Supervision Costs Research Articles

Emergency Capacity Pool to Respond to Unconventional Emergencies Based on Principal–Agent Theory

To address the conflict of interest between the government and enterprises regarding urban emergency transportation resources in unconventional emergencies and to enhance resource allocation and response efficiency. This paper proposes a collaborative government–enterprise model for emergency transport capacity reserves and develops an incentive model based on principal–agent theory. First, by comprehensively considering enterprise characteristics, high-quality enterprises are selected to collaborate with the government in building an emergency capacity pool of social vehicles. Second, to address potential conflicts of interest between the government and enterprises within the emergency capacity pool, this paper uses principal–agent theory to analyze the interest game process under information asymmetry, constructs a corresponding incentive model, and determines the government’s optimal incentive coefficient, the enterprise’s optimal actual capacity supply ratio, and the benefit distribution between both parties. Finally, numerical simulations and sensitivity analyses were used to verify the model’s applicability. The findings reveal that transport effort cost, economic requisition compensation, and government supervision cost influence the optimal decisions and outcomes in government–enterprise interactions. This study provides theoretical guidance and managerial insights for coordinating emergency transport scheduling between the government and enterprises during unconventional emergencies.

Supervision mechanism of integrated construction consultancy services in China: tripartite game analysis

PurposeMegaprojects contribute greatly to China’s socio-economic development. However, the diverse stakeholders of megaprojects tend to be prone to conflict and plunge the project into lower performance than expected. This study aims to investigate (1) the optimal supervision mechanism under direct supervision of the owner and (2) the optimal indirect supervision mechanism of the owner, with involvement of integrated construction consultancy (ICC) in supervision and considerations into the impact of collusion between the ICC and the general contractor on supervision efficiency.Design/methodology/approachThis study applies the principal–agent theory and game theory to design effective incentive and punishment mechanisms for direct and indirect supervision by the owner. Through the theoretical framework of game theory, it analyses the strategic interactions between the owner, the ICC and the general contractor, and evaluates the effectiveness of various supervision mechanisms based on Nash equilibrium theory.FindingsThe results showed adopting the direct supervision mechanism when the probability of the general contractor’s opportunistic behavior being detected was higher or the occurrence had a greater impact on the owner. However, the increase in supervision cost would reduce the motivation of owner’s direct supervision and prompt the owner to choose the indirect supervision mechanism. Additionally, the indirect supervision mechanism was more likely to inhibit the collusion between the ICC and the general contractor. Thus, increasing penalties for ICC would result in improved supervision of ICC, thereby improving the benefits to the owner.Originality/valueThis study examines the dynamic interaction between the owner, the general contractor and the ICC. The study establishes a game tree and game matrix based on principal–agent theory, and analyses direct and indirect supervision models to determine the Nash equilibrium and optimal supervision strategy that is in the best interest of the owner. The study advocates for improved management and supervision mechanisms and argues that tailored supervision mechanisms can significantly improve the performance of megaprojects, which is well validated in megaprojects in China.

An Evolutionary Stability Study of Zero-Carbon Transition for Shipping Enterprises Considering Dynamic Penalty and Carbon Quota Trading Mechanisms

The carbon quota trading mechanism is considered one of the most effective incentives for carbon reduction to address global climate change. Currently, the EU has adopted this mechanism to intervene in the zero-carbon transition of shipping companies. Unlike other businesses, the shipping market experiences cyclical changes and high uncertainty, with many factors and complex systems involved in the zero-carbon transition process. Research on the impact of dynamic penalty mechanisms combined with government incentive policies on the zero-carbon transition of shipping companies is relatively scarce. To explore this process under such mechanisms, an evolutionary game model of shipping companies’ zero-carbon transition considering dynamic penalties and carbon quota trading was constructed. The model analyzes the effects of factors such as carbon trading prices, emission reductions resulting from zero-carbon transition, government supervision costs, supervision intensity, subsidy values, and penalty caps on the transition process and performs a simulation analysis. The results indicate the following: (1) Under dynamic penalty mechanisms, the evolutionary trajectories of both government and shipping companies spiral towards a unique evolutionary stable strategy, addressing the shortcomings of static penalty mechanisms. (2) Government supervision costs negatively impact the zero-carbon transition of shipping companies, while supervision intensity has a positive effect. Government subsidies positively affect transition strategies but have a minor impact. Increasing the penalty cap benefits the zero-carbon transition of companies. (3) There is a critical point for carbon trading prices corresponding to changes in zero-carbon transition strategies, providing a basis for companies to decide whether to buy or sell carbon emission trading rights. Additionally, government regulatory changes lag behind the changes in companies’ zero-carbon transition behaviors. The results provide significant insights for government strategy formulation and investment in zero-carbon transition under the carbon quota trading mechanism.

