Supply Of Mortgage Credit Research Articles

The amplification effects of adverse selection in mortgage credit supply

This paper studies how information frictions in the securitization market amplify the response of mortgage credit supply to house price shocks. Securitization prices and quantities endogenously result from an optimal contracting problem between investors and banks. Banks are better informed than investors about the quality of mortgages they originate, leading to adverse selection in securitization. Investors use the quantity sold as a screening device to induce banks to reveal truthful information. We find that adverse selection amplifies the response of a bank’s mortgage credit to house price shocks. The degree of amplification is also a function of the technological differences in managing portfolios between banks and investors. The model is informative on how information frictions can induce large fluctuations in mortgage credit supply.

Real estate investors and the U.S. housing recovery

AbstractU.S. house prices fell nearly 30% between 2006 and 2012. Meanwhile, homeownership rates declined as mortgage credit supply tightened and investors bought up properties. Although nationally house prices recovered to prebust levels by 2016, homeownership rates declined through mid‐2016, as investors, particularly those purchasing through corporations, gained market share. By exploiting heterogeneity in zip codes' exposure to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac programs that affected investors' access to foreclosed properties, we find that increased presence of investors explains a significant fraction of the house price recovery. Investors reduced vacancies and shortened the time foreclosed properties spent in bank ownership.

Small Bank Lending in the Era of Fintech and Shadow Banks: A Sideshow?

Abstract Amid the emerging dominance of nonbanks, small banks use key financing advantages to persist in the mortgage market. We provide evidence of the heterogeneous impact of two shocks to the supply of mortgage credit: postcrisis regulatory burden and GSE financing cost changes. Small banks exploit regulation disproportionately affecting the largest four banks (Big4) and their ability to lend on balance sheet to strongly substitute for the retreating Big4. The erasure of guarantee fee (g-fee) discounts for large lenders facilitates small bank growth in GSE lending. Small banks also grow balance sheet loans in areas more exposed to g-fee hikes.

Mortgage Finance and Climate Change: Securitization Dynamics in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters

Abstract Using the government-sponsored enterprises’ sharp securitization rules, this paper provides evidence that, in the aftermath of natural disasters, lenders are more likely to approve mortgages that can be securitized, thereby transferring climate risk. The identification strategy uses the time-varying conforming loan limits above which the government-sponsored enterprises do not securitize mortgages. Natural disasters lead to more securitization right below the limit, suggesting an increased option value of securitization. A model identified using indirect inference simulates increasing disaster risk without GSEs. Mortgage credit supply would decline in flood zones and lenders would have a greater incentive to screen mortgages.

How Resilient Is Mortgage Credit Supply? Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic

<ns2:p>We study the evolution of USmortgage credit supply during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the mortgage market experienced a historic boom in 2020, we show there was also a large and sustained increase in intermediation markups that limited the pass-through of lowrates to borrowers. Markups typically rise during periods of peak demand, but this historical relationship explains only part of the large increase during the pandemic. We present evidence that pandemic-related labor market frictions and operational bottlenecks contributed to unusually inelastic credit supply, and that technology-based lenders, likely less constrained by these frictions, gained market share. Rising forbearance and default risk did not significantly affect rates on “plainvanilla” conforming mortgages, but it did lead to higher spreads on mortgages without government guarantees and loans to the riskiest borrowers. Mortgage-backed securities purchases by the Federal Reserve also supported the flow of credit in the conforming segment.</ns2:p>

Internet Appendix: How Resilient is Mortgage Credit Supply? Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic

We study the evolution of US mortgage credit supply during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the mortgage market experienced a historic boom in 2020, we show there was also a large and sustained increase in intermediation markups that limited the pass-through of low rates to borrowers. Markups typically rise during periods of peak demand, but this historical relationship explains only part of the large increase during the pandemic. We present evidence that pandemic-related labor market frictions and operational bottlenecks contributed to unusually inelastic credit supply, and that technology-based lenders, likely less constrained by these frictions, gained market share. Rising forbearance and default risk did not significantly affect rates on “plain-vanilla” conforming mortgages, but it did lead to higher spreads on mortgages without government guarantees and loans to the riskiest borrowers. Mortgage-backed securities purchases by the Federal Reserve also supported the flow of credit in the conforming segment.

