Climate Policy Support Research Articles

French attitudes on climate change, carbon taxation and other climate policies

This paper aims to assess the prospects for French climate policies after the Yellow Vests crisis halted the planned increase in the carbon tax. From a large representative survey, we elicit knowledge, perceptions and values over climate change, we examine opinions relative to carbon taxation, and we assess support for other climate policies. Specific attention is given to the link between perceptions of climate change and attitudes towards policies. The paper also studies in detail the determinants of attitudes in terms of political and socio-demographic variables. Among many results, we find limited knowledge but high concern for climate change. We also document a large rejection of the carbon tax but majority support for stricter norms and green investments, and reveal the rationales behind these preferences. Our study entails policy recommendations, such as an information campaign on climate change. Indeed, we find that climate awareness increases support for climate policies but no evidence for the formation of opinions through partisan cues as in the US, suggesting that better access to science could foster support for climate policies.

Personal harm and support for climate change mitigation policies: Evidence from 10 U.S. communities impacted by extreme weather

A growing body of research examines the role of extreme weather experience—as one of the most personal, visceral (and increasingly frequent and severe) impacts of climate change—in shaping views on climate change. A remaining question is whether the experience of an extreme weather event increases climate change concern via experiential learning or reinforces existing views via motivated reasoning. Building on this work, we explore the relationship between personal experience and climate change policy preferences using surveys in 10 communities that experienced extreme weather events (3 tornadoes, 3 floods, 2 wildfires, 1 hurricane and 1 landslide). We find that self-reported personal harm aligns with objective measures of event impacts and that personal harm (i.e., experience) is associated with higher levels of policy support. However, we do not find that objective measures of event impacts are related to policy support. Though political ideology (i.e., motivated reasoning) dominates our model of policy support in predictable ways, personal harm moderates this relationship suggesting that conservatives reporting higher levels of personal harm from the event are, on average, more likely to express support for climate policy than those reporting lower levels of harm. We postulate that while extreme weather events may serve as teachable moments on climate change, their lessons may only reach conservatives who feel personally harmed, even in the communities most affected.

Simple interventions can correct misperceptions of home energy use

Public estimates of energy use suffer from severe biases. Failure to correct these may hinder efforts to conserve energy and undermine support for evidence-based policies. Here we present a randomized online experiment that showed that home energy perceptions can be improved. We tested two simple, potentially scalable interventions: providing numerical information (in watt-hours) about extremes of energy use and providing an explicit heuristic that addressed a common misperception. Both succeeded in improving numerical estimates of energy use, but in different ways. Numerical information about extremes primarily improved the use of the watt-hours response scale, while the heuristic improved underlying understanding of relative energy use. As a result, only the heuristic significantly benefitted judgements about energy-conserving behaviours. Because understanding of energy use also predicted self-reported energy-conservation behaviour, belief in climate change, and support for climate policies, targeting energy misperceptions may have the potential to shape individual behaviour and national policy support. People make systematic errors when estimating the energy used by household appliances. This study shows that providing numerical information about extremes improves the use of the response scale, while a heuristic addressing a common misperception improves the underlying understanding of relative energy use.

A New Path for U.S. Climate Politics: Choosing Policies That Mobilize Business for Decarbonization

What policies could mobilize business support for progressive and durable national climate policy in the United States? I examine the climate policy experiences of U.S. states and propose that a national clean energy standard combined with carefully allocated public investment in clean energy infrastructure and innovation could mobilize economic interests in support of decarbonization. Further, I argue that the more entrenched clean energy and infrastructure become, the more likely it becomes that comprehensive climate policies can be passed in the future. This includes performance and deployment mandates beyond the electricity industry, including in the transport and building sectors. These initial steps may also help to build a winning coalition for progressive federal carbon pricing, as opposed to an accommodative coalition in support of weak carbon pricing.

