Susan Stebbing Research Articles

The life sciences and the history of analytic philosophy.

Comparative to the commonplace focus onto developments in mathematics and physics, the life sciences appear to have received relatively sparse attention within the early history of analytic philosophy. This paper addresses two related aspects of this phenomenon. On the one hand, it asks: to the extent that the significance of the life sciences was indeed downplayed by early analytic philosophers, why was this the case? An answer to this question may be found in Bertrand Russell's 1914 discussions of the relation between biology and philosophy. Contrary to received views of the history of analytic philosophy, Russell presented his own 'logical atomism' in opposition not only to British Idealism, but also to 'evolutionism'. On the other hand, I will question whether this purported neglect of the life sciences does indeed accurately characterise the history of analytic philosophy. In answering this, I turn first to Susan Stebbing's criticisms of Russell's overlooking of biology, her influence on J.H. Woodger, and her critical discussion of T.H. Huxley's and C.H. Waddington's application of evolutionary views to philosophical questions. I then discuss the case of Moritz Schlick, whose evolutionist philosophy has been overlooked within recent debates concerning Logical Empiricism's relation to the philosophy of biology.

The philosopher versus the physicist: Eddington’s rejoinder to Stebbing

ABSTRACT A number of recent papers or monographs have examined Susan Stebbing's criticisms of Arthur Eddington's scientific-philosophical writing. These papers focus on Stebbing's critique of Eddington's attempt to infer philosophical conclusions from developments in modern physics, his view that there is a discrepancy between the world of science and the world of common sense (best encapsulated by his famous ‘two tables’ metaphor), and his use of ‘inexact language’ to try and convey modern scientific insights to his readers. On November 10th 1938, Eddington presented a paper at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge entitled “Prof. Stebbing's ‘Philosophy and the Physicists'”. Eddington did not go on to publish this paper and it is not discussed in relevant scholarship. However, the details of Eddington’s talk are outlined in the minutes of that meeting. I argue that these minutes provide new insights into both the Stebbing-Eddington debate and developments in Eddington's late philosophical views. A full transcription of the minutes is included as an Appendix to this paper.

Susan Stebbing on Logical Positivism and Communication

In this paper, I look at Susan Stebbing’s articles and reviews that critically engage logical positivism. These appeared before the publication of A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and helped shape the early British reception of logical positivism. I highlight Stebbing’s adoption of G. E. Moore’s tripartite distinction between knowing a proposition, understanding it, and giving an analysis of it and, in light of this distinction, her focus on whether the principle of verifiability can ground a plausible account of communication. Stebbing thinks not, and I reconstruct her reasons, as well as her own account of communication. In doing this, I relate her criticisms to her rejection of methodological solipsism and her dissatisfaction with the logical positivist treatment of statements about other minds and the past. I also argue that Stebbing’s work provides a bridge to later criticisms of logical positivism by ordinary language philosophers. Foregrounding Stebbing’s engagement with logical positivism, especially her focus on communication, paints a fuller picture of how the logical positivists came to be part of analytic philosophy despite having different concerns than many of the British philosophers engaging their work.

Reason, Emotion, and the Crisis of Democracy in British Philosophy of the 1930s

This article examines how British philosophers of the 1930s grappled with the relationship between reason, emotion, and democratic citizenship in the context of a perceived “crisis of democracy” in Europe. Focusing especially on Bertrand Russell, Susan Stebbing, and John Macmurray, it argues that philosophers working from diverse philosophical perspectives shared a sense that the crisis of democracy was simultaneously a crisis of reason and one of emotion. They tended to frame this crisis in terms of three interrelated concerns: first, as a problem of balancing or integrating reason and emotion; second, as a problem of the relationship between emotions and democratic citizenship; and third, as a problem of how to properly train or educate the emotions. Significantly, British philosophers addressed these issues most directly in writings for a non-professional audience, as they sought to translate their professional expertise into popular works that might rejuvenate democratic citizenship. This historical episode is a reminder of how philosophers were deeply engaged in the cultural politics of the interwar period and is a telling example of how personalist concerns were central to philosophy even as the “analytic revolution” was gathering steam.

