Subsequent Argument Research Articles

The Incorrigibility of the Cogito

There is a kind of sceptic who thinks that there is absolutely no proposition whatsoever that anybody knows. Such a sceptic is very likely to think that it is always possible that our cognitive capacities should lead us astray. Afortiori, he must hold (if he is logical) that it is always logically possible that our cognitive capacities should lead us astray. And it may be that this sceptic thinks it is because it is always logically possible for our cognitive capacities to lead us astray that there is absolutely no proposition that anyone knows. (It does not much matter for the purposes of the subsequent argument whether any sceptic actually has held the views I have just mentioned.) I think some philosophers have supposed that Descartes has refuted the view of the sceptic that it is always logically possible for our cognitive capacities to lead us into error. If Descartes is right, there are at least three beliefs, and perhaps more, which are such that it is not even logically possible for our cognitive capacities to have led us astray when we arrive at them. If I believe (i) that I exist, or believe (ii) that I believe something, or believe (iii) that I am mentally modified in some way or other that is not specified, what I believe must be true. Bernard Williams, in his book: Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, puts this by saying that there is a class of logically incorrigible propositions. I think he, and I think Descartes also, thinks that it follows that there are some propositions which some people-i.e., anyone at all who believes these propositions, know to be true. However, I do not wish to get involved in questions about what either Descartes (or Williams) actually thought on these matters. What I wish to consider is whether there are any logically incorrigible propositions and whether it follows that, if there are, these propositions are known to be true by any person believing them. I doubt whether the word 'incorrigible' is a good one. One speaks of people as being incorrigibly wicked but not, except jokingly, as being incorrigibly good. Analogously, though one can have opinions which are incorrigibly false, one cannot have opinions

The Politics of Accountability: Executive Discretion and Democratic Control

Claiming to have established 'a first in parliamentary democracy,' Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed introduced Bill 35, The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act, to the provincial legislature on 14 April, 1976. Much of Lougheed's speech of introduction, and a considerable portion of his subsequent arguments during second and third readings of the bill, concerned the politics of parliamentary accountability. How much discretionary power should be vested in the provincial Executive Council (cabinet), and what legislative checks were being instituted to control AHSTF spending and to contain an undesirable accretion of executive powers? An uncharacteristically defensive Lougheed assured the assembled Conservative and opposition M LAs that the legislature itself would 'in essence, control the tap and hold the purse strings' of the Fund. But does it? Our paper evaluates this promise against the evidence of three years of performance since the passage of Bill 35. How is the Fund currently controlled? What constraints on executive power exist within the present statutory framework? Are the discretionary powers of the provincial cabinet and bureaucracy excessive? Beyond these questions there lies a broader set of issues: what is the real relationship between control of the Fund and the politics of development in Alberta? These are questions of more than parochial or academic interest. The ability of a small group of provincial politicians and civil servants to control the allocation of vast sums of public monies, subject, as we shall see, in practice to little more than an annual post facto legislative review, raises major questions about the politics of democratic accountability in Canada particularly in a province such as Alberta, with its tradition of overwhelming government majorities, tame legislative debate and weak opposition parties. The investment of the Fund, in other words, should not be divorced from the issues of how the investment decisions are made, and by whom. In Alberta, as we shall see, the questions of executive discretion and legislative control have been closely linked to differing conceptions of how the Fund should be invested and how much state intervention in the market place is acceptable. The problems of ministerial accountability and the containment of executive powers in a parliamentary system are complex matters which, at least in political theory, are probably more fundamental in the long run than the vexing allocative and distributive issues raised by

Tematska struktura u Prvom gudačkom kvartetu Josipa Slavenskog

Tematska struktura u Prvom gudačkom kvartetu Josipa Slavenskog

Applications of Variants of the Hölder Inequality and its Inverses: Extensions of Barnes, Marshall-Olkin, and Nehari Inequalities.