Hype and hope? Mind-body practice predicts pro-environmental engagement through global identity

Humanity is facing global environmental challenges and a global identity has been found to predict pro-environmental engagement. As the origins of a global identity are not broadly understood, we aimed to contribute to investigating its predictors. One way to cultivate a global identity might be through the mind-body practices of yoga and meditation that an increasing number of people pursue, as it is one traditional goal of these practices to evoke a sense of connectedness with all humans. In our online survey study, we compared 113 mind-body practitioners with 145 non-practitioners and found that mind-body practice positively predicted one of two dimensions of a global identity – namely global self-definition –, pro-environmental behaviour, and climate policy support. Moreover, mind-body practice positively and indirectly predicted pro-environmental behaviour as well as climate policy support through a stronger global self-definition. We thus suggest that mind-body practices might bear the potential for contributing to a sustainable society and that their causal effects on global identity should be examined in future research.

Public Support for Sustainable Welfare Compared: Links between Attitudes towards Climate and Welfare Policies

The emerging concept of sustainable welfare attempts to integrate environmental sustainability and social welfare research. Oriented at a mid-term re-embedding of Western production and consumption norms into planetary limits, it suggests the development of “eco-social” policies in the rich countries. In this theoretical context, this article empirically investigates the relationships between attitudes towards welfare and climate policy in 23 countries. Using 2016 data from the European Social Survey, we explored patterns of synergy between both kinds of policies as well as effects of crowding-out, where support for one kind of policy involves refusing the other. Since previous research addressed the role of welfare states and their institutional foundations in establishing environmentally sustainable societies, we studied how attitudes towards welfare and climate policies differ according to welfare regime affiliation. Additionally, we examined how a range of socio-demographic and political factors such as class, education, income, and political position shape people’s views on welfare and climate policy goals. The results of a multiple correspondence analysis indicate that the simultaneous support of welfare and climate policies follows welfare regime lines in that this support is the highest among social-democratic countries. However, also some conservative and Mediterranean countries score high in this regard. At the individual level, people with a higher education, employees in socio-cultural professions, and voters of moderate left and green parties display the highest mutual support for welfare and climate policies.

Motivated Attention in Climate Change Perception and Action

Despite the scientific consensus, some people still remain skeptical about climate change. In fact, there is a growing partisan divide over the last decade within the United States in the support for climate policies. Given the same climate evidence, why do some people become concerned while others remain unconvinced? Here we propose a motivated attention framework where socio-political motivations shape visual attention to climate evidence, altering perceptions of the evidence and subsequent actions to mitigate climate change. To seek support for this framework, we conducted three experiments. Participants viewed a graph of annual global temperature change while they were eyetracked and estimated the average change. We found that political orientation may bias attention to climate change evidence, altering the perception of the same evidence (Experiment 1). We further examined how attentional biases influence subsequent actions to mitigate climate change. We found that liberals were more likely to sign a climate petition or more willing to donate to an environmental organization than conservatives, and attention guides climate actions in different ways for liberals and conservatives (Experiment 2). To seek causal evidence, we biased attention to different parts of the temperature curve by coloring stronger climate evidence in red or weak climate evidence in red. We found that liberals were more likely to sign the petition or more willing to donate when stronger evidence was in red, but conservatives were less likely to act when stronger evidence was in red (Experiment 3). This suggests that drawing attention to motivationally consistent information increases actions in liberals, but discouraged conservatives. The findings provide initial preliminary evidence for the motivated attention framework, suggesting an attentional divide between liberals and conservatives in the perception of climate evidence. This divide might further reinforce prior beliefs about climate change, creating further polarization. The current study raises a possible attentional mechanism for ideologically motivated reasoning and its impact on basic perceptual processes. It also provides implications for the communication of climate science to different socio-political groups with the goal of mobilizing actions on climate change.

Carbon emissions and climate policy support by local governments in California: a qualitative comparative analysis at the county level

Drawing from the existing social science literature, we examine the relationship between fossil fuel use and the adoption of policy to address climate change at the local level. In our analysis, we incorporate direct measures of fossil fuel use in a manner that allows us to distinguish carbon emissions from consumption-based and production-based activities. Focusing on the 36 most populous and urbanized counties within the state of California, we merge these emissions, along with other political and economic measures, with an indicator of extensive policy support derived from climate agreement signatories. We then use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine conditions that are sufficient for broad adoption of climate policy within a given county. Based on the results, we frame consumption-based and production-based emissions as distinctive in the way that their relationship with climate policy adoption depends on other favorable political and economic conditions. In particular, we identify several routes to extensive adoption for counties that have a combination of low emissions and a favorable political environment. In the conclusion, we discuss the QCA findings and elaborate on the theoretical and practical implications for efforts to understand and to promote carbon reduction efforts at the local level.

