Sublunary World Research Articles

The paschein and pathê of the Earth and Living Beings in Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Meteorologica 1.14)

In his 2013 monograph on Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica, Malcolm Wilson has shown both that Aristotle conceived of meteorological phenomena as analogous to the bodily processes of animals, and that for the Stagirite the sublunar world should not be seen as a single body, but rather as composed of many different individuals. However, Wilson did not articulate the relationship between these two theories—that is, he did not answer the following question: how is it possible for the Earth to behave like an animal if it is not a single body? This paper argues that the answer to this question lies in the Aristotelian statement about the different paschein of the Earth and animals. In fact, in the chapter of Meteorology dedicated to climatic changes (1.14), Aristotle, after comparing such changes to the maturing and ageing of living organisms, states that ‘only, in the case of the bodies of plants and animals being affected does not occur in each part separately, but it is necessary for the being to mature and decay all at once, whereas in the case of the Earth this occurs in each part separately, due to cooling and warming’ (351a.28-31). In his commentary, Alexander of Aphrodisias reiterates that the difference between the changes of the Earth and those of living organisms concern the way in which these different subjects undergo affections (pathê). The concept of paschein/pathos is thus fundamental to understanding how Aristotle conceives of biological analogies, which play a key role in his meteorology: as the affections of maturing and corruption show, parallels with organic processes can be found in meteorological phenomena, but always at the level of the individual parts of the Earth. Although the sublunary world can be understood in organic terms, this world is not a ‘cosmic animal’, but rather a multiplicity of ‘regional animals’. To corroborate this thesis, this paper addresses several related questions, including: the mechanics ofenvironmental changes according to Aristotle; the differences between the regions of the Earth; the lexicon used in Meteorology to refer to the transformations of the Earth; the personal notes that Alexander adds to Aristotle’s discussion. Finally, the first modern translation of the relevant section of Alexander’s commentary is also provided here.

К вопросу формирования математической онтологии: историко-философский аспект

The article analyzes the possibilities of mathematics’ application to the physical reality from the historical-philosophical point of view. The undertaken analysis of the specific works of natural scientists of the past shows that the well-known thesis of Aristotle’s philosophy about the impossibility of applying mathematics in the “sublunary” world requires clarification. Most of the naturalists before Galileo’s time were undoubtedly Aristotelians. Accepting the qualitative variabil­ity of the “sublunary” world in Aristotle’s philosophy, when turning to physics they put into use, starting with Ptolemy, the possibility of a mathematical de­scription of the world. In this connection one of the main principles was the ad­justment of “projecting the law of heaven onto the earth”, which has been used in different ways. Aristotle’s philosophy forbade the application of mathematical laws in the world of physics, specifically in the so-called “sublunary world”. This was because in this area of being prevail four primary elements – fire, air, earth, and water, subject to continuous change, emergence, and destruction. From Aristotle’s point of view this could not be described within the framework of a mathematical approach. These changes are qualitative and this qualitative­ness should be reflected by corresponding physics. Such qualitative physics op­posed the Pythagorean and Platonic tradition, that allowed the use of mathe­matics in the physical world. In the course of history, however, exactly the philosophy of Aristotle held the dominant position. A thorough analysis of the natural scientists’ works who adhered to the Aristotelian point of view shows that all of them allowed the possibility of applying mathematics in the physical world

Girolamo Cardano’s Meteorological Predictions: Hippocratism, Weather Signs, Winds, and the Limits of Astrology

AbstractThe subject of meteorology was central to Girolamo Cardano’s thought. It held together his encyclopedism by tying the celestial realm to the sublunary world and human action. Meteorology, for Cardano, links abstract knowledge to the practical and operative. While many of his Aristotelian predecessors understood weather prediction as distinct from meteorology as a natural philosophical field, Cardano’s profound interest in conjectural arts and probabilistic reasoning led him to tie causal explanations to methods of forecasting future conditions of the air and their effects on humans, especially regarding health and disease. While it might be expected that Cardano would have emphasized astrological tools for weather forecasting, instead he went in a different direction, namely, embracing the ancient tradition of weather signs and revising Aristotelian theories of winds. At the end of his career, which he mostly spent writing commentaries on Hippocratic writings, he integrated his understanding of weather signs with Hippocratic rules of prognosis, revising traditional understandings of the causes of winds.