The primary aim of this paper is to extend Barnes [1], Marshall-Olkin [6], and Nehari [8] inequalities as applications of some results introduced in [10] by the author.Since several results from various sources are adopted here, a unified notation is required in order to simplify our subsequent arguments. To this end, let Lp = Lp(S, ∑, μ), p>0 (unless otherwise stated), be the space of all pth power non-negative integrable functions over a given finite measure space (S, ∑, μ) (where S may be regarded as a bounded subset of real numbers).

Duns Scotus's Rejection of 'Necessarily Exists' as a Predicate

Duns Scotus's Rejection of 'Necessarily Exists' as a Predicate CHARLES F. KIELKOPF THIS ISA RECONSTRUCTIONof an argument for the sixth conclusion of chapter three (3.23) of Duns Scotus's Treatise About the First Principle: ~it is the characteristic of but one nature to have necessary being of itself. The argument in 3.24 for this conclusion is reconstructed and shown to provide an argument that 'necessarily exists' is not a predicate because necessary existence cannot be a feature occurring in different natures. Slight changes in the reconstructed argument convert it into an argument that 'exists' is not a predicate because existence cannot be a feature occurring in different natures. Since neither necessary existence nor existence can be common features, problems are raised about the claim in 3.25 that "nothing is more perfect than a being having necessary existence of itself," and about Scotus's acceptance in 4.65 of a slightly retouched version of Anselm's Ontological Argument. By dismissing these problems I show that the fact that 'exists' and 'necessarily exists' are not predicates is irrelevant to ontological arguments. It is suggested that a necessary being necessarily has more perfections than any other being, although its existence and mode of existence are not features of it, let alone perfections of it. Similarly, it is suggested that the nature of an existing being has more perfections than any nature that is not the nature of an existing being but that, still, existence is not one of the features--let alone anything that can be called a perfection--making up the nature. Let us turn to a reconstruction of the 3.24 argument. Presentation of the second premise will be followed by some terminological stipulations. For reductio assume (1) N, and N2 are two different natures of necessary beings. (2) If N1 and N2 are two different natures of necessary beings, then there is a feature NE of existing necessarily that is common to both NI and N~. The second premise comes from the first four lines. We are not going to worry about the truth of the second premise. Indeed, Scotus's subsequent argument seems to show that existing necessarily cannot be a feature of a nature. Thus the subsequent argument may be strong enough to show that the whole of (2) is unacceptable because it is based on a mistaken analysis of what it would be for two distinct The basicideasof this paper werepresentedto the John CarrollSecondOhioConferenceon Medieval Studies, Cleveland, Ohio, October, 1975. 1Trans. A. Wolter,O.F.M. (Chicago:FranciscanHeraldPress, 1966).Thisis a translationof a revised Latin text of De primo principio and two related questionsfroman earlycommentaryon the Sentences. Hereafter, all passages from Scotusare from this book. Sections3.23and 3.24are appendedto this paper. Referencesto lineswillbe to the translationof 3.24, unless otherwisespecified. [13] 14 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY natures to be natures of necessary beings. However, as we shall see, the argument reconstructed below can be readily converted into a reductio argument against the consequent of (2). This reductio argument is of most interest because it is so readily transformed into an argument that 'necessarily exists' is not a predicate. For appreciation of the reconstructed argument, however, the terminology of (2) needs explanation (which I hope to provide by reference to 3.24). Let us use 'nature' very broadly to mean any consistent set of features. A feature in a nature shows what, among other things, an individual would be if it were to have the nature containing the feature. A feature is an entity that shows what an object is: a feature is an entitas quidditativa, as in line 3 of the Latin. A justification for using 'nature' so broadly is the fact that Scotus himself goes on in the next few lines to classify the alleged common feature of line 3 as a common nature. However, I am not classing all natures as features or entitates quidditativae. For instance, a set of features could be so large or complex that we could not know what is in it. Let us develop a notion of distinctive nature from "distinguuntur formalitatibus suis actualibus ultimis" of line 5. A distinctive nature DN, formalitas actualis ultima, is...

