Supreme War Council Research Articles

Meighen McCrae. Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918.

M<scp>eighen</scp> M<scp>c</scp>C<scp>rae</scp>. <i>Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918</i>.

Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918, by Meighen McCrae

Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918, by Meighen McCrae

Meighen McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War. The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918. (Cambridge Military Histories.) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2019

Article Meighen McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War. The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918. (Cambridge Military Histories.) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2019 was published on December 1, 2020 in the journal Historische Zeitschrift (volume 311, issue 3).

소련·핀란드 겨울전쟁과 영국의 정책

Before the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War on 30 November 1939, the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office argued positively the intervention of the Finnish problem. Though the Northern Department estimated that the Finnish intransigence towards the Soviet Union was folly, it inspired Finnish resistance for British national interest. Besides on 28 November, Churchill suggested to the War Cabinet the torpedo of the Russian ice-breaker. The French Prime Minister Daladier held the initiative in Allied policy towards Finland by Finnish strong resistance and expelling the Soviet Union from the League of Nations on 14 December. The Geneva resolution of the League of Nations intensified the British intervention towards the Soviet-Finnish War. In these circumstances. the British Chiefs of Staff that have opposed the intervention towards Finland before the Winter War endorsed the Scandinavian expedition at the cost of war with the Soviet Union by the end of December. Ironside influenced strongly a change of attitude of the Chiefs of Staff. But the influence of Churchill and Daladier was decisive. In the course of the development of British anti-Soviet intervention plans, Ling’s Report in the middle of January was the turning point of British intervention policy towards Finland. The middle of January thus must be regarded as the turning-point of the Winter War. The War Cabinet began to regard the assistance to Finland as an end. Furthermore, Daladier that suggested a plan of an expedition to Petsamo argued to expand the anti-Soviet front through an attack on Baku and Batum. Also, Churchill argued the strong anti-Soviet line through the speech of the light of freedom on 20 January. Thus by late January Churchill and Daladier began to see the Soviet Union as the main enemy. In the circumstances of the reinforcement of British intervention, on 29 January 1940, the Soviet Union responded to the peace fellers of the Ryti-Tanner government. In particular, on 12 February the Mannerheim Line was broken for the first time in the war. As a result, the Finnish military situation was aggravated severely. In the face of aggravated military situation and Finnish peace feelers, the Supreme War Council decided to send the allied regular army on 5 February. After this decision, in view of the comprehensive anti- Soviet plan Churchill pursued the military intervention to Finland at the risk of the war with the Soviet Union. Even Churchill suggested the military operation in Baku and the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, the appeasers of France argued to change the declared but unfought war with Germany into an undeclared but fighting against the Soviet Union. But on 29 February the Finnish government accepted in principle the peace terms of the Soviet Union. In the face of this situation, Churchill and Daladier tried to coerce the appeal of the aid of Finland through a threat of aid in order to prevent the termination of the Winter War. (Korea University / kssgh@hanmail.net)

Meighen McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918

Meighen McCrae, <i>Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917–1918</i>

The Polish-Ukrainian Conflict of 1918–1919 in the Context of the Rise of the Versailles System

The article studies the process of peace settlement of the war in Eastern Galicia between 1918 and 1919. The author conducts a comparative analysis of the policy of Poland and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic meant to legitimate power in the disputed region. He also studies the mediation initiative of the Entente and the conflict settlement process during the peace conference in Paris, revealing the motives of the parties’ actions. With reference to a particular example, the article mainly aims to prove that the idea of law and justice was degrading and failing due to the hegemony of western states that assumed the role of world arbiters following the defeat of the German-Austrian alliance. This status let them ignore the principles of international relations and take decisions relying on geopolitical motives and their own imperialist interests. The analysis is made with reference to archival and published sources, i.e. texts of international treaties, minutes of the Supreme War Council’s meetings, diplomatic correspondence, reports of povit commissars of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, appeals on behalf of the Polish population of Galicia, etc. Additionally, the author takes into account the achievements of modern historiography relating to the issue in question in the Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, and English languages.