Henrik Ibsen and Conspiracy Thinking: The Case of Peer Gynt

Henrik Ibsen and Conspiracy Thinking: The Case of <i>Peer Gynt</i>

The Esoteric Meaning of the Sin of Adam in the Manuscript Tradition of the Rasāʾil Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ

Abstract This paper deals with an addition to Epistle 50 of the Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ (Brethren of Purity) “On the Quantity and the Quality of the Species of [Proper] Attitude” in the Turkish MS Esad Efendi 3638 (1287 AD). One of the main topics of this addition is Adam – conceived as the progenitor of humankind, the first prophet, the Active Intellect, the rational human soul, and the imām. Adam’s disobedience and fall is seen as a symbol of the “cosmic drama” from which originated the sub-lunar world, and the Final Judgement. The passages of the addition concerning Adam are compared with the representation of Adam in the Risāla al-Ǧāmiʿa, the “crown” of the Rasāʾil Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ. The common contents lead to the hypothesis that the addition was a sort of “abridgement” on the ideas about Adam stated in the Ǧāmiʿa and may confirm an esoteric reading of the encyclopaedia of the Iḫwan al-Ṣafāʾ.

Aristóteles e a Lógica da Contingência: uma interpretação tradicional do argumento da batalha naval

Since Antiquity, the meaning and purpose of Aristotle’s sea-battle argument have been highly controversial. On the so-called traditional interpretation of De Interpretatione 9, the argument is intended to prove that not every statement is always true or false on the assumption deemed evident that facts may occur contingently in our sublunar world. In this paper I argue that this interpretation is for many reasons much more plausible than any of its competitors, so that its correctness is worthy at least of moral certainty. In particular, I contend that it can coexist in perfect logical harmony with a moderately charitable reading of Aristotle’s texts that at first glance it seems to confute. As a matter of fact, I contend that it is faithful to Aristotle’s view of logical laws as consequent upon the metaphysical structure of reality.

The Islamization of Aristotelism in the Metaphysics of Ibn Sina

The article analyzes the activity of the greatest classic of the Islamic philosophy - Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980-1037), aimed at the revision of Aristotelianism, mainly in terms of its synthesis with Islamic monotheism. Preferential attention is paid to the metaphysical section of Avicennian multivolume encyclopedia “The Healing” (c. 1020-1027). Instead of Aristotelian God / the Prime Mover as the final cause, which serves as the source of the movement of the world, Avicenna establishes God / Necessary Being, who acts as the Giver of being. Developing the ontological foundation of creationism, i.e. the creation of every thing in the world, the philosopher introduces a distinction between essence and existence ( māhiyyawujūd , lat. essentia-existentia), which will pass through the subsequent history of philosophy. Ibn Sina thoroughly modifies the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of God and His essential cataphatic attributes. The intellectual narcissism of God, Who only knows Himself in Stagirite, he changes with the concept of Divine Omniscience and His providence of all existents. Ibn Sina transforms Aristotelian eternalism into eternalistic creationism, modifying the emanationist scheme of cosmogenesis advanced by al-Farabi (d. 950), in which the process of proceeding of the existents from the First Principle appears as an intellectual act. The Muslim philosopher complements Aristotelian cosmology with the doctrine of angels, whom he identifies with cosmic intellects and souls as the governors of the celestial spheres. Avicennian radical innovation is in the doctrine of Active Intellect ( al-‘akl al-fa‘‘al , lat. intellectus agens ), who is not only the ruler of the sublunar world, but actually is its demiurge. This intellect is assigned with the function of the illumination of the human intellect, as well as with the role of the archangel Gabriel the transmitter of divine revelation according to Muslim tradition. From the philosophical perspective, Avicenna develops alien to Aristotelianism topics related to the prophecy and revelation, the immortality of the soul and its otherworldly fate.