Reducing Carbon Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants: An Analysis Using Evolutionary Game Theory

The promotion of energy conservation and emission reduction involves a multi-party game among governments, enterprises, and other stakeholders. To explore the game relationships among governments, the public, and coal-fired power enterprises under the “dual carbon targets”, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for energy conservation and emission reduction involving three parties: the government, coal-fired power enterprises, and the public. Through a theoretical analysis and simulation analysis of the case study involving a central Hebei energy enterprise in China, the impact of parameter variations on the strategic choices of all parties and the evolutionarily stable strategies of the system is thoroughly discussed. The research findings indicate that reducing public supervision costs, increasing government rewards, subsidies, and penalties, and enhancing government regulatory capabilities are crucial factors in promoting energy-saving and emission-reduction efforts by coal-fired power enterprises. After multiple evolutionary iterations, the tripartite evolutionary game system ultimately reaches an evolutionarily stable state of government regulation, public supervision, and energy-saving and emission-reduction by coal-fired power enterprises at the point E8(1,1,1). Based on these findings, we propose a series of policy recommendations aimed at providing theoretical support for the Chinese government to achieve its energy-saving and emission-reduction strategies under the dual-carbon targets. These recommendations also offer practical guidance for the government in formulating emission reduction policies, for enterprises in optimizing their operational strategies, and for the public in participating in emission reduction efforts.

Financing the capital-constrained farmer under random yield and investment information asymmetry: bank credit versus trade credit

PurposeFinancing the capital-constrained farmers to facilitate the production of agri-products is one of the greatest challenges facing the farming supply chain in the developing countries. In this study, we investigate the optimal financing scheme for the farming supply chain under random yield and investment information asymmetry environment to support rural economic development.Design/methodology/approachWe analyze a stylized model of farming supply chain where the capital-constrained farmer produces and sells agri-products through the agribusiness firm, and investigate the optimal financing scheme incorporating the investment information asymmetry and the challenge of yield uncertainty.FindingsThe results show that there is no one financing scheme equilibrium dominates for all situations, the financing scheme equilibrium is affected by the bank’s supervision cost to monitor the farmer’s moral hazard behavior, the variance of random yield and the farmer’s initial capital. The preference of the financing scheme for the agribusiness firm may be different from that for the farmer. The agribusiness firm might suffer from overfinancing problem under trade credit financing when the bank’s supervision cost is larger and the farmer’s own initial capital is lower; the higher variance of random yield will flare up the effect.Practical implicationsThis study sheds light on the choice of financing scheme under random yield and investment information asymmetry environment. This problem is particularly important for developing economies. Financing the capital-constrained farmers not only increases supplies of food and industrial raw materials, but also reduces poverty. The findings provide managerial implications for practitioners for how to leverage different financing scheme to support rural economic development.Originality/valueThis study develops new theoretical model for farming supply chain financing incorporating the challenge of yield uncertainty and investment information asymmetry, the two prominent factors that would impact the financial risk significantly. We analyze the equilibrium under both bank financing and trade credit financing schemes, and the results suggest that the financing scheme equilibrium is affected by the bank’s supervision cost to monitor the farmer’s moral hazard behavior, the variance of random yield and the farmer’s initial capital. The agribusiness firm might suffer from overfinancing problem under trade credit financing.

The hidden cost of abusive supervision: rudeness, sabotage, and ethics.

Abusive supervision in healthcare settings can have detrimental effects on employee behavior and patient care, making it crucial to understand the underlying mechanisms and mitigating factors. This study examines the impact of abusive supervision on patient-directed service sabotage, focusing on the mediating role of workplace rudeness and the moderating effect of work ethics. Data were collected from 305 hospital nurses, and structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the proposed model. The findings reveal that abusive supervision significantly increases workplace rudeness, which in turn escalates to service sabotage. However, strong work ethics were found to weaken the link between rudeness and sabotage, demonstrating their protective role in this negative cycle. The moderated mediation analysis further confirms that work ethics reduce the indirect impact of abusive supervision on service sabotage through rudeness. These results contribute to our understanding by illustrating how ethical standards can buffer against the negative consequences of abusive supervision, providing practical implications for enhancing leadership practices and promoting ethical behavior in healthcare environments.

