Sub-constitutional Level Research Articles

Lessons from Anti-Poverty Action in Ireland: Flexibility, Failure and the Pitfalls of a ‘Fourth Branch’ Model

This article reviews the experience of Ireland’s Combat Poverty Agency and asks what lessons it may have for fourth branch scholarship. The lesson of the Agency is, in part, one about the pitfalls for novel institutions operating within a traditional tripartite model of constitutional government. The article also suggests, however, that the Combat Poverty Agency’s history may point to the positive potential for the design and operational strategies of non-traditional bodies charged with the promotion of specific social or economic goals. In so doing some reservations about both the specific implications and overall utility of framing these bodies in ‘fourth branch’ terms are also raised. These include concerns regarding the distinctiveness and (relatedly) authority of some conceptions of a ‘fourth branch’. In particular, however, the article queries whether the elevation of independent agencies to ‘branch’ status is always beneficial; and whether, in fact, the location of anti-poverty agencies at a sub-constitutional level may, under certain conditions at least, offer advantages in terms of flexibility and practical problem-solving power.

The Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment: International Protection

The right to a clean and healthy environment (the exact formulations differ) is yet to be recognized as an independent right in the international bill of rights. The right is not mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) or in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Nevertheless, discussions revolving around international recognition of the right to a clean and healthy environment have continued since the early 1970s, when the UN Declaration on Environment (Stockholm Declaration (1972) and Rio Declaration (1992)) stated that “[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being…“(Principle 1) (Principle 1, UN Conference on the Human Environment, ‘Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’). Moreover, both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child ((adopted 20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3) make reference to an adequate condition of the environment (see article 12 of the ICESCR and article 24 of the CRC, in particular). The jurisprudence of human rights monitoring bodies to other treaties, like the Human Rights Committee, has started to recognize the application of human rights in environmental contexts. The right has also been recognized at the regional level, in a great number of constitutions, and at the sub-constitutional level. Considering the extent of international and in particular regional human rights treaties that refer to the environment, their case-law and the latest discussions on the matter, it seems that today, the question to ask about the human right to a clean and healthy environment is not whether the right should be acknowledged internationally, but how.

Relativizam, eklekticizam i dostojanstvo - Barakovo shvatanje ljudskog dostojanstva

This paper presents and examines a relativistic account of human dignity in law proposed by Aharon Barak. The first section delineates the key points of his concept of dignity and the second introduces eclecticism as a philosophical basis of dignity in law along with its shortcomings. The third section elaborates on the "primacy of the sub-constitutional level" and "society's bedrock views" as the legal underpinnings of Barak's dignity relativism. The author argues that in this account eclecticism and relativism enter into a symbiotic relationship, in which eclecticism simulates a value foundation of law, while it at the same time enables relativism coming from below. This symbiosis threatens to push the idea of human dignity into dignities of specific jurisdictions, legal cultures a step further into their separate universes, and 'Rechtsstaat' a degree closer to 'Justizstaat'.

Single-objective versus multi-objective theories of the firm: using a constitutional perspective to resolve an old debate

Our article contributes to the recurring debate on whether and how firms in competitive markets should pursue objectives other than purely financial ones. Two competing approaches dominate this debate: one favors profit maximization as a single objective; the other favors multiple, partly social objectives. This debate has been going on for decades without approaching consensus. Our article offers an explanation for this intellectual stalemate and proposes a constitutional perspective that reconciles and improves the two seemingly antagonistic approaches. At the core of our proposed solution lies the distinction between the sub-constitutional level of action (choices within constraints) and the constitutional level of rules (choices among constraints). Using this distinction, we argue that both single-objective and multi-objective theories of the firm play equally important, but categorically different roles.

Proportionality, constitutional law, and sub-constitutional law: A reply to Aharon Barak

Aharon Barak and I agree on many questions of proportionality analysis. But there are also points of disagreement. One point concerns the relation between constitutional rights and proportionality. Barak argues that my connection between constitutional rights and proportionality is too narrow. The connection I defend implies that proportionality has effects at the constitutional level. In contrast to this, Barak defends the thesis that proportionality only operates at the sub-constitutional level. In this article, I attempt to show that proportionality, already at the constitutional level, must have effects. Naturally, these constitutional effects have, in turn, effects at the sub-constitutional level.

