Structure Of Scientific Revolutions Research Articles

Paradigm changes in research: Kuhn meets socio-ecological transition theory

Recent research indicates that disruptiveness in science has decreased, triggering discussions about the reason for this. Earlier Thomas Kuhn discussed why revolutions in science are slow but inevitable processes. To better understand transition processes within a scientific discipline, this article draws on a novel transition concept. The concept combines ideas about the structure of scientific revolutions with the concept of adaptive cycles. Combining these two approaches facilitates theorization of the reasons for the reduced disruptiveness at the scientific discipline (system) level. To elucidate the interplay between individuals and the scientific discipline, and thus their role in processes of scientific paradigm shifts, the new model further integrates resilience theory. Factors determining the resilience of an adaptive system explain resistance to change at individual and system levels, as well as the interplay between these two levels. The discourse between environmental and ecological economics is used to illustrate the theoretical discussion and apply the novel transition concept to a specific case. The analysis shows that institutionalization, providing better answers to anomalies, and uncovering maladaptation are key in the transition process.

BEFORE STRUCTURE. THE RISE OF KUHN’S CONCEPTUAL SCHEME IN THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION

Thomas S. Kuhn’s intellectual development could be summed up in a two-stage course, first, the transition from physics to the history of science (primarily physics) and then from the history of science to the philosophy of science, a field in which he achieved consecration with The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) published in 1962. In the 1950s, before SSR, Kuhn dealt with the history of science and, finally, developed a detailed research on the case of the Copernican Revolution, publishing a book with the same name. The Copernican Revolution. Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (CR). My aim in this paper is to argue that in this case study Kuhn identified all those situations that he will later describe in the terms of the SSR’s vocabulary, from “paradigm” and “incommensurability”, to “normal science” and “scientific revolution.” I think that although the terminological options in CR differ, such as, for example, the use of the expression “conceptual scheme” for what will later be called “paradigm”, a simple conceptual archaeology directs us to claim that CR is the immediate predecessor of SSR.

A STRUCTURE FOR HISTORY: REFLECTIONS FROM KUHN’S HISTORIOGRAPHIC STUDIES

In the present work, we aim to analyze Lorraine Daston’s critiques of the historiographical value of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: we will defend its relevance from the attacks of “the history of contingencies”. Daston’s proposal asserts that the Kuhnian historiographical programme of professionalizing the history of science (moving it towards history departments to the detriment of science departments) has been fulfilled but has resulted in the abandonment of the Hegelian spirit from Kuhn’s historiography, i.e. the search for “a structure” of the history of science has been abandoned. We will analyze and incorporate the recent responses from K. Brad Wray and Pablo Melogno. Finally, through a thorough analysis of the relationships between philosophy and the history of science, particularly in Kuhn’s work, we will propose a defense of the systematic and explicit use of metatheoretical structures for historiographical endeavors.

Kuhnian Lessons for the Study of Open-Ended Evolution.

Kuhnian philosophy of science implies that progress in the study of open-ended evolution (OEE) would be accelerated if the OEE science community were to agree on some examples of striking success in OEE science. This article recounts the important role of scientific paradigms and scientific exemplars in creating the productivity of what Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, calls "normal" science, and it describes how the study of OEE today would benefit from exhibiting more of the hallmarks of normal science. The article concludes by describing five proposed projects that would help create a consensus in the OEE community on some good examples of the scientific study of OEE.

Generative Grammar in Thomas Kuhns Paradigm and Structure of Scientific Revolution

Generative Grammar in Thomas Kuhns Paradigm and Structure of Scientific Revolution

The Structure of Creative Revolutions

Abstract One of the more important questions about creativity is what makes a creative production a revolution? The present contribution follows the analysis of the development of scientific knowledge proposed by Kuhn (1962) in ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,’ to propose a typology that may contribute to an answer. This typology, based on a retrospective analysis of a given domain of productions, distinguishes between two types of creativity: normal creativity and revolutionary creativity. Creative revolutions refer to ‘game changing’ productions in the domain, creating a turning point in the development of this domain. These creative revolutions constitute major disruptions within the domain, since they display both a high degree of novelty and sufficiently high value for future creative productions to take them as a new point of reference. The proposition to distinguish between normal and revolutionary creativity is explored as a complementary view to other typologies on creativity.