Knowing how and knowing when: unpacking public understanding of atmospheric CO2 accumulation

It has been demonstrated that most people have a limited understanding of atmospheric CO2 accumulation. Labeled stock-flow (SF) failure, this phenomenon has even been suggested as an explanation for weak climate policy support. Drawing on a typology of knowledge, we set out to nuance previous research by distinguishing between different types of knowledge of CO2 accumulation among the public and by exploring ways of reasoning underlying SF failure. A mixed methods approach was used and participants (N = 214) were enrolled in an open online course. We find that ostensibly similar SF tasks show seemingly contradictory results in terms of people’s understanding of CO2 accumulation. Participants performed significantly better on stock stabilization tasks that explicitly ask about the relationship between stocks and flows, compared with a typical SF task that does not direct the participants’ attention to what knowledge they should use. This suggests that people possess declarative and procedural knowledge of accumulation (knowing about the principles of mass balance, i.e., what and how to use them) but lack conditional knowledge of accumulation (knowing when to use these principles). Additionally, through a thematic analysis of answers to an open-ended question, we identified three overarching ways of reasoning when dealing with SF tasks: system, pattern, and phenomenological reasoning, providing additional theoretical insights to explain the large difference in performance between the different SF tasks. These more nuanced perspectives on SF failure can help inform interventions aimed at increasing climate science literacy and point to the need for more detailed explorations of public knowledge needed to leverage climate policy support.

Commitment-Failures Are Unlikely to Undermine Public Support for the Paris Agreement.

Success of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which is founded on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), hinges on whether domestic support for international environmental agreements would be undermined if countries that are crucial to the global effort fail to reduce their emissions. Here we find that citizens in China (n = 3000) and the United States (n = 3007) have strong preferences over the design of international climate agreements, and contributions of other countries to the global effort. However, contrary to what standard accounts of international politics would predict, a survey-embedded experiment in which respondents were randomly exposed to different information on other countries’ behavior showed that information on other countries failing to reduce their emissions does not undermine support for how international agreements are designed. While other factors still make large emission cuts challenging, these results suggest that the Paris approach per se is not posing a problem.

The role of anchoring in judgments about expert consensus

AbstractRecent scholarship finds that communicating descriptive norms, such as the fact that 97% of climate scientists have concluded that human‐caused climate change is happening, is an effective gateway to changing individuals’ beliefs and attitudes about climate change and support for climate policies. Other scholars, however, have offered an alternative explanation: priming people with any “97%” figure serves as an anchoring heuristic that leads people to adjust their estimates of the scientific consensus. This study investigates this proposed anchoring effect. Results from three parallel experiments indicate that participants consistently update their perceptions of the scientific consensus when they receive a relevant statement about the scientific consensus on climate change, but not when receiving a semantically equivalent but otherwise irrelevant consensus cue that might be used as an anchor. Further, we find that perceived consensus mediates the effect of the consensus treatment on individuals’ attitudes. We also find that conservatives updated their consensus estimates significantly more than liberals. We replicate these results across three large samples from different sources (Total N = 3,132). These findings indicate that when people update their estimates of the scientific consensus, it reflects a genuine update in their beliefs and is unlikely to be a result of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. This work contributes to a growing literature on the value of communicating expert consensus about contested scientific issues.