Paul Painlevé and Franco-British Relations in 1917

Paul Painlevé took important decisions during 1917 as war minister and then premier. Professor Dutton examined his record in connection with General Sarrail and Balkan diplomacy. Here, I concentrate on the relationship with Lloyd George and Britain, analyse Painlevé's role both in the failed Nivelle offensive and its effects on the British Army and in the creation of the Supreme War Council that led eventually to unity of command. Although he was Premier for only nine weeks, this little-known politician played an important role in these events. My examination of that role will illuminate the troubled year of Passchendaele, demonstrating how closely it affected Britain, its army and civil–military relations.

Reply to Hasegawa

Reply to Hasegawa Yukiko Koshiro I thank Tsuyoshi Hasegawa for taking time to answer my criticism. In the limited space below, I would like to reiterate my stance against his argument that the majority of Japanese leaders clung to the unrealistic hope of keeping the Soviet Union neutral—the leitmotif of the sources printed in Shūsen shiroku. A body of little-known documents I consulted for my own research reveals the contrary. On December 8, 1941, General Hata Shunroku stated that top Japanese military leaders commonly understood that the Soviet Union would eventually enter the war against Japan. At the Supreme War Council meeting on August 19, 1944, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru explained in the emperor's presence the difficulty of keeping the Soviets on Japan's side. In mid-November 1944, Hata Hikosaburō, vice chief of staff of the Imperial Headquarters, confirmed to Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki his conviction that the Soviets would sooner or later nullify the Neutrality Pact. At the Supreme War Council meeting on June 8, 1945, Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori explained to the emperor that winning favorable neutrality with the Soviet Union was impossible and that any policy based on an assumption of Moscow's friendship was unrealistic. In spite of all these "realist" assessments, as soon as the Soviets entered the war, an effort seemed to begin to spawn a "myth" about the naiveté of Japanese leaders. For example, on August 9, 1945, Tōgō said at the Supreme War Council that Soviet entry into the war was a "completely unexpected [End Page 587] matter." On the following day, however, when he met with I. A. Malik, he never expressed hostility but reiterated his hope for Soviet-Japanese friendship. This is contrary to the conventional image of Japanese leaders being devastated by the shock of Soviet betrayal. How can we possibly explain the discrepancy between what the leaders knew and what they later claimed they did not know? How can we determine which sources tell the truth? In fact, these same questions can be raised about U.S. and Soviet behavior as well. I appreciate Hasegawa's offer to begin constructive scholarly discourse on this issue so we can obtain more diverse perspectives of Japan's surrender and possibly demythicize the war's end. Copyright © 2007 Society for Japanese Studies

Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War (review)

