Support For Income Redistribution Research Articles

Social Identification and Redistribution Preference: A Survey Experiment in Japan

Abstract What shapes preferences for income redistribution? Studies find that social identification plays an important role. In this paper, I argue that in-group favoritism generated through income proximity and out-group discrimination stemming from a nation/foreigner cleavage affect redistribution preference. Using data from a survey experiment with 4,002 Japanese citizens, I examined whether priming the poor as recipients of public assistance (or Seikatsu Hogo) generates more (less) support for income redistribution among the poor (the wealthier) and whether priming foreigners as public assistance recipients decreases support for redistribution. Analyses reveal that respondents with annual household income of 5–10 million yen negatively respond to the treatment priming the poor as public assistance recipients. Results also indicate that priming foreigners as public assistance recipients decreases support for redistribution. These findings corroborate previous research that finds evidence from North America and Europe. Analyzing a sample from Japan offers the external validity because the recent rise in income disparity in Japan involves unique characteristics including pauperization of low-income groups without enriching the wealthy. A rapid increase in the inflow of immigrants to Japan necessitates the need to study how Japanese people shape their redistribution preference in response to a growing number of foreign residents.

Does System Justification Promote Establishment Voting? Mainstream Politics in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

Throughout Europe and North America, mainstream political parties have ceded electoral support to antiestablishment parties from the far left and far right. We investigate the hypothesis that individual differences in system justification—the psychological tendency to defend and justify the overarching social system—would be negatively associated with antiestablishment voting, even among citizens who would otherwise be inclined to support radicalism. In three large, nationally representative surveys conducted in France (N = 14,432), Germany (N = 1,168), and the United Kingdom (N = 2,337), we observed that system justification was positively associated with voting for establishment parties and negatively associated with antiestablishment voting. System justification was associated with reduced support for antiestablishment parties on the right and left—even among respondents who were high on ethnic intolerance, opposition to the European Union, economic distress, and support for income redistribution. Thus, all other things being equal, system‐justification tendencies reinforce political moderation, establishment voting, and therefore social stability.

Redistribution and beliefs about the source of income inequality

Previous literature demonstrates that beliefs about the determinants of income inequality play a major role in individual support for income redistribution. This study investigates how people form beliefs regarding the extent to which work versus luck determines income inequality. Specifically, I examine whether people form self-serving beliefs to justify supporting personally advantageous redistributive policies. I use a laboratory experiment where I directly measure beliefs and manipulate the incentives to engage in self-deception. I first replicate earlier results demonstrating that (1) people attribute income inequality to work when they receive a high income and to luck when they receive a low income and (2) their beliefs about the source of income inequality influence their preferences over redistributive policies. However, I do not find that people’s beliefs about the causes of income inequality are further influenced by self-serving motivations based on a desire to justify favorable redistributive policies. I conclude that, in my experiment, self-serving beliefs about the causes of income inequality are driven primarily by overconfidence and self-image concerns and not to justify favorable redistributive policies.

Cross-Class Embeddedness through Family Ties and Support for Income Redistribution

Abstract There is long-standing evidence within the literature of class cleavages in social policy preferences. We re-evaluate class cleavages in support for redistribution by specifically focusing on the role played by cross-class embeddedness: the idea that individuals can be embedded in multiple social classes through family ties. Stronger affinity to the working class is hypothesized to be associated with stronger support for redistribution. We construct a harmonized measure of cross-class embeddedness combining information on social class positions for individuals, their parents, and their partner. The results demonstrate that cross-class embeddedness is highly common in the European context and linear probability models show that it is robustly associated with support for redistribution. Individuals who have more ties with the working classes are more supportive of redistribution and the effect is somewhat stronger for women than for men. Cross-class embeddedness through close family ties accounts for substantial heterogeneity within the upper classes. We conclude that family needs to be recognized as the unit of stratification that influences material interests and as a context of socialization that likely shapes solidarity. Cross-class embeddedness through family ties is thus important to consider in any analysis of social policy preferences.

Efficiency loss and support for income redistribution: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Income redistribution with an efficiency loss is expected to have a twofold negative effect on support for redistribution, as it lowers egoistic support for redistribution and activates efficiency preferences. This study tests whether such a negative relationship exists, increases with the size of efficiency loss and interacts with group communication and the income position. We present a laboratory experiment in which subjects receive a randomly allocated income and must coordinate on a majority tax rate using a deliberative communication tool. The rate of money lost as a part of the redistribution process is manipulated as a treatment variable (0%, 5%, 20%, or 60%). Experimental evidence shows that efficiency loss exerts a robust negative effect on support for redistribution. The effect shows a tipping point pattern, is stronger at the lower end of the income distribution and is not fully explained by egoistic preferences. Inefficiency matters mostly for the chosen tax rate after group communication. At an efficiency loss of 60%, however, group communication does not affect support for redistribution, which implies that inefficiencies tend to play a minor role in the context of redistribution as long as they are within a moderate range. JEL Classification: C91, C92, D63, D72

The economic context of solidarity. Period vs. cohort differences in support for income redistribution in Britain and the United States

