Substantive Disagreement Research Articles

The War against Terror as War against the Constitution

Abstract:

To Disagree, We Must Also Agree: How Intersubjectivity Structures and Perpetuates Discourse in a Mathematics Classroom

Learning in a socially mediated context like a classroom places emphasis on the ability of learners to communicate their ideas to others, and for members of a class to achieve shared meaning or intersubjectivity (IS). We take a participatory view of IS, where both consensual agreement and disagreement are regarded as aspects of a common set of processes that mediate collective activity. Interlocutors need not demonstrate convergence toward a common idea or solution to exhibit IS and, indeed, they appear to need a shared understanding to express substantive disagreement through divergent views. Multilevel, multimodal analyses of videotape of a middle school mathematics classroom, including speech, gestures, drawing, and object use, reveal a discourse that is organized into recurrent sequences of event triads. The dynamics toward and away from convergent ideas appears to be instrumental in fostering sustained and engaging discourse and influencing the representations that students propose during problem solving. Participants frequently exhibited IS, but, as allowed for in the participatory view, the interactions did not seem to convert many students from their initial interpretations. Instead, disagreements and a desire to establish common understanding appeared to lead participants to express their divergent views in more refined and accessible ways. Advancement of our understanding of the role that IS serves in socially mediated learning has the potential to inform both educational theory and emerging areas in embodied cognition and cognitive neuroscience that addresses imitation and empathy, and thus help to bridge research between brain function and social cognition.

Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (review)

Reviewed by: Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors by Charles S. Maier Mary A. Renda Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors. By Charles S. Maier. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006. Is empire rational? In Among Empires Charles Maier argues that it is profitable (so to speak) to cast the problem of U.S. power in these terms. To “explain” empire, says Maier, is to understand its “rationality”—the sense, that is, in which it is logical for the state that follows the course of empire. In order to consider the ways that empire has been or might become a rational path for the United States, Maier scans the history of dozens of empires to discern what he regards as the essential features of empire as a structure of rule. Foremost among these is the reproduction of structures of inequality. Empire “preceded capitalism [and] modern markets,” Maier argues, but it “could not have preceded inequality” as “it was the manifestation in world politics of hierarchies that already existed and seemed worth defending” (55). Empire, he finds, “depends on—and in turn consolidates—social cleavages throughout its domains” (10). Other distinguishing characteristics of empire are transnational elites that work together to organize economic life in accordance with metropolitan imperatives and to secure their own local dominance; the ability (and necessity) to compel compliance first and foremost through military might; and “frontiers” or borders marking off the territorial space to be protected from the challenges of rival empires and “barbarians.” Maier’s discussion of frontiers emphasizes the imperial institutions that structure border zones and the border conflicts that, in turn, structure the empire itself—from villages to “gated communities and urban projects,” from factories and hospitals to the seats of executive power. With these general observations as a guide, Maier turns his attention to the question of “U.S. empire.” Skipping ever so lightly over the conquest of the nation’s eventual North American land mass and barely touching ground in Latin America, the Caribbean, or the Pacific between 1898 and 1940, Maier focuses instead on the nation’s ascendance after World War II, first in relation to its Soviet rival and later as a force of undisputed (though not unchallenged) global dominance. So as not to distract readers with what may be a semantic rather than substantive disagreement, Maier emphasizes his use of the term empire as a comparative tool rather than as a precise designation for U.S. power. The strength of Maier’s analysis resides in his finely wrought account of the advent of U.S. dominance in postwar Europe in the face of expansionist Soviet aims. Maier details the construction of imperial institutions in the evolving European borderland of U.S. “empire.” He locates the springs of the emerging system in a longer-standing development: the rise of U.S. industrial power in the nineteenth century and, crucially, the advent of Fordism as a system of production and social organization. A series of specific and contingent developments, the opening salvos of the Cold War, led President Truman and George Marshall to embrace the coupling of U.S. financial assistance with European commitments to contribute to the military defense of an American-led alliance system. But, as Maier emphasizes, aid also required Marshall Plan recipients to adhere to the Fordist model for economic reconstruction. The “empire of production” that resulted rested on a collective commitment to economic growth, a buy-in from labor to accept a modulated share of national wealth, the construction of welfare states, and the exclusion of radical elements that would challenge the essential features of the emerging capitalist bargain. Finally, atomic weapons were the initially unique and crucial feature of U.S. military power, which underwrote and gave shape to the emerging system during this period. In the 1970s and 1980s, during a period of profound challenge linked initially with U.S. war in Vietnam, the “empire of production” gave way to a new structure of U.S. power, which Maier dubs an “empire of consumption [and]. . . diffused development” (275). No longer would the blast furnace of the steel mill stand for America’s industrial might; the domestic economy of the United States...

