Climate Change Policy Support Research Articles

Natural disasters, salience and public support for climate change policy

Natural disasters, salience and public support for climate change policy

Overcoming Confirmation Bias in Misinformation Correction: Effects of Processing Motive and Jargon on Climate Change Policy Support

A 2 (jargon vs. no jargon) × 3 (motive: control vs. accuracy vs. impression) between-subjects experiment examined the impact of jargon and processing motive in correcting climate change misinformation and promoting policy support. The results revealed a positive effect of jargon use when participants were asked to focus on accuracy during information processing. This effect was mediated by reduced anger, increased systematic processing, and enhanced perceptions of message credibility. However, jargon had a negative effect when no specific motive was induced, and it did not make a difference in correction outcomes when participants were asked to focus on making positive social impressions. These findings provide theoretical implications for information processing and practical insights for addressing misinformation in the context of climate change.

The complexity of pluralistic ignorance in Republican climate change policy support in the United States

Most Americans fail to recognize widespread public support for climate change action. Here we investigate how this phenomenon differs for Republican supporters versus opponents of several climate change policies. Surveying a representative sample of Republican voters (N = 1000), we find that misperception of in-group support for climate action is primarily restricted to Republicans already opposed to action. Specifically, those in the minority (i.e., Republicans opposed to climate action) were more likely to erroneously perceive other Republicans as holding views on climate change policy similar to their own. While Republican supporters recognize that most Republicans support climate change policy, they may be discouraged from expressing their support due to an information environment disproportionately portraying Republicans as opposed to climate change action.

The impact of anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty on climate change distress, policy support, and pro-environmental behaviour.

As the threat of climate change continues to grow, bolstering individual-level support for climate change initiatives is crucial. More research is needed to better understand how individual difference factors, such as climate change anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty (IU), may shape how people perceive climate change and respond to climate change messaging. To date, the majority of published studies have not taken these individual difference factors into consideration, and IU has been particularly neglected in the climate change literature. This study examined the independent effects of climate change anxiety and IU on three climate change-related outcomes: climate-related distress, support for climate change policies, and behavioural engagement. Participants were Florida residents (N = 441) who completed an online survey, including measures of climate change anxiety and IU. Participants then watched a video describing climate change consequences and completed three outcome measures: post-video distress, climate change policy support, and behavioural engagement. Controlling for demographic covariates, both climate change anxiety (β = .43, p < .001) and IU (β = .27, p < .001) were associated with greater post-video distress, but only IU independently predicted greater policy support (β = .10, p = .034) and behavioural engagement (β = .12, p = .017). Our findings suggest that IU may be an important factor in promoting pro-environmental behaviour and policy support, but climate change anxiety may increase emotional distress without boosting meaningful behaviours or support. Our findings highlight the potential influence of cognitive factors on climate change engagement and suggest that invoking uncertainty rather than anxiety may be more effective in catalysing effective environmental engagement.

Facing trade-offs: The variability of public support for climate change policies

Policy support is often measured by asking respondents to evaluate policies linked to an isolated policy goal. However, in real-world settings, policies usually have multiple implications. We study how people react when policies have negative implications for other valued goals, considering both their level of support and the certainty of their choices. Using survey experiment data collected in Germany in 2020 (N = 2233) that measures people’s support for climate policies with or without information about negative implications for different societal groups, we find that people decrease their policy support and become less certain about their choices when faced with negative implications for vulnerable groups. This effect is partially moderated by people’s climate change concern and their support for government assistance for such groups. We thus contribute to the understanding of people’s policy decision-making, with implications for the measurement of public support and the development of effective climate policies.

Trial by Fire: Support for Mitigation and Adaptation Policy after the 2020 Oregon Wildfires