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates whether economic indicators drive changes in support for income redistribution in Great Britain and the United States. Cross-sectional data from the British Social Attitudes survey (1986–2014) and the General Social Survey (1978–2014) are analysed by means of hierarchical age-period-cohort models, which makes it possible to disentangle cohort and year effects of economic context. This approach suggests that the level of inequality indeed matters for individuals' redistributive preferences. The observed patterns are more complex and intricate, however, than what is postulated by median voter theory. Most importantly, the analysis reveals cohort dynamics that have been neglected in previous research: A cohort's redistributive preferences are related to the level of inequality experienced during its formative years. American cohorts born during the post-war period of low inequality are found to be most averse of income redistribution by the government. In Britain cohort differences are markedly less outspoken and, surprisingly, the opposite pattern is found. Besides cohort effects of economic inequality, the British data also reveal an impact of the level of inequality prevailing in the year of survey. In line with an institutionalist perspective, British citizens living in more unequal times are not more, but less supportive of redistribution.

Strong Welfare States Do Not Intensify Public Support for Income Redistribution, but Even Reduce It among the Prosperous: A Multilevel Analysis of Public Opinion in 30 Countries

How tightly linked are the strength of a country’s welfare state and its residents’ support for income redistribution? Multilevel model results (with appropriate controls) show that the publics of strong welfare states recognize their egalitarian income distributions, i.e., the stronger the welfare state, the less the actual and perceived inequality; but they do not differ from their peers in liberal welfare states/market-oriented societies in their preferences for equality. Thus, desire for redistribution bears little overall relationship to welfare state activity. However, further investigation shows a stronger relationship under the surface: Poor people’s support for redistribution is nearly constant across levels of welfarism. By contrast, the stronger the welfare state, the less the support for redistribution among the prosperous, perhaps signaling “harvest fatigue” due to paying high taxes and longstanding egalitarian policies. Our findings are not consistent with structuralist/materialist theory, nor with simple dominant ideology or system justification arguments, but are partially consistent with a legitimate framing hypothesis, with an atomistic self-interest hypothesis, with a reference group solidarity hypothesis, and with the “me-and-mine” hypothesis incorporating sociotropic and egotropic elements. Database: the World Inequality Study: 30 countries, 71 surveys, and over 88,0000 individuals.

Why do the poor oppose income redistribution? An empirical test on the impacts of nationalism and fatalism

We study the poor’s psychological motivations to oppose income redistribution, relying on social identity and system justification theories. We find that national identification reduces differences between the poor and the rich in terms of attitudes toward income redistribution and self-esteem, by discouraging the poor from supporting redistribution but encouraging them to acquire greater self-esteem. Next, fatalism reduces and increases differences between the poor and the rich in terms of attitudes toward income redistribution and self-esteem, respectively. Yet, a closer look reveals that the responding patterns of the poor and the rich to fatalism are consistent only with the mechanism behind the prediction that concerns self-esteem. That is, fatalism increases support for income redistribution in both groups, whereas it reduces self-esteem only among the poor.

Shifts in Eastern Europeans’ support for income redistribution 1992–2009

ABSTRACTThis article examines how Eastern Europeans’ support for income redistribution has changed from 1992–2009. Contrary to expectations that Eastern Europeans would become more tolerant of inequality and less supportive of redistribution as market structures consolidated, support for redistribution has increased considerably. Support particularly increased during the 1990s as Eastern Europeans became more sceptical of the market’s fairness. Although support for redistribution decreased slightly in the 2000s, support in 2009 remained considerably higher than the 1992 levels. Support decreased during the 2000s because of a strengthening the effect of self-interest on attitudes as well as some regained support for the market’s fairness. The pattern of change in citizens’ attitudes suggests that support for redistribution shifts most during times of economic crisis and fluctuates to small degrees during periods of relative stability.

Why Do Women and Men Differ in Their Preferences Towards Redistribution? An Analysis of Sibling-Parent Data in a Most Gender-Egalitarian Context

This paper is about the puzzle of why women express stronger support for income redistribution than men. The analysis is based on Danish survey data (DLSY-C 2010) including information on brothers, sisters and parents and allowing us to distinguish factors within and between families. The findings are: (1) the baseline gender difference is as large within families as between families; (2) observable characteristics that differ between brothers and sisters account for only about 15 percent of the baseline gender difference; and (3) the gender difference varies substantially by socio-economic family background (parents’ sector of employment, education and wealth). In sum, the gender difference arises from familial factors not shared by brothers and sisters and varies strongly by socio-economic family background.

Support for the Welfare State Over Time: The Two Dimensions of Redistributive Preferences

Most political economy models start from the assumption that economic self-interest is a key predictor of support for income redistribution. A growing literature, in contrast, emphasizes the role of “other-oriented” concerns, such as social solidarity or affinity for the poor. These frameworks generate distinct, often conflicting predictions about variation in mass attitudes toward redistribution. We argue that this tension is in part an artifact of conceptualizing demand for redistribution as unidimensional, and propose distinguishing between redistribution conceived as taking from the “rich” and redistribution conceived as giving to the “poor”. These two facets of redistribution prime different individual motives: self-oriented income-maximization on the one hand, and other-oriented social affinity with welfare beneficiaries on the other. We find strong evidence for this framework using British longitudinal survey data and cross-sectional data from four advanced industrial countries. We discuss the implications for studying changes in mass support for redistributive social policies.

