Supreme Soviet Research Articles

The parliamentary election and referendum in Belarus, October 2004

Belarus became an independent state in December 1991 on the dissolution of the USSR; and it became a presidential state under its constitution of March 1994. At the first election under that constitution, in July 1994, Alexander Lukashenko won a convincing mandate with 80% of the vote in a second-round runoff against the then prime minister, Vyacheslav Kebich. Once elected, Lukashenko moved quickly to extend the powers of his office, which soon brought him into conflict with the Belarusian parliament (then known as the Supreme Soviet) and the Constitutional Court. He sought to resolve this by calling a referendum, in May 1995, when a positive vote allowed him to expand his presidential powers. In November 1996, a further and more controversial referendum approved an extension of the presidential term and replaced the parliament with a smaller and wholly subordinate National Assembly (Natsional'noe Sobranie). This was effectively a constitutional coup, which paved the way for the establishment of an increasingly authoritarian regime.

Rehousing and Refinancing Russia: Creating Access to Affordable Mortgaging

THE HOUSING SECTOR PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE in every country's economy, acting as a potential tool for sustaining and promoting overall welfare and development. In Russia, however, housing investment constitutes only 3-4% of GDP. As a result the housing sector, and its financing, require urgent restructuring in order to cope with the depreciation of stock and infrastructure networks that has resulted from a dependence on public subsidisation. Indeed, the large-scale and pervasive under-pricing of inputs in what is collectively referred to as the 'housing and communal sector' generates problems with maintaining financial viability in both the provision of housing and utility services, further encouraging flows of subsidy transfers.1 The impact of high subsidies is reflected in the fact that Russian households on average spend only about 6% of their income on housing and utility services, a figure much lower than in the transition countries of Eastern Europe.2 Local governments continue to assume prime responsibility for the housing and communal sector, managing and maintaining virtually all of the housing stock.3 Numerous housing reform initiatives have been introduced during the past decade, all with the intention of moving this sector to a more market-oriented system. All households located in state and municipally owned multi-apartment blocks became the subjects of this reform, as residents were granted the right to privatise free of charge the flat they were occupying.4 Most crucially, it was assumed that together with this transfer of ownership title the new owners would take over the management and maintenance of the housing stock." However, no real incentives have existed for households to privatise, as rents and utilities are highly subsidised, and housing management and maintenance are still provided by municipal enterprises.6 When considering how to construct mechanisms for the resolution of this problem the development of a system of mortgage financing is integral. It embodies the utilisation of property rights by owners to reorganise their property and to exercise this right to benefit from any appreciation in the value of the property whilst taking on responsibility for the property itself. In the present housing structure the majority of the new middle class still live in mixed-tenure housing. If they privatise their flats they enjoy capital appreciation, while public finance takes responsibility for the fabric of the building. The provision of appropriate incentives, such as subsidised and accessible

Easy Come, Easy Go: Ministerial Turnover in Russia, 1990 – 2004

A CABINET JOB REPRESENTS the zenith of a political career, whether in Russia or elsewhere. Yet the turnover of cabinet members is affected, albeit in varying degrees, by the duration of the government, that is, the length of its stay in office. The goal of this study is to analyse ministerial turnover in Russia. The chronological scope of the study is about 14 years, from July 1990, when the first transitional prime minister, Ivan Silaev, was appointed, to February 2004, when the cabinet of Mikhail Kas'yanov was dissolved. The study seeks to address several questions. First, I will discuss the duration of Russian governments in a comparative perspective. Second, I will analyse the turnover of ministers in Russia. Specifically, I will examine rotation across governments and types of ministerial specialisation. I will also consider the cases of short-term and long-lasting ministers. Finally, I will inquire into the turnover of deputy prime ministers and first deputy prime ministers, who constitute a 'buffer group' between prime minister and ordinary ministers in the Russian

Voices of freedom: Samizdat

In the first socialist systsem culture was more than a realm of artistry and aesthetics.1 It was often another dimension of a fierce struggle—ideological and political—against the bourgeoisie (Whit...