Reviewed by: Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War Robert K. Hanks Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War. By Elizabeth Greenhalgh. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-521-85384-2. Maps. Photographs. Tables. Figures. Notes. Bibliographic essay. Index. Pp. xvi, 304. $75.00. Many books about the Western Front during the First World War have been based solely on research in one country. As a result, the historiography of Franco-British relations on the Western Front has been plagued by persistent stereotypes and myths. Elizabeth Greenhalgh's admirable study does much to remedy this problem. Based on extensive archival research in both the United Kingdom and France, it blends together the themes of strategy, civil-military relations, liaison, and logistics. Greenhalgh's overall argument is that victory over the formidable German army was achieved only because Britain and France formed an effective partnership. That said, the path to 1918 was far from easy. The two countries began the war with no real tradition of military cooperation. This was reflected in Lord Kitchener's instructions that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) should cooperate with the French but that it should also maintain its independence. Relations between the two commanders-in-chief, Marshal Joseph Joffre and General Sir John French, were thus rocky from the beginning. While the two cooperated on occasion against their civilian masters, Joffre found it difficult from the outset to bend Sir John to his will in spite of the French army's [End Page 543] numerical domination of the front. Joffre's authority was further eroded by the growth of the BEF and the ineffectiveness of the French Military Mission with the BEF, which was initially staffed by intriguers and anglophobes. As a result, the French and British armies fought parallel but separate battles on the Somme in 1916. The result was "a complete failure" (pp. 70–71). Franco-British relations deteriorated further in 1917 as the politically divided British cabinet failed to exercise control over Sir Douglas Haig's bloody assaults. Events reached a nadir when British Prime Minister David Lloyd George plotted to undermine Haig by subordinating him to the ambitious new French commander-in-chief, Gen. Robert Nivelle. As a result of his support for Nivelle's disastrous offensive, Greenhalgh argues, Lloyd George bears considerable responsibility for both the French army mutiny and Haig's futile Passchendaele campaign (p. 154). The creation of a new Supreme War Council in October 1917 gave more institutional strength to the alliance, but failed to force Pétain and Haig to give up control of their reserves in 1918, prompting Greenhalgh to label it "a talking shop" (p. 179). Only the German March offensive forced Haig to accept Marshal Ferdinand Foch as Allied commander-in-chief. Having learned from his experiences in Belgium in 1914 and at the Somme in 1916, Foch finally achieved effective unity of command through his judicious use of reserves and his ability to navigate the shoals of inter-Allied rivalries. Greenhalgh agrees with Canadian historian Tim Travers that Foch was chiefly responsible for the victorious Allied strategy on the western front in 1918 (p. 254). Foch's successful command was supported by the Franco-British logistical effort. Following the French navy's lead, Britain successfully implemented the convoy system to overcome the U-boat challenge (p. 116). As a result, there were enough vessels to transport the American army and to meet the needs of both the civilian populations and the Allied armies. The creation of the Allied Military Board of Supply in 1918 under American and French leadership allowed Foch to shuttle reserves between crisis points on the Western Front and to pool resources. Though not free from suspicion and rivalry, the Allies' superior logistical coordination was "just as large an element in the final victory as unity of command" (p. 264). Greenhalgh's analysis is rich and insightful but not above criticism. Although she has made better use of the papers of Franco-British liaison officers than any previous study, the result sometimes over-emphasizes the importance of relatively junior officers to the detriment of more important figures. For example...

Victory through coalition: Britain and France during the First World War

Introduction 1. Coalition warfare and the Franco-British alliance 2. Command 1914-15 3. The Battle of the Somme, 1916 4. The liaison services, 1914-16 5. The allied response to the German submarine 6. Command 1917 7. The creation of the supreme war council 8. The German offensives of 1918 and the crisis in command 9. The allies counterattack 10. Politics and bureaucracy of supply 11. Coalition: a defective mechanism?

La rupture franco-britannique de 1940. Le conseil suprême interallié, de l'invasion à la défaite de la France

The Franco-British split of 1940. The Supreme War Council from the invasion to the defeat of France, François Bédarida. Could the Supreme War Council, created during the summer of 1939 to unify French and British strategies, survive the storm of May-June 1940 ? Confronted with the traumatic rout of their army, most French leaders took the path of defeatism, while with Churchill, the British opted resolutely for a light at ail costs. From then on, as can be seen by following the various summit meetings, only a few weeks were needed to lead yesterday's alies to the breaking point.

The Calais Conference of December 1915

The Allies' conduct of the Great War has frequently been castigated by historians as inept and amateurish. But it is perhaps the conduct of their diplomacy which most merits this description. Until the creation of the Supreme War Council at the end of 1917 there existed, apart from a number of liaison officers, no machinery to synchronise the strategy and diplomacy of Great Britain and France other than the periodic meetings of the politicans and generals of the two countries. Yet, as David Lloyd George came to realize, these were not really conferences at all, but rather meetings of men with pre-conceived ideas who desired only to find a formula which could obscure the underlying differences of opinion from the general view. They were really nothing but a ‘tailoring’ operation at which different plans were stitched together. What was required was the construction of an inter-Allied General Staff, designed to examine and give advice on the changing military situation. Obviously no government could abdicate its right to issue orders, but if the Central Powers were to be defeated the Allies needed to concede that there was far more to participation in a coalition than the mere lip-service to unity involved in the periodic gatherings of soldiers and statesmen. An examination of the Calais Conference of December 1915, called at a time when Allied operations on all fronts were showing a marked lack of success, will illustrate many of the failings and dangers of this primitive form of war diplomacy.

