Using multimodal imaging, this study highlights the importance of the hippocampus during premise integration and supports compensatory role of the hippocampal network during a logical reasoning task among older adults.

Dual Processing in Syllogistic Reasoning

The study aimed to examine several assumptions of dual process theories of reasoning by employing individual difference approach. A set of categorical syllogisms was administered to a relatively large sample of participants (N = 247) along with attached confidence rating scales, and measures of intelligence and cognitive reflection. As expected, response accuracy on syllogistic reasoning tasks highly depended on task complexity and the status of belief-logic conflict, thus demonstrating beliefbias on the group level. Individual difference analyses showed that more biased subject also performed poorer on Raven's Matrices (r = .25) and Cognitive Reflection Test (r = .27), which is in line with assumptions that willingness to engage and capacities to carry out type 2 processes both contribute to understanding of rational thinking. Moreover, measures of cognitive decoupling were significantly correlated with the performance on conflict syllogisms (r = .20). Individual differences in sensitivity to conflict detection, on the other side, were not related to reasoning accuracy in general (r = .02). Yet, additional analyses showed that noteworthy correlation between these two can be observed for easier syllogistic reasoning tasks (r = .26). Such results indicate that boundary conditions of conflict detection should be viewed as a function of both tasks' and participants' characteristics.

Reasoning and concurrent timing: a study of the mechanisms underlying the effect of emotion on reasoning

ABSTRACTNegative emotions typically have an adverse effect on reasoning, especially analytic or logical reasoning. This effect can be explained using an attentional framework in which emotion detracts limited-capacity cognitive resources which are required for reasoning. Another possibility is that the effect of emotion on reasoning is mediated by arousal, as previous research has shown that physiological arousal can be associated with decreased reasoning performance. In this research, we used a dual-task paradigm combining a syllogistic reasoning task and a time production task. Prospective timing allows to disentangle the effects of attention and arousal: time productions should lengthen if emotion takes up cognitive resources that are therefore not available for timing, whereas time productions should shorten if emotional reasoning results from increased arousal. Results from two experiments confirm the adverse impact of emotion on logical reasoning performance. Reasoning about emotional contents led to lengthened time productions, which suggests that the capture of limited cognitive resources is the main factor accounting for the adverse effect of emotion on reasoning and not arousal.

Linguistic barriers to logical reasoning: a new perspective on Aristotelian syllogisms

Experimental studies investigating logical reasoning performance show very high errorrates of up to 80% and more. Previous research identified scalar inferences of the sentencesof logical arguments as a major error source. We present new analytical tools to quantify theimpact of scalar inferences on syllogistic reasoning. Our proposal builds on a new classificationof Aristotelian syllogisms and a closely linked classification of reasoning behaviors/strategies.We argue that the variation in error rates across syllogistic reasoning tasks is in part due toindividual variation: reasoners follow different reasoning strategies and these strategies playout differently for syllogisms of different classes.Keywords: syllogisms, reasoning errors, individual variation, scalar inferences.

Contextual Abductive Reasoning with Side-Effects

AbstractThe belief bias effect is a phenomenon which occurs when we think that we judge an argument based on our reasoning, but are actually influenced by our beliefs and prior knowledge. Evans, Barston and Pollard carried out a psychological syllogistic reasoning task to prove this effect. Participants were asked whether they would accept or reject a given syllogism. We discuss one specific case which is commonly assumed to be believable but which is actually not logically valid. By introducing abnormalities, abduction and background knowledge, we adequately model this case under the weak completion semantics. Our formalization reveals new questions about possible extensions in abductive reasoning. For instance, observations and their explanations might include some relevant prior abductive contextual information concerning some side-effect or leading to a contestable or refutable side-effect. A weaker notion indicates the support of some relevant consequences by a prior abductive context. Yet another definition describes jointly supported relevant consequences, which captures the idea of two observations containing mutually supportive side-effects. Though motivated with and exemplified by the running psychology application, the various new general abductive context definitions are introduced here and given a declarative semantics for the first time, and have a much wider scope of application. Inspection points, a concept introduced by Pereira and Pinto, allows us to express these definitions syntactically and intertwine them into an operational semantics.

