Sudan People's Liberation Army Research Articles

Traditional and Religious Approaches as Psychosocial Support in the Reintegration of Former Girl Soldiers in South Sudan

Abstract The major cause of the conflict in South Sudan was power struggles among the political elites who manipulated ethnic differences along tribal lines. In the case of defunct Gbudue State both Sudan People Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLAIO) and South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM) massively recruited girl soldiers into their ranks. After the conflict, the girl soldiers returned home with deep psychosocial effects. The conflict has brought to fore existence of rich knowledge of traditional and religious approaches in reintegration process. This article attempts to examine the significance of traditional approaches used as psychosocial support during reintegration of former girl soldiers and analyse the extent of religion as dominant approach during the reintegration of former girl child soldiers in South Sudan. The article was guided by Instrumentalist theory: Elite Perspective. The study revealed both traditional approaches and religion in form of prayers helped psychologically to reintegrate former girl soldiers into the communities. The study also revealed that reintegration is a process that aims to reintegrate former girl soldiers within their families, economically and socially. From a methodological point of view, this article is a phenomenologically designed with findings include discussions about themes and patterns discovered during data analysis.

Reappraising the effectiveness of intelligence methods of a violent non-state sovereignty: a case-study of the SPLA insurgency in the Sudan (1983 – 2005)

ABSTRACT The development of Intelligence Studies has provided new and exciting insights into war, societies, ideologies, institutions, and even cultures and mindsets, even if the geographical reach of these studies has been largely limited to the West. One area that remains under-studied in general is that of insurgent intelligence, thereby underplaying the significance of a factor that can be pivotal in any armed conflict. This is particularly the case with regard to Africa. We still know very little about the role of insurgent intelligence apparatuses in this region, much less their perceptions and mental models of the world at large. This article seeks to address this situation by providing a case study of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). It draws on John Gentry’s framework for analysing non-state actor intelligence to set out the characteristics of the SPLA as an intelligence actor and to better understand its trajectory.

Religious Humanitarianism and the Evolution of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (1990-2005)

During the Cold War, military and economic tensions between the US and the Soviet Union shaped the process of war in conflict regions in different parts of the world. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s reshaped the balance of power in global politics, as new actors appeared on the global scene and global foreign policy shifted to mediating and providing humanitarian assistance in conflict regions zones. Humanitarianism became the method of conflict resolution, which provided humanitarian organizations, especially the religious ones among them, with the opportunity to have more influence in the outcomes of sociopolitical events occurring in the world. These dynamics impacted conflicts in Africa, especially within Sudan. This is because that era coincided with Sudan’s Second Civil War (1983-2005) between the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan (GofS). During the Cold War, both the US and Russia intervened in the civil war in Sudan by providing military and economic assistance to different parties, but, again, in the post-Cold War era humanitarianism was used in relation to the civil war. Transnational religious organizations provided humanitarian assistance in the war-torn and drought-afflicted regions in Southern Sudan, and sought to help implement peace initiatives to end the war. The organizations included Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a consortium of UN agencies and NGOs1 which was created in 1989. In addition, transnational religious groups based in the United States and Canada such as the Christian Solidarity International (CSI), the Canadian Crossroads, Catholic Relief Service, Mennonite Central Committee and the Lutheran Church got involved in humanitarian relief in Sudan. The global focus on religious humanitarianism extended to Southern Sudan as the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was founded in 1989-1990 to coordinate the humanitarian assistance. Because SPLA has led the civil war on behalf of Southern Sudan and had suzerainty over territories there, the humanitarian organizations had to build relationships with the SPLA to deliver relief through Southern Sudan and negotiate peace initiatives. This article analyzes how the transnational activities of the religious humanitarian groups shaped the evolution of SPLA from 1990 to 2005, with a particular focus on the US and Canadian organizations. We will see that the organizations influenced SPLA in a manner that impacted the civil war both in positive and negative ways. The organizations were ambivalent as, on one hand, they aggravated the conflict and, on the other hand influenced the development of both Church and non-Church related peace initiatives. Their humanitarian work was intricate as the civil war itself became more complex due to political issues that involved slavery, and oil extraction in Southern Sudan by US and Canadian multinational oil companies. All the parties involved took action to help end the civil war, but they all sought to serve their own interests, which jeopardized the possibility of a lasting peace. Thus, the interpretation of that history provides ways to help solve the current armed conflict in South Sudan.

