Bankruptcy-remote structure is a common way to refer to securitization and other transactions. But what does it mean, and what are its implications for bankruptcy law? This paper sets itself the task of clarifying those two questions. It shows that bankruptcy-remoteness is a goal, with two conceptions ("basic", and "enhanced"): one tries to achieve the insulation of the bankruptcy-remote assets from the bankruptcy of the sponsor; the other tries to achieve their insulation from bankruptcy proceedings altogether. The contrast between these goals and bankruptcy policy provides good ground to contrast the bankruptcy policy views on consolidation/atomization of the estate or contractarianism/judicialism in bankruptcy law. Also, the international mobility of these structures (and the SPVs usually employed in them) provides a good testing ground for the debate on territoriality/universality in international insolvency. Bankruptcy law is mandatory, so in theory the parties cannot exclude bankruptcy proceedings, determine the size of the estate, or choose jurisdiction and applicable law. In practice, however, transaction parties use combinations of mechanisms that allow them to achieve exactly that. The paper does a comparative analysis to study how different jurisdictions (by statute, and, mainly, court decisions) have dealt with those mechanisms in light of the apparent contradiction with bankruptcy principles (principles that are, themselves, the subject of controversy).The results are interesting. Despite attention has been mostly focused on the "basic" notion of bankruptcy remoteness, the partitioning between the sponsor's estate and bankruptcy-remote assets is relatively uncontroversial, and doctrines such as "true sale" or "substantive consolidation", which have acquired an ominous connotation, are empty threats. Peril comes in other forms, which are analyzed in the study.Much more relevant seems to be the courts' perspective on the mechanisms to achieve "enhanced" bankruptcy remoteness, which provides an interesting guidance on how contractarian solutions could work in practice. Since court decisions discuss individual contract mechanisms, rather than the idea of "bankruptcy remoteness" itself, their reaction was often more intuitive than policy-oriented. Contract provisions, however, cannot work miracles, and do not eliminate the underlying conflict between creditors. Also, the approach based on detailed rules can be rigid in hard cases in the absence of interpretative criteria that can replace bankruptcy principles.Finally, the analysis of international cases shows the difficulties of finding an acceptable and predictable setting for these transactions, when existing rules that determine jurisdiction and applicable law rely on a concept of "insolvency proceedings" that is anathema for these structures. Bankruptcy-remote structures provide an interesting (minimalistic) ground to test hypotheses that may be extrapolated to bankruptcy policy as a whole. But the analysis also shows the benefit of observation, before any views are formed.