What Drives Views on Government Redistribution and Anti-Capitalism: Envy or a Desire for Social Dominance?

In debates over the roles of law and government in promoting the equality of income or in redistributing the fruits of capitalism, widely different motives are attributed to those who favor or oppose capitalism or income redistribution. According to one view, largely accepted in the academic social psychology literature (Jost et al. 2003), opposition to income redistribution and support for capitalism reflect an orientation toward social dominance, a desire to dominate other groups. According to another view that goes back at least to the nineteenth century origins of Marxism, anti-capitalism and a support for greater legal efforts to redistribute income reflect envy for the property of others and a frustration with one’s lot in a capitalist system. In this paper I expand and test the social dominance thesis using sixteen nationally representative General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center between 1980 and 2004. Because few questions of interest were asked in most years or of most respondents, the sample sizes used for analyses vary from 535 to 15,743. I first show that respondents who express traditionally racist views (on segregation, interracial marriage, and inborn racial abilities) tend to support greater income redistribution. Traditional racists also tend to oppose free-market capitalism and its consequences, wanting the government to guarantee jobs for everyone and fix prices, wages, and profits. Next, I report a similar pattern for those who express intolerance for unpopular groups on the fifteen Stouffer tolerance questions (regarding racists, homosexuals, communists, extreme militarists, and atheists). Those who express less tolerance for unpopular groups tend to favor income redistribution and oppose capitalism. Then I present the results of six full latent variable structural equation models. The latent variables traditional racism (Model 1: r=.27) and intolerance (Model 2: r=.31) predict the latent variable income redistribution. Similarly, the latent variables traditional racism (Model 3: r=.33) and intolerance (Model 4: r=.36) predict anti-capitalism. Controlling for education, income (log), gender, and age (Models 5 and 6), the effects of the racism and intolerance predictors on redistribution and intolerance are reduced, but remain significant. Thus the preference against income redistribution, for example, is not just the result of income or education - rather, the data are consistent with racism and intolerance continuing to play a small, but significant role in explaining the support for income redistribution and anti-capitalism. The data are broadly inconsistent with the standard belief in the social psychology literature that pro-capitalist and anti-redistributionist views are positively associated with racism. I then explore an alternative hypothesis, showing that, compared to anti-redistributionists, strong redistributionists have about two to three times higher odds of reporting that in the prior seven days they were angry, mad at someone, outraged, sad, lonely, and had trouble shaking the blues. Similarly, anti-redistributionists had about two to four times higher odds of reporting being happy or at ease. Not only do redistributionists report more anger, but they report that their anger lasts longer. When asked about the last time they were angry, strong redistributionists were more than twice as likely as strong opponents of leveling to admit that they responded to their anger by plotting revenge. Last, both redistributionists and anti-capitalists expressed lower overall happiness, less happy marriages, and lower satisfaction with their financial situations and with their jobs or housework. Further, in the 2002 and 2004 General Social Surveys anti-redistributionists were generally more likely to report altruistic behavior. In particular, those who opposed more government redistribution of income were much more likely to donate money to charities, religious organizations, and political candidates. The one sort of altruistic behavior that the redistributionists were more likely to engage in was giving money to a homeless person on the street. Evidence from sixteen national representative samples from 1980 through 2004 tends to suggest that Social Dominance Orientation has been in part misconceived. In the United States, segments of the academic community seem to have reversed the relationship between pro-capitalism and income redistribution on the one hand, and racism and intolerance on the other. Those who support capitalism and oppose greater income redistribution tend to be better educated, to have higher family incomes, to be less traditionally racist, and to be less intolerant of unpopular groups. Those who oppose greater redistribution also tend to be more generous in donating to charities and more likely to engage in some other altruistic behavior. The academic assumption that anti-capitalism and opposition to income redistribution reflect an orientation toward social dominance seems unwarranted.

Partisan Preference and Income Redistribution: Cross-National and Cross-Sexual Results

AbstractThe relationships between attitudes toward income redistribution and partisan preferences are examined and contrasted in Canadian and American samples of college students. In both samples evidence is found that there is a strong relationship between the variables among males and an absence of a relationship among females. In Canada, support for income redistribution is strongly positively correlated with support for the New Democratic party, positively correlated with support for the Liberal party, and strongly negatively correlated with support for the Progressive Conservative party. In the United States support for income redistribution is strongly positively correlated with support for the Democratic party and strongly negatively correlated with support for the Republican party. Cross-national differences are also found between Canadian and American subjects, Canadian subjects having significantly lower variance among party supporters regarding this issue. Some implications of the results for research in the area of sex differences in politics and the influence of economic concerns on political behaviour are discussed briefly.