Exemplars in ‘science and religion’: a theological dialogue with Thomas Kuhn

Abstract This article argues that Thomas Kuhn's landmark work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, has not been adequately explored by theologians and scholars in the field of science and religion. While many cite Kuhn to suggest that science and religion share structural similarities, I contend that his work is crucial in addressing current debates about the definitions of ‘science’ and ‘religion’ and the potential for intellectual progress between them. Kuhn's framework provides more than a justification for adhering to incommensurable worldviews; it offers a nuanced understanding of how science and religion interact and the significance of tacit knowledge in scientific practice. This article explains Kuhn's focus on exemplars in his philosophy of science, which underpin his argument for key differences between science and theological inquiry. The article concludes that Kuhn's pluralistic view of truth offers theologians an opportunity to engage more deeply with science, rather than sidestepping it entirely.

Thomas Kuhn, Stefan Amsterdamski, and the Cycles of Scientific Development

In his most seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn advances a notion that science is embedded in historically contingent constellations of practices and ideas. In this view, history is part and parcel of science. Science develops by transforming that, which it emerges from – a theme later picked up by Polish philosopher of science, Stefan Amsterdamski. Kuhn also noticed important parallels between psychological and historical development. These insights have led him to the conclusion that what scientists do and what the science does are two different things. Scientific development is discontinuous in the sense that it cannot be measured by any external standard. Science is therefore its own judge. This paper identifies critical shortcomings of Kuhn’s theory of psychological development, which most affect his vision of scientific development. Subsequently, the problem of development is recast in terms of dynamic system theory or embodied cognition. The ensuing insights are organized into a cyclical model, with two main trajectories: one creative, the other generative. It is argued that the cyclical approach permits to overcome the dualisms, which plagued Kuhn’s original account (engagement versus criticism, creativity versus rule-following, etc.) and to further develop Amsterdamski’s idea that absent universal norms or standards, criticism and rationality are nonetheless possible.

A Critical Comment on T.S. Kuhn’s Views about the So-called Copernican Revolution and Several Current Prejudices – Barriers in Scientific Communities

The article is a case study on the views of the famous T.S. Kuhn about the so-called Copernican revolution. Generally, Kuhn is presented as a very successful historian and philosopher of science: an author of world bestsellers. The division among his supporters, i.e. about so-called left-wing and right-wing Kuhnians, is recalled, and the fact that Kuhn himself vehemently dissociated from a large proportion of his adherents. It is also noted here, that in the last 30 years, in addition to abundant hagiographic literature on T. S. Kuhn, there have also been a few critical studies of Kuhn’s achievements. The rest of the article presents the author’s critical analysis of Kuhn’s views on the so-called Copernican Revolution, which formed the basis of Kuhn’s scheme of scientific development presented in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); i.e. the world’s most famous monograph in social sciences and humanities so far. The criticism encompasses a genesis, content and reception of Kuhn’s views and the development of his interpretations. The analysis is carried out by the means of methodology of historical sciences and a scientific method, which the author describes as the hypothetico-deductive method of correspondence thinking. The criticism is based on the author’s current publications (developed here further on), which were sadly unnoticed by the researchers, although presented in the world center for the Copernican research, and are available on the Internet freely. This fact leads the author to the assumption that international Kuhnian research is underdeveloped seriously and that strong prejudices – barriers may exist in scientific circles, such as, e.g., primacy of number of citations (and other bibliometric indicators) over content analysis, the Matthew effect, the effect of alleged and actual scientific centers and peripheries, some mental remnants of the Cold War, as well as underdevelopment of scientific communication.

Paradigm shift in traditional Mongolian medicine in the 18th century

As Thomas Kuhn stated in his book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", revolution is an example of advanced science made by a successful paradigm shift from one to another. At that time, Kuhn's idea was a revolution in itself, becoming the primary method for scientific change. It became a basis for science paradigm policy shift and since, has been a model for gradual reform. Identifying and incorporating this model into the countries' scientific policy and reform is extremely important. The applicability of the used model can be judged by the outcomes resulting in the paradigm shift. By the way, not every scientific progress results in revolution. However, we would like to note that a laggard period with weak mental development is ended by an intellectual outburst. In other words, although in the 17th century, Mongols accepted Tibetan medicine within the framework of the "Four Medical Tantras" with recognition and common scientific mind, later in the 18th century, they thought beyond the box of the "Four Medical Tantras" and created the opportunity to develop a new paradigm. This shift made a valuable contribution to the establishment of, in a broader sense, Mongolian medicine and, in a narrow sense, traditional Mongolian medicine.

