Seven More Views on Intelligent Design

Abstract

Singham replies: Scientific knowledge is the most powerful and reliable source of knowledge that we have. Naturally, we ask why that is so. The response that it provides us with true information about the world is strongly entrenched in the scientific community as an obvious truth. Predictably, then, challenging this assertion generates objections similar to those raised by Ralph Linsker and Pantazis Mouroulis.Is there anything intrinsic in the subject matter or methods of science that justifies the belief that science is progressing toward the truth? Historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science have investigated this question; they have looked at how science is practiced and how scientific communities form, operate, arrive at consensus views, and make judgments about theories. What emerges is that the case for “truth” is hard to sustain (see references 2–6 and 9 in my original article). This is not some recent postmodern idea, as Mouroulis implies. The earliest substantive critique originated in 1906 with Pierre Duhem; 1 1. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, P. Wiener, trans., Princeton U. Press, Princeton, N.J. (1954). his thesis has since withstood spirited challenges. 2 2. S. G. Harding, ed., Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis, D. Reidel, Boston (1976). The idea that advances in scientific knowledge are not inexorably leading to the truth may strike many as weakening the case for science against its critics in ID. I believe that the converse is true and that the admittedly limited view of scientific knowledge that I have advocated—as being useful, predictive, and naturalistic, but not necessarily true—completely undermines the case for the inclusion of ID in the scientific framework. But I don’t espouse this view in order to oppose ID; it is a mistake to define science just to use that definition as a weapon in ideological wars. I arrived at my views regarding the nature of science long before ID came onto the scene, because I found the research of historians and philosophers of science to be very persuasive.Those who hold the more expansive view that science is revealing the truth about nature must be prepared to defend their position with more robust examples and arguments than those usually offered. Linsker wants to restore the concept of truth by limiting the domain of applicability of theories and cites the relationship between Einsteinian and Newtonian dynamics. The weaknesses of that oft-quoted argument were highlighted a long time ago. 3 3. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, U. Chicago Press, Chicago (1970), chap. 9. The personal motivations of individual scientists are also not at issue. I have no doubt that most scientists, not just the ones Mouroulis names, see themselves as seeking some fundamental truth about the universe. But believing does not make it so. The search for truth may be a mirage, an illusion. A mirage can serve a very useful purpose by encouraging people to move forward and make real progress; the search for truth may play this role in science and may have led to some of its spectacular successes. (Incidentally, I applaud Mouroulis for decrying views that are “free of evidentiary support.” But where is the evidentiary support for his own assertions?)Moorad Alexanian puts forth another popular view: that a reality exists, apart from the physical one, “which cannot be detected purely by physical devices,” and states as examples that “human consciousness and rationality are outside the bounds of science.” This view may or may not be true, but what is the evidence for it? How would we know what is and is not part of physical reality? Neuro-scientists and other brain researchers explore the very questions that, according to Alexanian, lie beyond physical reality. Are they operating outside science?We cannot arbitrarily prescribe what science is. We can only infer its characteristics by examining how, in actual practice, its knowledge is created. The work of historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science, although not necessary for the practice of science, become important when dealing with claims such as ID.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, P. Wiener, trans., Princeton U. Press, Princeton, N.J. (1954). Google ScholarCrossref2. S. G. Harding, ed., Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis, D. Reidel, Boston (1976). Google ScholarCrossref3. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, U. Chicago Press, Chicago (1970), chap. 9. Google Scholar© 2002 American Institute of Physics.