Structure Of Physical Theory Research Articles

Physics is Organized Around Transformations Connecting Contextures in a Polycontextural World

The rich body of physical theories defines the foundation of our understanding of the world. Its mathematical formulation is based on classical Aristotelian (binary) logic. In the philosophy of science the ambiguities, paradoxes, and the possibility of subjective interpretations of facts have challenged binary logic, leading, among other developments, to Gotthard Günther’s theory of polycontexturality (often also termed ’transclassical logic’). Günther’s theory explains how observers with subjective perception can become aware of their own subjectivity and provides means to describe contradicting or even paradox observations in a logically sound formalism. Here we summarize the formalism behind Günther’s theory and apply it to two well-known examples from physics where different observers operate in distinct and only locally valid logical systems. Using polycontextural logic we show how the emerging awareness of these limitations of logical systems entails the design of mathematical transformations, which then become an integral part of the theory. In our view, this approach offers a novel perspective on the structure of physical theories and, at the same time, emphasizes the relevance of the theory of polycontexturality in modern sciences.

Chiral asymmetries in near-horizon region of charged black hole and teleparallelism

The issue of encoding physical information into metric structure of physical theories has been discussed recently by the author in the case of black hole teleparallelism. In this paper, one obtains a teleparallel chiral currents from quantum anomalies and topological torsional invariants of Nieh-Yan type. The Pontryagin index is also obtained in the case of rotating Kerr spacetime metric of non-static black holes. Magnetic monopoles which appears in this approach can be eliminated by a torsion constraint. These ideas are applied to Kerr and Kerr–Newmann charged black holes.

The Duhem-Quine Thesis Reconsidered

Abstract The high point of the falsification of physical theories in a standard view of the philosophy of science is the so-called crucial experiment. This experiment is a kind of manipulated empirical test, which provides the criterion for distinguishing between two rival hypotheses, where one is an acceptable theory due to passing the test, and the other turns out to be an unacceptable theory as it does not pass the test. The crucial experiment was supposed to play a significant role because, in virtue of an empirical disconfirmation of one theory, the experiment was assumed to confirm the other as true. However, in 1906, in La théorie physique, son object et la structure (hereafter quoted in English translation as The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906/1954)), Pierre Duhem famously argued against this view and stated that crucial experiments in physics are impossible as they are necessarily ambiguous and logically incomplete. His contention rested on the claim that, “[a] physical theory is not an explanation [of true reality in itself in virtue of some broad metaphysical ramification of physics]. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as accurately as possible a set of experimental laws” (ibid., p. 19). Furthermore, different theories could be equally suitable to represent a given group of experimental laws. And, assuming holism, no hypothesis could be tested in isolation, but merely as a part of a set of an entire scientific theory. The problem which Duhem identified in 1906 was slightly overshadowed and neglected in mainstream philosophy of science until the appearance of a challenging paper by Willard Van Orman Quine published in 1951 and entitled “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Quine’s paper caused a revival of interest in Duhem’s original formulation and gave a new impulse towards the problem in the form of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis. The aim of this paper is to reconsider whether Duhem was right to argue that there are no crucial experiments in physics. In order to assess the validity of the thesis, first, this paper makes an exposition of Duhem’s arguments in their favour, and analyses the major criticisms of this position offered in the subject-literature of Adolf Grünbaum, who explicitly attacked the arguments for the thesis as inconclusive and false. Then, this paper presents possible modes of defence of the Duhem-Quine thesis and argues that the original formulation of the thesis is well qualified and plausible. Finally, this paper offers a pragmatic interpretation of the theory choice.

Constraining the state space in any physical theory with the principle of information symmetry

Symmetry shares an entwined history with the structure of physical theory. We propose a consequence of symmetry towards the axiomatic derivation of Hilbert space quantum theory. We introduce the notion of information symmetry (IS) and show that it constraints the state-space structure in any physical theory. To this end, we study the minimal error binary state discrimination problem in the framework of generalized probabilistic theories. A theory is said to satisfy IS if the probability of incorrectly identifying each of two randomly prepared states is same for both the states. It is found that this simple principle rules out several classes of theories while being perfectly compatible with quantum theory.

Duhem

Duhem used historical arguments to draw philosophical conclusions about the aim and structure of physical theory. He argued against explanatory theories and in favor of theories that provide natural classifications of the phenomena. This paper presents those arguments and, with the benefit of hindsight, uses them as a test case for the prevalent contemporary use of historical arguments to draw philosophical conclusion about science. It argues that Duhem provides us with an illuminating example of philosophy of science developing as a contingent, though natural, response to problems arising in a particular scientific context and under a particular understanding of the history of science in that context. It concludes that the history of science provides little support for interesting theses about the present or future state of science.