The Relational Revolution in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy By Steven Kuchuck. Confer Books, 2021. 198 pp.

The Relational Revolution in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy By Steven Kuchuck. Confer Books, 2021. 198 pp.Robin YoungRobin YoungRobin Young, PhD, is a senior member, training analyst, and instructor at the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP); an assistant adjunct lecturer at New York University (NYU); and founder of an international Loewald reading group. Young has published research on the revised psychoanalytic theories of female development; studied the mother/infant dyad under Lousie Kaplan at NYU; made international and national psychoanalytic presentations; and undertaken private studies with Lew Aron and Jessica Benjamin. She is a member of the International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy, and has had a private practice of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy since 1980.Search for more papers by this authorPublished Online:June 2023https://doi.org/10.1521/prev.2023.110.2.229PDFPDF PLUS ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations AboutReferencesAron L. (2006). Analytic impasse and the third: Clinical implications of intersubjectivity theory. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 87, 349–368. Crossref Medline, Google ScholarBalsam R. H. (2008). The essence of Hans Loewald. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 56, 1117–1128. Crossref Medline, Google ScholarBenjamin J. (2004). Beyond doer and done to: An intersubjective view of thirdness. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 73(1), 5–46. Crossref Medline, Google ScholarFerenczi S. (1949). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 30, 225–230. Google ScholarFreud S. (1912). Recommendations to physicians practicing psycho-analysis. In Strachey J. (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 12, pp. 109–120). London: Hogarth Press, 1957–1974. Google ScholarKuhn T. (1949). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Google ScholarLoewald H. (1951). Ego and reality. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 32, 10–18. Google ScholarMaroda K. J. (2005). Legitimate gratification of the analysts’ needs. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 41, 371–388. Crossref, Google ScholarRenik O. (1999). Playing one's cards face up in analysis: An approach to the problem of self-disclosure. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 68(4), 521–539. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2167-4086.1999.tb00546.x Crossref Medline, Google Scholar Previous article Next article FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Volume 110Issue 2Jun 2023 Information© 2023 N.P.A.P.PDF download

The Normal and the Revolutionary: Kuhn’s Conversations with Rorty

ABSTRACT In this paper I examine Thomas Kuhn’s epistolary and in-person exchanges with Richard Rorty, and their significance to the former’s work on the nature of scientific development during the years 1976–1986. Accordingly, it corresponds to a significant evolution of Kuhn’s thought from the position expounded earlier in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. These letters show how Kuhn’s philosophy of science evolved towards a greater emphasis on a key aspect of his former work—the nature of ‘the essential tension’—and that his more linguistically-oriented perspective in these latter years has that emphasis as its goal—at least as a significant part.

Rethinking the ordinary and the extraordinary: Reading Rancière’s dissensual politics through Kuhn

Jacques Rancière’s theorisation of the political has been particularly influential in investigating political struggles and social movements. By distinguishing between the police order – tasked with maintaining the dominant (hierarchical) system – and politics – aiming at breaking that system – Rancière suggests reading the political as a disruptive event. However, he does not specifically engage with the question of how politics affects and changes the police order. This is what this article aims at exploring. Building upon Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, I suggest approaching the police order in the same way Kuhn approaches ‘normal science’ and reading the political in the same way Kuhn reads revolutionary science. I ultimately suggest that Rancière’s theorisation of the political is limited because he does not (sufficiently) account for the interplay between police/politics nor for the emergence of an after-politics, that is, a new (ordinary) police order that emerges out of (extraordinary) political events.

Wissenschaftliche Episteme und Geltung. Von der Konstruktion zum Dialog

Abstract. The long triumph of constructivism, particularly visible works such as Kuhn's writing on the structure of scientific revolutions, and many other scientific studies have made one thing clear: Reason alone does not decide on scientific topics, theories, and methods. Instead, very different factors, often considered illegitimate, help determine the course of science. These findings make scientific enlightenment gestures recurrently appear as sheer mockery, undermine the validity claims of scientific statements, open up possibilities for a strong politicisation of science and block any retrograde way out. Those who are nevertheless convinced of the importance of scientific autonomy, who defend a special validity of scientific knowledge and who accept the scientific duty of responsiveness, should acknowledge the decision-making challenges in science and, as the article recommends, engage in theory-theoretical dialogues.