Has Hume a Theory of Social Justice?

72. HAS HUME A THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE? Toward the end of An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume asserts in a footnote that: In short, we must ever distinguish between the necessity of a separation and constancy in men's possession, and the rules, which assign particular objects to particular persons. The first necessity is obvious , strong, and invincible : the latter may depend on a public utility more light and frivolous , on the sentiment of private humanity and aversion to private hardship, on positive laws, on precedents , analogies , and very fine connexions and. turns of the imagination. For one who draws the connection between the ideas of justice and possession as closely as he does, Hume's ambivalence here concerning the rules or principles governing the distribution of objects to be possessed is more than slightly surprising. In fact, for admirers of Hume interested in theories of social (or distributive) justice, his failure to state a preference among these various 'principles of distribution' is downright depressing. Is this all Hume has to say on the subject of how possessions are to be distributed within society? Does it not matter to him what the principles are upon which this distribution is accomplished — as long as it is accomplished? These are the questions with which this essay is concerned, questions which essentially reduce to that of whether Hume has a theoiy of social or distributive justice at all. To be sure;, the amount of space Hume devotes to the discussion of justice would seem to indicate that he is working from a particular theory of social justice, and authors such as Miller, Day, and Ardal ascribe one to him, yet Hume's apparent lack of concern for principles of distribution disputes this ascript- 73. 2 ion. For at the center of all such theories — from Aristotle to Rawls — lies a preference for a certain principle or set of principles which dictates how advantages (goods, wealth, benefits, etc.) should be distributed. In order to evaluate Hume's status as a theorist of social justice, two approaches recommend themselves. First, it is necessary to discover and examine in Hume's major works possible criteria which might dictate how possessions should be distributed in society. Three such criteria will be dealt with here: the principle of utility as Hume construes it, the formal principle of correct application of law, and the principles Hume entitles the laws of nature". If none of these emerge, singly or in combination, as the principle underlying a Humean theory of social justice, a second avenue for analyzing Hume's views of social justice will be explored. Here some of the critical psychological and moral characteristics which Hume attributes to human nature will be examined to determine whether Hume, though he seems to accept no specific principle of distribution, might arrive at a coherent theory of justice in a negative fashion; that is, through rejecting certain criteria of distribution, particularly merit and need. II. The half-heartedness of Hume's commitment to the principle of utility as either a standard of personal morality , a measure of the justness of particular actions, or as 4 an explanatory principle has been frequently documented, and, although the main purpose of this essay is to examine Hume's theory of social rather than personal justice, a few comments on the latter will form a useful preface for the subsequent argument that Hume is equally as luke-warm toward utilitarianism as an adequate basis of social justice. Three considerations indicate Hume's non-utilitarian approach to personal morality. First, unlike all advocates of utilitarianism, Hume is not a consequentialist on matters 74. of personal ethics. That is to say, when Hume speaks of what makes persons or their actions virtuous, he insists that the major criterion for such an evaluation is the motive upon which the agent acts. In the Treatise he states that a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous ; (T478) , and maintains this view in the Enquiry as well. Hume therefore violates the consequentialist stance implicit in the utilitarian construal of personal morality, but just as seriously, is also left rather cold by the later utilitarian contention of Mill...

Recent Advances in Knowledge of Rubber Friction and Tire Wear

Abstract Progress in the last few years in understanding rubber friction and tire wear justifies a survey of developments since a review of the subject in 1958. Work on fundamental of friction and abrasion has mainly evolved from conceptions formed in the earlier investigations; it had, however, not been realized that wear of tires and, indeed, abrasion on certain laboratory machines brings into play gross properties of the tire or testpiece which affect rate of wear just as much as the actual abrasion resistance of the tread compound. This new field of research has led to rationalization of road testing, and has helped to bridge the gap between laboratory and road. A report on these developments is given. Much of the work is concerned with the viscoelastic nature of rubber friction and abrasion, which has come to light through the experimentally established validity of the rate-temperature equivalence principle for these processes. This principle, which holds good for all viscoelastic processes, is briefly described in the next section in order not to interrupt the subsequent argument.