Abstract The September 2020 Oregon wildfires were unprecedented in terms of their geographic scope and the number of communities affected by smoke and wildfire. Although it is difficult to directly attribute the event to climate change, scientists have noted the strong connection between warmer and drier conditions in the western United States—conditions that are linked to climate change—and increasing wildfire risk. These wildfires thus had the potential to act as a “focusing event,” potentially strengthening public support for climate change policy. Political ideology is a well-known driver of public support for climate change mitigation policies in the United States, but few studies have examined adaptation policy support. Moreover, other factors shaping postevent support for the two “pillars” of climate change policy—adaptation and mitigation—have rarely been compared. We conducted a survey of Oregonians within 6 months of the 2020 wildfires (n = 1308) to understand postevent support for climate mitigation and adaptation policies. We found that the magnitude of the association between political ideology and policy support was lower for adaptation policies than for mitigation policies, and there was no association with support for forest management changes. In contrast, selected sociodemographic characteristics played a more important role in support for selected adaptation policies than for mitigation policies. Significance Statement Increasing wildfire risk in the western United States is connected to warmer and drier conditions, both of which are linked to climate change. Most research on postevent support for climate change policy has focused on climate change mitigation policies. This study examines and compares public support for both mitigation and adaptation policies after the 2020 Oregon wildfires, yielding important information about the factors that shape support for each.

Media jako jeden z czynników wpływających na zaufanie do wyników badań naukowych w kontekście zmian klimatu

Rapid environmental change is one of the most pressing global issues today. Understanding the factors influencing trust in climate change research provides an opportunity to develop effective communication strategies and build public support for the issue. This article aims to identify the factors determining public trust in science and environmental issues. The lack of public trust in climate science hurts the willingness of individuals, specific social groups, and political actors to find actionable ways to address the problem. Low levels of public trust can lead to a lack of support for climate change policies or hinder the mobilisation of public opinion and political will to address the issue. Ideology and political views, education, cultural differences and media use patterns are among key factors influencing trust in climate change.

Investigating how economic and national identity loss messages impact climate change policy support

Investigating how economic and national identity loss messages impact climate change policy support

"If it weren't for COVID-19…": Counterfactual arguments influence support for climate change policies via cross-domain moral licensing or moral consistency effects.

In two studies, we investigated whether counterfactual messages (i.e., "If… then…") on the economic costs of past public policies influence support for future climate change policies. In Study 1, we tested whether the effect of upward counterfactual messages depended on their referring (or not) to the COVID-19 pandemic. Results showed lower support for a future climate change policy when the past expenses evoked by the upward counterfactual messages were attributed to COVID-19. In Study 2, we combined upward counterfactuals with downward counterfactuals presenting past economic efforts to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic as a moral credit. Results showed that exposure to downward counterfactuals decreased support for climate change policies among participants with low endorsement of anti-COVID-19 measures, whereas it increased support among participants with high endorsement. Discussion focuses on the conditions under which counterfactual communication may activate cross-dimensional moral licensing or moral consistency effects, influencing support for climate change policies.

When Are Loss Frames More Effective in Climate Change Communication? An Application of Fear Appeal Theory

This study investigated how goal frames (gain, non-loss, loss) either with or without efficacy statements affect consumers’ support for climate-change policy. Addressing the goal-framing literature’s difficulty in establishing a guiding theory with consistent findings, we (1) propose fear appeal theory as an alternative framework to guide goal-framing research; (2) test five fear appeal variables (fear, perceived threat, hope, perceived efficacy, and message processing) as mediators of goal-framing effects on policy support; and (3) highlight four common goal-framing confounds that may partly underlie the literature’s inconsistent findings. Aligning with fear appeal theory, results from a carefully controlled experiment revealed that a more threatening loss frame paired with an efficacy statement produced the strongest pro-policy attitudes and the greatest willingness-to-pay by successfully balancing fear/threat with hope/efficacy and by producing deeper message processing.

Using the three-pillar model of sustainability to understand lay reactions to climate policy: A multilevel approach

Public support for climate policy is necessary to enact the large-scale changes needed to mitigate climate change. We use the three-pillar model of sustainability as a conceptual framework to examine how individuals evaluate climate policies and how these evaluations predict policy support. We consider individuals’ evaluations of 1) environmental impacts (i.e., perceived policy effectiveness), 2) economic impacts, and 3) social impacts of policies. We use multilevel modeling to disentangle variance in policy support attributable to between-person differences (i.e., aggregated policy support) and within-person variations across policies. First, we fit a multilevel factor model to our dataset (Nobs = 1056) to identify whether the factor structure of the three-pillar model at both the between-person and within-person levels of analysis. The three-pillar model emerged at the within-person level. In contrast, items instead loaded onto two factors at the between-person level: benefits and harms. Thus, we created within- and between-person constructs matching these factors. Results from multilevel regressions suggest that a) individuals who anticipate more benefits and fewer harms of climate policies (as a set) also tend to report greater aggregated support for climate change policies, and b) anticipating environmental benefits, economic impacts and social impacts to be above average for a certain policy (relative to other policies) predicts greater support for that policy. Our work suggests the relevance of differentiating between who is most likely to support climate policies in general (i.e., between-person differences) as well as policy-specific evaluations associated with support for some policies over others (i.e. within-person variation in support).