Entrenching ‘Cooperative Federalism’: Is It Time to Formalise Coag's Place in the Australian Federation?

The purpose of this article is to assess the desirability and feasibility of any point of convergence between Australia’s formal constitutional arrangements and COAG. Although several commentators have suggested that this must be the logical endpoint to the sub-constitutional reform which is currently in train, there is ambiguity about much of the detail of such an argument. We consider precisely how constitutional recognition of intergovernmental co-operation might look – whether it should be of COAG itself (and what difficulties this might introduce in turn) or whether an appropriately facilitative change can be cast in more generalist terms. Of either option it must be asked to what extent it would properly address the concerns that many have expressed about the place of COAG and IGAs in our political system. Given the obstacles to constitutional change, it must be seriously considered whether many of those concerns could be met through reform remaining at the sub-constitutional level. Additionally, an awareness of what might be risked through formal constitutional recognition of a body that certainly enjoys the benefits of adaptability should not be lost sight of. For the present, the sub-constitutional federal arrangements will undoubtedly continue to change rapidly as governments grapple with shared problems in key policy areas such as health, natural resources and education. Others have concluded that no factor has determined the contours of Australian federalism more than the need for pragmatic solutions to policy problems and that these, rather than any overarching constitutional theory of the federal state, continue to drive reform. Nevertheless, as under-theorized and as reactive as these developments are, they only increase the desirability of formal constitutional amendment which is reflective of the reality of Australian federalism today. This is not merely for show or neatness – but rather to recognize that government is found under the Constitution, not apart from or alongside it. The point at which convergence is to occur between the product of political reform on the one hand and constitutional law on the other is surely contestable. It may be some time off yet. But it continues to be foreshadowed and as the need for it is only likely to grow stronger, it is best to be prepared. This article is our contribution to that effort.

Konstitutionelle Äquivalenz und Ordnungswahl

Zusammenfassung Dieses Papier versteht sich als Beitrag zur Ausweitung des Geltungsbereiches des ORDO-Konzepts, das wettbewerblichen Ordnungen verpflichtet ist, vom Markt auf die Politik. Wie läßt sich der politische Prozeß strukturieren, um der „individuellen Souveränität“ gerecht zu werden? „Konstitutionelle Äquivalenz“ besteht, wenn dieselben Individuen, die regelgebundene Entscheidungen treffen, auch zu Entscheidungen über die entsprechenden Regeln befähigt sind. Der Schlüssel zur Umsetzung der konstitutionellen Äquivalenz liegt in der Struktur der Regelsetzungskompetenzen einer Gesellschaft. Dem Paradigma vom „Staat als Monopolisten“ wird hier eine Form der dezentralisierenden Problemlösung gegenübergestellt, die die „Geographie der Institutionen“ an die „Geographie der Probleme“ koppelt und auf die neuentstehenden Entscheidungsträger das Paradigma von „ordnungspolitischen Akteuren als Wettbewerbern“ zutreffen läßt. Das Tauschparadigma läßt sich auf alle Ebenen des Tausches anwenden: Ebenso wie freiwillige Tauschakte auf Märkten erst dann möglich sind, wenn wohldefinierte Verfügungsrechte existieren, sind reagible ordnungspolitische Maßnahmen (unter konstitutioneller Äquivalenz) erst dann möglich, wenn auch hier die zugrundeliegenden Externalitäten durch wohldefinierte Verfugungsrechte internalisiert und betroffene Bürger problemadäquat mit dem gruppenexklusiven Recht zur Umsetzung ihres konstitutionellen Interesses im Zuge der Ordnungswahl ausgestattet werden. Hierfür wird eine abstrakte Vier-Ebenen-Struktur vorgeschlagen: 1. ein allgemeines Initiativrecht für Bürger auf der nationalen Verfassungsebene, 2. die institutionelle Meta-Ebene, auf der betroffenen Bürgern Problemlösungskompetenzen zugeordnet werden, 3. die konstitutionelle Ebene, auf der dazu befähigte Bürger den Ordnungsrahmen ihres Gesellschaftssystems mitgestalten und 4. die subkonstitutionelle Ebene, auf der innerhalb der geltenden Regeln die eigentlichen Strategien vorgenommen werden.