Study Of Foreign Direct Investment Research Articles

Foreign direct investment in the UK: evidence from a disaggregated panel of the UK food sector

Most empirical studies of foreign direct investment (FDI) typically use either a cross-sectional (capturing ownership-specific and industry determinants) or time-series (capturing the determinants of FDI over time) approach. Panel data techniques, however, have the advantage of combining both aspects of the data. Using disaggregated panel data for the UK food sector – a leading recipient of FDI in the UK – the results in this paper highlight the predominance of ownership-specific and industry characteristics in determining the presence of foreign-owned firms in this sector while macro-economic factors have a more marginal effect.

Tacitness, Learning, and International Expansion: A Study of Foreign Direct Investment in a Knowledge-Intensive Industry

This paper examines the impact of knowledge tacitness on a firm's propensity to establish plants in foreign rather than domestic locations. Our predictions build on knowledge-based, internalization, and evolutionary theories of foreign direct investment. We argue that the tacitness of technology has an inverted-U effect on the propensity to undertake foreign investment. We also expect that as a firm learns about a technology, it will become more likely to make foreign investments. We examine two forms of learning: that which accumulates as a function of the number of plants previously built by the firm (transfer-based learning), and that which accumulates as a function of time since the firm started using a technology (time-based learning). We investigate empirical effects in a sample of investments in the memory segment of the semiconductor industry. Our predictions about the curvilinear effect of tacitness are supported. The results also suggest that learning is a matter of taking time to become acquainted with the use of the technology, and of gaining experience through successive foreign plant investments. The study adds to the understanding of the effects of knowledge on corporate expansion.

Sarrio Slovenija Ltd.

(1998). Sarrio Slovenija Ltd. Eastern European Economics: Vol. 36, A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, pp. 29-54.

Biterm d.o.o.

(1998). Biterm d.o.o. Eastern European Economics: Vol. 36, A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, pp. 73-93.

Pražské Pivovary a.s.

(1998). Pražske Pivovary a.s. Eastern European Economics: Vol. 36, A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, pp. 05-25.

Berg–Montana Fittings Ltd.

(1998). Berg–Montana Fittings Ltd. Eastern European Economics: Vol. 36, A Comparative Study of Foreign Direct Investment in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, pp. 15-26.

Location, governance, and strategic determinants of japanese manufacturing investment in the united states

AbstractA firm's decision to manufacture abroad depends on location, governance, and strategic factors. Governance factors are firm‐specific. In spite of this, most empirical studies of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been conducted at the industry level (making it impossible to look at firm‐specific determinants), and only a handful have considered governance, location, and strategic factors simultaneously. This paper is the first large sample study of the determinants of foreign direct investment at the product and firm‐level. It examines the impact of location and governance factors, and of four types of strategic interactions, on a Japanese firm's propensity to manufacture in the U.S. The results support the view that foreign direct investment is explained by location, governance, and strategic variables. Economies of scale and trade barriers encourage Japanese FDI in the U.S. The larger a Japanese firm's R & D expenditures, the greater the probability it will manufacture in the U.S., but this is not the case for advertising expenditures. Some strategic factors are also important: Japanese firms with medium domestic market shares have the highest propensity to invest in the U.S. There is evidence of follow‐the‐leader behavior between firms of rival enterprise groups, but none of ‘exchange‐of‐threat’ between American and Japanese firms. Japanese investors are also attracted by concentrated and high‐growth U.S. industries.

Foreign Direct Investment in a Centrally Planned Economy: Lessons from China: Comment on Kamath

Shyam Kamath's recent study of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China aims collate recently available (p. 108), in order to draw for in other centrally planned economies (p. 109) and for the future of China's economic development (p. 110).1 The article's conclusions are described as tentative, and they are rather negative: the Chinese FDI policy is unlikely to bear much fruit (p. 123). In this comment I argue that stronger lessons can be drawn from China's experience with FDI, and that this experience has been a positive one. The major criticism of Kamath's article concerns its failure to view the Open Door policy in a more dynamic light. Kamath mentions considerable changes (p. 108), but presents data mainly on 1979-83 (and never beyond 1985) and treats this as the single period of the Open Door policy. Looking at the evolution of Chinese policy undermines or even reverses many of Kamath's conclusions. Table 1 and figure 1 illustrate the growth of pledged and actual in China since 1979. The 1979-83 period was one of slow growth in FDI, the first stage in opening up an economy that had been autarkic for decades. Statements like rights do not exist (p. 108) capture the feelings of many foreign investors dealing with China in these years. They were, however, an exaggeration, and, more important, Chinese authorities came to recognize the advantages of codifying property rights. This they started to do in a series of regulations put together in 1983-84, which provided the background for a boom in pledged in 1984 and the first half of 1985. The boom ended as the Chinese authorities became worried at their loss of macroeconomic control, and as foreign investors found that while the situation had improved, it was still not easy to do business in China. The biggest single obstacle still facing foreign investors was the inconvertible cur-