HIV prevalence and behavioral risk factors in the Sudan People's Liberation Army: Data from South Sudan.

OverviewAfter two decades of civil war, South Sudan has limited published data on HIV prevalence and behavioral determinants of HIV infection risk. A surge in HIV/AIDS prevalence is a real concern for this new country with limited access to medical or HIV preventive services, and low education and literacy levels. We present findings from the first bio-behavioral surveillance survey conducted within the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).MethodsA cross-sectional survey of 1,149 randomly selected soldiers from thirteen SPLA bases was conducted in two phases: July to August 2010 and April to May 2012. Consenting participants received HIV rapid tests, pre- and post-test counseling, and a personal interview. Demographics, knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors, including sexual behavior, alcohol use, and mental health were assessed using computer-assisted interviews.FindingsThe final sample included 1,063 survey participants (96.7% male). Education levels within the SPLA are low; only 16.4% attended school beyond the primary level. The overall HIV prevalence in the sample was 5.0% (95% confidence interval [CI]: 3.6–6.9). High-risk behaviors (e.g., multiple or concurrent sexual partners, heavy alcohol use, low condom use) were noted among SPLA members. High levels of HIV stigma were identified: 90.6% (n = 916) responded with one or more negative beliefs towards PLHIV, and 60.3% thought a healthy-looking person with HIV should not be allowed to remain in the SPLA.ConclusionResults from this first evaluation of risk behaviors and HIV prevalence among the SPLA highlight high-risk behaviors that may contribute to the spread of HIV. Understanding potential comorbid conditions will be critical to designing strategies to reduce HIV risk. This survey represents the first steps in understanding the HIV epidemic within the SPLA context.

Building the nation's body: The contested role of abortion and family planning in post-war South Sudan

This paper offers an ethnographic analysis of public health policies and interventions targeting unwanted pregnancy (family planning and abortion) in contemporary South Sudan as part of wider ‘nation-building’ after war, understood as a process of collective identity formation which projects a meaningful future by redefining existing institutions and customs as national characteristics. The paper shows how the expansion of post-conflict family planning and abortion policy and services are particularly poignant sites for the enactment of reproductive identity negotiation, policing and conflict. In addition to customary norms, these processes are shaped by two powerful institutions - ethnic movements and global humanitarian actors - who tend to take opposing stances on reproductive health. Drawing on document review, observations of the media and policy environment and interviews conducted with 54 key informants between 2013 and 2015, the paper shows that during the civil war, the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Movement mobilised customary pro-natalist ideals for military gain by entreating women to amplify reproduction to replace those lost to war and rejecting family planning and abortion. International donors and the Ministry of Health have re-conceptualised such services as among other modern developments denied by war. The tensions between these competing discourses have given rise to a range of societal responses, including disagreements that erupt in legal battles, heated debate and even violence towards women and health workers. In United Nations camps established recently as parts of South Sudan have returned to war, social groups exert a form of reproductive surveillance, policing reproductive health practices and contributing to intra-communal violence when clandestine use of contraception or abortion is discovered. In a context where modern contraceptives and abortion services are largely unfamiliar, conflict around South Sudan's nation-building project is partially manifest through tensions and violence in the domain of reproduction.

Military Kinship, Inc.: patronage, inter-ethnic marriages and social classes in South Sudan

This article analyses marital practices in South Sudan’s second civil war and its aftermath. It focuses on inter-ethnic kinship military ties sealed through the patronage of marriage and through inter-ethnic marriages. It argues that the marriage market became part of the broader circuit of predation by different armed groups. Inter-ethnic marriages varied between different ethnic groups and served different goals. They were symptomatic of changing and deteriorating ethnic dynamics within the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and with the local population. Ordinary civilians attempted to resist increased inequalities on the marriage market, used by the military elite as a tool for class consolidation.