The United States in the Supreme War Council. David F. Trask

<i>The United States in the Supreme War Council</i>. David F. Trask

The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter- Allied Strategy, 1917-1918.

The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter- Allied Strategy, 1917-1918.

The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917-1918

The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917-1918

The High Command of the Red Army

T HE supreme direction of Russia's war effort is in the hands of Joseph Stalin. He is the Commander in Chief of all the military forces of the U.S.S.R., the People's Commissar for Defense, and, last but not least, Chairman of the Supreme War Council. This Council, consisting of eleven members, plays an extremely important part in the direction of the war. The chief of the General Staff, Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, holds the post of Stalin's special adviser on all military matters. According to the Soviet Constitution, the question of war and peace is among the prerogatives of the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet Parliament). In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, its praesidium enjoys that prerogative, and is entitled, in emergency, to declare war. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is also entrusted with appointments of the High Command of the Red Army, dismissals, and changes. The Sovnarkom decides the extent of the yearly draft into the army, and also questions connected with the internal structure of the army. The Commissariat of Defense controls all the military forces of the Union, the General Staff, and the Political Department of the Red Army. The territory of the U.S.S.R. is divided, for the purposes of defense, into a number of military districts, each of them headed by a committee of three, one of whom is the Commander of the Military District. Short sketches follow of the characteristics and careers of the most distinguished members of the Soviet High Command.

International Unity in War and Peace

THE solemn declaration of the Supreme War Council issued in London last week states firmly and explicitly what most people have taken for granted about the unity of the Allies in war and in the making of peace. It should now be clear to the whole world that their unity is firmly established, and that it is not merely a contribution towards winning the war but will also constitute the sure and stable foundation of an enduring peace. The two Governments, desiring to extend the scope of agreements concluded last December to all spheres affecting the interests and security of the two nations, mutually undertake that they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement, and that they will not discuss peace terms before reaching complete agreement on the conditions necessary to ensure to each of them an effective and lasting guarantee of their security.

The Japanese Cabinet

No mention of the cabinet is made in the Japanese constitution of 1889. Nevertheless, both before and after the proclamation of the fundamental law, a large part of the national administration of Japan has been initiated, directed, and supervised in a collective method by a body of officials which resembles in external characteristics the typical European parliamentary cabinet.This cabinet has never enjoyed the unrivaled direction of administration as found in many parliamentary systems. First of all, the Emperor combines in himself all the rights of sovereignty and exercises these rights through various organs including not only the cabinet, but also the army and navy and the Imperial Household. The cabinet does not have a monopoly upon advice given to the Emperor. The right to advise is shared with the Genro (Elder Statesman), the officers of the Imperial Household, the Privy Council, and the advisers of the “supreme command,” including the chiefs of staff of the army and navy, the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and the Supreme War Council. The Privy Council is the special guardian of the constitution, consulted by the Emperor upon the propriety and wisdom of projects of law, ordinances, and treaties drafted or negotiated by the cabinet, and its advice may, and often does, run counter to that of the cabinet.

Military—I–The Strategy of the Allies

Essay| November 01 1928 Military—I–The Strategy of the Allies General Tasker H Bliss General Tasker H Bliss Former Chief of Staff, United States Army; Member of the Supreme War Council in France and of the American Commission at the Peace Conference Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1928) 29 (2): 197–211. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1928.29.2.197 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation General Tasker H Bliss; Military—I–The Strategy of the Allies. Current History 1 November 1928; 29 (2): 197–211. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1928.29.2.197 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1928 by The Regents of the University of California1928 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

At the Supreme War Council, by Peter E. Wright

At the Supreme War Council, <i>by Peter E. Wright</i>