Concerns with the SDT approach to causal conditional reasoning: a comment on Trippas, Handley, Verde, Roser, McNair, and Evans (2014).

Signal Detection Theory (SDT; Wickens, 2002) is a prominent measurement model that characterizes observed classification responses in terms of discriminability and response bias. In recent years, SDT has been increasingly applied within the psychology of reasoning (Rotello and Heit, 2009; Dube et al., 2010; Heit and Rotello, 2010, 2014; Trippas et al., 2013). SDT assumes that different stimulus types (e.g., valid and invalid syllogisms) are associated with different (presumably Gaussian) evidence or argument-strength distributions. Responses (e.g., “Valid” and “Invalid”) are produced by comparing the argument-strength of each syllogism with a set of established response criteria (Figure ​(Figure1A).1A). The response profile associated to each stimulus type can be represented as a Receiver Operating Charateristics (ROC) function by plotting performance pairs (i.e., hits and false-alarms) along different response criteria, which Gaussian SDT predicts to be curvilinear (Figure ​(Figure1B1B). Figure 1 (A) A graphical representation of the SDT model for a syllogistic reasoning task. (B) ROC curve representing the cumulative probabilities for hypothetical pairs of hits and false-alarms (“valid” responses to valid and invalid syllogisms, ... Trippas et al. (2014; henceforth THVRME) applied SDT to causal-conditional reasoning and make two points: (1) that SDT provides an informative characterization of data from a reasoning experiment with two orthogonal factors such as believability and argument validity; (2) that an inspection of the shape of causal-conditional ROCs provides insights on the suitability of normative theories with the consequence to consider affirmation and denial problems separately. The goal of this comment is to make two counterarguments: First, to point out that the SDT model is often unable to provide an informative characterization of data in designs as discussed by THVRME as it fails to unambiguously separate argument strength and response bias. THVRME's conclusion that “believability had no effect on accuracy […] but seemed to affect response bias” (p. 4) solely hinge on arbitrary assumptions. Second, that THVRME's reliance on ROC shape to justify a separation between affirmation and denial problems is unnecessary and misguided.

The effects of presentation and content on syllogistic reasoning by children with and without specific language impairment

This study examines performance at a syllogistic reasoning task for a group of children (age 10 years) with specific language impairment (SLI) along with age- and language-matched controls. The syllogisms were presented either verbally or verbally/pictorially, and contained two types of item: imaginary versus real, both intended not to evoke strong beliefs. Children with SLI performed worse than age-matched controls, and equivalently to language-matched controls. Patterns of performance indicate this may be due to cognitive ability deficits rather than specific language deficits. For all groups, pictorial presentation interfered with reasoning processes. It is suggested that, for syllogisms, this pictorial information contextualises the interpretation of the task, and that in turn either raises working memory load or evokes belief bias. Additionally, these results suggest that caution should be exhibited before using visual aids to help children with SLI in the classroom.

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning ( N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning ( N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect ( N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task ( N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.

Evaluating the roles of the inferior frontal gyrus and superior parietal lobule in deductive reasoning: An rTMS study

This study used off-line repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to examine the roles of the superior parietal lobule (SPL) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in a deductive reasoning task. Subjects performed a categorical syllogistic reasoning task involving congruent, incongruent, and abstract trials. Twenty four subjects received magnetic stimulation to the SPL region prior to the task. In the other 24 subjects, TMS was administered to the IFG region before the task. Stimulation lasted for 10min, with an inter-pulse frequency of 1Hz. We found that bilateral SPL (Brodmann area (BA) 7) stimulation disrupted performance on abstract and incongruent reasoning. Left IFG (BA 45) stimulation impaired congruent reasoning performance while paradoxically facilitating incongruent reasoning performance. This resulted in the elimination of the belief-bias. In contrast, right IFG stimulation only impaired incongruent reasoning performance, thus enhancing the belief-bias effect. These findings are largely consistent with the dual-process theory of reasoning, which proposes the existence of two different human reasoning systems: a belief-based heuristic system; and a logic-based analytic system. The present findings suggest that the left language-related IFG (BA 45) may correspond to the heuristic system, while bilateral SPL may underlie the analytic system. The right IFG may play a role in blocking the belief-based heuristic system for solving incongruent reasoning trials. This study could offer an insight about functional roles of distributed brain systems in human deductive reasoning by utilizing the rTMS approach.

