Civil War In Sudan Research Articles

The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars

The Root Cause of Sudan's Civil Wars

The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars

1Institute of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars Douglas Johnson Oxford James Currey 2003 xx + 234 £12.95 0 85255 392 7

The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars

The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars

Sudan's Islamic revolutions as a cause of foreign intervention in its wars: Insights from balance of threat theory

Sudan experienced a highly radical Islamic revolution in 1885 and a moderately radical Islamic revolution in 1989. Each time, Ethiopia intervened in a war that Sudan was fighting: in 1885 Mahdist Sudan was fighting a war of national liberation against Egypt, and in the 1990s Sudan was in the midst of a civil war. Egypt also intervened in Sudan's affairs during the 1990s, but not in Sudan's civil war. To explain connections between Sudan's Islamic revolutions and the varying interventions of Ethiopia and Egypt, this article explores the uses and limits of Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory ‐ a theory used by him to highlight causal connections between revolution and interstate security competition. One finding is that the theory provides important and unique insights into relations between revolutionary Sudan and two of its neighbors. The research also constitutes a new test of the theory. Another major finding, therefore, is that most but not alt of the hypotheses deduced from the theory are corroborated. As expected, significant instances of security competition were caused or exacerbated by Sudan's Islamic revolutions. However, the two revolutions did not cause security competition to increase nearly as much as the theory predicts. Implications of these findings are then explored.

Effective Humanitarian Assistance to Southern Sudan: The Legal, Political and Economic Constraints

Although the civil war in Sudan is one of the longest ongoing conflicts in Africa it has not attracted much international attention. During the course of the war many lives have been lost and many people have been in need of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian assistance to southern Sudan, however, has always been insufficient. This paper analyses the legal, political and economic constraints to effective humanitarian assistance. The legal obstacles seem to be the facts that there are no adequate international regulations regarding internally displaced persons, as the bulk of IDPs comes from Sudan, and that the Sudan is a sovereign state and the Sudanese fundamentalist government as legitimate and legal authority is entitled to full control of the actions of the humanitarian actors. The main political constraints are the policies of the government and of the rebel groups towards civilian populations and aid agencies, resulting in the prolongation of the violent conflict and the limitation of access to the people in need. However, the political involvement of humanitarian organisations and badly-designed development strategies are also to be blamed. The issues of ethnicity and ethnic tensions also seem to be crucial. The economic constrains are twofold: the inadequate level of funds and the existence of 'the economy of war'.

Sudan's Civil War: Slavery, Race, and Formational Identities

Sudan's Civil War: Slavery, Race, and Formational Identities

Sudan's Perfect War

WAR HAS raged in Sudan for all but 1i of the 45 years since its inde pendence. The most recent round of fighting began in 1983, after then President Ja' far Muhammad Numayri revoked the autonomy that had been granted to the country's south 11 years before and imposed Islamic law (the shari a) throughout the land. These steps were the final insult to the predominantly non-Muslim, non-Arab population of southern Sudan, which had long been cut off from the distribution of national resources and otherwise marginalized. At first, it was John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Move ment (SPLM) that took up the south's fight against government forces. But in the 19 years of bloodshed since, Sudan's civil war has been carried on by four different northern regimes and countless southern alliances. With two million fatalities so far, this war has produced more casualties than those in Angola, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Liberia, the Persian Gulf, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Rwanda put together. An astounding four million Sudanese-out of a population of around 29 million-have been made homeless. Yet militarily, the fighting has accomplished little. Today the government controls only key garrison towns in the south; the rest of the region is ruled by the SPLM or one of the many other factions that have evolved over the years. Meanwhile, rather than moving the conflict closer to resolution, political and economic developments in Sudan over the last few years have made achieving a negotiated and just peace even more unlikely.

Ethiopia's Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War: Was It as Significant as Khartoum Claimed?

Conflicts in Africa have arisen from a long list of antagonisms. Stephen John Stedman's list of problems generating conflict is very relevant to understanding prolonged and complex Sudanese conflict. This list includes the tugs and pulls of different identities, differential distri- bution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair and just. Stedman states that when individuals and groups turn to violence to solve such problems, conflict takes on a second dimension, that of security and survival, and this, in turn, makes conflict resolution as multifaceted as conflict itself. In such a scenario, conflict might become prolonged because antagonists come to fear consequences of settlement, in which parties choose mutual security arrangements over individual pursuit of security. 1 Moreover, fre- quent spilling of an internal conflict across borders inherited from colonialist period, and thus consequent interweaving of internal dispute into regional and sometimes even international political intrigues, reinforces complexity of conflict. The longer con- flict continues, greater military and political dependence of warring parties on their respective foreign supporters. In search for a model of a conflict that includes all above-men- tioned sources of antagonism and even contributes substantial elements of its own, Sudan's civil war and Ethiopia's involvement in it provide an ideal example. Although Ethiopia was not only country in region to intervene in Sudanese war, it was most consistently involved,