Do economic conditions affect climate change beliefs and support for climate action? Evidence from the US in the wake of the Great Recession

AbstractI show that climate skepticism increases with negative economic shocks and that the effects are concentrated among individuals in the labor force. I primarily employ a panel of US individuals in the period following the Great Recession, but also find consistent results with an alternative instrumental variables strategy. Among labor force participants, a one‐percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate leads to a three to five percentage point decrease in the probability of believing climate change is real and requires action. I conclude that support for climate change policies could depend on labor market conditions.

Support for mitigation and adaptation climate change policies: effects of five attitudinal factors

The increasing social consciousness about the causes and consequences of climate change has not led to a correspondingly high support for concrete mitigation or adaptation policies. Thus, more research is needed about the factors influencing citizen’s support for such climate change policies. In this study, we explore the effects on Spaniards’ support for one mitigation policy (car policy) and one adaptation policy (water policy) of five attitudinal factors: government response efficacy beliefs, people’s feeling of responsibility to mitigate climate change, personal self-efficacy beliefs, people’s disposition to resist change and psychological distance from climate change. We use data from an online survey implemented in the Netquest opt-in panel in Spain (N = 2290). We use structural equation modelling to control for spurious effects and test the fit of the model. Moreover, estimates are corrected for measurement errors. The results reveal that the most important factor affecting Spaniards’ support for both mitigation and adaptation policies is the perceived government response efficacy. Furthermore, we identified relevant differences regarding the importance of the above-mentioned five attitudinal factors depending on the climate change policy studied. More precisely, while government response efficacy and people’s feeling of responsibility to mitigate climate change have a direct effect on support for both policies, personal self-efficacy and people’s resistance to change only affect support for the mitigation policy directly. On the contrary, psychological distance to climate change only has a direct effect on support for the adaptation policy. Our results provide new insights into the causal mechanisms behind citizens’ support for climate change policies.

Climate change policy support, intended behaviour change, and their drivers largely unaffected by consensus messages in Germany

How can communication contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions through behaviour change and policy support? The existing literature emphasises informing people about the scientific consensus on climate change, but the underlying research has been conducted mainly in the US, where prior beliefs in human-made climate change are lower than in many other countries with the highest per-capita emissions. We test consensus messages in an ‘extended gateway belief model’ using a pre-registered survey experiment on a representative quota sample of the German population (N = 1171). Our data show that consensus messages are likely to have no or only minimal effects on perceived scientific agreement, intended behaviour change and policy support. Still, in line with prior research, we find that perceived scientific agreement, belief in climate science, efficacy beliefs, and worry about climate change predict policy support and intended behaviour change. These results demonstrate that effective communication needs tailoring to its local context.

Not out of MY bank account! Science messaging when climate change policies carry personal financial costs

We suggest that policies will be less popular when individuals personally have to pay for them rather than when others have to pay (i.e., a Not Out of My Bank Account or NOMBA effect). Dual process models of persuasion suggest that personally having to pay would motivate scrutiny of persuasive messages making it essential to use effective science communication tactics when using climate science to support climate change policies. A pilot experiment (N = 186) and main study (N = 758) support a NOMBA effect with less policy support (Pilot study) and lower recommended fees (Main study) for a policy that would require participants, rather than another group, to pay a fee for community solar panels. Consistent with dual process models and suggesting systematic processing, only when participants would have to pay the fee, messages using strong (vs. weak) science communication tactics increased support for policies (Pilot study), increased the favorability of thoughts about the policy (Main study) and these thoughts subsequently predicted policy support (Main study). Inconsistent with propositions that information about expert sources would be a heuristic or bolster science messages, expert consensus information did not influence thoughts or policy support in any study condition. Efforts to understand climate change policy support would benefit from attending to research on dual process models of persuasion, including understanding how different types and degree of outcome relevance can alter how people process science information used to bolster support for climate change policies.