Introduction to the Special Issue: Time

If you were to list the perennial issues in philosophy, the nature of time would no doubt be on that list. The essays in the present volume all touch upon the problem of time. The volume includes four contributions from different perspectives within the history of philosophy of time.Jani Hakkarainen and Todd Ryan delve into David Hume's account of time. Hume thinks there can be no time without succession. Consequently, unchanging, steadfast objects do not have a duration. They are stationary, not subject to any change. Although they lack a duration, they coexist with a temporal succession. This introduces a problem: What is the relation between unchanging objects and time? Hakkarainen and Ryan draw on what they call Hume's Principle of Quantitative Comparison. Each indivisible temporal extent is equal to any other temporal extent; differences in duration are due to the different number of temporal parts. Steadfast objects may be thought to undergo a certain number of calculable changes when they are compared to ordinary successions we experience. This experience is provided, for example, by the ticking of a clock. We have the capacity to think that steadfast objects have precise durations. We humans nevertheless cannot give any deep explanation as how we come to this conclusion.Emily Thomas focuses on the graphic representation of time. Whereas the visual representation of time has typically been done with matrices or grids, Joseph Priestley represented time in a line in 1765. Priestley's line divides time “by an equal scale” into centuries. Many have interpreted this as being evidence of a Newtonian influence, as if there is an absolute time flowing equably. Thomas situates Priestley's position in the modern debates on the nature of our ideas. She argues that the absolutist reading does not have merit. Thomas thinks rather that Priestley sides with David Hartley, who explained how we acquire the ideas of duration and time from sensation. Thomas's essay advances our understanding of the history of space-time parallelism. With timelines, the analogy between time and space becomes a possibility.In my essay I assess Ernst Mach's criticism of Isaac Newton's substantivalist account of time. Newton's argument for absolute time relates to his mathematical-empirical physics and theology. In his Science of Mechanics, Mach largely neglects the laws of motion, calculus and the omnipresence theology that is at the background of Newton's concept of time. Mach did however criticize Newton's absolutist argument on the basis that the self-existing flow cannot be observed, measured, or experimented with, and he provided an alternative relational account of time. I point out that this was not only extreme positivism or phenomenalism, but an epistemology and ontology suited for the subsequent physical theories of relativity. Finally, I argue that Mach's denial of the independent atomic structure of matter should not be entirely assimilated to his denial of substantivalism about time. The two phenomena are different, so we should evaluate Mach's reasoning concerning them accordingly.Matyáš Moravec and Peter West go through Susan Stebbing's criticism of Arthur Eddington's popular account of the passage of time. Stebbing's target, Moravec and West argue, is Eddington's largely Bergsonian view on time. She objects to the view that our minds have “a private door” to the physical reality which no measurements can disclose. Stebbing believes that our experience of the passage of time belongs to our ordinary, every-day experience, and she thinks Eddington mystifies the whole idea by leaning on a peculiar form of introspection. Moravec and West build a case for Bergson's influence on Eddington, arguing that Bergson probably did contribute to Eddington's idea of “the intuition of becoming.” Both seem to think that we may access the dynamic temporal reality in ways not captured by scientific investigation, by means of an introspective internal experience of duration.As a final remark, I think I should note, with regret, that out of the six authors in this volume only one is a woman. Let the reader know that as an editor I tried to strike a better balance. I still trust that the quality of the articles is high, and most importantly, worthwhile for readers interested in the history of philosophy of time.

Stebbing and Eddington in the Shadow of Bergson

AbstractIn this paper, we argue that the French philosopher Henri Bergson was a hidden interlocutor in Susan Stebbing's critique of Arthur Eddington in her Philosophy and the Physicists. First, we outline Stebbing's critique of Eddington's philosophical-physical writings with a particular emphasis on her case against Eddington's account of the passage of time. Second, we provide evidence that Eddington's philosophy is, at its core, Bergsonian and make the case that Eddington was directly influenced by Bergson's philosophy of la durée. Third, we lay out Stebbing's critique of Bergsonism in her Pragmatism and French Voluntarism and identify important similarities with her critique of Eddington over twenty years later. In doing so, we show that it is Eddington's Bergsonism that she is attacking. Finally, we situate Stebbing's criticisms of both Eddington and Bergson within two wider conflicts that emerged in early twentieth century British philosophy: one between an objectively describable time of physics and subjective temporal experience, and the other between science and intuition.

Susan Stebbing's Intellectualism

This paper reconstructs Susan Stebbing’s account of intelligentdealing with a problem and defends this account against chargesthat it relies on a “censurable kind” of intellectualism. This chargewas made in Stebbing’s own time by Laird and Wittgenstein. MichaelKremer has recently made the case that Stebbing is also a proximatetarget of Gilbert Ryle’s attack on intellectualism. This paper arguesthat Stebbing should indeed be counted as an intellectualist since sheholds that intelligent dealing with a problem requires propositionalthought. Yet, for Stebbing, thinking is an activity of a whole personand is enabled and constrained by their dispositions. This complexpicture of a thinker enables Stebbing’s account to resist argumentstargeting certain forms of intellectualism such as Ryle’s regressargument. It also helps her to respond to the charge that sheoveremphasizes the importance of intellectual failures. On the picturethat emerges, Stebbing offers a strikingly modern epistemology thatincorporates the social features of a person as well as their purelyintellectual features.