Federal Reforms in Russia: Putin's Challenge to the Republics

The development of the Russian federal system has been marked by conflict, co-optation, and consensus. Emerging from the generally unitary Russian republic within a formally federal but largely unitary Soviet Union, post-Soviet Russia began its development as a federal system with little experience and few institutional structures salvageable from the earlier system. The patchwork Soviet-era constitution adapted to the newly independent political system was insufficiently clear to structure adequately political interactions across levels of society. The construction of a functioning federal system also began with the regime already at a disadvantage: In struggling for power with former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian president Boris Yeltsin advised all of Russia's regions to take as much sovereignty as they could swallow. Ultimately, although this recommendation helped Yeltsin win Russia's independence, it hampered the future development of federalism, for the regions had become mindful of their autonomy and willing to ignore central laws and edicts. The most independent category of regions in Russia under the Soviets and after are the republics, which have historical basis in Lenin's nationalities policy that was instrumental in the formation of the Soviet Union. Built on a legacy of advantage that was perhaps more de jure than de facto, the republics have been more independence minded. During his tenure as post-Soviet Russia's leader, Yeltsin worked to re-establish central authority, however. This process followed four basic stages. First, the 1992 Federation Treaty between Russia's regions and the central government stopped centrifugal forces that threatened the disintegration of the state and established Russia's republics as virtual state entities. Second, the 1993 Russian constitution began the process of re-integrating an inchoate political system following the president's victory over the Soviet-era legislature, the Supreme Soviet. The constitution eliminated almost all privileges allocated to the republics, with the exception of rights to write a constitution and maintain a local state language in addition to Russian. Third, the Yeltsin government returned some of the de jure powers it had taken away in the constitution. In some ways, Yeltsin recognized that new constitutional strictures could not be enforced, and instead threatened a resumption of centrifugal forces. Through a series of bilateral agreements signed with more than half of the Russian regions from 1994 to 1998, de facto powers held by a number of regions were selectively enshrined in law beyond constitutional guidelines. This third period was typical of Russia's tentative movement (two steps forward, one step backward) toward a more centralized, albeit still federal, political system. The bargaining process between the center and the regions favored certain republics early. Following the economic crash of 1998, still a de jure federation with strong central powers, Russia had de facto moved dramatically in the direction of a confederation, with a number of strong regions and a weak center. Fourth, in spring 2000, newly elected president Vladimir Putin began a push for political centralization. Putin formed seven federal districts guided by presidential representatives, reconfigured the selection processes for deputies to the upper house of parliament (the Federation Council), and strove to enhance the institution of local self-government nationwide. Putin's administration also has worked to bring regional laws and constitutions in accord with the Russian constitution and federal laws. (1) This last initiative has been bolstered by fiscal reform designed to raise the center's control of regionally collected revenue. To varying degrees, all of these reforms were designed to reduce the strength of regional executives. These acts and reforms guide my analysis in this article. More specifically, I examine how new political institutions and a more aggressive federal government have influenced Russia's twenty-one ethnic republics, (2) which have frequently possessed certain advantages leading to asymmetry in Russian federalism. …

A populist island in an ocean of clan politics: the Lukashenka regime as an exception among CIS countries

THE COLLAPSE OF SOCIALIST REGIMES in Eastern Europe and Eurasia resulted in the polarisation of politics.' In East Central European and Baltic countries (henceforth, Western post-communist countries2) political parties began to play an important role already in the early stage of transition. In these countries unitary constitutional regimes and free market economies are predominant. In contrast, in the politics of CIS countries informal clan relations are prevalent. It is true that since the end of the 1990s we have seen several examples of successful party building even in the CIS. However, these successful parties, such as Unified Russia and the United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, have been merely an official facade of clan relations.3 In contrast to the unitary state building in the Western post-communist countries, in CIS countries national-subnational political relations have been extremely deconcentrated, although the constitutions of most of these countries, except for Russia, declare that they have chosen a unitary path of state building. In these countries a patrimonial capitalism, advantageous not only to domestic enterprises but also to the population in general, took shape. The purpose of this article is to examine the Belarusian political regime under President Aleksandr Lukashenka as a populist one, which is uncommon for a CIS country. In order to understand this peculiarity, it is insufficient to compare Belarusian politics with the politics of other CIS countries. It can only be understood in the context of polarisation of post-communist political and economic regimes. Table 1 lists nine criteria distinguishing the two types of post-communist regime. Criterion 1: constitutional definition. While Western post-communist countries adopted either parliamentary or, at best, weak presidential systems, superpresidentialism has become the norm for CIS countries, with the exception of Moldova. These superpresidencies are the successors of the former central committees of communist parties and are functioning as a guarantee for personalised distribution of resources and assets. It is true that most CIS countries adopted semi-presidential, not pure presidential, systems. Under semi-presidential systems the president appoints the

Belarus Will Soon Be Liberated

Stanislau Shushkevich, a nuclear physicist by training, is currently the chairman of the Hramada party. He was chairman of the Supreme Soviet and head of state of Belarus, from 1991 to 1994. During this time, he presided over the summit attended by leaders of the three Slavic Soviet republics in early December 1991 at the Belovezhsky Forest. This summit brought about the decision to dissolve the USSR. As the leader of an independent Belarus, Shushkevich oversaw the transfer of the nuclear weapons in Belarusian territory to Russia, the construction of basic institutions of state, and economic and political reforms--despite inheriting a legislature overwhelmingly dominated by the communist nomenklatura. Since the reestablishment of a dictatorship that followed his fall from power in 1994, Shushkevich has become active in opposition politics and dissidence and has attempted to unify the democratic opposition to the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime. In November 2003, Shushkevich was in Washington, D.C. and Toronto to participate in two panels organized by the American Enterprise Institute and the University of Toronto, respectively, in honor of ten years of Demokratizatsiya. In this interview, Shushkevich speaks about possible paths to liberation, the unifying of the opposition, Russia's meddling, the West's indifference, and possible reform models for a free Belarus. He also reminisces about the summit at the Belovezhsky Forest, meetings at Novo-Ogarevo, and teaching Russian to Lee Harvey Oswald in Minsk. This interview was conducted in Toronto on November 22, 2003, and translated by Demokratizatsiya founder Fredo Arias-King. Demokratizatsiya: Today, Belarus has the unique position of being the only open dictatorship in Europe. But after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, of Vladimir Meciar, of Franjo Tudjman's regime and other despots, how do you think that Belarus will free itself for a second time? Shushkevich: It is quite difficult to predict these events. I would like to say, there is one thing also that differentiates Belarus from these cases. That is the amount of time it has spent under Moscow's influence. But in the opinion of the international community and in the foreign policy of Russia, Belarus is in a special situation. The thing is, and this was mentioned in our panel yesterday, it is obvious that Belarus is located in a zone controlled by Russia, and all the summons, all the pleas--lately I am getting acquainted with that term--are answered with basically, Yes, it's a dictatorship. Yes it's awful. But there is really no activity by the international community to limit Russian meddling in Belarus.... Many Russian politicians condemn the dictatorship in Belarus, [and especially] President [Boris] Yeltsin, who would give strong remarks about [President] Lukashenka, but then follow a policy of practically supporting this person. Some structures make a shy effort to explain their previous activity as an attempt to reform Belarus, with the help of the strong hand of the political will of Lukashenka, then force him to allow in democracy. This is the naive explanation that I heard the other day in the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of Sergei Karaganov. I think that for the educated people of Russia, the educated politicians of Russia, it has become clear that keeping Lukashenka is not a good idea. To predict what is the next step is sufficiently hard. He expelled from his inner circle those who were capable of logical thought [and] were capable of historical facts, and left the opposite types, who then took over him. And that type of company is only capable of awful things. In the meantime, leading politicians disappeared without a trace. It is clear that this was the doing of the hand of the regime, because it is not possible that other criminal structures carry this out in Belarus. But what will be next? Hard to say. The regime constantly exists in a state of agony. Today it enjoys significantly less support than the united opposition. …

Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism by Mikhail s> Gorbachev Zdeněk Mlynář , George Shriver (review)

774 SEER, 8I, 4, 2003 Gorbachev, Mikhail and Mlynar, Zdenek. Conversations with Gorbachev. On Perestroika, thePragueSpring,andtheCrossroads of Socialism. Translated by George Shriverwith a forewordby Archie Brown. Columbia University Press,New Yorkand Chichester, 2002. XXV + 225 pp. Index. $25.00. ZDENEK MLYNAR&kand Mikhail Gorbachev studied Law together at Moscow State University in the early 1950S. Forming a lifelong friendship, even as students they were moving towards tentative criticism of the existing Communist system. Mlyna'rreturned to Czechoslovakia and went on to become the leading theoretician of the Communist reform movement there, the Prague Spring. Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia in I969, by which time Mlynarwas in exile, contributedto his own political evolution, as he saw the consequences of the Soviet invasion. Mlynar died in I997, but between November I993 andJune I994 he and Gorbachev taped the conversationswhich are reproduced in this book. With Mlynafrtaking the lead, and often interrogatingGorbachev about his alleged mistakes,they range over their own lives, the historiesof their countries and the future of socialism. Both consider their attemptsto reform Communism, as opposed to preservingit as it was or destroyingit, to have been correct. In these conversations,both remaincommittedto theirconception ofthe socialist idea, but in a context where it fuses with elements of liberalism into an explicitly social-democratic outlook. They consider that the Soviet bloc countries were not socialist, because they were not democratic. These ideas were alreadyclear in the lastyear of Gorbachev'sleadershipof the Party,and have been further developed, since these conversations, in his Memoirs (London, I996) and Gorbachev: OnMy Country andtheWorld (New York,2000). Mlynar reports that the main aim of the Czechoslovak reformersin I968 was to achieve pluralism;they hoped to develop a multi-partysystemin eight to ten years. Gorbachev, on the other hand, says that he came in i 983 to see the need for 'democracy[. ..], pluralismand freedomof choice', but identified this with what he saw as the Leninist aim of developing '"the living creative activityof the masses"' (p. 98). He emphasizesthatthe initial aim ofperestroika was to end economic stagnation. Although he saw already in late I986 that the Partywas not playing the role he wanted it to play, and indeed was acting as a brake on perestroika,he continued for several years to believe that the way out was to put the Partyunder the control of society through elections, while still continuing 'to keep the highest level of party and government authority in my own hands' (p. I I 2). It should perhaps be remembered that Mlynarbelonged to thatgenerationof Communistswho had themselvestaken partin the riseto power of the Partyin Czechoslovakia,andwere more radical in appreciating the need to correct their own mistakes;whereas Gorbachev grew up in what was already Stalin's dictatorship,and was much less able to breakfromthe Leninistleading role of the Party. Likewise, Gorbachev'supbringingnot only led him to seek to preservethe Union, but also made it hard for him to envisage any change in its composition. Archie Brown, in his introduction to the book, declares that independence for the Baltic republicswas a 'democratic necessity' (p. x), but Mlynar gives Gorbachev an easy ride on this question. While Gorbachev REVIEWS 775 ruled out force in relation to Western Europe, state violence leading to multiple deathswas used againstseparatistsin Tbilisi, Baku,Vilnius and Riga. Gorbachev does not deny his role in sending troops to BakuinJanuary I990, but saysthat the violence against demonstratorsin Tbilisi in March i989 and the killingsin Vilnius in January i99i took place without his knowledge. He does not mention the killingsin Riga, also inJanuary I99I, and Mlynar does not askhim about this, or indeed aboutthe whole campaignwhich Gorbachev launched against Lithuania afterthe Supreme Soviet declared independence in March I990. Aside from the lack of democracy, Gorbachev sees many benefitsas having flown from the Soviet system. People did believe in socialistvalues, definedby Gorbachev as 'freedom, equality, justice, and solidarity' (p. I55). They respected labour, took pride in the industrializationof the country and were prepared to make sacrificesfor future benefit. The population became more educated and lived better. Mlynaraddsthat the existence of Soviet societyput pressureon capitalism,in the interestsof the workers;the welfarestate 'would hardly have happened without the "Soviet threat"' (p. I52). The justice of this comment is...

Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe by S. Birch F. Millard , M. Popescu K. Williams (review)

REVIEWS 775 ruled out force in relation to Western Europe, state violence leading to multiple deathswas used againstseparatistsin Tbilisi, Baku,Vilnius and Riga. Gorbachev does not deny his role in sending troops to BakuinJanuary I990, but saysthat the violence against demonstratorsin Tbilisi in March i989 and the killingsin Vilnius in January i99i took place without his knowledge. He does not mention the killingsin Riga, also inJanuary I99I, and Mlynar does not askhim about this, or indeed aboutthe whole campaignwhich Gorbachev launched against Lithuania afterthe Supreme Soviet declared independence in March I990. Aside from the lack of democracy, Gorbachev sees many benefitsas having flown from the Soviet system. People did believe in socialistvalues, definedby Gorbachev as 'freedom, equality, justice, and solidarity' (p. I55). They respected labour, took pride in the industrializationof the country and were prepared to make sacrificesfor future benefit. The population became more educated and lived better. Mlynaraddsthat the existence of Soviet societyput pressureon capitalism,in the interestsof the workers;the welfarestate 'would hardly have happened without the "Soviet threat"' (p. I52). The justice of this comment is shown by the witheringaway of partsof the welfarestate, the lack of funding for state education and the privatizationof public services in West Europeancountriesin the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union. The new introductionsby Brown and by Gorbachev himself usefullyplace the conversationsin context. While the book originallyappeared in Czech in I995, it is symptomatic of Gorbachev's loss of influence in Russia that no Russian edition has appeared yet. Despite the wave of sympathy for him immediately after the death of his wife Raisa, he is stillblamed for the chaos perceived as resulting from his attempt to reform the system, and for the collapse of the Union he fought so hardto preserve. School ofSlavonic andEastEuropean Studies PETER J. S. DUNCAN University College London Birch, S.; Millard, F., Popescu, M. and Williams, K. Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Designin Post-Communist Europe. One Europe or Several? Palgrave,Basingstokeand New York,2002. xiii + 24I pp. Tables. Notes. Bibliography.Glossary.Index. C47.50. ELECTORAL system design may not be a subjectto send the pulses racing and may be mocked in some circles as the preserve of nerdy academics, but as Sarah Birch, FrancesMillard, Marina Popescu and Kieran Williams demonstratein their excellent new book, not only was the initial choice of electoral systemcentral to political debate in I989- I99I post-Communist Europe, but those choices and subsequent amendments have done much to shape politics in the region in the following decade. Birch et al. cover much ground in their tightly argued book. After an opening overview chapter, the authorsdevote around twenty-fivepages each to Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine, before a concluding chapter brings together the book's main discoveries and arguments. Central to Embodying Democracy is the 776 SEER, 8i, 4, 2003 distinction drawn between two separate stages of electoral design: the first, which coincides with the initial impetus to democratization, and the second, which follows free elections. The relative importance of various ingredients which went into the decision-makingpot (historicalfactors,foreigninfluences, contextual factors, interest-basedcalculations)the authors argue, differedin the two stages. Wisely, Birch et al. avoid the pitfallof imposing a rigid structurefor all the chapters recognizing, rather, the diversityof design and the variations in the degrees and frequency of change as each chapter devotes itself to the salient issues, debates and changes in the country under inspection. The chapter on Hungary (one of the best in the book), for example, concentrates on the I989 Round-table agreement. The authors show that the fiendishly complicated Hungarian electoral system adopted in I989 with its two votes, three levels (I76 single-member constituencies, twenty multi-member constituencies and a national list)and the differentrulesfor the two roundsof the single-member elections 'were a result of a succession of compromises and trade-offs in circumstancesof ad hocjudgments or partyadvantage'(p. 49). The book is rich in detail and replete with numerous tables. Embodying Democracy, alongside the project's website (www.essex.ac.uk/elections) will prove to be an invaluableresource.Alongside each chapter'sclearlytabulated changes in electoral law for the respective countries, there are tables, for example, giving all...

Interpretation of Separability of an Arbitration Agreement and its Practical Effects on Rules of Conflict of Laws in Arbitration in Russia

THERE HAS been controversy as to the interpretation of the separability of an arbitration agreement in Russia. There has been a shift from the controversy between the orthodox contractual and procedural theories to that between the procedural and positive legal norm theories. The dispute concerns the rules of conflict of laws on the determination of the law applicable to an arbitration agreement in Russia. This article will consider the Russian controversy on interpretation of the principle of separability of an arbitration agreement and its practical implications for the determination of the law applicable to an arbitration agreement. In practice, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission1 (FTAC), the permanent arbitral tribunal in the USSR, had exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from foreign trade. Originally, the FTAC was attached to the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry (USSR CCI). The FTAC was renamed as the Arbitration Court by the Statute on the Arbitration Court attached to the USSR CCI adopted on 14 December 19872 (‘the 1987 Statute on the AC’). The USSR CCI, the governing body of the Arbitration Court, was officially succeeded by the RSFSR CCI under the terms of the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of 18 November 1991.3 Eventually, the Arbitration Court was placed under the Russian Federation4 CCI5 (RF CCI) and renamed as the International Commercial Arbitration Court (ICAC) attached to the RF CCI by the Law on the International Commercial Arbitration enacted by the RF Congress on 7 July 19936 (‘the 1993 Law on the ICA’). The RF CCI established the new Rules on the ICAC on 8 December 1994 (‘the 1994 Rules on the ICAC’). For convenience, the term ‘FTAC’ will be used below for all cases before the Rules on the Arbitration Court (‘the 1988 Rules on …