Comparing respondents who passed versus failed an Instructional Manipulation Check: A case study about support for climate change policies

The presence of satisficers among survey respondents threatens survey data quality. To identify such respondents, Oppenheimer et al. developed the Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC), which has been used as a tool to exclude observations from the analyses. However, this practice has raised concerns regarding its effects on the external validity and the substantive conclusions of studies excluding respondents who fail an IMC. Thus, more research on the differences between respondents who pass versus fail an IMC regarding sociodemographic and attitudinal variables is needed. This study compares respondents who passed versus failed an IMC both for descriptive and causal analyses based on structural equation modeling (SEM) using data from an online survey implemented in Spain in 2019. These data were analyzed by Rubio Juan and Revilla without taking into account the results of the IMC. We find that those who passed the IMC do differ significantly from those who failed for two sociodemographic and five attitudinal variables, out of 18 variables compared. Moreover, in terms of substantive conclusions, differences between those who passed and failed the IMC vary depending on the specific variables under study.

The influence of different efficacy constructs on energy conservation intentions and climate change policy support

This study examines how different efficacy constructs – self efficacy, personal outcome expectancy, collective efficacy, and collective outcome expectancy – independently influence willingness to engage in personal energy conservation behavior and support for policies to address climate change. Data from a representative, cross-sectional survey of 23 countries, European Social Survey Round 8, was analyzed to test the relationship. Overall, the results demonstrated that self efficacy, personal outcome expectancy, and collective outcome expectancy were all positively associated with both behavioral intention and policy support. Results regarding collective efficacy were unstable. The results demonstrate the importance of clearly distinguishing different constructs of efficacy beliefs from each other and suggest how climate change communication efforts may benefit from focusing on particular efficacy factors.

Visual art inspired by climate change-An analysis of audience reactions to 37 artworks presented during 21st UN climate summit in Paris.

This paper suggests and tests a psychological model of environmental art perception and subsequent support for climate change policies. The model is based on findings from art perception and environmental psychology, which indicate that the response of the viewer to the artwork is (1) first an emotional reaction, which can be positive and/or negative. The emotional activation leads to (2) evaluation of the perceived quality of the artwork. This forms the first impression of the artwork the viewer gets, which then triggers (3) reflections on the artwork that are finally related to support for climate policies. The model test uses data collected at the ArtCOP21 that accompanied the 21st UN climate summit in Paris. At 37 connected events, the research team collected 883 audience responses with a brief quantitative paper-pencil questionnaire. The data were analyzed using a multilevel-structural equation modeling approach. Results support the suggested theoretical model. Moreover, the effect of reflections on the artwork on support for climate policies is moderated by environmental attitudes, meaning the lower the environmental attitudes, the higher the effect of reflections on policy support. Finally, artwork features like color, size, displaying something personal, etc., could be identified that had a significant relation to differences on the artwork level regarding the first impression of the artwork and the reflections elicited. The study shows that being confronted with climate change-related artwork relates at least in the short run to increased climate policy support, which is mostly channeled through an emotional activation with following cognitive processing. Features of the artwork relate to how strongly and which emotions are activated.

Indiscriminate, Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change.

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two "green beliefs," referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals' concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs-which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews-differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.

Identifying the most important predictors of support for climate policy in the United States

AbstractReducing global warming will require enacting strong climate policies, which is unlikely to happen without public support. While prior research has identified varied predictors of climate change policy support, it is unclear which predictors are strongest for the American electorate as a whole, and which predictors are strongest for Democrats and Republicans. In a nationally representative sample of registered voters (n = 2063), we use relative weight analysis to identify the strongest predictors of public climate policy support. We find that, among registered voters in the USA, the five most important predictors of climate policy support are: worry about global warming; risk perceptions; certainty that global warming is happening; belief that global warming is human-caused; and general affect toward global warming. Collectively, these five variables account for 51% of the variance in policy support. Results split by political party indicate that pro-climate injunctive norms and global warming risk perceptions are the variables that differ most between Republicans and Democrats, accounting for significantly more variance in policy support among Republicans. These findings can inform policymakers and advocates seeking to build public support for climate action.