Swap Lines Research Articles

The Flight to Safety and International Risk Sharing

We study a business cycle model of the international monetary system featuring a time-varying demand for safe dollar bonds, greater risk-bearing capacity in the U.S. than the rest of the world, and nominal rigidities. A flight to safety generates a dollar appreciation and decline in global output. Dollar bonds thus command a negative risk premium and the U.S. holds a levered portfolio of capital financed in dollars. We quantify the effects of safety shocks and heterogeneity in risk-bearing capacity for global macroeconomic volatility; U.S. external adjustment; and the international transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, including dollar swap lines.

Fundamentals vs. Policies: Can the US Dollar's Dominance in Global Trade Be Dented?

The US dollar plays a dominant role in the invoicing of international trade, albeit not an exclusive one as more than half of global trade is invoiced in other currencies. Of particular interest are the euro, with a large role, and the renminbi, with a rising role. These two currencies are well suited to contrast the roles of economic fundamentals and policies, as European policy makers have taken a neutral stance in contrast to the promotion of the international role of the renminbi by the Chinese authorities. We assess the drivers of invoicing using the most recent and comprehensive data set for 115 countries over 1999-2019. We find that standard mechanisms that foster use of a large economy's currency predicted by theory – i.e. strategic complementarities in price setting and integration in cross-border value chains – underpin use of the dollar and the euro for trade with the United States and the euro area. These mechanisms also support the role of the dollar, but not the euro, in trade between non-US and non-euro area countries, making the dollar the globally dominant invoicing currency. Fundamentals and policies have played a contrasted role for the use of the renminbi. We find that China's integration into global trade has further strengthened the dominant status of the dollar at the expense of the euro. At the same time, the establishment of currency swap lines by the People's Bank of China has been associated with increases in renminbi invoicing, with an adverse effect on dollar use that is larger than for the euro.

How the Federal Reserve's Central Bank Swap Lines Have Supported U.S. Corporate Borrowers in the Leveraged Loan Market

<ns2:p>The cost of borrowing U.S. dollars through foreign exchange (FX) swap markets increased significantly in the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in February 2020, indicated by larger deviations from Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP). CIP deviations narrowed again when the Federal Reserve expanded its swap lines to support U.S. dollar liquidity globally—by enhancing and extending its swap facility with foreign central banks and introducing the new temporary Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) repurchase agreement facility.</ns2:p>

Price-Setting in the Foreign Exchange Swap Market: Evidence from Order Flow

This paper investigates price discovery in foreign exchange (FX) swaps. Using data on inter-dealer transactions, we find a 1 standard deviation increase in order flow (i.e. net pressure to obtain USD through FX swaps) increases the cost of dollar funding by up to 4 basis points after the 2008 crisis. This is explained by increased dispersion in dollar funding costs and quarter-end periods. We find central bank swap lines reduced the order flow to obtain USD through FX swaps, subsequently affecting the forward rate. In contrast, during quarter-ends and monetary announcements we observe high frequency adjustment of the forward rate.

Effects of the Fed’s enhanced swap line with the ECB on CIP deviations

ABSTRACT In this paper we study the effects of the enhancement of the Fed’s swap line with the ECB during the coronavirus epidemic on dollar cross-currency basis swap spreads against the euro, which had widened during the coronavirus crisis, reflecting greater deviations from covered interest parity (CIP). We find that the enhanced swap line contributed to making the three-month dollar cross-currency basis swap spreads against the euro less negative, i.e. narrowing the CIP deviations.

Mapping the Effects of Genetic Variation on Chromatin State and Gene Expression Reveals Loci That Control Ground State Pluripotency.

Mouse embryonic stem cells (mESCs) cultured in the presence of LIF occupy a ground state with highly active pluripotency-associated transcriptional and epigenetic circuitry. However, ground state pluripotency in some inbred strain backgrounds is unstable in the absence of ERK1/2 and GSK3 inhibition. Using an unbiased genetic approach, we dissect the basis of this divergent response to extracellular cues by profiling gene expression and chromatin accessibility in 170 genetically heterogeneous mESCs. We map thousands of loci affecting chromatin accessibility and/or transcript abundance, including 10 QTL hotspots where genetic variation at a single locus coordinates the regulation of genes throughout the genome. For one hotspot, we identify a single enhancer variant ∼10 kb upstream of Lifr associated with chromatin accessibility and mediating a cascade of molecular events affecting pluripotency. We validate causation through reciprocal allele swaps, demonstrating the functional consequences of noncoding variation in gene regulatory networks that stabilize pluripotent states invitro.