The Logic of Economic Reform in Russia by Jerry F. s> Hough (review)

REVIEWS 775 differentpasts, including the half-century of rule by Moscow, and different futurestoo. The problem is that an explicit theoretical model is really not an optional extra in analysing processes of social change, and the principal authors disavow any claim to 'theory testing' (the inverted commas appear in the original).But there is in fact a rudimentarytheory of state-societyrelationsat work here, smuggled in piecemeal, and expressed in the authentic voice of Parsonian functionalism. They are prone to statements like the following, which gives a good sense of the tone and argument of the book as a whole: 'Popularly perceived legitimacy -that the political system is serving the needs of the population is an importantcomponent of political stabilityin any country'(p. I89). The claim is untrue,even ifrestrictedto the specialcase of multi-partyparliamentarysystems.Western democracies (as the principal authors are inclined to acknowledge from time to time) are riddled with apathy and anomie. This study in effect diagnoses a severe case of the same ailment in post-communist states, but offers few clues about how we are to relate the survey findings to the hopes, fears and expectations of the people who answeredthe questions.Fromthat standpoint,the book provokesa sense of disappointmentat an opportunitymissedto listen to realvoices at a time of momentous changes. School ofSocialSciences LESLIE BENSON University College Northampton Hough, Jerry F. T1he LogicofEconomic Reform in Russia.BrookingsInstitution Press, Washington, D.C., 2001. xvii + 3I8 pp. Tables. Notes. Index. $I8.95 (paperback). LIKE theRussianeconomy, veteranSovietologistsface aproblemofrestructuring . Can they adapt their entrenched capacities to the post-Soviet situation? Jerry Hough's book showshow difficultthey areliable to findit. His firstfour chaptersoffera personal overview of Russia'sinitialeffortsat reshaping its economic system, beginning with Gorbachev's policies in the terminal years of the USSR, but focusing mainly on post-IggI measures in the Russian Federation. The emphasis is heavily on the first two years (199 -93) of the Yeltsinregime, with its newly liberalized markets,financial instabilitiesand helter-skelterprivatization. In chapterfive, Hough turnsto thepolitical and electoralvicissitudeswhich accompanied these early reform struggles.He gives a vivid account of Boris Yeltsin'sremarkablehandlingof thepoliticaltrianglecomprisinghis executive apparatus;the legislature (Congress of People's Deputies and its derivative, the Supreme Soviet) which increasinglychallenged him and his policies; and public opinion at large. This phase culminated in autumn I993 with the forceddissolutionof the legislatureand the formulationof a freshconstitution. The new set-up downgraded the legislature and made it bicameral, with only the lower house (theDuma) directlyelected by the population. The first Duma election, skilfullycalled by Yeltsinin late 1993 so as to pre-empt any possible attemptsto rejectthe constitution,gave a sizeable majorityto parties 776 SEER, 8o, 4, 2002 ostensibly hostile to the previous two years' policies. There followed a less turbulentre-runof the same triangulardramaasbefore, but with the question of the Presidentialsuccession looming larger than the I995 and i999 Duma elections. The politics of some of the economic debates of these later years form the topic of chapterssix and seven. A concluding eighth chapter reverts to more general reflectionson 'Institutions,MarketReform and Democracy' in today'sRussia. Hough applies his expertise as a political scientist both to grass-roots research on Russian public opinion and to analysis of Yeltsin'spresidential performance, especially his re-election of I996. The author considers and rejectsthe possibilityof decisive voting frauds.He stressesYeltsin'spopulism and patronage. He understates, I suspect, the financial and administrative skulduggery which denied the opposition (primarily Gennady Zyuganov) equalityof campaign exposure. On the otherhand, he arguablygivestoo little weight to the psychological advantage of Presidential incumbency. To vote for an opposition partyin the Duma but for the Presidentin officelookslike a natural'splitticket'in the Russiancontext. The serious shortcomings of the book, however, are in the sphere of economics. It is here that Hough the Sovietologist, so far from having restructured,is cocooned in preconceptions sustainedby an inadequategrasp of basicprinciples. The key preconception is that fundamentally nothing (or very little) has changed as regards the mechanism of economic control. The Russian economy remains state-directed. Large industrial corporations are 'quasiministerialholdings '.Gosplanhasbeen re-labelledthe Ministryof Economics. Subsidieshave alteredonly in form, not in substance. Close behind follows the related notion that Russia'seconomic reformhas above all decimated fixed investments in order to subsidize a raft...

