Today, almost exactly two hundred years from his ascent to the chief justiceship, John Marshall's star, along with that of the president who appointed him to the Court, is clearly on the rise. Evidence abounds. R. Kent Newmyer's new biography joins such important recent works as Jean Edward Smith's biography (1996), Charels F. Hobson's and Herbert Alan Johnson's accounts of Marshall as chief justice (1996, 1997), and James F. Simon's new study of Marshall and Jefferson (2002). It is not just a matter of quantity either; there is a real air of appreciation of the man and his deeds in most of the new work and a great freedom from the deep ambivalence toward Marshall characteristic of the classic statements of earlier ages, such as those of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter. As might have been expected from his previous excellent biography of Joseph Story, Marshall's closest comrade on the Court, Newmyer has added a very fine piece to the Marshall revival. The general thrust of this biography is well captured in his title: John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court. It was heroic in part because Marshall himself, as Newmyer gives him to us, was heroic. An engaging appreciation for his subject pervades the whole book; Newmyer clearly admires Marshall and indeed gives the reader reason to do so too. As a biography it succeeds better than many at not losing its subject in his work and times, but (unlike most psychobiography) it does not fail to recall that the subject's work and its relation to his times provide the reasons for our interest in him. Newmyer keeps Marshall the person and personality always on stage. He brings out uncommonly well what others have noted—Marshall's personal gift for human relations and his naturally democratic cast of soul, which were coupled with a love of order, good common sense, and formidable analytic reasoning power. Newmyer is particularly good in discussing Marshall's pre-Court legal practice and using it to show the qualities of mind and character that gave shape to his Court career. Although Newmyer keeps Marshall the human being front and center, he does not concentrate on his personal life per se. Beyond Marshall the individual, Newmyer sees the Marshall court as heroic because it established two features of the American political order that were either missing or gravely endangered when Marshall came to the Court. Newmyer does not accept the old view that Marshall invented or usurped the power of judicial review, but he does insist that it was not a foregone conclusion that the Court would in fact be able to make its claim to this power stick. He points especially to the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions as loudly raising the claim that that power of constitutional interpretation rightly rested with the states, a view both Marshall and Newmyer know meant anarchy for the American constitutional order. Second, Newmyer, like other recent writers (for example, Hobson and Christopher Wolfe), sees Marshall's great achievement as the separation of law and politics and the establishment of a sphere of political life that operates on legal rather than political principles. He fits this emphasis nicely into an effort to locate Marshall within the now classic liberalism-republican debates about the early republic.