Sudan and South Sudan: from one to two

Introduction: Liberation or Political Realism? 1. South Sudan: The Beginning of The Struggle for Political Emancipation 1947-2004 2. Northern Sudan and South Sudan: Denying The South Autonomy Led to Independence 3. The Anya-Nya Liberation Movement: 1955-72 4. The Southern Front and Self-Determination: 1964-2005 5. The Nimeiri Regime and the Oil Debate: 1980-83 6. South Sudan And The June 1989 Islamic Revolution in Sudan 7. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement And Army: As Liberators and as Rulers

“We are trained to be married!” Elite formation and ideology in the “girls’ battalion” of the Sudan People's Liberation Army

Women have supported, willingly or not, the Sudan People's Liberation Army's (SPLA) struggle of 22 years that led to the country's independence in 2011 as part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This article explains the movement's relationship to women by contrasting it with other examples of guerilla armies in sub-Saharan Africa at the time. It highlights the lack of ideological depth of the movement from its inception, and dissects the many roots behind the rank-and-file and the population's hostility toward women's fighting. It analyzes the reasons behind the creation of the only “Girls' battalion”, Ketiba Banat, which became an incubator for the creation of a new female elite and fulfilled political and social functions during the 22 years struggle. It also depicts other groups of women who joined the SPLA and were militarily trained outside of Ketiba Banat. Women's engagement was socially stratified during the war and membership to Ketiba Banat became an engine for increased social differentiation during the war and even more so afterwards. The women who were trained in other battalions but found themselves excluded from post-war neo-patrimonial networks, share the same frustrations than in other African post-conflict contexts.

The Political Crisis in South Sudan

KeyWords: South Sudan; SPLM/A; civil warThe political crisis in South Sudan is now more than a year old, with no immediate end in sight to the fighting between armed factions. What began as a power struggle within the ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), reignited factional fighting within the army, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), in December 2013. Both the political and military crises had their origins in unresolved tensions following the split in the SPLM/A in the 1990s and the incomplete integration of opposed factions into the army following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 (see Johnson 2014). Many South Sudanese expected that these tensions would eventually erupt in some form of conflict following independence in 2011, but the rapid escalation and intensity of fighting has still taken them by surprise.This commentary can give only the barest outline of a complex series of events motivated by a mixture of political disappointment, personal ambition, and ethnic rivalry. A more detailed reporting of various aspects of the crisis can be found in the updated reports of the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan and human rights reports by Amnesty International, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and the South Sudan Human Rights Commission (2014).1The CPA was constructed around the assumption that John Garang would remain the leader of the SPLM/A, the head of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and the first vice president in the power-sharing Government of National Unity (GNU) with the National Congress Party (NCP) throughout the six-year interim period leading up to the South Sudanese independence referendum in 2011. His death in July 2005, three weeks after his inauguration as first vice president, catapulted two men into unexpected positions of power: Salva Kiir Mayardit, Garang's deputy, assumed the leadership of the party and his two constitutional positions, while Riek Machar, occupying the third highest position in the party, became vice president in the GoSS. Had Garang lived, it is unlikely that either man would have remained in their initial positions, as Garang was adept at moving potential rivals around, preventing them from entrenching themselves in positions of power within the party or the army.Salva Kiir, a veteran guerrilla of the first civil war, was, along with Garang, the last surviving founder of the SPLM/A, all others having been killed in the fratricidal warfare that engulfed the SPLM/A during the 1990s (see Johnson 201 l:ch.7). His survival was due, in part, to having kept aloof from the internal politics of the movement, seeing himself as a soldier rather than a politician. Tensions had arisen between him and Garang at the end of 2004, just before the signing of the CPA, and his future in a Garang-led government was uncertain.Riek Machar had joined the movement from a civilian, rather than a military, background and broke with Garang in 1991 over personal and ideological differences. His attempt to lead a reformed movement failed, and in the end he was forced to fall back on the support of sections of his own Nuer people, a significant proportion of them coming from Khartoumbacked militias. Machar soon lost control over both the formal and informal armed bodies under his command. His rebellion disintegrated into internecine fighting among Nuer, with civilians being the main targets, a pattern that was to reemerge in his current rebellion (see Johnson 2009, 2011:ch.8). He reconciled with Garang in 2002, just as internationally brokered peace negotiations with Khartoum began, and was elevated to the number three spot in the movement's hierarchy.Salva Kiir faced many challenges in forming a government to administer southern Sudan during the interim period prior to the independence referendum. As leader of the army, the party, and the government, he first appointed persons closer to himself than to Garang, some with strong ties to Khartoum, leaving many of the SPLM stalwarts-Garang's Orphans- marginalized within the party and government (see Nyaba 2011 ). …

Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict

During the night of 15 December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. The fighting pitted forces loyal to President Salva Kiir against those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar. Five days later, Uganda sent troops into South Sudan, advancing a number of reasons for intervention, including that it had been invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan to ensure order; it needed to evacuate Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; it had been asked by the United Nations Secretary-General to intervene; and that the regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development had sanctioned the intervention. As the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops started fighting on the side of forces loyal to Kiir. The underlying reasons for the intervention were clearly economic, but those advanced were legal. This article discusses both sets of reasons and concludes that the economic reasons are more persuasive. Nevertheless, while some of the legal arguments (such as being invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan) can be asserted, others are clearly dubious. In addition, the participation of Ugandan troops in the fighting on the side of the Kiir government renders the intervention illegal.

Development of a novel Global Trauma System Evaluation Tool and initial results of implementation in the Republic of South Sudan

IntroductionTrauma remains a leading cause of death and disability in the world, and trauma systems decrease mortality from trauma. We developed the Global Trauma System Evaluation Tool (G-TSET) specifically for use in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) desires a military trauma system (MTS) which allowed us to pilot the G-TSET. MethodsThe G-TSET was developed by modifying key components of a trauma system applicable to LMICs. We partnered with the SPLA Medical Corps using clinical collaboration, direct observation, and discussion groups. Benchmarks and indicators were scored with 5 indicating “full capability” and 1 meaning “not present” and were used to develop a SPLA MTS plan. ResultsThe overall MTS score was 1.15 indicating an urgent need for system development. The assessment highlighted the need for SPLA Command support. Battlefield care, transport to a trauma facility, and inter-facility communication were identified for improvement. After essential battlefield care, consisting primarily of bandaging and splinting, transport times for injured SPLA soldiers were 12h to 3 days by truck. Based on our findings, we collaborated with SPLA medical leadership to develop a plan to develop a formal MTS. ConclusionWe piloted a novel trauma system assessment tool for the MTS in the RSS. Qualitatively, we identified gaps in the MTS and provided the medical leadership with a plan for improvement. We anticipate a short-term follow-up to quantify improvement, and we seek to validate this tool for use in other countries.

South Sudan: Civil war, predation and the making of a military aristocracy

This article addresses the social and political implications of wartime and post-war resource capture in South Sudan. It argues that predation by armed groups during the second civil war (1983–2005) initiated a process of dominant class formation, and demonstrates how, through various strategies of resource capture and kinship networks, commanders from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other factions formed a new aristocracy – a “dominant class” that thinks of itself as “the best”. Drawing on Marcel Mauss’s analysis of ‘gifts’, it describes how commanders, through gifts of bridewealth and wives to their subordinates, formed a lower stratum of followers that strengthened their position. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the military elite in power has maintained this lower stratum through the deployment of nepotistic and clientelist networks. The article discusses three modes through which the elite has sought to distinguish itself, showing how the elite has used the lower stratum to demonstrate its prestige and influence in the post-war period, and how the elite’s ostentation and widespread corruption have triggered popular resentment in which old ethnic enmities sometimes resurface. ON 15 DECEMBER 2013 THE GRAVEST POLITICAL CRISIS in the short history of the Republic of South Sudan erupted. Following a series of disagreements within the highest echelons of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, thirteen political figures were imprisoned, accused by President Salva Kiir of attempting a coup under the leadership of estranged Vice-President Riek Machar. Since then, Kiir – aided by the Ugandan army and supported by an increasingly embarrassed international community, as well as by the former northern Sudanese foe – has tried to