Regret and Behavior: Comment on Zeelenberg and Pieters

Zeelenberg and Pieter's (2007) regret regulation theory 1.0 offers a synthesis that brings together concepts spanning numerous literatures. We have no substantive disagreement with their theory, but instead offer 3 observations to further aid regret researchers studying consumer decision making. First, the overall arch of any regret theory must be situated within an understanding of behavior regulation. Second, the distinction between regrets of action versus inaction is best understood in terms of motivational implications, particularly with regard to Higgin's (1998) distinction between promotion and prevention focus. Third, the opportunity principle offers a particularly clear means of summarizing the regulatory consequences of the regret experience. Regret is an emotion pivotal for decision making, and its cognitive underpinning has and continues to be elucidated in research focusing on counterfactual thinking.

Too Hot to Handle? How to Manage Relationship Conflict

Conventional wisdom, together with the weight of published management advice, recommends that management teams engage task conflict directly but avoid relationship conflict. Implicit in this advice is the premise that it is indeed possible to separate the task and relationship aspects of a business conflict. This article argues that this separation is not always possible for management teams. When teams discuss topics. substantive disagreements (task conflicts) tend to trigger negative attributions about others' motives or abilities (a key element of relationship conflicts). When this happens, most managers suppress their true thoughts, thus avoiding genuine discussion. Yet, when interpersonal attributions are suppressed, they tend to leak into the business conversation anyway, such as in the form of implied accusations or aggravated tones of voice. These dynamics are virtually inevitable, even when managers try hard to avoid them. Making a distinction between ''hot'' and cool topics can help clarify when avoiding discussion of relationship conflict in management teams is feasible and when it's not. In addition, management teams facing hot topics need to learn to handle relationship conflicts productively, despite the heightened emotions and interpersonal tensions associated with them.