The World above the Moon in the al-Farabi’s Cosmology

This article provides a general analysis of the cosmological system of al-Farabi. The aim is to describe the peculiar methodological approach of al-Farabi to the system of the universe. The cosmology of al-Farabi is an important part of his philosophy. In his cosmological system, al-Farabi follows the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic interpretations. However, he added a lot from the Neoplatonic worldview. In this regard, al-Farabi is a universal interpreter who synthesized the view of peripatetics and Neoplatonists into a single cosmological system. He also developed their cosmology by adding the doctrine of celestial intelligence to the celestial spheres of the supra-moon world. Speaking about the very structure of the cosmological system, al-Farabi notes that each primary element has its own place. At the center of the world is the element of earth that forms our planet. Earth is the center of the universe; it is motionless and has a spherical shape. The principle of the central and fixed position of the Earth in the Universe is the cornerstone in Aristotelism and for many centuries determined the dominance of the geocentric system in astronomy. Above the moon, there is superlunary world which is fundamentally different from the sublunary world. The superlunary world acts according to its own laws. In this world, all bodies are composed of ether. The ether is unchanged; it does not turn into other elements.

La cohérence de la théorie de la substance chez Aristote entre les Catégories et la Métaphysique : ontologie et déterminologie

In the Corpus Aristotelicum there are two different theories of substance which apply to the sublunary world. The first theory is found in the Categories and selects the individual concrete as a primary substance (πρώτη oὐσία). The second is found in the Metaphysics (mainly in book Z) and selects the Form (εἶδος) and the Essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) as a primary substance. Most of the interpretations of modern Aristotelian scholarship claim an inconsistency. They suggest that if at all Aristotle has a theory of substance, then it is either the substance theory of the Categories or the one of the Metaphysics but not both of them. The supposition of all these interpretations is that Aristotle’s theory of substance is unambiguous and that there can be only a single primary substance. These interpretations suppose that the theory of substance is applicable only to a single domain, namely to ontology.In my paper I argue that this supposition is false. I suggest that Aristotle’s theory of substance is applicable not only to ontology but also to the domain of determinology whose meaning is explained in the paper. The theory of substance of the Categories applies to ontology whereas the one of the Metaphysics applies to determinology. The two theories are consistent with each other in a way that there are two commensurate sorts of primary substance: the individual concrete as the ontological primary substance of the Categories and the Form‑Essence as the determinative primary substance of the Metaphysics.Furthermore, I claim that Aristotle’s concept of substance is manifold and flexible. The concept evolves and is expanded in the Metaphysics. It is manifold because his theory of substance has a certain structure which includes the following three criteria for selecting a primary substance: (1) subjecthood viz. being a subject (τὸ ὑποκείμενον), (2) independence (τὸ χωριστόν) and (3) (well) determined individuality (τὸ τόδε τι). Aristotle’s concept of substance is flexible because these criteria do not have an absolute signification per se but are general and relative. They get a final signification when they are applied either to the ontology in the Categories or to the determinology in the Metaphysics. Their application to a certain domain establishes a theory of substance according to the domain in question and selects a primary substance according to the same domain. Aristotle’s concept of substance is flexible also because in the Metaphysics he enlarges his first concept of substance expressed by the three criteria by adding a new sort of substancehood expressed by the idion criterion.

Agency and Effect in the Astrology of Abū Maʿshar of Balkh (Albumasar)

Abstract The aim of this paper is to show how the ninth-century astrologer, Abū Maʿshar Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Balkhī, accounted for generation, corruption and change in the sublunary world. He sides with the philosophers against the astrologers and takes as his principal source the Peripatetic tradition. He shows that it is the movements of the heavenly bodies, rather than their elemental qualities, that are responsible for all elemental changes, and that these changes ‘result from,’ or follow naturally from, those movements rather than are caused by them.