Briefing: The crisis in South Sudan

ON 16 DECEMBER 2013 THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, appeared on state television in military uniform to announce that he had successfully put down a coup attempt in the capital, Juba. The coup attempt was said to have been led by former Vice-President Riek Machar and several ex-cabinet ministers and officials of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), including Madame Rebecca Nyanding de Mabior, the widow of the SPLM’s first leader, John Garang. Eleven alleged coup plotters were arrested in their homes, but Riek Machar escaped from Juba, and, amid reports over the next few days of targeted killings of Nuer in Juba by men in uniform loyal to the President, the commanders of the 8th and 4th army divisions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jonglei and Unity states announced their defection to Riek Machar and seized control of the state capitals of Bor and Bentiu. In telephone interviews from secure places Riek Machar denied that he had been involved in a coup but then urged the army to overthrow Salva Kiir and announced his plans to march on Juba. Despite the fact that the arrested ministers came from a variety of communities across South Sudan, Western media reports cast the political struggle exclusively in tribal terms, of Salva Kiir’s Dinka against Riek Machar’s Nuer. The targeted killings in Juba and revenge killings of Dinka by Nuer in Akobo and Bor in Jonglei state seemed to bear this out. The coup was said to have begun with a fight between Nuer and Dinka soldiers in the presidential guard following a meeting of the SPLM’s National Liberation Council (NLC), which Riek Machar and the alleged plotters had boycotted, and in which Salva Kiir had denounced Riek in strident terms. Yet while the government of South Sudan has kept to this version of events, they have presented little concrete evidence to support their claim

Armed-Group Amnesty and Military Integration in South Sudan

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the government of South Sudan has sought to neutralise the threat that armed groups pose to stability through their integration into the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), rather than coercion. Although successful in part, this approach has nevertheless led to the continued proliferation of armed groups. In this article, Lesley Anne Warner analyses how the government of South Sudan and the SPLA have administered the amnesty and integration process, concluding that military integration is a process that is managed, but not yet fully mastered.

POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND GLOBALIZATION - Zachariah Cherian Mampilly. Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War.Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011. xxi + 293pp. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $45.00. Cloth.

POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND GLOBALIZATION Zachariah Cherian Mampilly. Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011. xxi + 293 pp. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $45.00. Cloth.This book is a must-read for anybody wishing to understand why some rebels assemble comprehensive administrations to rule civilians while others fail to do so or reject this task. In his analysis, Mampilly challenges claims of other scholars that economic incentives drive rebel organization and goals, arguing instead for a process-based approach. In his well-researched surveys of rebel governance in Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, Sudan's SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army), and Congo's RCD-Goma (Rasemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma), Mampilly finds that preconflict political environments weigh heavily in shaping how rebels rule, but within this context rebels make consequential choices. He backs this conclusion with extensive interview and documentary evidence collected during field visits and from his interactions with rebel leaders and administrators.Mampilly takes rebel agency seriously. Most rebels want to rule civilians, but rule requires considerable discipline among rebels and it claims resources that they could use for fighting. Yet ruling civilians brings rebels in contact with local material and political resources under civilian control. Effective rebel rule provides rebels with information from civilians about the activities of their enemies and rivals within rebel ranks. Equipped with such information, rebels can use violence selectively to address these challenges. Rule becomes more viable as rebels refrain from mistreating local people and avoid attracting international condemnation. In reality rebels have to make tough choices as they confront splits in their ranks, claim credit for services that NGOs provide, and contend with militias in addition to national armies. Mampilly calls this an interactional approach in which key actors identify opportunities and adjust strategies accordingly. These rebel leaders are not slaves to resource curses or factional tensions or cross-border patrons. These variables weigh in the balance, but rebels use strengths to compensate for weaknesses, and clever leadership matters too.Diving into the case studies, Mampilly explains that the dense institutions of the effective Sri Lankan state gave the Tamil Tigers an administration they could appropriate as they became rebel rulers. The bad news for rebels in Sudan and Congo is that civilians there had learned how to live without effective state institutions under preconflict regimes. Adept at evading the state, those civilians evaded rebels too, leaving these rebels to rule through a mix of coercion and patronage, much like the old Congolese state. In Sudan rebels shared the political environment that tested the rulers of that state. …