The Road to Balanced Oversight

![Figure][1] Earlier this year, an international group of scientists and others convened at Hinxton, England (see the related Policy Forum in this issue, p. [921][2]), to address the moral challenges facing collaboration in human embryonic stem cell research that emerge from differences in national laws. Although a focus on embryo research is understandable, it is not the only area of science in which societies differ in values and laws. Scientists throughout the world work under different regulatory regimes governing human subjects, nonhuman animals, pathogens and biohazards, genetic modification of organisms and plants, and access to medical and public health records. In some cases, these differences reflect disagreements about ethically permissible conduct that approach the intensity of debates about the moral status of the embryo. Whether the issue is research on chimpanzees, the creation of novel organisms, or the destruction of human embryos, scientists need to consider whether it is ethical to travel to other countries to engage in research practices that would not be legally permissible in their home countries. Many scientists may see this as a personal decision that should turn largely on whether they accept or reject the moral premises that underlie their nation's laws. Scientists also need to consider, however, the potential impact of “research tourism” on the public's trust in the scientific community and on the ethics of science itself. ![Figure][1] CREDIT: GETTY IMAGES An English stem cell scientist who failed to follow standards set by the United Kingdom's Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) when working outside the United Kingdom would probably be viewed by colleagues as acting unethically. Moreover, such conduct might compromise public trust in the effectiveness of the HFEA to keep embryo research within socially acceptable ethical bounds, and thus might have negative effects on public support for the science itself. Similarly, a U.S. clinical scientist who elected to conduct research in a country whose regulations were more lax than those set by the U.S. Common Rule governing research on human subjects would probably also be viewed by colleagues as acting unethically. In many contexts, this scientist would also be subject to government and institutional penalties. By contrast, the Hinxton group concluded that scientists living in countries that restrict elements of human embryonic stem cell research should be free to engage in those practices in more permissive countries without legal repercussions. At the same time, however, many in the group recognized the tension that taking this position raises for the ethics of science overall. Scientists should welcome societal oversight of their research, much as all citizens should welcome the benefits of a well-ordered, lawful society more generally. The question is not whether science should be given a special pass when it comes to the reach of national laws. Rather, it is how best to strike a balance between ensuring that science conforms to a society's values and respecting the global context in which science increasingly operates. Of course, striking this balance is made more complicated when there is substantive moral disagreement not only between societies but also within societies about whether a particular research practice or line of investigation is ethical. The case is complicated still further when, as seems to be true with regard to human embryonic stem cell research, much if not most of the scientific community lines up on one side of the moral issue. These specific conditions of moral disagreement may warrant particular circumspection on the part of lawmakers with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction. That said, even if there is complete consensus within the global scientific community about the ethics of a particular scientific practice, scientists should not expect societies to defer to their views when it comes to matters of morality. Rather, scientists must continuously make their case to society by appealing to public moral reasons that are accessible to all. This is hard work that requires scientists to leave their laboratories and make themselves available to lawmakers, the public, and the media. At the same time, however, most scientists operate in institutional and professional cultures that rarely reward, and certainly do not prepare, scientists for engaging with the public. Until these structural disincentives to effective interaction between scientists and societies are remedied, we can expect the road to balanced oversight of science to be more complicated than it need be. [1]: pending:yes [2]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.1127990

Rejoinder: A Further Discussion of Job Analysis and Use of KSAs in Developing Licensure and Certification Examinations: A Response to LaDuca

In his commentary to our paper on the use of knowledge, skill, and ability statements in developing credentialing examinations ( Wang, Schnipke, & Witt, 2005 ), Dr. LaDuca set forth his concerns while commending our paper for providing helpful insights into the importance of careful delineation of KSAs. We believe that there is little substantive disagreement between our position and Dr. LaDuca's. Based on the counterarguments offered in his commentary, we believe that some misunderstanding occurred regarding our main point. Our response here further clarifies our main point to address Dr. LaDuca's criticisms. Additional explanations are provided to indicate that our paper is intended to address job analysis issues over a broader and diverse array of professions/occupations/fields, and our perspective is not limited to the context of credentialing physicians. We recommend that, for such professions/occupations/fields for which task inventory constitutes an appropriate approach to job analysis, the use of KSAs should be considered to establish a linkage between the credentialing examination and the job tasks.

THE NATURE OF TESTIMONY

I discuss several views of the nature of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I then offer a diagnosis of the widespread disagreement regarding this topic; specifically, I argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one of them. Finally, I develop an alternative view of testimony that captures both aspects of the nature of testimony and thereby provides the basis for an illuminating theory of testimony's epistemological significance. Is testimony a reliable source of belief ? When are we justified in accepting the testimony of a speaker? Is testimony just as basic a source of know- ledge as sense perception, memory, and reason? These sorts of questions pervade the literature in the epistemology of testimony, and yet it is seldom recognized that there is substantive disagreement about what testimony even is, with theories being offered about what conditions need to be met for a person to testify that scarcely resemble one another. Even more importantly, when attempts are made at answering these ques- tions, the epistemological consequences of competing views of the nature of testimony are often ignored. In this paper, I plan to remedy this by, first, clearing up much of the current confusion about the nature of testimony and by, second, sketch- ing an account of what it is to testify that is suitable for the epistemology of testimony. I shall proceed as follows: I shall first discuss various sub- stantively different views of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I shall then offer a diagnosis of why the disagreement over the nature of testimony is so deep; specifically, I shall argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one

