Economic Voting Studies Research Articles

Economic Voting and Political Sophistication in the United States

The authors propose a reexamination of the conditioning effect of political sophistication on economic voting in U.S. presidential elections. Replicating Gomez and Wilson's (2001) analysis with survey data from the past five American presidential elections (1988—2004), they show that low sophisticates strictly rely on sociotropic economic judgments in their intention to support the incumbent party's candidate. For their part, high sophisticates appear to use both sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations in their voting intention, but only in elections where the sitting incumbent is running for reelection (1992, 1996, and 2004). Most of these findings do not hold, however, once the postelectoral reported vote is used as the dependent variable. Indeed, the authors find that pocketbook evaluations do not have a significant impact on high sophisticates' reported vote choice, and they also find important variance in economic voting effects among low sophisticates. The results indicate that high sophisticates continue to use sociotropic evaluations in their voting decision, but only in incumbent elections. Overall, the analysis raises doubts about some of the previous studies' conclusions and underlines the importance of considering the moderating role of contextual factors such as incumbency and political campaigns in economic voting studies.

An economic analysis of voting in Sweden

Using data from the Swedish Election Studies between 1985 and 1994 supplemented with time series on inflation and unemployment, I compare the impact of macro- and microeconomic variables on the individual vote. The principal finding is that macroeconomic variables influence the vote a bit more than microeconomic variables do. In consequence, both self-interest and public interest appear to be important explanations of economic voting in Sweden. Macroeconomic variables have, however, been much more influential in determining election outcomes. Since previous studies of economic voting have used cross-sectional data only, it is also worth noting that panel estimates indicate a much greater impact of macroeconomic variables on the individual vote than cross-sectional estimates do.

Does Economics Still Matter? Econometrics and the Vote

Evans and Andersen make the provocative argument that the effects of economic perceptions on political support are greatly exaggerated, owing to the endogeneity of economic perceptions with respect to partisanship. I question their claim, for several reasons. First, the dependent variable measure of popularity is unusual. Second, the causal modeling is based on debatable assumptions that could be behind these surprising results. Third, in the United Kingdom and the United States, evidence suggests that national economic perceptions reflect closely the real economy. There may well be an endogeneity problem in economic voting studies, but it more likely runs from economic perceptions to partisanship, rather than vice versa. Panel studies, available for both the United Kingdom and the United States in national election surveys, offer ideal databases for testing these rival claims in the future. Great care must be given to exogenize properly the partisanship variable.

The parliamentary elections in Hungary, April 2002

While economic voting studies exist for the new democracies in post-communist Europe, time-series vote functions are scarce. Here, we fill this void by testing how public support for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) responds to political shocks and economic oscillations, using monthly data from 2002 to 2009 (N = 83). As the economy fluctuates, on both objective and subjective measures, Hungarians reward or punish the Prime Minister’s party in the traditional manner. Political shocks, including the change to an MSZP minority government, the 2006 riots, and the IMF bailout, induced increased support for the party while troops in Iraq and the election campaign led Hungarians to be less supportive of the party. Clearly, government support in Hungary can be explained in political economic terms, despite the newness of democracy and the severe economic uncertainties of the times.

The Conditional Impact of Blame Attribution on the Relationship Between Economic Adversity and Turnout

Previous research has found that those facing economic adversity are less likely to vote. This has serious implications for the nature of democratic accountability, since those who are less likely to vote in an economic downturn may also be the ones most likely to punish the incumbent party. In fact, some have used aggregated electoral data to justify such a claim (Radcliff 1994). However, such conclusions are premature. Once the intervening effects of blame attribution are taken into consideration, there are conditions under which economic adversity actually enhances turnout. Data from the American National Election Studies (1990-98) demonstrate that those facing economic adversity are more likely to vote when they blame the government for economic outcomes. These are the same people who have been shown in numerous economic voting studies to be much less supportive of the in-party. These findings suggest that economic adversity does not necessarily constrain democratic accountability and highlight the perils associated with making inferences about individual-level behavior with aggregate data.

Is ‘Clarity of Responsibility’ Important for Economic Voting? Revisiting Powell and Whitten's Hypothesis

In the words of Martin Paldam, comparative economic voting studies suffer from a ‘great instability’ – i.e., economic effects appear in some countries at some times, but not others, and tend to be weak and inconsistent across studies. Powell and Whitten propose a possible solution to the ‘instability’ of cross-national voting studies: ‘to explain differences in retrospective economic voting across nations and over time we must take account of the political context within which elections take place’. More specifically, they take into account the ‘context of political responsibility’, arguing that voters are more likely to punish/reward incumbent governments if it is very clear which parties are responsible for economic conditions. They find that voters hold government parties responsible for the economy when there is high ‘clarity of responsibility’, but not when ‘clarity of responsibility’ is low. Over Four Decades', in Helmut Norpoth, Michael Lewis-Beck and Jean-Dominique Lafay, eds, Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 9–31, at p. 26. G. Bingham Powell Jr and Guy D. Whitten, ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context’, American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 391–414, p. 409. Powell and Whitten, ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting’, p. 410.