The need for simplicity in research in child psychology.

suffice: (a) the effects of interference on crank turning behavior (16); (b) an experiment involving the learning of concepts of size (6); (c) an investigation of reinforcement variables affecting the resistance to extinction of a simple response of placing a ball in a hole (I). In each of these problems the behavior studied is relatively simple, particularly in relation to far more complex responses involved in studies of social development, or in investigations of the effects of child rearing methods on personality growth. It is felt that the best way to begin the argument for the current need for simple research in child psychology is to make an analysis of a characteristic area of research involving exceedingly complex variables. For this purpose, the writer has selected the general area involving the effects of child rearing variables on personality development. Out of this analysis and subsequent argument should come the impression that the writer's main reason for favoring basic research is a methodological one. Following this discussion, the writer will present some of the important uses of the study of simple processes in child psychology, and follow this with a treatment of the advantages that such a research orientation has. The research literature in child development is replete with investigations concerned with the relationships between early guidance or child rearing procedures and personality development of children. The independent and dependent variables of these studies are typically complex, hard-to-measure processes. Many of them involve attempts to measure the effects of such variables as punishment, affection, rejection, breast feeding, and home atmosphere on the adjustment of the child. Measures of these child rearing variables are usually obtained through interviews, rating scales, projective tests, or observational procedures. The adjustment or response measures are typically scores on paper and pencil personality tests, clinical judgments, teacher ratings, or responses in projective doll play situations.

DEPENDENCE OF THE FIDUCIAL ARGUMENT ON THE SAMPLING RULE

Suppose that we have a series of observations, given to have been drawn independently from a common chance distribution of specified form depending on a single unknown parameter 6. Suppose the observations have been takeni according to some sampling rule such that the eventual lnumber of observations does lnot depend on 0 except possibly through the observations themselves. All recognized kinds of sequential rule, including fixedsample-size rules, satisfy this condition. (A type of sanmpling rule to be excluded would be one where the number of observations depended on other observations subsequently suppressed.) It is well kniown that the likelihood function of 0, given the observations, is independent of the sampling rule. For in any expression for the chance of observing what has actually been observed, the sampling rule only enters as a factor independent of 6, which is therefore irrelevant when the chances corresponding to different values of 6 are compared. It follows that the posterior probability distribution for 0 derived by Bayes's theorem from some given prior distribution is also independent of the sampling rule. (I shall refer to this use of Bayes's theorem as 'the Bayesian argument', for short.) On the other hand, in order to make a significance test (for instance, a test of whether the specified form of parent distribution is reasonably compatible with the observations), we need to take the sampling rule into account, in general. The same is true of other common statistical procedures; for examples and references, see Anscombe (1954). The purpose of this note is to show that in order to apply Fisher's fiducial argument (as recently re-expounded by him, 1956) we need to consider the sampling rule, just as for significance tests. This is interesting for two reasons. First, Fisher has stressed that a fiducial distribution is to be interpreted in exactly the same way as if it had been derived by a Bayesian argument, and indeed a fiducial distribution may be taken as prior distribution for incorporation in a subsequent Bayesian argument. Moreover, when the fiducial argument is for mathematical reasons not available, Fisher suggests that the likelihood function may be considered directly instead. Thus, what the fiducial argument is likened to and intimately associated with, and what is suggested as a substitute for it when it is not available, both differ from it in regard to dependence on the sampling rule. Secondly, Lindley (1957) has shown that, if the common chance distribution of the observations referred to in the opening sentence above is a member of the exponential family, then the fiducial argument does not have a property of consistency evidently desired for it by Fisher unless the resulting distribution for 6 is actually a posterior Bayes distribution. The examples below show that, in so far as fiducial distributions can be identified with posterior Bayes distributions, the corresponding prior distributions depend on the