Europe, America and the Unity of International Law

Is international law Europeanized? If so, what are the implications of such Europeanization for the unity and coherence of international law? This paper claims, first, that the application of international law by domestic courts in Europe does not threaten the unity of international law. There may be good reasons for domestic courts not to give effect to international law, based on democratic legitimacy, internal balance of powers or reciprocity with other nations. Yet, the risk of fragmentation or inconsistent interpretations is not one of them. Second, the definition and pursuit of a European agenda or European approach to international law does not threaten the unity of international law. Europe must shed its reluctance to define, and aggressively pursue, such agenda based on European values and interests. Third, and most importantly, when scratching the surface of today's conventional wisdom of Europe as the defender of international law and America as its antithesis, the attitudes, mental framework and reflexes as well as prevailing concerns are strikingly similar across the Atlantic. Most differences in approach are explained not by inherent, substantive disagreements between Europe and the US, but rather by relative power positions and internal constitutional features.

Critical care: why there is no global bioethics

The possibility of content-full, universal, bioethical norms is assessed. The literature brings into question a global bioethics. A salient moral and bioethical pluralism undermines the plausibility of imposing of uniform bioethical norms on critical care. Addressing the tension between the aspiration to a global bioethics and the presence of moral pluralism is timely, given the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's development of universal, bioethical norms. The practice of critical care in the 21st century will be influenced by the tension between bioethical pluralism and counter-assertions on behalf of a global bioethics. A growing literature reflects a bioethical pluralism with significant implications for critical care. Much of the literature supporting pluralism is rooted in a reaction in the Pacific Rim against North American and Western European moral and philosophical commitments. These voices of moral dissent join an already salient moral diversity in the West regarding issues ranging from abortion to end-of-life decision-making, physician-assisted suicide, and euthanasia, as well as conflicting understandings of the bioethics of appropriate approaches to the allocation of scarce medical resources. This literature acknowledging bioethical diversity contrasts with announcements of universal bioethical norms. Clinicians need to appreciate the sources of moral controversy that divide them from their patients and from their colleagues and to recognize that moral and economic differences may lead to different standards of care. Taking bioethical diversity seriously supports focusing on procedural moral approaches that allow peaceable collaboration in the face of substantive moral disagreement.

The evolution of the language faculty: Clarifications and implications

In this response to Pinker and Jackendoff's critique, we extend our previous framework for discussion of language evolution, clarifying certain distinctions and elaborating on a number of points. In the first half of the paper, we reiterate that profitable research into the biology and evolution of language requires fractionation of “language” into component mechanisms and interfaces, a non-trivial endeavor whose results are unlikely to map onto traditional disciplinary boundaries. Our terminological distinction between FLN and FLB is intended to help clarify misunderstandings and aid interdisciplinary rapprochement. By blurring this distinction, Pinker and Jackendoff mischaracterize our hypothesis 3 which concerns only FLN, not “language” as a whole. Many of their arguments and examples are thus irrelevant to this hypothesis. Their critique of the minimalist program is for the most part equally irrelevant, because very few of the arguments in our original paper were tied to this program; in an online appendix we detail the deep inaccuracies in their characterization of this program. Concerning evolution, we believe that Pinker and Jackendoff's emphasis on the past adaptive history of the language faculty is misplaced. Such questions are unlikely to be resolved empirically due to a lack of relevant data, and invite speculation rather than research. Preoccupation with the issue has retarded progress in the field by diverting research away from empirical questions, many of which can be addressed with comparative data. Moreover, offering an adaptive hypothesis as an alternative to our hypothesis concerning mechanisms is a logical error, as questions of function are independent of those concerning mechanism. The second half of our paper consists of a detailed response to the specific data discussed by Pinker and Jackendoff. Although many of their examples are irrelevant to our original paper and arguments, we find several areas of substantive disagreement that could be resolved by future empirical research. We conclude that progress in understanding the evolution of language will require much more empirical research, grounded in modern comparative biology, more interdisciplinary collaboration, and much less of the adaptive storytelling and phylogenetic speculation that has traditionally characterized the field.