Critique of Legislation in the Health Sector: A Review of Medical Waste Regulation in Indonesia

Medical waste management in Indonesia has become a critical issue in the health sector, especially with the increasing volume of medical waste during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although there are regulations governing medical waste management, such as Law no. 32 of 2009 concerning Environmental Protection and Management and Minister of Health Regulation no. 18 of 2020, its implementation still faces various obstacles. This research aims to criticize legal regulations related to medical waste in Indonesia, by highlighting regulatory weaknesses, implementation challenges in the field, and their impact on public health and the environment. The research methods used are normative juridical studies and case studies in several health facilities in Indonesia. The research results show that there is a gap between regulations and practice in the field, which is caused by limited infrastructure, weak supervision, and high operational costs. This research recommends that the government tighten supervision, provide incentives for health facilities, and develop more detailed technical guidelines regarding medical waste management.

A new calibration method for radon detector in seismic systems

Radon observation is an important measurement item of seismic precursor network observation. The radon detector calibration is a key technical link for ensuring radon observation accuracy. At present, the radon detector calibration in seismic systems in China is faced with a series of bottleneck problems, such as aging and scrap, acquisition difficulties, high supervision costs, and transportation limitations of radon sources. As a result, a large number of radon detectors cannot be accurately calibrated regularly, seriously affecting the accuracy and reliability of radon observation data in China. To solve this problem, a new calibration method for radon detectors was established. The advantage of this method is that the dangerous radioactive substance, i.e., the radon source, can be avoided, but only “standard instruments” and water samples with certain dissolved radon concentrations can be used to realize radon detector calibration. This method avoids the risk of radioactive leakage and solves the current widespread difficulties and bottleneck of radon detector calibration in seismic systems in China. The comparison experiment with the traditional calibration method shows that the error of the calibration coefficient obtained by the new method is less than 5% compared with that by the traditional method, which meets the requirements of seismic observation systems, confirming the reliability of the new method. This new method can completely replace the traditional calibration method of using a radon source in seismic systems.

Clean energy ship application to promote carbon neutrality in global maritime industry: State governance or international supervision？

The global maritime industry is facing the goal to achieve "carbon neutrality", and substituting traditional ship fuel with clean energy is the most important solution. Whether to promote clean-energy ships through state governance or unified international supervision to achieve carbon neutrality has been a long-standing debate. This study employs both a tripartite evolutionary game model and a quadrilateral evolutionary game model to compare the effectiveness of state governance and unified international supervision in promoting clean-energy ships. The tripartite model simulates interactions between local governments, shipping companies, and shippers, revealing that high subsidy costs reduce local governments' incentives to promote clean-energy ships. The quadrilateral model introduces international supervision, demonstrating that a unified international oversight mechanism can accelerate the global maritime industry's progress toward carbon neutrality. Numerical simulations indicate that lowering the purchase costs of clean-energy ships and introducing government subsidies significantly influence the adoption of clean-energy ships, while supervision costs impact the effectiveness of international regulations. These findings provide critical insights for policymakers aiming to balance financial incentives and global supervision strategies to foster low-carbon development in the maritime sector.

Incentive and Supervision Mechanism for Operation and Maintenance of Mega Railway Infrastructure Based on Principal-Agent Theory

This study incorporates fairness preference theory into the principal-agent model to address the challenges arising from information asymmetry between the government and railway infrastructure operation and maintenance (O&M) companies. It develops an incentive and supervision model for the management of mega railway infrastructure operations and maintenance, considering two perspectives: full rationality and fairness preference. The models are compared and analyzed, exploring the costs of government supervision and the changes in expected benefits when equity preference is taken into account. The conclusions are supported by numerical examples and visual analysis, illustrating the impact of different variable parameters on the behavioral strategies of the government and O&M companies. The findings demonstrate that a well-designed incentive and supervision mechanism can effectively regulate the behavior of railway infrastructure O&M companies. The effort level of O&M companies is positively correlated with the intensity of government incentives and supervision. Moreover, from the perspective of fairness preference, transferring some financial benefits from the government to O&M companies not only increases their extra effort but also reduces government’s supervision costs, while the government’s expected utility gain depends on the strength of “reciprocity” exhibited by O&M companies.