The philosopher versus the physicist: Susan Stebbing on Eddington and the passage of time

ABSTRACT In this paper, I provide the first in-depth discussion of Susan Stebbing’s views concerning our experience of the passage of time – a key issue for many metaphysicians writing in the first half of the twentieth century. I focus on Stebbing’s claims about the passage of time in Philosophy and the Physicists and her disagreement with Arthur Eddington over how best to account for that experience. I show that Stebbing’s concern is that any attempt to provide a scientific account of the passage of time will face problems, since the events described by physics are necessarily measured against the passage of time. I then identify views elsewhere in her philosophical corpus that can help shed light on this claim. Ultimately, I argue, Stebbing’s views on time should be construed as part of her wider commitment to ‘realism’. To be a realist, for Stebbing, is to accept a set of propositions which are a pre-requisite for even beginning to analyse the world around us. For Stebbing, I argue, part of what it means to be a realist is to accept our experience of the passage of time as something fundamental that cannot itself be subject to analysis.

Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis

ABSTRACT Susan Stebbing is often portrayed as indebted to G. E. Moore for her ideas concerning the relationship between common sense and philosophy and about analysis. By focusing mostly on her article “The method of analysis in metaphysics”, this article argues that, in fact, Stebbing anticipated some of Moore’s ideas in “Proof of an external world”, and even ideas in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. It further argues that Stebbing cast an original light on the method of analysis, while at the same time being much more aware of its limitations than Moore in “A defence of common sense”. In fact, her reservations anticipated some of Wittgenstein’s criticisms, in Philosophical Investigations, of his earlier logical atomism. It is concluded that Stebbing’s paper is a treasure trove of seminal ideas both in metaphysics and in epistemology, the full significance of which is better appreciated by reading it in connection with the work of these founding fathers of analytic philosophy.

Susan Stebbing’s Logical Interventionism

We examine a contribution L. Susan Stebbing made to the understanding of critical thinking and its relation to formal logic. Stebbing took expertise in formal logic to authorise logical intervention in public debate, specifically in assessing of the validity of everyday reasoning. She held, however, that formal logic is purely the study of logical form. Given the problems of ascertaining logical form in any particular instance, and that logical form does not always track informal validity, it is difficult to see how she could justify her belief in logical interventionism. Her answer to this problem is the contribution we explore here. It involves the view that although the logician’s expertise is not sufficient to assess arguments made in everyday contexts on its own, it nevertheless plays a unique role in giving systematicity and direction to the critique of such arguments, in particular, in public debate.

Knowledge Missemination: L. Susan Stebbing, C.E.M. Joad, and Philipp Frank on the Philosophy of the Physicists

Science popularization might take different forms. In the early twentieth century, Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington presented the most successful endeavors. Philosophers were highly unimpressed and disturbed by these popular works and various authors declared their disagreement with the physicists’ philosophical books against their own philosophical background. I will discuss three different philosophers, L. Susan Stebbing, C. E. M. Joad, and Philipp Frank, whose three lines of criticism represent three different forms of philosophy, social engagement, and scientific outlook. What is interesting is that there was a point when the most diverse philosophers (of science) agreed in contrast of their common enemy, namely, those popularizing scientists that have their reputation and use it to propagate false, or at least misleading views about science, culture, and values. What we shall see is how far this agreement went among these figures and how the divergent strategies culminated in very similar results regarding knowledge dissemination.

STEBBING ON ‘THINKING TO SOME PURPOSE’

Susan Stebbing's Thinking to Some Purpose is analysed along the lines of contemporary efforts in critical thinking, and some of the problematized media material of her time. It is concluded that what Stebbing recommends is difficult to achieve, but worth the effort.

Susan Stebbing, Incomplete Symbols and Foundherentist Meta-Ontology

Susan Stebbing’s work on incomplete symbols and analysis was instrumental in clarifying, sharpening, and improving the project of logical constructions which was pivotal to early analytic philosophy. She dispelled use-mention confusions by restricting the term ‘incomplete symbol’ to expressions eliminable through analysis, rather than those expressions’ purported referents, and distinguished linguistic analysis from analysis of facts. In this paper I explore Stebbing’s role in analytic philosophy’s development from anti-holism, presupposing that analysis terminates in simples, to the more holist or foundherentist analytic philosophy of the later 20th century. I read Stebbing as a transitional figure who made room for more holist analytic movements, e.g., applications of incomplete symbol theory to Quinean ontological commitment. Stebbing, I argue, is part of a historical narrative which starts with the holism of Bradley, an early influence on her, to which Moore and Russell’s logical analysis was a response. They countered Bradley’s holist reservations about facts with the view that the world is built up out of individually knowable simples. Stebbing, a more subtle and sympathetic reader of the British idealists, defends analysis, but with important refinements and caveats which prepared the way for a return to foundherentism and holism within analytic philosophy.