What's a word worth?

Geotaxis denotes automatic, reliable orientation and movement in relation to a gravitational stimulus. It is, by definition, dependent on perception of gravitational cues or of stimuli that arise from gravitational forces, such as proprioceptive cues. Recent empirical re-examinations of negative geotaxis in infant rats, briefly reviewed in our commentary, indicate that the behavior of rats on an inclined plane is not geotaxis. Depending on factors such as the angle of incline or the substrate material, a rat pup may be observed to orient up, down, or in no particular direction. Absent is a robust, reliable and valid gravity-oriented response by infant rodents on inclined surfaces. There was no substantive disagreement expressed by the commentators on these points. The discrepancy between the specificity of the term, geotaxis, and the general absence of an oriented response to gravitational cues bothers each of the commentators and us in different ways and to varying degrees. Despite these differences, it was gratifying that a common theme in each of the Open Peer Commentaries is a basic concern with the conduct of science. Krieder and Blumberg drew a parallel between lack of terminological rigor and the absence of methodological standardization in testing infant rodents’ performance on an inclined surface. They see dual benefits to the use of standardized methods. First would be consistency, so that results from different laboratories could be compared legitimately. This is essentially impossible today, due to the wide variation of what is performed under the label of tests of negative geotaxis (see Kreider and Blumberg’s Peer Commentary).

Responses to Responses

34Historically Speaking January/February 2005 Responses to Responses J. Peter Euben I begin with an apology. Because Platonic Noise (the book from which my initial remarks were drawn) is a series ofessays that makes an argument cumulativelyrather than consecutively, I decided to make some general methodological and poUtical points as a way ofinviting debate. Thatmayhave been a mistake . I probablyshouldhave chosen one point and developed it in more detail and with greater nuance. Absent that, conclusions become mere assertions, and (hopefuUy) subtle arguments become mere platitudes. Perhaps thatwould have assuaged Samons's complaints that my call for engagement leaves him "cold" and that I offer no alternative to Nussbaum's Uberal cosmopolitanism except a banal conclusion about thinking with the Greeks (though I must admit his churlish tone does not make me sanguine about this). In fact, Platonic Noise has a chapter on Nietzsche that elaborates the idea of engagement and another that develops a "critical cosmopolitanism" as an alternative to Nussbaum 's. Much of Carol Thomas's response is sensible, but I do have a few caveats, which may or may not constitute more substantive disagreements . First of all, I am not convinced that confrontation is always unproductive, as the civil rights movementindicated. Second, I am more skeptical than she is that "the human element of all cultures has been relatively constant" because I am not sure how much or what kind ofevidence could warrant such a claim, and because the human element has too often proved to be a projection ofa particularlypowerful class or culture. FinaUy, I wonder how much the idea that the emotions are hardwired is not itselfa cultural construct , though I have no wish to associate myselfwith a know-nothing anti-positivism. I could not agree more with Mary Lefkowitz about the contemporary "usefulness " of the ate as a way of reminding ourselves about the Umits ofhuman knowledge, the need for a self-critical voice to interrogate those overly confident oftheir ability to master events and peoples, and her assertion that only a god can see the whole. And in the present poUtical context her otherwise uncontroversial claim that "trying to know, being wiUing to ask hard questions ofoneself and others, is not a sign ofweakness but a sign of wisdom" has power and urgency. Nor do I have any serious disagreements with DanieUe Allen's elegant and provocative remarks. I obviously endorse her claim that every generation answers differendythe question of what it should take into the future from a past it partly constructs. I also agree that there is no single final use for classical historythatjustifies its value once and for all. . . . I do not think reading Plato or Sophocles will "solve" anything. Further, I regard civility and comtnunity as overratedvirtues , which couldonly sporadically befound in classicalAthens. ButI am tempted to push this further and ask under what historical conditions might that past have no use at all? For instance, a thoroughly Marxist or theocratic regime could not recognize Athens and Rome as a politically and culturally relevant archive. Though I find her suggestion ofwhat unites otherAthenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob." And while I agree that experimentalism destabiUzes the future in a waythatmakes embracing an uncontroversial past attractive, such a past in turn constructs a series ofexclusions that hinder more profound forms of experimentation. Like Allen, Ober provides an example of how to use classical poUtical thought with a sense of discrimination and purpose (as he does in all his other work). His first sentence reminds us ofwhatis assumed bysaying "the Greeks" and why it is that generalities must attend to particulars. Only then can we recognize the differences between Athens and most other Greek poleis and so intelligently consider the similarities between it and us. I agree with Ober that the unattractive exceptionalism of Athens is ineluctably connected to what most ofus regard as its attractions and admire how, in a brief space, he shows how the multiple sources, locations, and organizations of social and technical knowledge enabled the Athenians to become a powerful state largely run by ordinary citizens. More provocatively, he argues against the assumption that democratic politics are incompatible with...