How Aware Are Other Nations of Climate Change? Analyzing Germans’ Second-Order Climate Change Beliefs About Chinese, US American and German People

ABSTRACTWhat people believe about the beliefs of other people – second-order beliefs – has been acknowledged as a key factor that shapes public support for international climate policy. However, very little is known about their origins. Based on data from an online survey (n = 935), we analyzed how German citizens assess the climate change awareness in their own nation as compared to those of the US and China. Even if the public climate change awareness in the US and China factually differs, we found that German citizens equivalently rate both nations similar and much lower than their own, a finding which can be explained with social identity processes and “in-group”/“out-group” biases. Hierarchical regression analyses demonstrate that the attention individuals pay towards television and social media predict second-order beliefs on climate change awareness positively, while attention to print media is a negative predictor.

Does Quality of Government and Trust Explain the Cross-National Variation in Public Support for Climate Policies?

In accordance with the Paris agreement, the signing countries have undertaken to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, implying more government intervention to steer the behaviors of different actors with climate policy measures. However, states face very different possibilities for gaining support for such interventions, especially those targeting the consumption patterns of individual citizens, due to for example the variation in economic development, the quality of political institutions, and other country covariates. While most research on climate policy support has focused on individual factors, such as ideological position, values and socio-demographic factors, there are also studies out there showing that there is quite some variation in country support for various climate change policies. Using newly published data from the European Social Survey, we explore whether variation in climate policy support is associated with levels of quality of government (QoG) and individuals’ trust in political institutions and people in general, and if these associations vary across different types of climate policies. We find that QoG and generalized trust are positively linked to support for climate taxes, but we find no associations with support for climate subsidies and climate bans. Moreover, we find that political and institutional trust are more strongly linked to support for climate taxes than to support for climate subsidies and climate bans.

Combining Climate, Economic, and Social Policy Builds Political Support for Climate Action in the US

Despite the gravity of the climate threat, governments around the world have struggled to pass and implement climate policies. Today, politicians and advocates are championing a new idea: linking climate policy to other economic and social reforms. Will this approach generate greater public support for climate action? Here, we test this coalition-building strategy. Using two conjoint experiments on a representative sample of 2,476 Americans, we evaluate the marginal impact of 40 different climate, social, and economic policies on support for climate reforms. Overall, we find climate policy bundles that include social and economic reforms such as affordable housing, a $15 minimum wage, or a job guarantee increase US public support for climate mitigation. Clean energy standards, regardless of what technologies are included, also make climate policy more popular. Linking climate policy to economic and social issues is particularly effective at expanding climate policy support among people of color.

Agrowth Instead of Anti-and Pro-Growth: Less Polarization, More Support for Sustainability/Climate Policies

An agrowth strategy, defined as being agnostic and indifferent about GDP growth, is proposed as an alternative to unconditional anti-and pro-growth strategies. It is argued that such a strategy can contribute to reducing scientific and political polarization in the long-standing debate on growth versus the environment. Hence, it can broaden urgently needed support for serious sustainability and climate policies. The exposition includes a novel graphical illustration, a summary of recent surveys of citizens and scientists regarding support for an agrowth position, and a discussion of implications for population growth and policies.

Probing the hidden depths of climate law: Analysing national climate change legislation

National governments that are committed to a social transition in the pursuit of climate policy face a complex legal challenge in evaluating how their legal and regulatory architectures support climate policy and in introducing new legal measures to implement their Paris Agreement commitments. This article sets out a method for appraising how fragmented national climate‐relevant laws combine to create an aggregated legal and regulatory landscape that frames and governs national responses to climate change. Appraising this kind of landscape is a methodologically fraught exercise, considering that climate change can intersect with many areas of law and regulation, which are all embedded within the histories, legal doctrines and governance frameworks of particular legal systems. We propose a tripartite method for this task – identifying ‘direct’ or explicit climate laws, identifying ‘indirect’ or implicit climate laws, and investigating legal cultures that inform and express both types of climate‐related law. The article focuses on climate‐related legislation in countries with lawmaking assemblies in proposing this approach, arguing that the national scale and legislative processes are both particularly significant in evaluating climate laws. This approach to climate law methodology can support both national climate planning and multilateral processes such as the Paris Agreement's global stocktake.

