ABSTRACT Punitive house demolitions were intensified by the Israeli government during the Second Intifada with the intent of curbing suicide bombings. Using econometric analysis, Benmelech et al. (2015) suggest that this policy is effective, citing deterrence as the driving factor. In 2014, the Israeli Supreme Court relied on the findings of an earlier draft of the Benmelech paper to reject a petition against the resumption of punitive housing demolition. In this research, I show that the Benmelech findings are spurious due to misspecified modelling and that the reported effect of punitive house demolition camouflages confounding factors. I also show that among the multiple security measures put in place during the Second Intifada, arrest campaigns did negatively impacted suicide bombings. I provide suggestive evidence that explains individual motives for suicide bombings and why punitive house demolition lacks a deterrence effect. The motives are likely related to the aggravation of grievances from excessive state oppression, willingness to exact revenge, and the glorification of self-sacrifice and martyrdom in asymmetric conflict.