Empirical Evidence in the Structure of Physical Theories

The author considers the empirical component of physical theories. He studies the origin and development of the theory of physical experiment, the structure and gnoseological hypotheses of the measuring process, as well as the relativity principle concerning the measuring equipment. Examples of modern physical theories are used in order to demonstrate the influence of experimental facts on the formation and development, verification and accepting of these theories in the structure of scientific systems. The role of accidental experimental facts in this process is also the subject.

Parsing the prose of D. V. Holliday

The published works of D. V. Holliday have been praised as exemplifying the scientific method [K. G. Foote, J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 115, 2521 (2004)]. They also exemplify a direct writing style that embodies some elements of a physical theory. Paraphrasing P. Duhem in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton University, 1954), these works, by Holliday, communicate “as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible, a whole group of experimental” findings. These stylistic features are illustrated by reference to three papers published in JASA under Holliday's name, one with a coauthor, during the period 1972–1980.

New perspectives on Pierre Duhem’s The aim and structure of physical theory

New perspectives on Pierre Duhem’s The aim and structure of physical theory

Quantum geometrodynamics: whence, whither?

Quantum geometrodynamics is canonical quantum gravity with the three-metric as the configuration variable. Its central equation is the Wheeler–DeWitt equation. Here I give an overview of the status of this approach. The issues discussed include the problem of time, the relation to the covariant theory, the semiclassical approximation as well as applications to black holes and cosmology. I conclude that quantum geometrodynamics is still a viable approach and provides insights into both the conceptual and technical aspects of quantum gravity. These considerations reveal that the concepts of spacetime and time itself are not primary but secondary ideas in the structure of physical theory. These concepts are valid in the classical approximation. However, they have neither meaning nor application under circumstances when quantum-geometrodynamical effects become important. ...There is no spacetime, there is no time, there is no before, there is no after. The question what happens “next” is without meaning [1].

Toward a Political Philosophy of Science

Science is commonly conceived as a system of propositions tested and justified through rigorous methods, that seeks to achieve epistemic values such as objectivity, coherence, precision, systematization, generalization, explanatory and predictive force. Even less orthodox authors, like Thomas Kuhn who focuses not only on science as product but also as a specific kind of social practice, only takes into account epistemic values, and leaves aside moral, social and political considerations. From this point of view, science is morally and politically neutral. More recently some philosophers like Javier Echeverria (2002) and Leon Olive (2000) have pointed out the relevance of non- epistemic values to understand the development of science and technology. However, from Karl Popper to Larry Laudan, most philosophers of science consider that introducing social or political discussions in the context of justification of scientific theories represents a serious threat to the rationality of science. Those authors like Paul Feyerabend and Michel Foucault, who point out the intrinsic relationship between scientific truth and political power, are condemned as irrational postmodernists. Fortunately during the last decades the social, moral and political dimensions of science have caught the attention of philosophers, sociologists and historians of science in the scope of Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Fuller, 1993; Pickering, 1992; Mitcham, 1995; Ibarra and Lopez Cerezo, 2003). But this new and increasingly innovative discipline, although it challenges many presuppositions of standard philosophy of science (mainly logical empiricism), deals more with the interaction of science and technology in applied contexts (techno science) rather than with the intrinsic problems of justification of scientific theories. My main purpose here is to argue that it is necessary to consider moral and political questions in the core of epistemological and methodological problems of scientific theories that are typically discussed in traditional philosophy of science. Accordingly, the first part of my argument relies on two important philosophers of science from the beginning of the twentieth century: Pierre Duhem and Otto Neurath. Both criticized the widespread idea that the rationality and objectivity of science is exclusively based on a rigorous methodology, and both introduced moral, social and political considerations to clarify the nature of scientific rationality. Unfortunately these important insights of the founding fathers of the twentieth century philosophy of science have not been recovered and acknowledged by most of their philosophical heirs. After clarifying some important moral, social, and political aspects of scientific rationality, the second part of my argument uses the pragmatic view of scientific rationality to challenge the methodological and exclusively epistemic concept of rationality that originated with Plato and became the dominant view in modern philosophy through the work of Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon, and Thomas Hobbes. I also discuss the political consequences of methodological and epistemic rationality, taken together with the widespread idea that political and even ethical decisions must be based on scientific knowledge. I maintain that these two theses are not only false, but have strong authoritarian implications. Finally, the third part of my argument turns again to Neurath in order to suggest a republican way of relating science and political decisions, so as to promote social and political values, such as justice and democracy, alongside epistemic values. Empirical Underdetermination, Good Sense, and Auxiliary Motives In his book, The End and Structure of Physical Theory (1906), Pierre Duhem presented one of the most important issues of contemporary philosophy of science: the empirical Underdetermination of theories. This problem was subsequently developed by Willard Van Orman Quine and is commonly know as the Duhem-Quine thesis. …