Simple algebras with purely inseparable splitting fields of exponent 1

Introduction. Let C be a field of characteristic p 0, and let K be a finite algebraic extension field of C such that the pth power of every element of K lies in C. Then K/C is called a purely inseparable extension of exponent 1. It was shown by N. Jacobson that there is a Galois theory for such extensions in which the place of the Galois group is taken by the derivation algebra of K/C. In particular, if K is any field of characteristic p, the purely inseparable extensions K/C of exponent 1 are precisely those in which C is the field of constants of a restricted K-Lie ring of derivations of K which is of finite dimension over K. In the classical theory of simple algebras, it is shown that, if K/C is a Galois extension, the Brauer similarity classes of the simple algebras with center C and split by K constitute a group which is canonically isomorphic with the group of equivalence classes of the group extensions of the multiplicative group of K by the Galois group of K/C. The present paper provides the answer to a question put to me by J-P. Serre, of whether one could establish an analogous result, for K/ C purely inseparable of exponent 1, in which restricted Lie algebra extensions [2] of K by the derivation algebra of K/C take the place of the group extensions. Not only is the answer to this question affirmative, but it provides an excellent illustration of the theory of restricted Lie algebra extensions. It turns out, in fact, that the Lie algebra extensions which arise from simple algebras are trivial extensions when regarded as ordinary extensions, so that the essential structural elements are here precisely those which differentiate the restricted extensions from the ordinary ones. ?1 contains the field theoretical background of our problem. In particular, it gives a simple proof of the main theorem of Jacobson's Galois theory [4] which we include here because it gives us the connection, on which many of our subsequent arguments are based, between the structure of the field extension K/C and that of the derivation algebra of K/C. Theorem 2, which is not needed in the sequel, is the analogue for the present situation of a well known result in the classical Galois theory and is significant for the cohomology theory of derivation algebras. In ?2 we give a proof of a theorem of Jacobson's on derivations (in a slightly generalized form) which is fundamental for the crossed product theory that follows, in the same way as the analogous theorem for isomorphisms is the source of the classical theory of crossed products. In ?3 we discuss the special type of restricted Lie algebra

Dominion-Provincial Financial Arrangements: An Examination of Objectives

The present status of Dominion-provincial arrangements is the consequence of the constitutional and administrative decisions made in 1867 as developed over subsequent decades and the course of economic, social, and political developments and the correlative budgetary changes in both federal and provincial fields. The purpose of this paper is to set out the historical objectives of Dominion-provincial financial policies, to examine the shifts which have occurred in these objectives from time to time, and to attempt a statement of the appropriate objectives in the Canadian system. Much of the subsequent argument has to do with the fiscal consequences of federalism in Canada and with the fact that changing circumstances have imposed on the junior levels of government, and to some extent on the federal Government also, financial responsibilities which it was not originally contemplated they would have to bear.The allocation of functions between the Dominion and the provinces by the Act of 1867 was clearly intended to place on the Dominion those which financially were the most onerous. The heavy costs of development, including the public debt, national defence, and national government were to be borne by the Dominion, while the supposedly lighter costs of public welfare, education, provincial development, and provincial administration were given to the provinces. On the revenue side, the lucrative taxes—customs and excise—were given exclusively to the Dominion and the direct taxes also were given to the Dominion, though not exclusively, to use if it so desired. The provinces were limited to direct taxes, which, with the exception of real property taxes, it was supposed they would be reluctant to use, and to the relatively unproductive licences, fees, and fines. While the federal Government was to pay annual grants to the provinces, the Act of 1867 stipulated that “such grants shall be in full settlement of all future demands on Canada.” This interpretation of intention at Confederation is accepted generally by the historians of the period and is supported by many statements of participants in the Confederation debates. In the period immediately following Confederation these objectives were realized.