Working memory capacity and cognitive styles in decision-making

Human decision-making is thought to involve the interplay of two distinct information processing systems: a rational (logical) system and an experiential (intuitive) system ( Epstein, 1994). Moreover, the ability to engage in rational processing is believed to be constrained by working memory capacity (WMC) ( Feldman Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). Accordingly, preference for rationality, but not preference for experientiality, was expected to mediate the relationship between WMC and performance on cognitive tasks that require logical reasoning. Path analysis using AMOS 18, with data from 269 non-paired twins, confirmed this mediation hypothesis. Higher WMC was predictive of stronger preference for rationality, which, in turn, was predictive of better syllogistic reasoning, lower susceptibility to gambling biases, and lower superstitiousness and categorical thinking. As expected, WMC was unrelated to preference for experiential processing, and higher experientiality predicted poorer performance on the syllogistic reasoning task, higher susceptibility to gambling biases and greater superstitiousness.

Exploring logical reasoning abilities in schizophrenia patients

ObjectiveTo assess deductive reasoning in schizophrenia patients with special reference to whether accuracy varies across type of stimulus problem. Previous research suggests that patients, unlike healthy controls, are insensitive to emotionally provocative (salient) problem content. MethodA syllogistic reasoning task consisting of five argument types varying in salience, congruence with commonly held beliefs and meaningfulness was administered along with standard intellectual and symptom measures to 25 schizophrenia patients and 26 healthy control participants. ResultsPatients performed below control participants in all reasoning task conditions, but group differences were non significant after controlling for IQ. There were no significant interactions between group and argument type in terms of reasoning accuracy and both patients and controls performed better when reasoning with belief congruent material. In addition, no relation between deduction and paranoid symptoms was found. ConclusionFormal deductive reasoning abnormalities in schizophrenia are a reflection of the broadly based cognitive impairment documented in the illness.

Source credibility and syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments examined whether a source credibility effect would be observed for a syllogistic reasoning task. In the experiments, people were given two statements, presented as the results from a survey, followed by a conclusion that was supposedly made by one of two sources. In Experiment 1, one of the sources was described as honest and the other as dishonest, and in Experiment 2, one of the sources was described as an expert and the other as a non-expert. Because a pilot experiment showed that credibility can be overridden by people's experience with a source, all conclusions in Experiments 1 and 2 were ones that were likely to be accepted (i.e., necessary and possible strong conclusions). Both experiments showed a clear source credibility effect, particularly for the invalid conclusions. These results, along with the belief bias effect and previous research with conditional reasoning, suggest that people can be influenced by extraneous context, such as the honesty or expertise of a source, in a syllogistic reasoning task.

The neural basis of syllogistic reasoning: An event-related potential study

The spatiotemporal analysis of brain activation during syllogistic reasoning, and the execution of 1 baseline task (BST) were performed in 14 healthy adult participants using high-density event-related brain potentials (ERPs). The following results were obtained: First, the valid syllogistic reasoning task (VSR) elicited a greater positive ERP deflection than the invalid syllogistic reasoning task (ISR) and BST between 300 and 400 ms after the onset of the minor premise. Dipole source analysis of the difference waves (VSR-BST and VSR-ISR) indicated that the positive components were localized in the vicinity of the occipito-temporal cortex, possibly related to visual premise processing. Second, VSR and ISR demonstrated greater negativity than BST developed at 600–700 ms. Dipole source analysis of difference waves (VSR-BST and ISR-BST) indicated that the negative components were mainly localized near the medial frontal cortex/the anterior cingulate cortex, possibly related to the manipulation and integration of premise information. Third, both VSR and ISR elicited a more positive ERP deflection than BST between 2500 and 3000 ms. Voltage maps of the difference waves (VSR-BST and VSR-ISR) demonstrated strong activity in the right frontal scalp regions. Results indicate that the reasoning tasks may require more mental effort to spatial processing of working memory.