Autonomy, Constitutivity, Exemplars, Paradigms

This paper proposes an exploration of relationships and exchanges between the philosophies of Cavell and Kuhn by the study of aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Although the notions of language games and family resemblances used by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions have been elaborated by Wittgenstein, Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein inspired that of Kuhn. I will attempt to show that against this background, Cavell’s conception of the relations of arts, works of arts, and artists, can be relevantly compared to Kuhn’s conception of the relations of sciences, scientific successes, and scientific practitioners. Three ways of elucidating the mutual exchanges between Cavell and Kuhn may be distinguished: One consists in clarifying the ways in which Cavell and Kuhn explicitly mutually inspired each other. Another one consists in clarifying that Cavell’s Wittgenstein inspired Kuhn. And a third one consists in clarifying that Wittgenstein inspired both Kuhn and Cavell and the ways in which he inspired them. This third way is not exclusive of the first two and even contributes to these by rendering explicit their stakes. For at stake is not only the restitution of the truth of an exegetical mediation: that Kuhn’s Wittgenstein cannot be truly understood without accounting for Cavell’s Wittgenstein. Rather the transitive character of the mediation implied by interpretation does not substitute for the intransitive character of a thoroughly philosophical inheritance. It is not the case that because Kuhn was inspired by Cavell who was inspired by Wittgenstein, that Kuhn could be inspired only by Cavell’s Wittgenstein, and not by Wittgenstein. Further, the question is not only philological but philosophical if we take into account the methods and the philosophy of Wittgenstein. To use an image: that a path was indicated by someone to someone else could not have implied that what was indicated by a person to another was oneself; this much was already known to us with the old fable of the moon, the finger and the sage. With this paper I will thus first seek to establish the relevance of the comparison of Cavell’s conception of the relations of arts, works of arts, and artists with Kuhn’s conception of the relations of sciences, scientific successes, and scientific practitioners. Then I will attempt to render explicit the unrestrictive limits of this comparison both to account for the mutual exchanges between Cavell and Kuhn and consider or bring out some symmetries and asymmetries concerning the place of paradigms in sciences and arts.

The Question of the New

The editors of this special issue of Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies invited contributors to write on Stanley Cavell and Thomas Kuhn. Unfortunately, this paper will end with Kuhn. The reason is simple: I found that I couldn’t begin writing anything on Cavell and the new before I had set up the literary and historical framework for the project, and before I had discussed Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work on aspect-seeing and Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). These are the parts of my work in progress that I’ll share here.

Thomas Kuhn and Science Education: Learning from the Past and the Importance of History and Philosophy of Science.

Beginning 60years ago, Thomas Kuhn has had a significant impact across the academy and on culture more widely. And he had a great impact on science education research, theorising, and pedagogy. For the majority of educators, the second edition (1970) of his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn,1970a) articulated the very nature of the science, the discipline they were teaching. More particularly, Kuhn's book directly influenced four burgeoning research fields in science education: Children's Conceptual Change, Constructivism, Science-Technology-Society studies, and Cultural Studies of Science Education. This paper looks back to the Kuhnian years in science education and to the long shadow they cast. The discipline of science education needs to learn from its past so that comparable mistakes might be averted in the future. Kuhn's influence was good and bad. Good, that he brought HPS to so many; bad, that, on key points, his account of science was flawed. This paper will document the book's two fundamental errors: namely, its Kantian-influenced ontological idealism and its claims of incommensurability between competing paradigms. Both had significant flow-on effects. Although the book had many positive features, this paper will document how most of these ideas and insights were well established in HPS literature at the time of its 1962 publication. Kuhn was not trained in philosophy, he was not part of the HPS tradition, and to the detriment of all, he did not engage with it. This matters, because before publication he could have abandoned, modified, or refined much of his 'revolutionary' text. Something that he subsequently did, but this amounted to closing the gate after the horse had bolted. In particular, the education horse had well and truly bolted. While educators were rushing to adopt Kuhn, many philosophers, historians, and sociologists were rejecting him. Kuhn did modify and 'walk back' many of the head-turning, but erroneous, claims of Structure. But his retreat went largely unnoticed in education, and so the original, deeply flawed Structure affected the four above-mentioned central research fields. The most important lesson to be learnt from science education's uncritical embrace of Kuhn and Kuhnianism is that the problems arose not from personal inadequacies; individuals are not to blame. There was a systematic, disciplinary deficiency. This needs to be addressed by raising the level of philosophical competence in the discipline, beginning with the inclusion of HPS in teacher education and graduate programmes.

