Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is one of the tools that has been used for a long time to quantitatively assess the safety status of nuclear power plants (NPPs) around the world. However, despite all the positive aspects of the PSA of nuclear power plants, it, for example, does not take into account such a component as physical protection, which carries with it a corresponding negative effect, which is associated with the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to sabotage. It is not possible to directly involve the PSA of NPPs to evaluate the effectiveness of physical protection of nuclear facilities, since the existing methodology and procedure for applying this tool is not suitable for physical protection, which requires the development of a new methodology for the probabilistic analysis of physical protection. At the same time, it should be noted that in some cases it is possible to apply the methods of the traditional NPP PSA to perform some elements of the probabilistic analysis of physical protection without changes (for example, the analysis of equipment reliability), in other cases it is necessary to develop new methods for some of the elements of the probabilistic analysis of physical protection by analogy with the traditional NPP PSA (that is, to adapt, for example, the analysis of success criteria), and finally, in other cases, it is necessary to develop own new methods (for example, the analysis of the offender's actions) for the elements of the probabilistic analysis of physical protection, which are absent in the traditional NPP PSA. In general, the process of applying PSA of nuclear power plants to evaluate the effectiveness of physical protection systems of nuclear facilities requires not only the development of a new methodology, but also requires a rather large expenditure of time with the involvement of significant human and material resources. Therefore, for the first iterative step of using the traditional PSA of nuclear power plants to evaluate the effectiveness of physical protection of nuclear facilities, as an example, the possibility of adapting the methodology of the analysis of the success criteria of the traditional PSA of nuclear power plants for the probabilistic analysis of physical protection of nuclear facilities is considered.
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