A New Year's Message from Dmitri Shostakovich

SEER,Vol.8o, No. 2, Apr7l2002 MARGINALIA A New Year'sMessagefromDmitriShostakovich DAVID CONWAY INthe springof I999 the authorwas sharingan officein the building of the Literaturnaya Gazeta in Moscow. A Russian colleague invited him to attend the auction of books and manuscripts which was held there every few weeks in a ground floor room. At this auction, for a very modest sum, he acquired the Shostakovich holograph which is the subjectof this note. In fact the lot consisted of three items: the manuscript, which is written in blue ballpoint on a piece of notepaper 14.5 cm x I9 cm, perforatedat the top whereit hasbeen detachedfroma pad (seeFigs Ia and b);a typed transcripton a sheet of paper 2Icm x 30 cm; and a copy of Pravda for the IstJanuary I963, in which the item is printed in the top right-hand corner of page 3. It may be deduced that these items, which bear the imprint and discolouringof the same rustypaper-clip, were 'liberated' from the files of Pravda.The published version bears the headline 'To Friendship!To Creative Activity!' and reprints the manuscript verbatim, save for omission of the date '20.XII.i962' (which in the typescripthad been altered to '3o.XII.i 962'). The text, for which no stylistic grace or musical interest may be claimed, translatesas follows: I962 has been a yearof greatachievements in all fieldsof buildingour culture.Newandsignificant workhasappeared inliterature andart.Soviet science amazed the world with huge achievements.With a feeling of legitimatepridewe enter I963. It is to be hopedthata communityof all our creative unions will have begun with the New Year. Up to now there has been no genuine intercourse between writers, artists, architects, composers and workersin the theatreand cinema. And yet we all have a common aim in our work. We are all building Soviet culture.And to build it we must all be together. Forthis, we must of necessity associate with each other, to be conversantwith all the successes and failuresof our comrades in allied arts. The Party summons us to create works worthy of our people, who are building a communist society. Creative friendship, creative contacts David Conway is presently studying for an MPhil at University College London, researching the topic 'Jewry in Music I 750- I850'. A NEW YEAR S MESSAGE FROM SHOSTAKOVICH 289 amongst all representativesof literature and art, will help us achieve this honourable aim. To friendship,to creativeactivity! To the New Year!' Fl|||i g ia 1 1 :>8 4 ?f 's":~~4 prrai oef Sotkvic asa cnistn opoet of th Soit system 1 Manuscrpt in possession.of, h a,uto:r. Indeed ~so eue sem th tex tat thswo suscrbetoth prri of Shostakovich...} as .: conisen opoet of the Sovie.. i.t:.: system I Maucrpi;posesioofthathr 290 DAVID CONWAY T, - | _ | | | | 1 _ _ | |- Fig . ib may be inclined to consider it a deliberateparody of its house style. It is just what one might expect from a dutiful senior apparatchik Shostakovich had finallybecome a Partymember in i 96i and had in i1962been elected as a Leningraddeputyto the Supreme Soviet. There is, of course, substantial controversy over Shostakovich's attitude to the Soviet regime, in print (initially fuelled by Volkov's A NEW YEAR S MESSAGE FROM SHOSTAKOVICH 29I 'revisionist'book Testimony2) and, increasingly, on many sites on the internet.3 Whether Shostakovich's relationship to the regime was characterized by naivety, expediency, fear, cunning, patriotism or clandestine revolt is beyond the scope of the present note. (Although for the record the author believes that all of these played theirpart, as they did for virtuallyevery other Soviet citizen.) What the manuscript under consideration does indicate, however, is that there is an alternative to the scenario put forward by many of the 'revisionist' school, in which the composerwas constantlyforcedto put his name to all sorts of declarations and letters written by Communist authorities and organizationson pain of professionalor personalpenalty. That this was sometimes, or even often, the case, is not contested. MstislavRostropovichrecountsfindingthe composerpractisingwriting his signatureupside-down: '"It's for 'my' articlesin the newspapers," Shostakovich explained, "It's so that I can sign them when they push them acrossthe table to me without having to turnthem round to read them...

The Democratization Issues in Belarus and the OSCE

This article reviews the relations between the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and Belarus, which has become very tense in recent years. Since joining the OSCE in 1992 as a newly independent state, Belarus soon began showing signs of authoritarianism. In November 1996, President Alexander Lukashenko took steps to strengthen his control over the country by proposing a new constitution that would broaden his authority, extend his term in office from five years to seven years, and create a bicameral National Assembly in the place of the Chamber of Representatives (Supreme Soviet) -- a reversion, as the opposition would call it, to the Soviet era. The OSCE, which had been closely involved with democratization process in Europe, responded in 1998 by sending a mission, the AMG (Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus) . After making little progress, it was replaced by the even more powerless OOM (OSCE Office in Minsk) in 2003, as a result of the Belarus government's resistance. This setback by the OSCE coincided with the growing presence in Belarus of the ACEEEO (Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials), an election-monitoring body which has disagreed with the OSCE on quite a few issues. Meanwhile, it should be noted that Belarus, despite its high degree of political stability and low security risk, still displays significant repression of human rights: The correlation between traditional diplomatic relations and human rights (or democratization) does not appear to hold true in Belarus. In light of this peculiarity, and given the recent weakening of its mission, the OSCE democratization regime in Belarus will continue to suffer in the foreseeable future.

Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict

Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict by John B. Dunlop (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, xi, 234 pp, $54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper). Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus by Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal (New York: New York University Press, 1998, xiv, 416 pp, $39.50). Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power by Anatol Lieven (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, xii, 436 pp, $57.95 cloth, $25.60 paper). Prisoner of the Mountains directed by Sergei Bodrov (Orion Pictures, 1997, 99 minutes).In November 1994 Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia, was worried about his standing in the opinion polls. Elections to the State Duma the previous year had not gone well, and the legislature was now dominated by a 'red-brown' opposition of old-line communists and nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovskii's somewhat misleadingly named Liberal Democratic party. Meanwhile, chronic economic difficulties, rising crime, and increasingly flagrant corruption continued to erode Yeltsin's popularity. Even more worrisome, in the Caucasus region on Russia's southern border, Islamic separatists were threatening the Russian Federation's fragile unity.The crisis in the south centred on Chechnya, a small Muslim nation on the northern edge of the Caucasus mountain range that had declared its independence from Moscow in November 1991, shortly after the collapse of the USSR. Ironically, Yeltsin initially encouraged Chechen separatism in his campaign to weaken the authority of his archrival, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Although Yeltsin now opposed the move, over the next two years he did little to re-establish Moscow's authority over the breakaway republic. There were far bigger fish to fry at home, such as the struggle with the Supreme Soviet that had ended in a bloody showdown in October 1993.As for Chechnya, President Dzhokhar Dudaev, a charismatic former Soviet air force general with a penchant for melodramatic rhetoric and Cosa Nostra couture, had proven spectacularly unfit to govern his infant regime. With an unusually high number of BMWs and Mercedes-Benzes racing about the streets, there were many outward signs of prosperity in the capital, Grozny. Yet much of the republic's civic apparatus, such as schools and hospitals, had all but ceased to function. In the words of a British journalist: 'Dudaev seemed much more interested in the idea of calling Chechnya independent than in the practicality of making it work.' By 1994, Chechens were growing increasingly unhappy with their leader's laissez-faire style. There were many signs that his many domestic political opponents might soon force Dudaev out of office.Yeltsin was not prepared to wait. His own heavy-handed efforts to encourage Dudaev's foes had ended ignominiously on 26 November 1994, when an attempt to seize Grozny by opposition forces reinforced with Russian armour was easily quashed. The humiliation of this Caucasian Bay of Pigs only further encouraged hard-liners in the Kremlin. At the same time, although the presidential election was still more than a year away, it seemed that decisive action would surely boost Yeltsin's sagging political fortunes. One leading official reasoned: 'It is not only a question of the integrity of Russia. We need a small victorious war to raise the president's ratings.' After all, only two months earlier United States troops had easily occupied the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, in a similar operation to restore 'legitimacy' there. The Russian minister of defence, Pavel Grachev, boasted that one paratroop brigade would need no more than two hours to secure Grozny.General Grachev proved to be too optimistic. On 31 December, a day that happened to coincide with the minister's birthday, some 6,000 Russian ground troops launched a major assault on the Chechen capital. Even though Dudaev's men had done little to prepare the city's defences, it would take seven weeks of vicious urban combat and heavy artillery strikes to drive them out of their capital. …

The Problem of Executive Power in Russia

The Problem of Executive Power in Russia Lilia Shevtsova (bio) As Alexis de Tocqueville’s discussion of the American presidency reminds us, incorporating the executive power within an effective system of checks and balances is critical for the successful operation of democratic government. The dangers of allowing too much authority to the executive are visible in many third-wave democracies, but in none more so than in Russia. In fact, the Russian president today possesses powers that in many ways are closer to those of France’s constitutional monarch in Tocqueville’s era than to those of an American president. And the consequences of this undue concentration of power have gravely damaged Russia’s democratic prospects. Russia’s superpresidential regime was formed in December 1993 after President Boris Yeltsin had forcibly dissolved the Russian Supreme Soviet, closing a chapter in the history of the new post-communist state that had been characterized by an all-out battle between the executive and the legislature. As the victor, Yeltsin got the chance to build a new structure of government without having to compromise with other political actors. He exploited this opportunity to create his own “presidential pyramid” (or vertikal, a term his advisors use to describe a system of strong executive power supported by presidential appointments of loyal supporters to leading positions at all levels and frequent resort to presidential decree). In forming the [End Page 32] new regime, Russia’s ruling group drew upon the models of the American and French presidencies (it was especially impressed by General de Gaulle and the French Fifth Republic). But what Russian political “engineers” took from Western experience was the external attributes of liberal democracy and the mechanisms guaranteeing strong presidential power; mechanisms creating checks and balances to the presidency were deliberately weakened or simply rejected. The American founding fathers thought that steps must be taken to rein in ambition through a system of institutional restraints, but the founders of the Russian government in 1993 proceeded from the opposite principle, making the “Leader-Arbiter” the core of the new Russian regime. The most important component of France’s Fifth Republic was a more ordered party system and the formation of stable party coalitions supporting the president, 1 but the architects of the Russian presidency ignored the need to anchor it in the support of parties and of parliament. It is virtually impossible to remove the Russian president from office. (According to the impeachment procedure established in Article 92 of the Russian Constitution, two-thirds of the State Duma must vote to charge him with treason or some other grave crime. These charges must be validated by the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. Then, two-thirds of the Federation Council must vote to remove him within three months of the filing of the charges.) Yet the president may dissolve the Duma if it rejects his candidate for prime minister three times or passes a no-confidence vote twice in three months. Yeltsin has actively used the threat of dissolution to force the deputies to submit to his will by approving his budget, confirming his latest choice for premier, and the like. Russia also lacks a strong judiciary able to restrain the president’s authoritarian inclinations or to curb the corruption of his entourage; the leaders of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts have been chosen from among those personally loyal to Yeltsin. In short, the Russian president has powers reminiscent of those of the French monarch in Tocqueville’s time. Within the Russian executive branch there is no clear division of powers between the president and the government; the prime minister and his cabinet are completely dependent on the president. Yeltsin has shown that he can change prime ministers (he did so five times between March 1998 and August 1999) without any explanation or consideration of the balance of political forces, thereby devaluing the post of prime minister and turning the government itself into little more than a puppet. Although the cabinet’s lack of independence permits the president to have a decisive influence on all current policy, it also leaves the president responsible for all of the cabinet’s mistakes. The fact that the government does not...

