Reappraising the effectiveness of intelligence methods of a violent non-state sovereignty: a case-study of the SPLA insurgency in the Sudan (1983 – 2005)

Abstract

ABSTRACT The development of Intelligence Studies has provided new and exciting insights into war, societies, ideologies, institutions, and even cultures and mindsets, even if the geographical reach of these studies has been largely limited to the West. One area that remains under-studied in general is that of insurgent intelligence, thereby underplaying the significance of a factor that can be pivotal in any armed conflict. This is particularly the case with regard to Africa. We still know very little about the role of insurgent intelligence apparatuses in this region, much less their perceptions and mental models of the world at large. This article seeks to address this situation by providing a case study of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). It draws on John Gentry’s framework for analysing non-state actor intelligence to set out the characteristics of the SPLA as an intelligence actor and to better understand its trajectory.