Are “Griefs of More Value than Triumphs”? Power Relations, Nation-Building, and the Different Histories of Women's Wartime Contributions in Postwar South Sudan

Abstract In this article, the author examines the roles of women during the second civil war of South Sudan (1983–2005) and how their contribution to the liberation struggle led by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is advertised by the new state in the postwar era. Pinaud analyzes the reasons behind the promotion of the women's battalion's history in the postwar era by the state, in contrast with its disregard for camp followers. Highlighting the different categories and socioethnic origins of female actors in the war, she subscribes to the idea developed by other authors that advertised myths and official state history are the products of an ideological selection operated by the group dominating the state. This article illustrates how, by silencing the history of the camp followers (particularly in the Equatorian region), the state effectively censors the wartime experiences of an entire segment of the population. The state fails to engage a negotiation of beliefs, which is formative of a collective memory that shapes a group's sense of shared experience and identity. The article thus brings new material to reflect on the social and political dynamics behind the formation of state history, collective memory and nationhood in South Sudan, a relatively new stream of research.

Are “Griefs of More Value than Triumphs”?: Power Relations, Nation-Building, and the Different Histories of Women’s Wartime Contributions in Postwar South Sudan

In this article, the author examines the roles of women during the second civil war of South Sudan (1983–2005) and how their contribution to the liberation struggle led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is advertised by the new state in the postwar era. Pinaud analyzes the reasons behind the promotion of the women’s battalion’s history in the postwar era by the state, in contrast with its disregard for camp followers. Highlighting the different categories and socio-ethnic origins of female actors in the war, she subscribes to the idea developed by other authors that advertised myths and official state history are the products of an ideological selection operated by the group dominating the state. This article illustrates how, by silencing the history of the camp followers (particularly in the Equatorian region), the state effectively censors the wartime experiences of an entire segment of the population. The state fails to engage a negotiation of beliefs, which is formative of a collective memory that shapes a group’s sense of shared experience and identity. The article thus brings new material to reflect on the social and political dynamics behind the formation of state history, collective memory and nationhood in South Sudan, a relatively new stream of research.

The Mystery of Phantom States

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. For a subtle investigation of Weber that goes beyond the state-as-violent-entrepreneur model, see Rogers Brubaker, The Limits of Rationality (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984). See also Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Michael Mann, The Rise and Decline of the Nation State (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990). 2. Liam Anderson, “Reintegrating Unrecognized States: Internationalizing Frozen Conflicts,” in Unrecognized States in the International System, eds. Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (London: Routledge 2010), p. 188. 3. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): pp. 75–90 http://wand.stanford.edu/courses/polisci350c/classonly/fearon_laitin2003.pdf. 4. See Barbara F. Walter, “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (April 2006): pp. 313–330, http://bama.ua.edu/~sborrell/psc521/separatists.pdf; and Walter, “Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): pp. 105–135. 5. Saskia Baas, “Child soldiers & Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),” April 27, 2010, ugandawatch.blogspot.com/2010/05/special-report-child-soldiers-sudan.html. 6. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis, “The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design,” in Understanding Civil War: Africa, eds. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005). See also Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” 7. Lawrence Wright, “Captives: What really happened during the Israeli attacks?” The New Yorker, November 9, 2009., http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/11/09/091109fa_fact_wright. 8. Vladimir Solonari, “Creating a ‘People’: A Case Study in Post-Soviet History-Writing,” Kritika 4, no. 2 (Spring 2003): pp. 411–448. 9. “Statement of the NKR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Related to the Resolution of the UN International Court on the Independence of Kosovo,” http://www.nkr.am/en/statements/116/. Additional informationNotes on contributorsDaniel BymanDaniel Byman is professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, research director of the Saban Center at Brookings, and author of A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. He is also a member of the TWQ editorial boardCharles KingCharles King is professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and author of Odessa: Genius and Death in a City of Dreams