Strains in Offshore US Dollar Funding during the COVID-19 Crisis

This note analyzes recent trends in offshore US dollar funding markets and explores the drivers of dollar funding costs during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Preliminary evidence suggests that only part of the sharp increase in observed dollar funding costs can be attributed to the standard supply- and demand-side factors analyzed in the October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), including the dollar funding fragility of non-US global banks. Changes in market structure since the global financial crisis, as well as heightened uncertainty and tensions in the commercial paper market, may provide further explanations for the movements in dollar funding costs in late March 2020. The US Federal Reserve’s swap line arrangements have helped lessen strains in dollar funding markets, but funding pressure remains significant for some emerging market economies, notably those with-out access to the swap lines. Furthermore, tighter dollar funding conditions appear to have accompanied increases in financial stress in the home economies of affected non-US global banks and to have generated adverse spill-over effects in the form of cutbacks in cross-border lending.

Global Banks’ Dollar Funding

Leading up to the global financial crisis, US dollar activity by global banks headquartered outside the United States played a crucial role in transmitting shocks originating in funding markets. Although post-crisis regulation has improved banking systems’ resilience, US dollar funding remains a global vulnerability, as evidenced by strains that reemerged in March 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. We show that shocks to US dollar funding costs lead to financial stress in the home economies of these global non-US banks, and to spillovers to borrowers, especially emerging economies. US dollar funding vulnerability amplifies these negative effects, while some policy-related factors act as mitigators, such as swap line arrangements between central banks and international reserve holdings. Thus, these vulnerabilities should be monitored and, to the extent possible, controlled.

Global Banks’ Dollar Funding: A Source of Financial Vulnerability

Leading up to the global financial crisis, US dollar activity by global banks headquartered outside the United States played a crucial role in transmitting shocks originating in funding markets. Although post-crisis regulation has improved banking systems’ resilience, US dollar funding remains a global vulnerability, as evidenced by strains that reemerged in March 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. We show that shocks to US dollar funding costs lead to financial stress in the home economies of these global non-US banks, and to spillovers to borrowers, especially emerging economies. US dollar funding vulnerability amplifies these negative effects, while some policy-related factors act as mitigators, such as swap line arrangements between central banks and international reserve holdings. Thus, these vulnerabilities should be monitored and, to the extent possible, controlled.

The Federal Reserve’s Dollar Swap Lines and the European Central Bank during the global financial crisis of 2007–09

AbstractAlthough the literature has studied the role of the Federal Reserve as the global lender of last resort in 2007–09, many aspects of the Dollar Swap Lines to the European Central Bank need further exploration. Accordingly, we provide original evidence about the auction operations, allotted amounts and interest rates with regard to the Federal Reserve’s dollar swaps and the European Central Bank’s dollar provision. More specifically, we examine the demand side of the Dollar Swap Lines (whereas the existing literature mentions the supply side only) and we scrutinise the interest rate (whereas the literature concentrates on volumes) set by the Federal Reserve, and also the rate set by the European Central Bank. Our findings cast light on the nature of the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the global lender of last resort by coining the notion of the financial dilemma, under the dollar system within a framework of globalised financial markets.

The Hedging Channel of Exchange Rate Determination

We propose the currency hedging channel that connects countries' external imbalances to their exchange rate behavior. We present a model in which investors increase their currency hedging during periods of financial distress, in proportion to their net foreign asset exposure. This behavior coupled with constrained financial intermediation explains observed relationships between gradually adjusting external imbalances and volatile spot and forward exchange rates. We find empirical support for the hedging channel in both the conditional and unconditional moments of exchange rates, option prices, and countries' uses of Federal Reserve swap lines. Additionally, we forecast currency returns using a hedging demand proxy.