Logic and belief across the lifespan: the rise and fall of belief inhibition during syllogistic reasoning

Popular reasoning theories postulate that the ability to inhibit inappropriate beliefs lies at the heart of the human reasoning engine. Given that people's inhibitory capacities are known to rise and fall across the lifespan, we predicted that people's deductive reasoning performance would show similar curvilinear age trends. A group of children (12-year-olds), young adults (20-year-olds), and older adults (65+-year-olds) were presented with a classic syllogistic reasoning task and a decision-making questionnaire. Results indicated that on syllogisms where beliefs and logic conflicted, reasoning performance showed the expected curvilinear age trend: Reasoning performance initially increased from childhood to early adulthood but declined again in later life. On syllogisms where beliefs and logic were consistent and sound reasoning did not require belief inhibition, however, age did not affect performance. Furthermore, across the lifespan we observed that the better people were at resisting intuitive temptations in the decision-making task, the less they were biased by their beliefs on the conflict syllogisms. As with the effect of age, one's ability to override intuitions in the decision-making task did not mediate reasoning performance on the no-conflict syllogisms. Results lend credence to the postulated central role of inhibitory processing in those situations where beliefs and logic conflict.

“At least one” problem with “some” formal reasoning paradigms

In formal reasoning, the quantifier "some" means "at least one and possibly all." In contrast, reasoners often pragmatically interpret "some" to mean "some, but not all" on both immediate-inference and Euler circle tasks. It is still unclear whether pragmatic interpretations can explain the high rates of errors normally observed on syllogistic reasoning tasks. To address this issue, we presented participants (reasoners) in the present experiments either standard quantifiers or clarified quantifiers designed to precisely articulate the quantifiers' logical interpretations. In Experiment 1, reasoners made significantly more logical responses and significantly fewer pragmatic responses on an immediate-inference task when presented with logically clarified as opposed to standard quantifiers. In Experiment 2, this finding was extended to a variant of the immediate-inference task in which reasoners were asked to deduce what followed from premises they were to assume to be false. In Experiment 3, we used a syllogistic reasoning task and observed that logically clarified premises reduced pragmatic and increased logical responses relative to standard ones, providing strong evidence that pragmatic responses can explain some aspects of the errors made in the syllogistic reasoning task. These findings suggest that standard quantifiers should be replaced with logically clarified quantifiers in teaching and in future research.

Reasoning in people with obsessive‐compulsive disorder

The aim of this study was to investigate the inductive and deductive reasoning abilities of people with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Following previous research, it was predicted that people with OCD would show different abilities on inductive reasoning tasks but similar abilities to controls on deductive reasoning tasks. A two-group comparison was used with both groups matched on a range of demographic variables. Where appropriate, unmatched variables were entered into the analyses as covariates. Twenty-three people with OCD and 25 control participants were assessed on two tasks: an inductive reasoning task (the 20-questions task) and a deductive reasoning task (a syllogistic reasoning task with a content-neutral and content-emotional manipulation). While no group differences emerged on several of the parameters of the inductive reasoning task, the OCD group did differ on one, and arguably the most important, parameter by asking fewer correct direct-hypothesis questions. The syllogistic reasoning task results were analysed using both correct response and conclusion acceptance data. While no main effects of group were evident, significant interactions indicated important differences in the way the OCD group reasoned with content neutral and emotional syllogisms. It was argued that the OCD group's patterns of response on both tasks were characterized by the need for more information, states of uncertainty, and doubt and postponement of a final decision.

Cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and instructional set as predictors of critical thinking

This study examined the predictors of belief bias in a formal reasoning paradigm (a syllogistic reasoning task) and myside bias in two informal reasoning paradigms (an argument generation task and an experiment evaluation task). Neither cognitive ability nor thinking dispositions predicted myside bias, but both cognitive ability and thinking dispositions were significant predictors of the ability to overcome belief bias in the syllogistic reasoning task. However, instructional set (either decontextualizing or non-directive instructions) had a significant effect on myside bias in the argument generation task, as well as a marginal effect on the syllogistic reasoning task. On the latter, and to some extent on the former task, instructional set interacted with cognitive ability. The debiasing effect of decontextualizing instructions was particularly large for those participants in the lowest quartile of cognitive ability.