Did technology contribute to the housing boom? Evidence from MERS

We examine the effects of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, on mortgage origination volumes and foreclosure rates prior to the Great Recession. MERS was introduced in the late 1990s and significantly reduced the cost and time associated with secondary mortgage sales. Using novel data from the Massachusetts Registry of Deeds, we show that the introduction of MERS led to an expansion in mortgage credit supply that was primarily fueled by nonbank lenders originating mortgages to low-income borrowers. We also find that foreclosure rates were higher on these mortgages. Our paper provides a new explanation for the credit supply increases observed prior to the 2008 financial crisis and for the disproportionate supply increase observed in low-income areas.

Credit Supply and Housing Speculation

Abstract Credit supply expansion boosts housing speculation and amplifies the housing cycle. The surge in private-label mortgage securitization in 2003 fueled a large expansion in mortgage credit supply by lenders financed with noncore deposits. Areas more exposed to these lenders experienced a large relative rise in transaction volume driven by a small group of speculators, and these areas simultaneously witnessed an amplified housing boom and bust. Consistent with the importance of belief heterogeneity, house price growth expectations of marginal buyers rose during the boom, while housing market pessimism among the general population increased.

The Impact of Monetary Conditions on Bank Lending to Households

We study the impact of monetary conditions on the supply of mortgage credit by banks to households. Using comprehensive credit register data from Hungary, we first establish a bank-lending-to-households channel by showing that monetary conditions affect the supply of mortgage credit in volume. We then study the impact of monetary conditions on the composition of mortgage credit along its currency denomination and borrower risk. We find that expansionary domestic monetary conditions increase the supply of mortgage credit to all households in the domestic currency and to risky households in the foreign currency. Because most households are unhedged, bank lending in multiple currencies may involve additional risk taking. Changes in foreign monetary conditions affect lending in the foreign currency more than in the domestic currency, and also differ in their compositional impact along firm risk.

Real Estate Transaction Taxes and Credit Supply

We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect of house price changes on mortgage credit supply. Based on approximately 33 million real estate online listings, we construct a quarterly hedonic house price index (HPI) between 2008:q1 and 2017:q4, which we instrument with state-specific RETT changes to isolate the effect on mortgage credit supply by all local German banks. First, a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces HPI by 1.2%. This effect is driven by listings in rural regions. Second, a 1% contraction of HPI induced by an increase in the RETT leads to a 1.4% decline in mortgage lending. This transmission of fiscal policy to mortgage credit supply is effective across almost the entire bank capitalization distribution.

How Resilient Is Mortgage Credit Supply? Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic

We study the evolution of US mortgage credit supply during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the mortgage market experienced a historic boom in 2020, we show there was also a large and sustained increase in intermediation markups that limited the pass-through of low rates to borrowers. Markups typically rise during periods of peak demand, but this historical relationship explains only part of the large increase during the pandemic. We present evidence that pandemic-related labor market frictions and operational bottlenecks contributed to unusually inelastic credit supply, and that technology-based lenders, likely less constrained by these frictions, gained market share. Rising forbearance and default risk did not significantly affect rates on “plain vanilla” conforming mortgages, but it did lead to higher spreads on mortgages without government guarantees and loans to the riskiest borrowers. Mortgage-backed securities purchases by the Federal Reserve also supported the flow of credit in the conforming segment.

Mortgage market credit conditions and U.S. Presidential elections

Voters punish incumbent Presidential candidates for contractions in the county-level supply of mortgage credit during market-wide contractions of credit, but do not reward them for expansions in mortgage credit supply in boom times. Our primary focus is the Presidential election of 2008, which followed an unprecedented swing from very generous mortgage underwriting standards to a severe contraction of mortgage credit. Voters responded to the credit crunch by shifting their support away from the Republican Presidential candidate in 2008. That shift was large and particularly pronounced in states that typically vote Republican, and in swing states. Without it McCain would have received half the votes needed in nine crucial swing states to reverse the outcome of the election. We extend our analysis to the Presidential elections from 1996 to 2012 and find that voters only react to contractions, not expansions, of credit, and reactions are similar for Democratic and Republican incumbent parties.

How Much Does Home Equity Extraction Matter for Spending?

In this note, we investigate recent trends in home equity extraction and how these trends may have impacted household spending and residential improvements. Home equity extractions—which rose and fell with house prices in the 1990s and 2000s—have remained sluggish in the recovery despite low interest rates and gains in home equity. Compared to the mid-2000s, equity extractions have fallen especially among younger households and those with lower credit scores and higher leverage, suggesting that mortgage credit supply is likely tighter than before the recession, at least for portions of the population.