Research on Agricultural Machinery Services for the Purpose of Promoting Conservation Agriculture: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Involving Farmers, Agricultural Machinery Service Organizations and Governments

Agricultural machinery services are an important guaranteed way to promote Conservation Agriculture. It is of great significance to study how to encourage farmers to choose agricultural machinery services to promote the standard implementation of Conservation Agriculture technology. In order to promote the implementation of Conservation Agriculture and improve the supply of agricultural machinery services, this paper identifies the stakeholders of normative Conservation Agriculture technology adoption behavior and the relationship between agricultural machinery service organizations, farmers and agriculture-related governments. An evolutionary game model was established to evaluate the decision-making characteristics of tripartite behavior and simulate the evolution trend of stakeholder behavior. The results show that agriculture-related governments, agricultural machinery service organizations and farmers can achieve evolutionarily stable strategies. The punishments and subsidies of agriculture-related governments and the supervision cost of all links of agricultural machinery social service organizations can significantly affect the behavior strategies of the three parties. The government set up reasonable subsidy and punishment mechanisms, and the agricultural machinery service organization controls the supervision cost of all links to ensure the stability of the three-party behavior strategy. This study provides theoretical guidance for scientific decision making and active cooperative development of the government, farmers and agricultural machinery service organizations and lays a foundation for countermeasures and suggestions to further promote farmers’ implementation of Conservation Agriculture technology.

Revisiting SME Financing in Bangladesh

Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Financing is a topic of significant research interest to academics and an issue of great importance to the policy makers around the world. Economic, as well as technical and social arguments warrant the promotion of SMEs, as they create large scale, low-cost employment opportunities, use locally available inputs and technologies, mobilize small and scattered private savings, develop entrepreneurship, and correct the regional imbalance in development that exists in developing countries. Despite all these potentials, SMEs are disappearing, abandoning the potential role they could have played in economic development. Several studies have identified the major obstacles that include, but not limited to, financing, infrastructure facilities, taxes and regulations and stability in policies. This paper focuses on the financial constraints in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, among the formal sources, commercial banks are not interested because of the high risk and high supervision cost associated with this type of financing. Absence of sound collateral puts SMEs at a relative disadvantage. However, we have found that some of the commercial banks have some ‘innovative’ products or services targeting at SMEs only, while others have ‘repackaged’ some of their existing products as SME products. The contribution of commercial banks is meager except BASIC Bank Ltd. and BRAC Bank Ltd. It has been observed in the study that commercial banks disburse loans to this sector only when government introduces ‘credit guarantee scheme’ in different capacity. ‘Relationship lending technologies’ should be introduced in case of the existing ‘transaction lending technologies

How can rural China achieve sustainable development through inclusive innovation? A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Promoting inclusive innovation is crucial for achieving inclusive growth and sustainable development. This study investigated the decision-making behaviors and interaction mechanisms among the government, enterprises, and base of the pyramid (BoP) customers in the context of inclusive innovation in rural China by applying evolutionary game theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model was developed, and evolutionarily stable strategies along with their corresponding conditions were derived. Numerical simulations were employed to analyze the dynamic evolution process of stakeholders’ strategy choices under various scenarios and their sensitivity to key parameters. The findings suggest that the government plays different roles throughout the lifecycle of inclusive innovation in rural China, acting as an advocate in the initial stage, a promoter in the growth stage, and gradually diminishing its involvement as the market matures. Furthermore, the study reveals that low subsidies are not conducive to the evolution of optimal solutions for the three stakeholders, while high supervision costs reduce the government’s regulatory willingness, thereby hindering enterprises and the BoP customers from implementing and engaging in inclusive innovation in rural areas. Based on these insights, this research proposed some promotional mechanisms tailored to the different developmental stages of inclusive innovation, drawing from the industry life cycle theory. The insights and model developed in this study extend beyond rural China and offer a valuable framework for enhancing sustainable development in rural areas across other developing countries and regions.

Integration of Acute Malnutrition Treatment Into Integrated Community Case Management in Three Districts in Southern Mali: An Economic Evaluation.