The social management of complex uncertainty: Central Bank similarity and crisis liquidity swaps at the Federal Reserve

During the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve issued billions of dollars in liquidity swap agreements with foreign central banks, serving as a global lender of last resorts. Most studies of this event have analyzed the distribution of these swap lines using materially rational frameworks, which is logical under normal lending conditions. However, this approach does not account for the extensive evidence on social influences over decisions made under uncertainty. Meeting minutes from the Federal Reserve exhibit significant flexibility in recipient selection, and the content of these discussions suggest that social dynamics were important in members’ decision-making. This paper tests the effect of social similarity between foreign central banks and the Federal Reserve on the likelihood of receiving a swap line during the crisis. I introduce new measures of social similarity among central banks with data on employees’ professional ties and public speeches in the years preceding the global financial crisis. Statistical results show a positive, significant effect for social similarity on swap line receipt, even when tested alongside material predictors, and this social rationality appears to have been a deciding feature in some cases of swap distribution. I conclude with implications for future crises, and potential regulatory consequences.

The evolution of the Offshore US-Dollar System: past, present and four possible futures

AbstractLittle has contributed more to the emergence of today's world of financial globalization than the setup of the international monetary system. In its current shape, it has a hierarchical structure with the US-Dollar (USD) at the top and various other monetary areas forming a multilayered periphery to it. A key feature of the system is the creation of USD offshore – a feature that in the 1950s and 60s developed in co-evolution with the Bretton Woods System and in the 1970s replaced it. Since the 2007–9 Financial Crisis, this ‘Offshore US-Dollar System’ has been backstopped by the Federal Reserve's network of swap lines which are extended to other key central banks. This systemic evolution may continue in the decades to come, but other systemic arrangements are possible as well and have historical precedents. This article discusses four trajectories that would lead to different setups of the international monetary system by 2040, taking into account how its hierarchical structure and the role of offshore credit money creation may evolve. In addition to a continuation of USD hegemony, we present the emergence of competing monetary blocs, the formation of an international monetary federation and the disintegration into an international monetary anarchy.

The Hedging Channel of Exchange Rate Determination

We document the exchange rate hedging channel that connects country-level measures of net external financial imbalances with exchange rates. In times of market distress, countries with large positive external imbalances (e.g. Japan) experience domestic currency appreciation, and crucially, forward exchange rates appreciate relatively more than the spot after adjusting for interest rate differentials. Countries with large negative foreign asset positions experience the opposite currency movements. We present a model demonstrating that exchange rate hedging coupled with intermediary constraints can explain these observed relationships between net external imbalances and spot and forward exchange rates. We find empirical support for this currency hedging channel of exchange rate determination in both the conditional and unconditional moments of exchange rates, option prices, large institutional investors' disclosure of hedging activities, and central bank swap line usage during the COVID-19 market turmoil.

Brother, Can You Spare a Dollar? Designing an Effective Framework for Foreign Currency Liquidity Assistance

The core principles of financial crisis management call upon central banks to lend freely, against good quality collateral, and at a penalty rate of interest, to solvent but illiquid banks and other financial institutions during periods of widespread panic and instability. While often taken for granted, these principles were designed for a world in which central banks have the capacity to create money denominated in the same currency as the one in which domestic banks and other financial institutions issue deposits and other short-term liabilities. Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. The application of these principles is far from straightforward in a world where financial institutions rely on short-term foreign currency liabilities as a source of financing. This is the world of the Eurodollar market. The global financial crisis vividly illustrated the potential systemic risks arising from the existence of a large Eurodollar market. Faced with a systemic foreign currency liquidity crisis, central banks struggled to secure access to the foreign currency reserves needed to provide emergency liquidity assistance to their domestic banking systems. In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve and other major central banks established a network of swap lines designed to provide foreign currency liquidity assistance to the international financial system. The central bank swap lines have been hailed as one of the most important and effective policy responses to the financial crisis. However, while it may be tempting to view them as an effective prophylactic against future foreign currency liquidity crises, the current structure of the swap lines fails to establish truly credible international commitments or constrain the moral hazard problems stemming from this ambitious state sponsored liquidity insurance. This Article examines the unique policy challenges posed by foreign currency liquidity problems, along with how to build a more effective framework for the provision of foreign currency liquidity assistance.