Sudan's Predicament: Civil War, Displacement and Ecological Degradation

Introduction - Sudan's predicament, Girma Kebbede Sudan - the North-South conflict in historical perspectives, Girma Kebbede South Sudan - a war-torn and divided region, Girma Kebbede war, social transition and illness conception - the case of tuberculosis, Jok M. Jok civil war in Sudan - the impact of ecological degradation, Mohamed Suliman losing ground - land impoverishment in Sudan, Girma Kebbede the challenges of peace, Girma Kebbede.

Sudan: Humanitarian crisis, human rights abysm

The ongoing catastrophe in Sudan is the greatest humanitarian crisis in the world today. There are no exceptions. Sudan, which is geographically largest of African nations, bears this ghastly distinction with terrible clarity. Numbers tell only part of the story, but they are sufficient for the moment. A carefully assembled set of data from the U.S. Committee for Refugees shows that almost two million human beings have perished in the most recent phase of ongoing civil war in Sudan. 1 As many as five million refugees have been created, making the refugee problem alone the greatest of its kind in the world. 2 And at the height of the summer famine of 1998, the UN's World Food Program estimated that well over 2 million more human beings, mainly children, were at risk of starvation. 3 And the catastrophe continues: famine, epidemic disease, enslavement, and scorched-earth warfare remain defining features of the landscape in the south, where civil war has been so devastatingly concentrated. Despite its distinction as an abysm of inhumanibSudan is rarely reported on, and even more rarely does this reporting do more than rehash some part of the litany of horrific numbers; a useful context is almost never provided. There are some recent signal exceptions: William Finnegan's superb essay in The New Yorker a year ago, all too aptly entitled"The Invisible War, "4 and Richard Miniter's excellent"The False Promise of Slave Redemption' in The Atlantic Monthly. ~ And there has been some fine investigative reporting around the terribly misconceived cruise-missile attack on the AI Shifa pharmaceutical factory in August 1998, particularly Vernon Loeb's for The Washing~ton Post. ~ Very occasionally there is an editorial of note. But in the main, Sudan remains---even for informed and intelligent Americ a n s a n unrecognized abysm of human suffering while it slides slowly, relentlessly, helplessly toward ever greater destruction. The civil war that is the engine of this destruction shows no signs of abating; indeed, if anything; Canadian and Chinese oil interests in Sudan promise to intensify the war by generating a great deal of hard currency, for the cash-strapped Khartoum regime, one party in the multi-faceted civil war. The regime, dominated by the

Rethinking the civil war in Sudan

A troubled country, the largest in a troubled continent, the Sudan surely tells one of the most tragic stories of war. The war is presented in the West as a religiously inspired persecution of Christian tribesmen in the south by the Islamic Fundamentalist government. The real story, however, is one of continued opposition and periodic fighting since shortly before independence in 1956 (and in other forms before then), and one in which a great variety of actors have a role. The purpose of this article is to argue that the war in Sudan has much less to do with religious intolerance and involves many other factors: regional and global politics and basic issues of food and water.

Dracunculiasis eradication: delayed, not denied.

By the end of 1998, Asia was free of dracunculiasis (Guinea worm disease), with Pakistan, India, and Yemen having interrupted transmission in 1993, 1996, and 1997, respectively. Transmission of the disease was also interrupted in Cameroon and Senegal during 1997. Chad reported only 3 cases during 1998. Dracunculiasis is now confined to only 13 countries in Africa. The overall number of cases has been reduced by more than 97% from the 3.2 million cases estimated to have occurred in 1986 to 78,557 cases reported in 1998. Because the civil war in Sudan remains the major impediment to eradication of dracunculiasis, the interim goal is to stop all transmission outside that country by the end of 2000. The most important operational need now is for national programs to improve the frequency and quality of supervision of village-based health workers in order to enhance the sensitivity of surveillance and effectiveness of case containment.

Sudan: international responses to war in the Nuba mountains

More than a decade of war in the Nuba mountains between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) is threatening the way of life and very existence of the Nuba people. Responsibility for the tragedy in the Nuba mountains lies squarely in the hands of successive Sudanese governments who are accused of human rights atrocities, creating famine conditions, war crimes and even genocide. The silence that surrounds the plight of the Nuba, however, also attests to the failure of the international community to secure protection and assistance for war‐affected populations in Sudan's civil war.

Dracunculiasis eradication: almost a reality.