Enabling community health workers (CHWs) to treat acute malnutrition improves treatment access and coverage. However, data on the cost and cost-effectiveness of this approach is limited. We aimed to cost the treatment at scale and determine the cost-effectiveness of different levels of supervision and technical support. This economic evaluation was part of a prospective nonrandomized community intervention study in 3 districts in Mali examining the impact of different levels of CHW and health center supervision and support on treatment outcomes for children with severe acute malnutrition. Treatment admission and outcome data were extracted from the records of 120 participating health centers and 169 CHW sites. Cost data were collected from accountancy records and through key informant interviews. Results were presented as cost per child treated and cured. Modeled scenario sensitivity analyses were conducted to determine how cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness estimates change in an equal scale scenario and/or if the supervision had been done by government staff. In the observed scenario, with an unequal number of children, the average cost per child treated was US$203.40 in Bafoulabé where a basic level of supervision and support was provided, US$279.90 in Kayes with a medium level of supervision, and US$253.9 in Kita with the highest level of supervision. Costs per child cured were US$303.90 in Bafoulabé, US$324.90 in Kayes, and US$311.80 in Kita, with overlapping uncertainty ranges. Additional supervision has the potential to be a cost-effective strategy if supervision costs are reduced without compromising the quality of supervision. Further research should aim to better adapt the supervision model and associated tools to the context and investigate where efficiencies can be made in its delivery.

A study on the evolutionary game theory of third-party governance of environmental pollution based on the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights

The third-party governance of environmental pollution and the pollution rights trading system are two typical examples of modern environmental governance systems. In China, the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights between pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises is the link through which to achieve synergy between the two factors. To explore how to achieve such synergy, first, the “principle of no-fault liability” is introduced, and the responsibilities of pollution-discharging enterprises and pollution-control enterprises are defined. Second, based on the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights, a revenue-sharing mechanism for pollution rights trading is designed. Finally, a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of pollution-discharging enterprises, pollution-control enterprises and local governments is constructed, and numerical simulation is performed. The results are as follows. 1) By setting a reasonable market trading price for pollution rights, a reward and punishment distribution coefficient, an improvement in reputation gains, and a saving in pollution rights indicators become conducive to the formation of cooperative relationships between pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises, for which the reasonable range of the reward and punishment distribution coefficient is (0.3, 0.4]. 2) Regardless of whether a government subsidy is provided, the optimal range of the revenue-sharing coefficient from pollution rights trading is [0.5, 0.6]. 3) When a government subsidy is withdrawn, increasing the market trading price and surplus indicators of pollution rights can promote the stable operation of the third-party governance model. 4) An increase in policy support and administrative accountability of higher levels of government and a reduction in supervision costs for local governments can help these parties effectively avoid addressing the absence of local government supervision. It is recommended that third-party governance enterprises participate in pollution rights trading to implement the main responsibilities of pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises and to set a reasonable revenue-sharing coefficient and reward and punishment distribution coefficient of pollution rights.

The Dynamics of Rewards and Penalties: Governmental Impact on Green Packaging Adoption in Logistics

The widespread use of traditional packaging materials poses significant environmental challenges. Adopting green packaging is essential for reducing pollution and conserving natural resources. This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of government incentives and penalties in promoting the adoption of green packaging by logistics companies. We developed an evolutionary game theory model that involves governments and logistics companies, comparing the impacts of static and dynamic reward and penalty policies. The results indicate that (1) static policies often lead to oscillatory adoption rates of green packaging without achieving a stable equilibrium, while dynamic policies generally promote steadier adoption of sustainable practices. (2) Different combinations of dynamic policies have varying influences on logistics companies’ propensity to adopt green packaging solutions. Specifically, dynamic rewards and static penalties are particularly effective at encouraging logistics companies to adopt green packaging. (3) A combination of dynamic rewards and penalties tends to facilitate more rapid and consistent adoption of green packaging by logistics companies. (4) An increase in government supervision costs is associated with reduced regulatory actions and a lower prevalence of green packaging. These insights are critical for policymakers aiming to craft regulations that successfully encourage sustainability within logistics operations.

Game analysis on PPP model operation of abandoned mines ecological restoration under the innovation of central government's reward and punishment system in China.