Seven More Views on Intelligent Design

Singham replies: Scientific knowledge is the most powerful and reliable source of knowledge that we have. Naturally, we ask why that is so. The response that it provides us with true information about the world is strongly entrenched in the scientific community as an obvious truth. Predictably, then, challenging this assertion generates objections similar to those raised by Ralph Linsker and Pantazis Mouroulis.Is there anything intrinsic in the subject matter or methods of science that justifies the belief that science is progressing toward the truth? Historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science have investigated this question; they have looked at how science is practiced and how scientific communities form, operate, arrive at consensus views, and make judgments about theories. What emerges is that the case for “truth” is hard to sustain (see references 2–6 and 9 in my original article). This is not some recent postmodern idea, as Mouroulis implies. The earliest substantive critique originated in 1906 with Pierre Duhem; 1 1. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, P. Wiener, trans., Princeton U. Press, Princeton, N.J. (1954). his thesis has since withstood spirited challenges. 2 2. S. G. Harding, ed., Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis, D. Reidel, Boston (1976). The idea that advances in scientific knowledge are not inexorably leading to the truth may strike many as weakening the case for science against its critics in ID. I believe that the converse is true and that the admittedly limited view of scientific knowledge that I have advocated—as being useful, predictive, and naturalistic, but not necessarily true—completely undermines the case for the inclusion of ID in the scientific framework. But I don’t espouse this view in order to oppose ID; it is a mistake to define science just to use that definition as a weapon in ideological wars. I arrived at my views regarding the nature of science long before ID came onto the scene, because I found the research of historians and philosophers of science to be very persuasive.Those who hold the more expansive view that science is revealing the truth about nature must be prepared to defend their position with more robust examples and arguments than those usually offered. Linsker wants to restore the concept of truth by limiting the domain of applicability of theories and cites the relationship between Einsteinian and Newtonian dynamics. The weaknesses of that oft-quoted argument were highlighted a long time ago. 3 3. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, U. Chicago Press, Chicago (1970), chap. 9. The personal motivations of individual scientists are also not at issue. I have no doubt that most scientists, not just the ones Mouroulis names, see themselves as seeking some fundamental truth about the universe. But believing does not make it so. The search for truth may be a mirage, an illusion. A mirage can serve a very useful purpose by encouraging people to move forward and make real progress; the search for truth may play this role in science and may have led to some of its spectacular successes. (Incidentally, I applaud Mouroulis for decrying views that are “free of evidentiary support.” But where is the evidentiary support for his own assertions?)Moorad Alexanian puts forth another popular view: that a reality exists, apart from the physical one, “which cannot be detected purely by physical devices,” and states as examples that “human consciousness and rationality are outside the bounds of science.” This view may or may not be true, but what is the evidence for it? How would we know what is and is not part of physical reality? Neuro-scientists and other brain researchers explore the very questions that, according to Alexanian, lie beyond physical reality. Are they operating outside science?We cannot arbitrarily prescribe what science is. We can only infer its characteristics by examining how, in actual practice, its knowledge is created. The work of historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science, although not necessary for the practice of science, become important when dealing with claims such as ID.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, P. Wiener, trans., Princeton U. Press, Princeton, N.J. (1954). Google ScholarCrossref2. S. G. Harding, ed., Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis, D. Reidel, Boston (1976). Google ScholarCrossref3. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, U. Chicago Press, Chicago (1970), chap. 9. Google Scholar© 2002 American Institute of Physics.

The complete Duhemian underdetermination argument: scientific language and practice

Current discussion of scientific realism and antirealism often cites Pierre Duhem’s argument for the underdetermination of theory choice by evidence. Participants draw on an account of his underdetermination thesis that is familiar, but incomplete. The purpose of this article is to complete the familiar account. I argue that a closer look at Duhem’s The aim and structure of physical theory (1914) suggests that the rationale for his underdetermination thesis comes from his philosophy of scientific language. I explore how an understanding of physical laws as symbolic is meant to support the thesis. In the course of my argument, I point out that Duhemian underdetermination is not meta-practical but grounded in the practice of science, specifically in the scientist’s use of instruments and measurement techniques. Measurement has a significant limitation, according to Duhem: it always involves approximation and a degree of experimental error. Consequently, it cannot overcome the gap between the ordinary, concrete language of observation and the (abstract and symbolic) mathematical language of science. Moreover, Duhem argues that the use of instruments in experiment invokes whole groups of theories. I contend that, ultimately, this reliance on auxiliary assumptions—which makes possible the use of instruments—is the foundation of his thesis and that recognizing this completes the familiar account of his underdetermination argument.

