Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Research Articles

Vigilance is the Price of Liberty

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is the only integrated command to exist in peacetime. Established in the aftermath of the Second World War, its existence is embedded in the multilateral approach to international relations and defence that characterised the post-war years. Today, as NATO adapts to the new security environment, so does SHAPE. In this article, Linda Risso offers a historical analysis of SHAPE’s development over the past seven decades and examines how the operational headquarters is preparing for the new challenges that the Alliance is facing. ◼

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer and NATO, 1948–69: a deferential leader

ABSTRACTThe Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, was an unlikely hero who rose to the challenge of France’s expulsion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from its territory in 1966. President de Gaulle’s action forced the Alliance to locate its new headquarters in another NATO country and move 800,000 tons of military equipment out of France in less than a year’s time. How to achieve this goal without irrevocably fracturing relations with France was the charge given to the Supreme Allied Commander, a man of equable temperament and – from the perspective of some of his peers – of modest talents. He lacked the authority of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the intellect of General Alfred M. Gruenther Gruenther, and the imperious temperament of General Lauris Norstad. But against the odds he succeeded in opening Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters in Belgium on 1 April 1967. This essay seeks to examine his long relationship with NATO and judge how successful he was in his leadership as Supreme Allied Commander in the 1960s.

High Hopes, Bold Aims, Limited Results: Britain and the Establishment of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950–1953

Although a great deal has been written about British policy in the Middle East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the reorganization of the Southern flank of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe after the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the assumption of NATO's naval Mediterranean Command by Britain has attracted little attention. This article analyses British aims and policy on the formation of the Mediterranean Command, the talks between London and Washington concerning the appointment of a Naval Commander-in-Chief, the attitudes of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey towards British policy, and finally, the establishment of NATO's Mediterranean Command in conjunction with the reorganization of SHAPE's Southern flank. For strategic as well as prestige reasons, Britain tried to retain its traditional dominant eastern Mediterranean position by encouraging the establishment of an Allied naval Mediterranean Command under a British Commander-in-Chief. However, the decline of British military and naval power and political influence meant that Britain secured a compromise settlement which only partially satisfied its aspirations.

The NATO strategic commanders' assessment of requirements for strategic sea and airlift

With the end of the Cold War and the adoption of a new NATO strategic concept, NATO nations now emphasize the use of mobile, flexible, and multinational military forces to be deployed for a myriad of crisis response operations outside the normal NATO treaty area. One critical shortfall for a number of NATO members has been the ready availability of strategic sea and airlift assets. Most NATO nations rely on the civilian transport market to provide dry cargo vessels and wide-body cargo aircraft. The two NATO strategic commands, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Headquarter Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), have been assessing the requirements for sea and airlift and have proposed to nations a variety of measures to improve their movement and transport capability. SACLANT staff has been developing the operations research methods to assist in this assessment. The current paper conveys the methodology and the mathematical programming model used in this analysis, using ship, aircraft, and port availability constraints. Furthermore, the paper presents a framework of the modeling and simulation capability of the NATO commands and agencies in the movement and transportation area. Additionally, the paper provides an example of the use of simulation models in follow-up activities such as high-level seminars in which national military force planners and movement and transport staff participate. During these events, participants are provided with the results from a number of transportation simulation models, in an attempt to steer the decision making process in NATO.

Operational Analysis in the Frontline

Progress across Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) has been measured by operational analysts since NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed in December 1995. The first studies were conducted at a very low level concentrating on the basics of survival By the time the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) arrived in November 1996, it was clear that the OA tools would need to be dynamic, developing alongside the progress throughout BiH. Maslow's “Hierarchy of Needs” theory was used to indicate when major changes were required to the analysis and in 1997 Measures of Effectiveness were introduced.In 1998 a further step was taken with the first Six-Month Review. This is the current method for tracking progress and is an integral element of SFOR's mission. The assessment runs parallel with a Troops to Task Analysis and together they assist SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) with determining the levels of troops required within BiH. The methodology focuses on ten criteria identified by the North Atlantic Council, and is the first study to assess the level of sustainable progress achieved within BiH. This paper discusses the necessity for dynamic OA at the frontline and how measurements of progress have developed since a cease-fire was announced in December 1995.

Devos v. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Shape) and Belgium

International organizations — Employees — Immunity — NATO — SHAPE — Entitlement of employees to exemption from taxation in receiving State — Paris Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to North Atlantic Treaty, 1952 — Article 7(2)International organizations — Employees — Legal status — NATO — SHAPE — Distinction between “civilian component” and civilian personnel — Nationals of receiving State — Status as international civil servants — Paris Protocol, Articles 3(1)(b) and 7(2) — Agreement on the Status of nato, its National Representatives and its International Staff, 1951, Article 17 — The law of Belgium

Automated interactive simulation modeling system: AISIM

A new general purpose simulation modeling tool, AISIM (Automated Interactive Simulation Modeling System), has been developed by Air Force System Command's Electronic Systems Division under the direction of Air Force Program Element 64740F, Computer Resource Management Technology. The 64740F Program Element develops and transfers into active use the technology, tools, and techniques needed to cope with the explosive growth of computer resources used in mission critical Air Force systems. The program was initiated to: 1. 1) provide for the transition of computer system developments in laboratories, industry, and academia to system program offices. 2. 2) develop and apply software acquisition management techniques to reduce life cycle costs. 3. 3) provide improved software design tools. AISIM is one of these tools. Among the users of AISIM are Air Force Systems Command Product Divisions, the Defense Mapping Agency, Naval Underwater Systems Command, and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Technical Center. AISIM is designed to provide quick answers to system performance questions during the conceptual phase of a system's acquisition. AISIM has undergone many tests and is currently in the initial operating capability phase of software development. Initial test results indicate potential for wide application to the study of communication nets, computer system architectures, and data processing functions during the conceptual stages of system development. This paper introduces the reader to AISIM—its model building capabilities and its five user interfaces.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe: Dr. J. W. Abrams

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe: Dr. J. W. Abrams

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The second annual report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR, Ridgway), to the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the operations of Supreme Head-quarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) during the period since May 1952, was released on May 30, 1953. In reviewing the changes which had been made in the period under consideration – the first year in which General Ridgway held the position of SACEUR – the report noted that “much has been done to increase our defense forces and to make them more effective” but “measured against the Soviet capacity, our progress is insufficient to give us acceptable prospect of success if attacked”. SACEUR observed that by the end of 1952, the numerical goals for NATO forces set at the Lisbon meeting of the Council had in large part been met, “although there was a substantial shortfall in planned combat effectiveness”. The outstanding deficiency of a year ago in tactical air forces had been improved both from deliveries under the United States military assistance program and from increased combat capability; nevertheless, the Supreme Commander still regarded air power as “the weakest link in our defense”. While the growth of land forces had been “encouraging” if not “satisfactory”, the same was not true of the arrangements for the supply and support of those forces. General Ridgway emphasized the complexity of the present system in which each nation was responsible for the support of its own troops; however, he felt that the situation could largely be remedied with the approval and implementation of plans submitted by SHAPE to the Standing Group in October 1952. Progress had been good, the report noted, in the infrastructure program.