There is a huge funding gap in the abandoned mines ecological restoration in China. It is of great research value to explore how PPP model can better introduce social capital into the low-profit ecological restoration of abandoned mines. Based on the innovation perspective of the central government's reward and punishment system, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of "local government-social capital", analyzes the interaction and behavior mechanism of core stakeholders in the operation process of abandoned mines ecological restoration PPP mode, and discusses the influence of evolutionary equilibrium strategy and parameters change on evolutionary strategy under different scenarios by Matlab simulation. The research shows that the abandoned mines ecological restoration needs the support of the central government. When the local government lightly punishes the low-quality service of social capital, the central government needs to pay higher costs to promote all parties to actively participate in the operation and supervision of the PPP project. The revenue and cost of government supervision, the operating subsidy for social capital and the cost saved by social capital in providing bad service are the key factors affecting the evolution of the game between government and social capital. Punishment can effectively spur social capital to keep the contract and operate in the project, but the punishment effect will be ineffective without government supervision. Finally, some suggestions are put forward, such as establishing a long-term supervision mechanism and a reasonable income mechanism for PPP projects, increasing penalties for violations, attracting third parties to reduce supervision costs and strengthening communication between the two parties, so as to make the project take into account the economic performance of social capital and the social welfare of government departments, and achieve dual Pareto improvement.

Multi-Scenario Mask Detection Method and Implementation Based on Deep Learning

Object detection is one of the core issues in the field of computer vision, with the task of accurately locating and recognizing all objects of interest in images, determining the categories and positions of objects. Regarding masks as targets in object detection, utilizing deep learning techniques to detect the wearing of masks on faces can greatly improve issues such as high manual supervision costs, low efficiency, and subjective differences. In this paper, based on the YOLOV5 algorithm, we propose a mask detection technology that can accurately detect the wearing of masks in real-time, and experimentally determine the occlusion boundaries.

Analysis of Multi-Stakeholder Behavioral Strategies in the Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Industry through an Evolutionary Game Theory

Construction and demolition waste (C&DW) recycling products have drawn worldwide attention over the past few decades. There is a general agreement among researchers that C&DW recycling is an important means for curbing the deterioration of the environment. Previous papers mainly focused on the decision-making behavior of dual stakeholders or tripartite stakeholders, as well as the lack of cooperation among multiple stakeholders. This study explored a dynamic evolutionary game model with three different parameter conditions to research the decision-making behaviors and stable strategies of the multi-stakeholders involved in the C&DW recycling product industry, including government departments and some enterprises. This research also investigated how the government’s supervision costs, penalties applied to enterprises, and resource taxes affect the dynamic evolution process of C&DW recycling. This research conducted numerical simulations using Python to analyze stakeholders’ behavioral evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and the sensitivity to main factors in each stage of the C&DW recycling process to accelerate the development of construction waste resource utilization. Based on the results of the evolutionary game, this paper proposed that the roles of multi-stakeholders are different at different stages of industry development, and that supervision costs, penalties, and resource tax have their own impacts on the C&DW recycling product industry. The paper suggests a range of discussions and simulation studies to highlight the significance of the government’s refined and moderate adjustments to the regulatory incentive system and the level of government regulation and involvement at different stages of the process. These adjustments are aimed at promoting the sustainable recycling and utilization of construction and demolition waste (C&DW) products within some countries’ construction industry.

A stochastic and time-delay evolutionary game of food safety regulation under central government punishment mechanism

Food safety is a pressing issue affecting public health, and strengthening food safety regulation has become a widespread consensus. This study addresses the three-party game involving food production enterprises, third-party testing agencies, and government regulatory authorities. Considering the influence of random disturbances and time delays on the strategy-choosing and behavioral evolution of game players, a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model for food safety regulation with time delays is established. The stability of the model is analyzed by using Lyapunov's method, and the strategy evolution of the game players is investigated while combining numerical simulations. The study shows that the net benefit of the players' expected strategies is key in determining whether the overall game system can reach the optimal equilibrium. The level of penalties imposed by the central government on local government regulators is key to food safety. The main factors influencing the strategy-choosing of game players are the level of penalties imposed by the local government regulators on third-party testing agencies, together with the supervision costs of the local government regulators. Random disturbances have a certain impact on strategy-choosing of the game players, with a greater impact on testing agencies, followed by food production enterprises, and a weaker impact on government regulatory authorities. The time delay factors exhibit a certain delay effect on the evolutionary path of strategy-choosing among the game players, which aligns with the actual situation. The findings of the study have implications for food safety regulation.