Pierre Duhem, the History and Philosophy of Physics, and the Teaching of Physics

The distinguished physicist and historian and philosopher of science Pierre Duhem (1861–1916) not only taught physics, but also worked out in his Aim and Structure of Physical Theory a philosophical analysis of physics. Duhem's analysis offers important suggestions about how physics progresses and also how physics should be taught. This essay suggests what advice Duhem would give persons involved in physics teaching about how physics should be presented. In particular, it discusses Duhem's insightful critique of what he called the Newtonian method.

Is microphysics incomplete?

Bymicrophysics we mean, roughly speaking, the physics of elementary particles and their interactions. The question we ask is whether knowledge of microphysics suffices,in principle, to determine the physics and chemistry of larger assemblages of inert matter. Since there seems to be little more than expressions of opinion on this subject, we infer that the question is regarded as belonging more to metaphysics than to physics. In this paper we attempt to analyse it in such a way as to arrive atprecisely defined mathematical problems, the solution of which may allow one to give a non-metaphysical answer to the question.The paper is organized as follows. The Introduction describes how we arrived at the problem. It is followed by a section on Philosophical Considerations, in which we explain (mainly in the words of Bertrand Russell) the atomic theory of the ancient Greeks, to understand what should be kept and what should be set aside. Next comes one on The Structure of Physical Theories, in which we develop the notions ofreduced descriptions, observational windows andrelative atomism, which are our main analytical tools. They allow us to reduce the problem to mathematical ones in the next section, entitled States of Matter in Nonrelativistic Physics. They also allow us to say a bit more, which is done in the sections on Reversibility and the Arrow of Time, Remarks (in which biological systems are touched upon), and a Summing-up.

Modeling Theory and Composing Process Models

In 1914, near the beginning of World War I, philosopher Pierre Duhem expressed a profound disdain for scientists who used models as conceptual aids. In Duhem's view, models were a kind of mental crutch, needed only by those poor souls who were burdened with an English mind-a mind that was careless, unexacting, and unable to manage complex systems of abstract representation. The French mind, on the other hand, which was characterized by straitness, clarity, and method, did not require the clumsy simplifications provided by models in order to apprehend reality (68-73). Intricate formulae were its daily fare, if not its raison d'ttre. This ability of the mind to handle complex representational systems without the assistance of mechanical or graphic aids was, to Duhem's way of thinking, not only a requisite for true thought but also another clear testament to the superiority of the race over that of the English. Duhem's argument, developed in The Aim and Structure ofPhysical Theory, is interesting for a variety of reasons, not merely because it manages to combine philosophy with a rather quaint form of Frankish nationalism. It is also noteworthy for the contrast it provides to current critiques of writing process models and their underlying epistemologies. To Duhem, meaningful understanding was intimately linked to rigor, mathematical exactitude, and representational precision; since models were simplifications, their descriptions were unreliable and their utility questionable at best. In an age when positivism had not yet been supplanted as the dominant ideology guiding inquiry, Duhem criticized models for their failure to be positivistic enough. To a number of present-day composition scholars such as Patricia Bizzell, Marilyn Cooper and Michael Holzman (Talking, Reply), and William Irmscher, this view of models-in light of poststructuralist epistemology and reflexive methodological criticism-seems naive, a relic of a past age when scientific subjectivism masked itself as objectivity. In their critiques of cognitive writing process models, notably those models offered by John Hayes and Linda Flower (Identifying, Writing), Robert de Beaugrande, and Marlene Scardamalia and Carl Bereiter, these scholars suggest that the epistemological

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[Scientific enquiry] is a matter of comparing the corollaries of a whole group of hypotheses to a whole group of facts. Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory , Paris, 1906.

Duhem and history and philosophy of mathematics

The first part of this paper consists of an exposition of the views expressed by Pierre Duhem in his Aim and Structure of Physical Theory concerning the philosophy and historiography of mathematics. The second part provides a critique of these views, pointing to the conclusion that they are in need of reformulation. In the concluding third part, it is suggested that a number of the most important claims made by Duhem concerning physical theory, e.g., those relating to the ‘Newtonian method’, the limited falsifiability of theories, and the restricted role of logic, can be meaningfully applied to mathematics.

Pierre Duhem's the aim and structure of physical theory: A book against conventionalism

I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Theorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincare's account of scientific language, Le Roy's view that laws are definitions, and the conventionalist's use of simplicity as the criterion of theory choice. Duhem regarded most theory choices as decidable on empirical grounds, but made historical context the main determining factor in scientific change.

Quantum Mechanics and the Structure of Physical Theories

Quantum Mechanics and the Structure of Physical Theories

On the mathematical structure of physical theories

On the mathematical structure of physical theories