Matter and Nature

Abstract The fundamental principle—ruling both Avicenna’s metaphysics and his ethics—that the action of superior causes cannot be explained in virtue of the existence of inferior effects—seems to deny any possibility of a consistent idea of providence in Avicenna’s system. Despite this fact, Avicenna recurs to the term (ʿināya; tadbīr) as well as to the idea of providence in various contexts in his oeuvre. More precisely, providence is equated to the flow of being that originates and explains the world; and this not only in respect to the fundamental, existential, positive and “good” properties that belong to it—the world itself is good, the flow is the principle of good and the First Principle is the cause of the world in so far as the order of good is concerned—but also as regards the marginal, negative, non-existential and “bad” properties that can affect its individuals and that are necessarily consequents of the good itself: evil is something the First Principle “wants”, although in an accidental way, and it is therefore implicit in and contained by divine causality. In this paper I shall outline the fundamental structure that explains the existence of individuals in the sublunary world. I do not claim to be exhaustive (some questions require further investigation); my aim is to provide an overview of the topic, with a main question in mind: on what principles does Avicenna base his idea of providence?

Dibattiti filosofici e scientifici sulla geomanzia nel medioevo latino

Abstract: Geomancy, a divinatory discipline imported from the Arab world, flourished in the Latin Middle Ages. In the attempt to explain the popularity of geomancy, translators and authors of geomantic writings, philosophers, theologians, and other scholars addressed such issues as its validity, its philosophical implications, and the worldview it presupposed. This paper explores this debate, delineating the epistemological status of geomancy in relation to astrology. The problem of the scientificity of geomacy will be discussed with regard to the celestial influences on the sublunary world. In addition, the different roles played by both the geomancer and the consultant (quaerens) are examined. Attention will be paid to the concept of intentio, which implies a psychological analysis peculiar to geomancy. Geomancy is also characterized by ritual elements such as both preliminary prescriptions and invocations of God, meaning that it is not an ordinary divinatory technique, but a form of wisdom revealed only to experienced and upright geomancers, who can thus obtain knowledge of future events and hidden things. From this analysis emerges the complex nature of geomancy, whose original Arabic version had a prominent religious character and a close, albeit ambiguous, link with Islamic prophecy.

Logic of the confucianist discourse and philosophy of Imanuel Kant in the modern context

The paper suggests an analysis of the Confucian discourse and its logic through the prism of the M. McLuhan’s conception of the visual and audio-tactile cultures. Parallels between the Confucian ethics and that of I. Kant are led. There is asserted that the Confucian and Kantian ethics developed in different outlook context and on different cultural grounds, the latter doesn’t prevent them to pull together their positions in modern culture. In classical Confucianism we have the case of magical thinking, that exceeded from the so-called organismic outlook, according to which the Universe is something like a gigantic organism, every person, animal or other living creature is some sort of organ of this organism. Every organ has its proper place and function, the same concerns humans who, being parts of the Universe organism, have also their proper place and duties or, how it was called in China, their proper Tao. When everyone follows one’s tao anything in the Sublunar world goes in piece and harmony. All problems of social and natural character are caused by that some people got away from their tao, from their duties. Humans can become the humans only in society where some hierarchies and duties are supposed and members of the society are obliged to follow them. That means it is necessary to follow duty in order to be human. The philosophy of Kant, unlike that of Confucius, developed in quite another context, the context of rational culture of the visual type of perception. The result the Kant’s philosophy came in the sphere of ethics are similar to those of Confucianism. Both Kant and Confucianism affirm variants of the ethics of duty. But negating cosmological metaphysics, Kant deduces the latter from the reason itself, the famous categorical imperative prescribe to behave in accordance with norms that could become foundation of common legislacy. From here the problem of transition from the reason to outer reality arises. The problem, from attempts to solve that as a matter of fact, all later the so-called German classical philosophy developed. However, the answers given in its frame turned out to be not legitimite in the frame of the visual culture. In this context the ideas of Confucianism may be an alternative foundation to the ethics of duty.

Why was astrology criticised in the Middle Ages? Contribution to further research (on the basis of selected treaties of professors of the University of Krakow in the 15th century).

People have always been interested in distant, mysterious celestial bodies. Astrologers who explored the mysteries of the study of the stars and planets wanted to read them as predictions of future events. Astrological practices were often seen as bordering of magic, whichto a large extent influenced the negative perception of this area of study and its supporters, even though astrologers were employed at the kings’ and bishops’ courts, and even at the papal court. The relationship of astrology with occult sciences, which were regarded as sinful and heretical, led to the situation when its proponents were subject to accusations. Particular attention was paid to the fact that the belief in the influence of heavenly bodies on the events taking place in the sublunary world undermines the foundation of the Christian religion, i.e. the dogma of the free will of man. This and other charges constituted a kind of a “catalogue of allegations” that were made against astrology and astrologers throughout the Middle Ages.