The idea of a global campaign to eradicate dracunculiasis was first proposed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 1980, during the advent of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) (1981-1990). In 1981, the Steering Committee of the IDWSSD adopted eradication of dracunculiasis as a subgoal of their efforts to provide safe drinking water to unserved populations. In 1988, African ministers of health voted to eradicate dracunculiasis by the end of 1995, a target date that was endorsed by UNICEF in 1989 and the World Health Assembly in 1991. Although nine of 18 endemic countries, India (1980), Pakistan (1987), Nigeria and Cameroon (1988), Ghana (1989), and Mauritania, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Togo (1990) completed national searches for cases of the disease, only four countries, India (1983), Pakistan (1988), Ghana (1989), and Nigeria (1989), actually started eradication programs during the 1980s. The remaining 14 endemic countries began their eradication programs between 1991 and 1995. At the end of 1996, dracunculiasis had not been entirely eradicated, but its incidence had been reduced by 95%, from an estimated 3.2 million cases in 1986 to 152,805 cases in 1996. Sudan reported a total of 118,578 (78%) of the 152,805 cases of dracunculiasis reported during 1996. Insufficient funding and the civil war in Sudan continue to be the major obstacles to overcome. A primary aim of the eradication program in 1997 is to seek to ensure that all cases of dracunculiasis outside of Sudan are contained. In Sudan the challenge is to pursue all appropriate control measures in all accessible areas as vigorously as possible until political circumstances allow access to all of the remaining affected areas.

Self‐Determination and Unity: The Case of Sudan

Taking national unity to be desirable but not at any cost, the authors explore the conditionality of unity on genuine and lasting realization of the people's right to self‐determination through the political stability, economic development, and social justice for all citizens of a country, both individually and collectively. While emphasizing that secession and separate statehood are not the only way for realizing a people's right to self‐determination, the authors argue that this option must be considered seriously when a people is denied their right to self‐determination within the country. If this right is satisfied within an existing state, it is extremely unlikely that a minority would opt for the high political, economic, and security risks of separate statehood. But without that option, a majority may have little incentive to address the grievances of the minority. Applying their analysis to the civil war in Sudan, the authors propose a clear set of criteria and mechanisms for evaluating standards of achievement for self‐determination with unity within a specific time. Should the conditions of unity fail to materialize, the possibility of peaceful and orderly secession must be considered.

Cultures under pressure in the Sudan: the Ingessana and the Uduk

The paper examines the pressures being exerted by cultural and economic processes upon “African” cultures in the intermediate zone of the Sudan. It examines in particular the experience of the Ingessana and Uduk peoples living between the White and Blue Niles. The Uduk have experienced the greater degree of disruption from Sudan's civil war, and many Uduk have sought refuge in Ethiopia. The Ingessana are in the frontline facing cultural and economic pressures from the north. To pressures for Islamisation and Arabicisation have been added the development of chromite mining, mechanised agriculture and increased nomadic activity around their hills.

Dracunculiasis Eradication: Beginning of the End

Beginning with the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-1990), an increasingly broad coalition of international and bilateral agencies, organizations, private companies, and other institutions have joined forces to eradicate dracunculiasis (Guinea worm disease). From an estimated annual incidence of 10 million persons just before the campaign began, the remaining incidence of cases is now less than two million. More than 23,000 villages are known to be endemic. All 18 countries where the disease is still endemic have completed or begun nationwide searches to identify endemic villages, except Kenya. Dracunculiasis is nearly eradicated in Asia, where Pakistan found only 23 cases in 1992, and India found 1,081 cases. Cameroon and Senegal are close to achieving eradication in Africa, where the two formerly highest endemic countries, Nigeria and Ghana, reduced their combined total of cases from approximately 820,000 in 1989 to less than 240,000 in 1992. Much remains to be done, however, in francophone West Africa and especially in East Africa. The most serious current obstacles to eradicating dracunculiasis by 1995 are the civil war in Sudan, apathy of some national and international health officials, and inadequate funding for the campaign.

Repatriation of 150,000 Sudanese Refugees from Ethiopia: The Manipulation of Civilians in a Situation of Civil Conflict

This paper outlines the dramatic return to Sudan of 150,000 men, women and children from Itang Refugee Camp in Ethiopia in June 1991. These people were pawns in Sudan's civil war, manipulated by governments, military forces and the media - a state of affairs that the international community failed to deal with effectively. At the time of the return to Sudan, ICRC and the United Nations were working to assist the returnees in two different areas and each had a different access agreement and thus a different impact on the survival of the returnees. The paper focuses on the role of political awareness and negotiation in the protection of refugees and in the organisation of relief in the context of a civil war.