Oil Platforms: Lessons of Dissensus

AbstractThe recent judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Oil Platforms ('Oil Platforms') is a fascinating and confusing mix of formal consensus and substantive dissensus. By fourteen votes to two, the Court dismissed both the United States defence and Iran's substantive claim in the case. Yet the Court's nearly complete unanimity is belied by a considerable substantive disagreement on the reasoning leading to this outcome, as reflected in the numerous separate and dissenting opinions appended to the judgment. An analysis of these opinions reveals that the disagreement within the Court cannot be considered simply a reflection of varying judicial appreciations of law and fact; it reveals a fundamental, even philosophical disagreement relating to the very function of the Court: Is the principal function of the Court the adjudication of claims brought by States, or the settlement of disputes between States? The fundamental disagreement among the Judges on this issue seems a reflection of their training and background – between Judges trained in the common law tradition and those hailing from the civil law or similar more policy-oriented backgrounds. Apart from the jurisprudential disagreement relating to the function of the Court, the judgment also raises important issues of substantive international law, in particular those relating to the relationship between the law of peace and the law of armed conflict. The judgment testifies to the continuing validity of this distinction, despite the many attempts of international legal scholarship to move beyond this distinction to a more enlightened era of international relations.

The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How To Interpret the ECHR

This paper addresses the role of the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights and attacks the standard image in the literature that pictures judges as having, by default, a great amount of discretion in interpretation and a power to create new law. The Court's notion of 'autonomous concepts' is presented and analysed thoroughly, to show that substantive disagreement is widespread in law and that judges must necessarily make choices precisely out of respect for what the ECHR grants. The paper draws resources from Ronald Dworkin's philosophy and shows the affinities between the theory of 'autonomous concepts' and Dworkin's 'semantic sting' argument. It is argued that all concepts in the ECHR are autonomous, in the following two senses: first, people do not share the same linguistic criteria on how to identify their meaning; second, the correct meaning may radically transcend the way the ECHR concepts are classified and understood within the national legal order. Judges therefore have to construct substantive theories that aim at capturing the nature or purpose of the right involved and of the ECHR more generally. The paper concludes by urging scholars and judges to stop raising the threat of judicial discretion and work out general theories of adjudication for the ECHR.

Misspecification and bubbles in hyperinflation data: reply to Engsted

Engsted (2003) takes issue with several aspects of Hooker (2000). Mainly, he objects to the statement that cointegration tests cannot be implemented when bubbles exist, draws different conclusions than I did from my bubble-test evidence, and faults the paper’s failure to include measures of the magnitude of model noise. In this reply, I focus mostly on interpreting the evidence, where we have substantive disagreement that I believe is largely a result of differing priors. Regarding cointegration tests in the presence of bubbles, in practice researchers may of course infer that a differenced bubble is stationary—even though it will not be—and apply cointegration tests. My statement was simply intended to draw attention to this issue and highlight concerns about test properties. What is particularly helpful in assessing the usefulness of a test under such conditions is a Monte Carlo analysis, like the one included in my paper, which gives readers a way to judge for themselves the efficacy of the test under different scenarios. On the last point, I agree with Engsted on the merits of model noise measures, and I find those he reports a useful contri-