Energy Supply and Decarbonisation Beyond Brexit: Politics and Policy

Energy Supply and Decarbonisation Beyond Brexit: Politics and Policy

The significance of political culture, economic context and instrument type for climate policy support: a cross-national study

ABSTRACTWhile many countries have pledged to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the choice of national climate policy measures demonstrates widespread variation. Although system of government, path-dependency and economic entanglements can explain a certain amount of variation in policy choice, research also points specifically towards the highly politicized nature of climate policy instruments and their sensitivity to public support as explanatory factors for cross-national differences. Previous studies hypothesize that various country-specific contextual factors determine both general preferences for environmental protection and the public’s preferences for different types of policy instruments. One suggestion is that countries’ prevailing political cultures have significant consequences for such public support. Another supposition is that, since countries differ in their economic dependency on climate detrimental industry such as fossil fuel production, this should be a significant factor determining both public attitudes and subsequent political decisions. This paper applies unique, original data from four countries with significant variation in (i) political-cultural contexts (Sweden and Norway vs New Zealand and Australia and (ii) economic dependency (Norway and Australia vs Sweden and New Zealand) to analyze how, and to what extent, these two contextual variables interact with, and moderate, the effect of individual-level factors on support for climate policy measures in the four countries. Furthermore, the paper explores variations in support for different types of CO2 taxes (directed towards individual consumers, industry, and fossil-fuel producers) in the four countries.Key policy insightsAcross contexts, public policy support is lower for taxes directed towards private consumption than for taxes directed towards industry, and the strongest for CO2 taxes on fossil fuel producing industry.Political culture and economic context influence the effect of individual-level factors on policy support.In a context of high economic dependency on the fossil-fuel industry, people are less likely to support the introduction of CO2 taxes.The effect of left-right ideology on policy support is sensitive to political-cultural context.

Psychological Barriers to Bipartisan Public Support for Climate Policy

Psychological scientists have the expertise—and arguably an obligation—to help understand the political polarization that impedes enactment of climate policy. Many explanations emphasize Republican skepticism about climate change. Yet results from national panel studies in 2014 and 2016 indicate that most Republicans believe in climate change, if not as strongly as Democrats. Political polarization over climate policy does not simply reflect that Democrats and Republicans disagree about climate change but that Democrats and Republicans disagree with each other. The results of a national panel experiment and of in-depth interviews with four former members of Congress suggest that Democrats and Republicans—both ordinary citizens and policymakers—support policies from their own party and reactively devalue policies from the opposing party. These partisan evaluations occur both for policies historically associated with liberal principles and politicians (cap-and-trade) and for policies associated with conservative principles and politicians (revenue-neutral carbon tax). People also exaggerate how much other Democrats and Republicans are swayed by partisanship. This foments false norms of partisan opposition that, in turn, influence people’s personal policy support. Correcting misperceived norms of opposition and decoupling policy evaluation from identity concerns would help overcome these seemingly insurmountable barriers to bipartisan support for climate policy.

Consequence evaluations and moral concerns about climate change: insights from nationally representative surveys across four European countries

This paper examines consequence evaluations and moral concerns about climate change across four European countries. Data from nationally representative samples (each n > 1000) were analysed in order to explore the relative importance of consequences versus morality in explaining public support for different climate policies. Most respondents expected climate change to have largely negative consequences for their respective country. Climate change consequences were viewed most negatively in Germany, followed by France, the U.K. and Norway. While the vast majority of respondents expressed at least some degree of moral concern about climate change, a notable minority in each sample stated that they have no such concerns. Moral concerns were highest in France, followed by the U.K. and Norway, and lowest in Germany. It was found that both judgements explain support for policies that aim to mitigate climate change or aim to adapt to the impacts of climate change. However, our results further suggest that moral concern was a stronger predictor of policy support than consequence evaluations. If at all, consequence evaluations were more likely to predict policy support in Germany and Norway than in the U.K. and France. Overall, policies that involved subsidies received the strongest support, whereas policies involving individual costs received the least support. This research broadens our understanding of the intertwining between risk perceptions and public support for climate policies, documenting variability across and within countries. Implications for policy-makers with an interest in communicating climate change risks to the broader public audience are discussed.