L’hypothèse de la cessation des mouvements célestes au xive siècle : Nicole Oresme, Jean Buridan et Albert de Saxe

Abstract Aristotelian cosmology implies the plurality of celestial motion for the process of generation and corruption in the sublunar world. In order to investigate the structure of the cosmos and the degree of dependence of the sublunar on the supralunar region, medieval Latin commentators on Aristotle explored the consequences of the cessation of celestial motion. This paper analyses the position of some philosophers of the fourteenth-century Parisian school, namely Nicole Oresme, John Buridan and Albert of Saxony.

The Worldmakers: Global Imagining in Early Modern Europe

The Worldmakers: Global Imagining in Early Modern Europe

The Aim and Structure of Gershom ben Solomon’s Shaʿar ha-shamayim

Abstract Gershom ben Solomon’s very popular Shaʿar ha-shamayim (The Gate of Heaven), written in the Midi in the last quarter of the 13th century, differs from the two earlier 13th-century Hebrew encyclopedias in that it lays very strong emphasis on the empirical sublunar world (beginning with the elements and especially with the two Aristotelian exhalations), nearly ignoring the theory of the soul and metaphysics. This article argues that the clue to Gershom’s distinctive approach to the study of the world is to be found in Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Maʾamar yiqqawu ha-mayim (A Treatise on ‘Let the Water Gather’) of 1231. With this insight, we also realize that Gershom’s is an ‘encyclopedia’ of a new genre, really a personal philosophical work, whose numerous building blocks are arranged in accordance with a philosophical principle. In this respect, the work is that of a true philosopher-scientist, not of a mere compiler.

Samuel Richardson and the Theory of Tragedy: Clarissa's Caesuras by J. A. Smith

Reviewed by: Samuel Richardson and the Theory of Tragedy: Clarissa's Caesuras by J. A. Smith Jacob Sider Jost J. A. Smith. Samuel Richardson and the Theory of Tragedy: Clarissa's Caesuras. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016. Pp. 175. £60.00. At the publication of its first volumes in 1747, Clarissa billed itself as The History of a Young Lady, and scholars of our time have largely honored that subtitle by reading Richardson's magnum opus in historical terms: as a case study in eighteenth-century printing or reception study; as a witness to changing eighteenth-century ideas about religion, [End Page 66] gender roles, moral philosophy, or consumer culture; and as a chapter in the history of the English novel. Mr. Smith is not ignorant of the historiography of Clarissa. He is at home among Richardson's revisions and recastings of the novel's text, knows the printer-author's biography, and often buttresses his arguments about Clarissa with well-chosen parallels from its predecessor Pamela and successor Sir Charles Grandison. But this is a defiantly formalist, ahistorical reading: Mr. Smith argues that in order to comprehend the tragic force of Clarissa we must look not to Richardson's own theory of tragedy (as articulated in his critique of Rymer's idea of poetic justice in the novel's postscript) but rather to the twentieth-century tragic theories of Walter Benjamin and Jacques Lacan. Indeed, in its appeal to continental theory as a heuristic for understanding Richardson, Mr. Smith's study is itself refreshingly untimely, recalling William Warner's Clarissa and the Struggles of Interpretation (1979) and Terry Castle's Clarissa's Ciphers (1982), to the alliterative title of which its subtitle pays homage, even as it makes use of the intervening generation of textual and historicist criticism. Samuel Richardson and the Theory of Tragedy is organized around two central claims: first, that Clarissa is a refutation of "received notions" of eighteenth-century England, particularly the axioms that "a reformed rake makes the best husband" and that once a woman is "subdued" by seduction or rape, she remains "always subdued." Second, the novel's refutation of these insidious commonplaces is through tragedy. Posed thus baldly, the argument seems straightforward, even obvious: Richardson's readers wanted a conventional wish-fulfilling ending, but he killed off Clarissa in order to teach them, quite literally, a lesson. But Mr. Smith plays several elegant variations on this theme, showing how Richardson's straightforward didactic purpose expresses itself ingeniously in the form of his text. In his first chapter, Mr. Smith shows how "received notions" circulate in the novel, for instance when the Harlowes compulsively repeat a "language of the family" as though reiteration alone could give normative force to the clan's claims on Clarissa. The two chapters that follow argue that Clarissa's "mad papers" and Lovelace's inarticulacy and impotence in the face of Clarissa's post-rape resistance show the power of reiterated received notions brought to bay when faced with tragedy. Mr. Smith's final chapter and conclusion expand on what sort of tragedy this is. As in the tragic plots of German Baroque drama that fascinated Benjamin, Clarissa depicts a world abandoned by God in which signification breaks apart into undecidable allegories; like Antigone as read by Lacan, Clarissa follows her deepest desire (the desire to die) even when it conflicts with everything else in her life. Mr. Smith shows an impressive command of recent Clarissa scholarship, but a formalist-theoretical reading of this kind stands or falls on the strength of its own readings. These are often insightful and sometimes brilliant, as when Mr. Smith, who has been considering Lovelace's dream of holding Clarissa during her apotheosis and the contrast between the sublunary world and transcendent beyond in Nietzsche and Benjamin's readings of Raphael's Transfiguration, draws attention to the this-worldly materiality of Clarissa's coffin by comparing its arrival (announced, Belford writes, with "a sort of lumbering noise upon the stairs") to the piano delivery in Laurel and Hardy's The Music Box. But some readings are unconvincing: Mr. Smith's basic insight that the mad papers work by creating unexpected and...