Ionization Maximum for Protons

IN a recent paper, Holloway and Moore1 have given a curve showing the average specific ionization, as a function of the residual range, for protons in air. On this curve the ionization maximum occurs at 1.9 mm. residual/range, and in the course of the paper the absolute value of the maximum specific ionization is quoted as 2,320 ion pairs per mm. The shape of the ionization/range curve was deduced from earlier measurements of Parkinson, Herb, Bellamy and Hudson2, and the absolute value of the ionization was obtained on the assumption that, in the region of 3 cm. residual range, the mean specific ionization produced by a proton is a quarter of that produced by an α-particle of the same velocity. On this basis Holloway and Moore inferred that the maximum specific ionization is about one third as great for protons as for α-particles in air (6,760 ion pairs per mm.). Now, while there is overwhelming evidence for the correctness of this last assumption (the 1:4 ratio of ionizations for particles of the same velocity, when the ratio of the effective charges is constant at 1:2), it also appears that the conclusions, regarding the position and height of the ionization maximum for protons, to which the subsequent argument leads, run contrary to accepted evidence from other experiments. If this be admitted, then one must clearly assume that the results of Parkinson, Herb, Bellamy and Hudson will not bear the detailed analysis which Holloway and Moore place upon them, when protons of the smallest energy are concerned. It is the object of the present note to point out the contrary evidence referred to above.

Water Hammer in Pipes, Including Those Supplied by Centrifugal Pumps: Graphical Treatment

The damage done to pipes as a result of water hammer is so serious that no engineer can afford to neglect it in the design of long pipes, particularly those under low heads. Unfortunately the problem has appeared to many to be very intricate, and indeed the mathematical treatment is so involved and so lengthy that few practising engineers would attempt to solve water-hammer problems mathematically. In many cases a purely arbitrary rule has been employed in finding the pressure rise, with little knowledge on the part of the engineer as to whether the formula fits his case or not, and thus much money may be wasted on too heavy a line, or, on the other hand, it may be so light as to be dangerous.In the following treatment of the subject, the rigid theory has first been explained and some problems have been solved, but most of the paper deals with the elastic (and correct) theory. A problem is first worked out by the arithmetical integration method in order to establish ideas and to make the subsequent argument clear. The fundamental equations giving rise to Allievi's equations must be clearly understood for a grasp of the true relationships that exist, and these have been treated in some detail, but it is safe to say that if the argument has been followed up to the end of the general equations, no difficulty will be experienced with the graphical treatment.In explaining the diagrams, very simple cases are first dealt with and the elegance of the method will make an appeal at once. The water-hammer pressure can be found for any simple pipe, and at any point on the pipe, and for any chosen gate movement, and results can be obtained with accuracy in less than thirty minutes in simple cases. For compound pipes, the solution is nearly as rapid. The pressures arising in the discharge lines from pumps have been fully discussed in the case of pumps with small inertia, and also in cases in which the inertia is large enough for consideration, when an existing pump has been employed to supply the data used.The accuracy of the method is beyond question; where intersections are at small angles the exact points are hard to determine, but this trouble may easily be avoided by changing the scales. If a slide rule is used in solving the problem mathematically the corresponding case will be encountered.

The Cost of Anthropometric Measurements

ALLOW me to correct an absurd typographical blunder in the account of my anthropometric laboratory at the Healtheries, which appears in Mr. Ernest Hart's lecture at the Society of Arts. It originally occurred in the Journal of the Society of Arts, whence it was copied into your columns (p. 142) last week. The effect of the error to which I refer is to make the statement that the cost of measuring each person at the laboratory in seventeen different ways was 3l., whereas it should have been 3d. The subsequent argument, based on the extreme cheapness of the process, becomes in consequence unintelligible. I write myself to make the correction, because the part of Mr. Ernest Hart's address which refers to the anthropometric laboratory was written for him, at his request, by myself. I regret I had not an opportunity of revising it in proof.