Child Soldiers and Youth Citizens in South Sudan's Armed Conflict

Kabili (not his real name) was a child soldier during the Second Sudanese War. He was affiliated with the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA) during part of a brutal conflict in which over two mi...

Humanitarian Obstruction as a Crime Against Humanity: The Example of Sudan

Widespread military violence, much of it targeting civilians, accelerated dramatically this past June in the Soutfi Kordofan region of Sudan, and as of September 1 it had spread to Blue Nile State. Like much of Sudan, South Kordofan and Blue Nile are a highly combustible mix of etiinic animosities, tortured history, and great numbers of heavily armed men (see Small Arms Survey 2011). South Kordofan has the added misfortune of being the Khartoum regime's only oil-producing state following the independence of South Sudan on July 9, 2011. But while geographically in northern Sudan, much of Blue Nile and South Kordofan - and virtually the entire Nuba Mountains area in the center of South Kordofan - identifies with the South culturally, politically, and militarily. Tens of thousands of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers are from the Nuba and southern Blue Nile; they refuse to be sent back to the South or disarmed - and if pushed by Khartoum, they will fight to save their lands and cultural heritage. The SPLA-Nordi is now a distinct entity, and considers itself and its political counterpart (the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North) as fighting an aggressive tyranny in their homelands. This is not hard to understand, particularly in the case of the Nuba. In the 1990s, during die first military action undertaken by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party, the African people of the Nuba were nearly annihilated; hundreds of thousands were killed or displaced from their fertile lands. Though not a widely known event, there is almost no dissent among students of Sudan that this episode of ethnically targeted destruction was in fact genocide. And one of its most notorious and consequential features was a total embargo on humanitarian aid to the region for much of the 1990s, even as South Sudan was the fitful beneficiary of the U.N. umbrella effort known as Operation Lifeline Sudan. This embargo is of central concern here, given the horrific human suffering and destruction that followed direcdy from it. Khartoum's more recent military offensive in South Kordofan and Blue Nile extends die offensive begun on May 20 in die contested border region of Abyei (which lies immediately to the south of South Kordofan). Only belatedly has the international community acknowledged that the incident cited by Khartoum as casus belliwas merely a pretext and that the attack was premeditated. The same is true of the regime's assault in South Kordofan, where on June 5 tanks and military equipment began to pour into Kadugli, die state capital. Within days widespread and clearly planned military actions were underway, again pitting Arab militias and Khartoum's regular armed forces against the African populations of the region, in particular those of the Nuba Mountains. In Kadugli there were authoritative reports of house-to-house searches for Nuba, who were then piled into catde trucks - or summarily executed. Roadblocks reminiscent of Rwanda in April 1994, and serving the same purpose, were also widely observed. Satellite imagery confirmed the existence of mass graves, as did eyewitness accounts from the ground collected by U.N. human rights investigators (who were shordy thereafter expelled by Khartoum). The presence in Kadugli of a U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) peacekeeping team did nothing to deter violence, or even protect African Nuba people who sought protection within the U.N. compound. Moreover, all of South Kordofan is within reach of Khartoum's major military air base at el-Obeid, which is just to the north. This has meant a constant aerial assault on civilian and humanitarian targets, especially in the Nuba Mountains - a continuation of the pattern I've analyzed and detailed for die past thirteen years (see Reeves 2011). The aerial offensive in South Kordofan has been extensive and concerted, and the clear goal has been to eliminate the troublesome populations of the Nuba once and for all. …