Does God Create Evil? A Study of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Exegesis of Sūrat al-falaq

ABSTRACTThe present piece of research analyses Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s exegesis of Sūrat al-falaq in his voluminous tafsīr, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb. In his exegesis of Sūrat al-falaq, al-Rāzī draws on the insights of philosophical Sufism (ʿirfān), philosophy, and science in general, in addition to the transmitted (naqlī) sciences. The focus of al-Rāzī’s exegesis in this chapter is the problem of evil. According to al-Rāzī, evil is found only in the sublunar world, that is, the world of generation and corruption. And this is so owing to the fact that the sublunar world contains bodily substances, in contrast to the world of spirit, in which only spirits (arwāḥ) dwell. However, as his exegesis segues into the specific verses of Sūrat al-falaq, it begins to take a more polemical turn against the Muʿtazilites and other theological opponents. Al-Rāzī’s theodicy remains faithful in part to his Ashʿarite predecessors and, although he attempts to deconstruct the Muʿtāzilite position on this issue, he does not present an alternative doctrine in his tafsīr. Instead, his response (after refuting his opponents) betrays a combination of scriptural evidence and rational arguments that seek to valorize divine omnipotence.

The Mathematics of High School Physics

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mathematicians and physical philosophers managed to study, via mathematics, various physical systems of the sublunar world through idealized and simplified models of these systems, constructed with the help of geometry. By analyzing these models, they were able to formulate new concepts, laws and theories of physics and then through models again, to apply these concepts and theories to new physical phenomena and check the results by means of experiment. Students’ difficulties with the mathematics of high school physics are well known. Science education research attributes them to inadequately deep understanding of mathematics and mainly to inadequate understanding of the meaning of symbolic mathematical expressions. There seem to be, however, more causes of these difficulties. One of them, not independent from the previous ones, is the complex meaning of the algebraic concepts used in school physics (e.g. variables, parameters, functions), as well as the complexities added by physics itself (e.g. that equations’ symbols represent magnitudes with empirical meaning and units instead of pure numbers). Another source of difficulties is that the theories and laws of physics are often applied, via mathematics, to simplified, and idealized physical models of the world and not to the world itself. This concerns not only the applications of basic theories but also all authentic end-of-the-chapter problems. Hence, students have to understand and participate in a complex interplay between physics concepts and theories, physical and mathematical models, and the real world, often without being aware that they are working with models and not directly with the real world.