Women in Early Analytic Philosophy: Volume Introduction

Introduction to the special issue including papers about Susan Stebbing, Susanne Langer and Maria Kokoszyńska.

Book review: Siobhan Chapman, Susan Stebbing and the Language of Common Sense

Book review: Siobhan Chapman, <i>Susan Stebbing and the Language of Common Sense</i>

Analogies and Missing Premises

I have in several different treatments of analogy claimed that analogies are a distinct type of argument and should not be regarded as a species of either induction or deduction. I've distinguished between inductive analogies and a priori analogies, but have resisted interpretations of analogy arguments which would render them either as requiring generalizing inductions or as presuming an implicit premise which, when added, would render them deductively valid. I My views on analogy have been influenced by those of John Wisdom who, in his unpublished Virginia Lectures, maintained that what he called arguments by case, or case-by-case reasoning, is the most basic type of reasoning. 2 But Wisdom's views are neither standard nor well-known. Many people are hesitant about accepting analogy as a distinct type of argument. Some go even further, not wishing to accept arguments based on analogy as being arguments at all. Susan Stebbing, for instance, once claimed that so-called arguments by analogy were merely rhetorical devices. 3 Few today are likely to adopt the view that arguments by analogy are not arguments at all. But the idea that analogies are not a distinct type of argument does seem plausible to many people. There are several variations on this theme. Analogies can be regarded as all being inductive arguments, as all being implicitly deductive arguments, or as either implicitly inductive or implicitly deductive, depending on the case. It is the third view which is addressed here. Some analogies give empirical evidence about an analogue instance, claim a primary subject instance is similar to the analogue in various respects, and then reach a conclusion predicting further similarities. Such arguments strike many people as having an inductive generalization as an unstated premise, and as thereby embodying an implicit enumerative induction. Thus they might wish to model an inductive analogy as:

Compulsion and Moral Concepts

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionCompulsion and Moral ConceptsGerald B. DworkinGerald B. Dworkin Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 78, Number 3Apr., 1968 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/291681 Views: 7Total views on this site Citations: 6Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1968 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Robert C Hughes Law and Coercion, Philosophy Compass 8, no.33 (Feb 2013): 231–240.https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12013Jan-Willem van der Rijt Coercive Interference and Moral Judgment, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14, no.55 (Jan 2011): 549–567.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9262-2Jan-Willem van der Rijt The Analysis of Coercion, (Aug 2011): 5–31.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0766-5_2William I. Torry Multicultural Jurisprudence and the Culture Defense, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 31, no.4444 (Jan 1999): 127–161.https://doi.org/10.1080/07329113.1999.10756540R. A. Gonce F. H. Knight on Capitalism and Freedom, Journal of Economic Issues 26, no.33 (Jan 2016): 813–844.https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1992.11505332Michael Keeley Freedom in organizations, Journal of Business Ethics 6, no.44 (May 1987): 249–263.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00382935

Pain and pleasure: Some reflections on Susan Stebbing's view that pain and pleasure are moral values

Pain and pleasure: Some reflections on Susan Stebbing's view that pain and pleasure are moral values

Max Black. Logic and semantics. Philosophical studies, Essays in memory of L. Susan Stebbing, Published for the Aristotelian Society by George Allen &amp; Unwin Ltd., London1948, pp. 98–128.

Max Black. Logic and semantics. Philosophical studies, Essays in memory of L. Susan Stebbing, Published for the Aristotelian Society by George Allen &amp; Unwin Ltd., London1948, pp. 98–128. - Volume 15 Issue 3

J. Wisdom. L. Susan Stebbing, 1885–1943. Philosophical studies, Essays in memory of L. Susan Stebbing, Published for the Aristotelian Society by George Allen &amp; Unwin Ltd., London1948, pp. 1–4. - A. C. Ewing. Philosophical analysis. Philosophical studies, Essays in memory of L. Susan Stebbing, Published for the Aristotelian Society by George Allen &amp; Unwin Ltd., London1948, pp. 67–84. - Frank

J. Wisdom. L. Susan Stebbing, 1885–1943. Philosophical studies, Essays in memory of L. Susan Stebbing, Published for the Aristotelian Society by George Allen &amp; Unwin Ltd., London1948, pp. 1–4. - A. C. Ewing. Philosophical analysis. Philosophical studies, Essays in memory of L. Susan Stebbing, Published for the Aristotelian Society by George Allen &amp; Unwin Ltd., London1948, pp. 67–84. - Frank