The microeconomic voter

In the United States, aggregate and individual level studies of economic voting for the Congress have produced contradictory findings. The same is true for models of economic voting for the Australian Parliament. This paper presents data taken from a series of individual level studies which show that voters' attitudes towards fiscal and microeconomic issues have been better predictors of the vote for the Australian House of Representatives over the last four elections than their attitudes towards macroeconomic issues. This finding suggests that the cause of the inconsistency between aggregate and individual level models of voting may be that aggregate models of economic voting which include only macroeconomic variables are inadequately specified, since they do not take broader aspects of the economy into account.

The grievance asymmetry revisited: A micro study of economic voting in Denmark,1986–1992

An analysis of the economic voting of 17,100 Danes, demonstrates that reaction is about three times larger to a deterioration in the economy than to an improvement. The results point to the importance of economic stability in the social welfare function and provides an explanation of the costs of ruling. An explanation is provided for why governments change which supports the partisan model of the political business cycle.

Reality Bites: News Exposure and Economic Opinion

Reality Bites: News Exposure and Economic Opinion

From the Pocketbook of the Welfare Man: A Pooled Cross-Section Study of Economic Voting in Denmark, 1986–92

A basic question in the analysis of the economic voting of the individual is whether the decision to vote for the government is sociotropic or determined by the pocketbook? It is sociotropic if the voter considers the whole of the economy. It is pocketbook voting if people look at their personal economic circumstances. The question has remained at the centre of research in economic voting since it was first raised by Kinder and Kiewiet in 1979. Over the years, it has generated a sizeable number of empirical studies, mostly based on American data, as well as a fair share of disagreement. From a theoretical viewpoint it is not obvious whether economic man is a sociotropic or a pocketbook voter. There is a strong argument for both assumptions: (α) the pro-pocketbook argument suggests that homo economicus pursues his own interest or that of his household, and votes with his pocketbook; (β) the proto-sociotropic argument suggests that voters consider what governments try to accomplish. They do not try to steer the economy of any individual, but the economy of the country.The word sociotropic literally means society-directed. The corresponding concept for self-directed would be egotropic, as we write in other papers. The Editor has resolved that this is not in the dictionary. Moreover, several writers prefer the term egocentric. This is too loaded with other meanings for our taste. So we shall use the term pocketbook voting in the present Note.Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, ‘Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting’, American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 495–527, and ‘Sociotropic Politics’, British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981), 129–61. See further the cross-national study by Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988, 1990), and the surveys by Peter Nannestad and Martin Paldam, ‘The VP-Function. A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years’, Public Choice, 79 (1994), 213–45; and Douglas A. Hibbs, Solidarity or Egoism? (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1993). These recent surveys allow us to restrict these references to a minimum.

It's the government's fault! A cross‐section study of economic voting in Denmark, 1990/93

Abstract. The relationship between voters' support for the government and thirteen items tapping their evaluation of the economic situation is analyzed. One data set is collected under Conservative rule and another under Social Democratic rule. The answers are first aggregated into three factors. Two are egotropic: the economic situation of the family, and its unemployment situation. One is sociotropic: worry about the economic development in the country. The impact of the first is strongly significant, and greater than found in comparable studies. The impact of the second is mostly significant, while the impact of the third is the least reliable. We have thus found a clear case of pocketbook voting.

The Hungarian election of May 1994

While economic voting studies exist for the new democracies in post-communist Europe, time-series vote functions are scarce. Here, we fill this void by testing how public support for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) responds to political shocks and economic oscillations, using monthly data from 2002 to 2009 (N = 83). As the economy fluctuates, on both objective and subjective measures, Hungarians reward or punish the Prime Minister’s party in the traditional manner. Political shocks, including the change to an MSZP minority government, the 2006 riots, and the IMF bailout, induced increased support for the party while troops in Iraq and the election campaign led Hungarians to be less supportive of the party. Clearly, government support in Hungary can be explained in political economic terms, despite the newness of democracy and the severe economic uncertainties of the times.

Attributing Presidential Responsibility for National Economic Problems

Several recent studies of economic voting have challenged a central assumption of the reward-punishment theory of retrospective voting, that voters hold the incumbent party responsible for all manner of economic fluctuations. Our research expands on prior work in several ways by specifying and testing a model of the way people attribute responsibility to presidents for national economic problems. We find that during the 1982 recession, President Reagan was spared the wrath of the reward-punishment theory among individuals who felt that economic problems were more the fault of the previous administration, that presidents have relatively little control over the causes of inflation and unemployment, and that past presidents were unable to control these same problems. Implications for retrospective voting theories and the outcome of the 1982 midterm elections are discussed.

Economic Expectations and Voting Behavior in United States House and Senate Elections

Past individual-level studies of economic voting (1) have incorrectly operationalized the model they employ by using past-oriented rather than future-oriented questions and (2) have failed to examine the level of economic voting in United States Senate elections. Using the 1978 National Election Study, we show that economic voting exists in Senate but not House elections, presumably due to the differences in electoral context. Even when economic voting occurs, however, there is no guarantee that the public will influence the direction of macroeconomic policy.