Kazakstan's Political Transformation since 1991

According to the 1993 Constitution, the Republic of Kazakstan was proclaimed as a democratic, secular, and unitary state. Human beings, their life, freedom, and inherent rights were granted the status of supreme value. A presidential republic as a form of government arose from the functions of the head of state and executive. The supreme legislative body, a one-chamber parliament (Supreme Soviet), preserved remnants of the old Soviet state system in name and function, denying the principle of the division of power. The Supreme Soviet was the only legislative and higher representative body that did not correspond to its legislative function, since that implied a hierarchical power structure. As the only legislative body, parliament could not have subordinate structures. According to the Constitution, the Supreme Soviet issued laws, controlled the observance of laws, and made formal interpretations of laws. This contradicted the power-division principle, according to which it should be the legislative body only. Judicial power in the republic in accordance with the 1993 Constitution belonged to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Arbitration, which was to be elected by the Supreme Soviet. But this also contradicted the power-division principle.

Procedural breakdown and deadlock in the Russian State Duma: The problems of an unlinked dual‐channel institutional design

ONLY THREE MONTHS after T-72 tanks bombed the Russian Supreme Soviet into the past, the Russian electorate adopted a new Constitution and elected a new legislature in December 1993.1 In spite of all the change, though, it may appear that little has changed for Russia's legislature. The new State Duma shares many of its unfortunate predecessor's characteristics: its large membership is dispersed among roughly two dozen committees, ambiguity persists in its triangular relations with government and president, and its leadership body is even called a 'soviet'.2 One significant change, however, has held dramatic consequences for Russian legislative processes. The Supreme Soviet excluded partisan factions from its institutional design but, like most legislatures, the Duma has a dual-channel design with both committees and partisan factions.3 In spite of the weakness, instability and lack of societal roots of Russia's post-communist partisan organisations, the Duma's creators essentially grafted a faction-based structure onto the Supreme Soviet's non-partisan, committee-centred design. With most other environmental and institutional variables remaining constant, this affords an unusual opportunity to examine the effects of institutional design on legislative behaviour. What are the implications of increasing party strength in legislatures in states with high levels of political fragmentation? The Duma's experience vividly demonstrates that including partisan organisations does not solve a legislature's problem of managing conflict. How they are integrated relative to legislative committees determines the combination of incentives and constraints that will either compel legislators to pursue conflict-management strategies or leave them unconstrained in the exercise of individual discretion even if this means confrontation and deadlock. The Duma has an unlinked, dual-channel design, in which partisan factions and legislative committees are parallel, autonomous channels of organisation. The lack of links between the channels leaves deputies unconstrained to pursue strategies of competition, conflict and sabotage in the Duma's internal, legislative process. It renders the Russian legislature unable to manage internal conflict on legislative issues. Committees fight each other, effectively blocking each others' initiatives. Factions

Introduction

In June 1990, following the example set by Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Republic, the Supreme Soviet in Chişinău declared Moldova sovereign. Henceforth, Moldovans would recognize only those laws approved by their own parliament and maintain relations with the other republics only within “an association of sovereign states.” Formal independence came a year later, on 27 August 1991, following the failure of the Moscow coup that sought to unseat Mikhail Gorbachev and preserve the Soviet Union. In the heady times that followed, Moldovans debated basic questions of political organization and, inevitably, the difficult issue of Moldova's relationship with neighboring Romania.

Victor Amazaspovich Ambartsumian. 18 September 1908–12 August 1996

Ambartsumian's life spanned the whole period of existence of the USSR and illustrates both the difficulties of working under that system and the remarkable talents necessary to surmount them. He founded a flourishing school of astronomy in Armenia and the Byurakan Observatory. Within the Soviet Union his political skills made him a member of the Supreme Soviet and one of the most powerful scientists of his time. In astronomy, he discovered basic results in the theory of the transfer of radiation through matter. He discovered stellar associations and showed that most stars were born in such unbound expanding associations rather than in bound clusters. He came to believe, therefore, that stars were born explosively. Extending this to galaxies, he was the first to emphasize the importance of activity and explosions in the nuclei of galaxies long before quasars and black holes were discovered there. He was a pioneer of astronomical research from Soviet spacecraft.

5. On the Deepening of the Integration of the Peoples United in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Repeal of the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR “On the Denunciation of the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR” of 12 December 1991

"5. On the Deepening of the Integration of the Peoples United in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Repeal of the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR “On the Denunciation of the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR” of 12 December 1991." Statutes and Decisions, 33(6), pp. 64–65