Rawls, Public Reason and the Limits of Liberal Justification

This article is a contribution to a critical exploration of the liberal project of normatively justifying basic political principles. The specific focus is John Rawls's use of the idea of public reason. After briefly discussing the evolution of Rawls's ideas from A Theory of Justice to his most recent writings, the key components of his conception of public reason are set out. Two principal lines of criticism are developed. The first is that the criteria of legitimacy Rawls establishes for a democratic procedure are unworkably demanding. The second is that there is no reason to think that resort to the idea of public reason will significantly constrain the scope of substantive political disagreement within a constitutional democracy. The article concludes with a few speculative reflections about the relevance of the limitations of Rawls's account of public reason for the project of liberal justification more generally.

Political Disagreement, Legitimacy, and Civility

For many contemporary liberal political philosophers the appropriate response to the facts of pluralism is the requirement of public reasonableness, namely that individuals should be able to offer to their fellow citizens reasons for their political actions that can generally be accepted. This article finds wanting two possible arguments for such a requirement: one from a liberal principle of legitimacy and the other from a natural duty of political civility. A respect in which conversational restraint in the face of political agreement involves incivility is sketched.The proceduralist view which commends substantive disagreement within agreement on procedures is briefly outlined, as is the possible role for civic virtue on this view.

Marxism and Natural Limits: A Rejoinder

[I want to extend gratitude to Ted Benton for his thoughtful reply which, as always, raises many important questions. This rejoinder begins by explaining why I chose Benton's 1989 article as an object of critique, and by responding to his complaint about the argumentative style of my work. I then consider the question of alternative ‘readings’ of Marx and Engels – a discussion which acts as a kind of bridge to our substantive disagreements. In terms of the latter, I proceed to show that Benton does not effectively respond to my argument that his interpretation and critique of Marx and Engels suffer from a material/social dualism that is inconsistent with the dialectical approach developed by the founders of Marxism. Due to their crucial importance for ecology and Marxism, Benton's replies on the labour-process, natural conditions, and eco-regulation are treated in a separate section. I conclude with a brief discussion of ecology and class., I want to extend gratitude to Ted Benton for his thoughtful reply which, as always, raises many important questions. This rejoinder begins by explaining why I chose Benton's 1989 article as an object of critique, and by responding to his complaint about the argumentative style of my work. I then consider the question of alternative ‘readings’ of Marx and Engels – a discussion which acts as a kind of bridge to our substantive disagreements. In terms of the latter, I proceed to show that Benton does not effectively respond to my argument that his interpretation and critique of Marx and Engels suffer from a material/social dualism that is inconsistent with the dialectical approach developed by the founders of Marxism. Due to their crucial importance for ecology and Marxism, Benton's replies on the labour-process, natural conditions, and eco-regulation are treated in a separate section. I conclude with a brief discussion of ecology and class.]

Methodological and contextual factors in the Dawkins/Gould dispute over evolutionary progress

Biologists Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould have recently extended their decades-old disagreements about evolution to the issue of the nature and reality of evolutionary progress. According to Gould, ‘progress’ is a noxious notion that deserves to be expunged from evolutionary biology. In Dawkins' view, on the other hand, progress is one of the most important, pervasive and inevitable aspects of evolution. Simple appeals to ‘the evidence’ are clearly insufficient to resolve this disagreement, since it is precisely the interpretation of the evidence that is in dispute. Scientific controversies in general, and the Dawkins/Gould dispute over evolutionary progress in particular, are worth examining in some detail because doing so sheds light on the interconnected roles of methodological and contextual factors in the formation, articulation and defense of scientific claims. My aim in this paper is to clarify the structure of the Dawkins/Gould dispute by analyzing it in terms of a tri-level model of scientific controversies, involving ‘top-level’ substantive disagreements, ‘middle-level’ methodological differences, and ‘bottom-level’ differences in historical and social factors. This simple three-tiered model is sufficiently abstract to have more general applicability to other scientific controversies.