Sustainable Energy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics: An Introduction to the Special Issue

At the end of the 19th century, the field of physics was considered nearly complete, encouraging triumphal statements by some of the most eminent physicists of the day, for instance, "There is nothing new to be discovered in physics now. All that remains is more and more precise measurement (William Thompson, Baron Kelvin of Largs). Only a few random clouds troubled this bright horizon, for instance, the vexing negative result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, some puzzling aspects to the photoelectric effect, and a the lack of a coherent explanation for the blackbody radiation spectrum. Nothing terribly serious, nothing that wouldn’t be mopped up eventually. In fact, the first would soon be key to Einstein’s revolutionary special theory of relativity, the second would win him the Nobel prize in physics, and the third, in the able hands of Max Planck, would crack open the door to the paradigm-shattering quantum world. Indeed, every moment is the end of physics or its beginning-–depending on one’s curiosity. Viewed through the lens of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, physics’ sudden turnabout was to be expected. Whenever experts consider a field complete, beware and be amused, for it will likely erupt in revolution. This is because the nature of knowledge itself guarantees scientific paradigms will invariably germinate the seeds of their own destructions. They must. When a paradigm is established, it is encumbent upon scientists to explore it as fully as possible, to extend its domain to the fullest possible extent.

Paradigm Shift in Finance: The Transformation of the Theory from Perfect to Imperfect Capital Markets Using the Example of Company Valuation

In the capital market and financing theory, we are currently observing major upheavals. For decades, the neoclassical paradigm has dominated in science and practice. Triggered by economic and political crises, transformations, the COVID-19 pandemic, and political instabilities, a paradigm shift is currently occurring in finance. This paradigm shift leads to models and theories that can explain imperfections in capital markets and provide decision support for managers. The aim of this article is to analyse the paradigm shift and to demonstrate it using an example of business valuation theory. We draw on the insights of the philosopher Thomas Samuel Kuhn. He vividly explains the paradigm shift in science in his major work “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”. A paradigm shift in science always encounters resistance. The reasons for this include the strong neoclassical school in finance and the dependence on research funds. Funders expect the use of established methods and the simplicity and dissemination of the models that have prevailed so far. On the other hand, the neoclassical models are unsuitable to explain the transformation processes on financial markets. This fact has been empirically proven. We show a variety of arguments that speak clearly about this paradigm shift. Their importance clearly outweighs the reasons to continue subscribing to the old paradigm. Accordingly, new theories and models have been developed to better explain the changes in the markets. With the simulation-based business valuation, an approach has been developed that considers different degrees of market imperfections. The simulation-based valuation can also depict the special case of the neoclassical paradigm, so that all market constellations can be covered.

DECIPHERING EAST-SIDE SOUTH AMERICANS INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS DYNAMICS

The impressive results of the editorial project featured in this dossier on theprehistory of the Amazon viewed from the Atlantic flank of South America outlinea scientific and ethical success story. The works presented can be seen as a vindication of Max Planck (1950) sinical views of change in science. “A new scientific truthdoes not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, butrather because its opponents eventually die and a new generation grows up that isfamiliar with it” He re-emphasized the some view in another part of the same book,asserting that “an important scientific innovation rarely makes its way by gradually winning over and converting its opponents: it rarely happens that Saul becomesPaul. What does happen is that its opponents gradually die out, and that the growinggeneration is familiarized with the ideas from the beginning: another instance of thefact that the future lies with the youth”. Thomas Kuhn (1962) “Structure of scientificRevolutions” provided a rational explanation and helped understand what happensin the mind of working researchers, scientists and scholars.