‘Bringing what people want’: shrine politics among the Agar Dinka

AbstractLarge shrines are built by Dinka in parts of the central southern Sudan. In early 1983, coinciding with the deepening political crisis which led to the current devastating civil war in Sudan, the byre of the divinity Mayual, a shrine of the Agar Dinka of southern Bahr al-Ghazal, was rebuilt by representatives of several subtribes with lands around the town of Rumbek.The byre shrine stood for the community of its rebuilders, a community that recognised the politico-religious centrality of the subclan Panamacot, the senior subclan of a group of religiously powerful subclans known as rordior, the sons women. The senior religious figure from Panamacot was the master of the byre. The master of the byre was also President of Rumbek Town Court, a secular office created by the government. Until his election in 1976 Agar had maintained that the institutions of religious leader and secular court official could not be combined in the same man.In late 1982 and early 1983 the imminent rebuilding of the shrine became the focus of a politico-religious dispute between the master of the byre and a divinely inspired rival from a different subclan. The dispute was a struggle for influence within the rebuilding community. The form and logic of the dispute were in part created by the particular nature of each man's religious abilities, which in turn derived from his possession by particular manifestations of Divinity, manifestations which imaged differing (but not distinct) areas of historically constituted experience and were intrinsic to the creation of that experience. A politico-religious crisis was created by the coming together of people's experience of the activities of different manifestations of Divinity and the differing abilities of each religious leader with experience of daily life, perceptions of the past, and fears about the way national and regional politics were unfolding. The episode demonstrated the way that, among Agar Dinka at least, divinely inspired leadership depends upon an interpretive deal continually negotiated between a leader and his followers, a deal in which all parties are speculating on the future in the light of both the present and the past.

African Refugees: An Analysis

The past decade has witnessed a staggering increase in the number of refugees in Africa; from 1.5 millions in 1969, their numbers have today risen to more than 5 million—that is, of the 10 mlliion refugees in the world, 5 millions are African. Even more alarming is the fact that the number of refugees in Africa is now greater than the populations of very many African countries. They criss-cross the entire continent and there is not a single country in Africa which has not been affected by the refugee problem. And always behind the flight of these peoples is the spectre of injustice and strife, of racial persecution or civil war—all violations of human rights.The first major group of African refugees arose as a result of national liberation struggles; thousands were dispersed to the neighbouring countries. While the National Liberation Front of Algeria (FLN) fought for the country's independence (beginning 1956), many women and children waited in refugee camps in Tunisia and Morocco. Thereafter, fortunately, most of sub-Saharan Africa obtained independence peacefully, but as the waves of independence struck the strongholds of settler and white dominated southern Africa, the travails of refugees emerged once more. Massive movements of people accompanied the strife in Angola, Mozambique, as well as Guinea Bissau. Thereafter, there was a stream of refugees from South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.Meanwhile, because of internal conflicts, Africa was having its own refugee problems. Some of the most serious ones arose out of the inter-ethnic clashes in Burundi and Rwanda, with the Tutsi fleeing Rwanda and the Hutu escaping Burundi. Then the civil war in Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo) occurred in different places at different times (1960–65 and then again in March 1977–78), and has still not completely subsided. Similar is the case of Chad; the civil war in the country, which has recurred time and again, has sent large numbers of refugees fleeing to the Cameroons. Again the 20 year civil war in Sudan caused much of its southern population to scatter to the surrounding countries and as they were returning home, Sudan started receiving Ethiopian refugees from 1967—first from Eritrea, then other parts of Ethiopia. The warfare in Ogaden, the defeat of the Somalia Army by Soviet-armed and Cuban-reinforced. Ethiopian forces in 1977–78, left Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti with large displaced populations. Large sections of the populations of Guinea, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda were forced to seek exile because of harsh rule in their countries. New waves of refugees—millions of men, women and children—came out from Nigeria following the civil war in that country.Finally, the other important category of refugee that the continent cannot ignore are the “economic” refugees—people who leave their home simply because they cannot eke out a living or are escaping starvation due to the recent droughts. This last category usually pass unnoticed as long as the host countries accept them. Nevertheless, when sent back to their own countries, as Ghana and Uganda did and most other countries would ultimately do, they have difficult problems of integration.Keeping in mind this conceptual heterogeneity of the refugees in Africa, an attempt is made to analyze three types of problems and their combinations which cause refugee migrations in sub-Saharan Africa. For this purpose, sub-Saharan Africa may be divided into three parts—Southern Africa, that is the frontline states; Tropical Black Africa and states neighbouring the Sahara. For further analysis, the cause for which people seek refuge may be characterized as: 1. Domestic instability arising out of tribal issue conflicts and apartheid; 2. Border clashes, again resulting out of tribal rivaries and apartheid; 3. Foreign intervention towards preserving domestic clientele.