COVID-19’s Reality Shock for External-Funding Dependent Emerging Economies

COVID-19 has brought to light a reality that had been mostly forgotten in an era of ample dollar liquidity: the excessive dependence of emerging economies on external financing. The sudden increase in global risk aversion arising from COVID-19 has caused investors to rush to safe assets and to the dollar, away from no-reserve currencies. The COVID-19 shock has also sharply reduced emerging markets’ access to dollars, exports, tourism receipts and even remittances, as the shock also affects the countries where migrants earn their incomes. The fiscal and monetary room emerging economies have to respond is limited, and the lack of automatic stabilisers on the fiscal side also means that fiscal policy does not have the same redistributive effects during a severe shock as in the developed world. In principle, various options are available to confront liquidity problems: domestic monetary policy, capital controls, dipping into foreign exchange reserves, regional schemes such as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation, central bank swap lines, and International Monetary Fund programmes. But not all these options are available to most countries. Central banks’ responses to the pandemic have been much less aggressive in the emerging world than in the west, as their currencies have plummeted in many cases, increasing the cost of dollar liabilities. Capital controls are temporary and costly. Self-insurance and regional insurance schemes are unavailable to many economies, particularly in Latin America. The United States Federal Reserve has reacted quickly with swap lines to key central banks, but this is only a partial option because the Fed risks being overburdened in its attempt to provide cross-border dollar liquidity. The IMF remains the most obvious lender of last resort for emerging economies, but needs to make two changes to become more effective: a more targeted set of facilities with quicker disbursement and less conditionality; and increased financial resources.

Jumpstarting an International Currency

Monetary and financial policies that lower the cost of credit for working capital in a currency outside of its country can provide the impetus for that currency to be used in international trade. This paper shows this in theory, by exploring the complementarity in the currency used for financing working capital and the currency used for invoicing sales. Financial policies by a central bank can jump-start the use of its currency outside a country’s borders. In the data, the creation of 38 swap lines by the People’s Bank of China between 2009 and 2018 provides a test of the theory. Signing a swap line with a country is significantly associated with increases in the use of the RMB in payments to and from that country in the following months.

Odgovor centralnih banka na pandemiju KOVID-19

During the past few months, the world has been battling an unexpected and invisible threat. It has challenged all aspects of life in dealing with economic, humanitarian, and social consequences. At the moment, the economic impacts of the corona crisis are still a puzzle, but the fact is that the largest crisis in the recent history caused by a pandemic will lead to a global recession. In times of crisis, a policy-mix strategy is necessary and implies the inclusion of respective Central Banks in providing adequate measures of monetary policy for economic and financial recovery. The aim of this paper is to identify and analyse measures taken by respective Central Banks in order to mitigate the damage caused by the virus crisis and help national economies in recovery. Reactivation of non-standard measures applied in the previous financial crisis shows that the standard instruments and targets of such institutions are insufficient in emergency circumstance. The comparative analysis conducted will show how Central Banks of the largest economies and the region responded to the corona virus challenge, with particular reference to the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The results show that Central Banks opted for unconventional monetary policy measures reflected in quantitative easing, zero interest rates, and swap lines in order to alleviate the negative effects of the emerging crisis. Exceptional measures will be needed to ensure recovery in response to the coronavirus and the rapid deterioration of the global economy. The specificity of the monetary arrangement in Bosnia and Herzegovina has once again proved to be a constraint in the implementation of economic policy measures in extraordinary circumstances.

How central bank swap lines affect the leveraged loan market

The cost of borrowing U.S. dollars through foreign exchange (FX) swap markets increased significantly at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in February 2020, indicated by larger deviations from covered interest rate parity (CIP). CIP deviations narrowed again when the Federal Reserve expanded its swap lines to support U.S. dollar liquidity globally—by enhancing and extending its swap facility with foreign central banks and introducing the new temporary Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) repurchase agreement facility for foreign and international monetary authorities. Recent research by Meisenzahl, Niepmann, and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2020) shows how wider CIP deviations result in higher borrowing costs for U.S. corporations in the leveraged loan market. In this article, we discuss this finding, which suggests that, besides other channels, the Federal Reserve’s initiatives to provide global U.S. dollar liquidity contributed to easier financial conditions for U.S. corporate borrowers.

Jumpstarting an International Currency

Monetary and financial policies that lower the cost of credit for working capital in a currency outside of its country can provide the impetus for that currency to be used in international trade. This paper shows this in theory, by exploring the complemen-tarity in the currency used for financing working capital and the currency used for invoicing sales. Financial policies by a central bank can jump-start the use of its cur-rency outside a country’s borders. In the data, the creation of 38 swap lines by the People’s Bank of China between 2009 and 2018 provides a test of the theory. Signing a swap line with a country is significantly associated with increases in the use of the RMB in payments to and from that country in the following months.