Who Benefited from the Lending Boom to Poor and Minority Neighborhoods Leading to the Housing Crisis?

The late 1990s through the mid-2000s was a period of historic growth in mortgage lending and house prices and there is intense debate over whether lending growth was a cause or consequence of house price growth. I show that lending growth was strongest for lower-income and minority borrowers. However, I also show that there was pronounced lending growth for all borrowers, regardless of income or race, in lower-income and higher-minority neighborhoods. Importantly, each of these results hold after I control for the effects of growth, or expectations of growth, in house prices. This evidence is consistent with the view that the house price boom was caused by an expansion in the supply of mortgage credit, primarily benefiting borrowers and neighborhoods which previously had the most limited access to mortgage credit. In particular, the evidence can be explained by government housing policies which mandated increased lending to lower-income borrowers as well as borrowers in lower-income and higher-minority neighborhoods.

Prudential policies and their impact on credit in the United States

Abstract We analyze how two types of recently used prudential policies affected the supply of credit in the United States. First, we test whether the U.S. bank stress tests had any impact on the supply of mortgage credit. We find that initiation of the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress tests in 2011 had a negative effect on the share of jumbo mortgage originations and approval rates at stress-tested banks, whereby banks with worse capital positions were impacted more negatively. Second, we analyze the impact of the 2013 Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending and subsequent 2014 FAQ notice, which clarified expectations on the Guidance. We find that the institution-specific share of speculative-grade term-loan originations decreased notably at regulated banks after the FAQ notice, especially at banks with greater market share for such loans.

Lending to the Poor and Minorities Leading to the Housing Crisis: Was There a Boom?

I provide new evidence on the boom and bust in the housing market during the mid-2000s. The boom actually began in the late 1990s, paused briefly in 2001, and then resumed through the mid-2000s. Moreover, the boom was indeed greatly pronounced among lower-income and higher-minority neighborhoods, indicating that mortgage lending expanded for reasons that were unrelated to factors such as an improvement in borrower income prospects or credit quality. These results are consistent with the credit supply view that the boom and bust was caused by an exogenous expansion in the supply of mortgage credit.

Employment in the Great Recession: How Important Were Household Credit Supply Shocks?

AbstractI pool data from all large multimarket lenders in the United States to estimate how many of the over 7 million jobs lost in the Great Recession can be explained by reductions in the supply of mortgage credit. I construct a mortgage credit supply instrument at the county level, the weighted average (by prerecession mortgage market shares) of liquidity‐driven lender shocks during the recession. The reduction in mortgage supply explains about 15% of the employment decline. The job losses are concentrated in construction and finance.

Small Bank Lending Amidst the Ascent of Fintech and Shadow Banking: A Sideshow?

Amid the emerging dominance of nonbanks, small banks use key financing advantages to persist in the mortgage market. We provide evidence on the heterogeneous impact of two shocks to the supply of mortgage credit: post-crisis regulatory burden and GSE financing cost changes. Small banks exploit disproportionate regulation on the largest four banks (Big4) and their ability to lend on balance sheet to strongly substitute for the retreating Big4. The erasure of guarantee fee (g-fee) discounts for large lenders facilitates small bank growth in GSE lending. Small banks also grow balance sheet loans in areas more exposed to g-fee hikes.

Employment in the Great Recession: How Important Were Household Credit Supply Shocks?

I pool data from all large multimarket lenders in the U.S. to estimate how many of the over seven million jobs lost in the Great Recession can be explained by reductions in the supply of mortgage credit. I construct a mortgage credit supply instrument at the county level, the weighted average (by prerecession mortgage market shares) of liquidity-driven lender shocks during the recession. The reduction in mortgage supply explains about 15 percent of the employment decline. The job losses are concentrated in construction and finance.

The Role of Housing and Mortgage Markets in the Financial Crisis

Ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, there is widespread agreement that the boom in mortgage lending and its subsequent reversal were at the core of the Great Recession. We survey the existing evidence, which suggests that inflated house-price expectations across the economy played a central role in driving both the demand for and the supply of mortgage credit before the crisis. The great misnomer of the 2008 crisis is that it was not a subprime crisis but rather a middle-class crisis. Inflated house-price expectations led households across all income groups, especially the middle class, to increase their demand for housing and mortgage leverage. Similarly, banks lent against increasing collateral values and underestimated the risk of defaults. We highlight how these emerging facts have essential implications for policy.