Structure Of Empirical Knowledge Research Articles

A Graded Bayesian Coherence Notion

Coherence is a key concept in many accounts of epistemic justification within ‘traditional’ analytic epistemology. Within formal epistemology, too, there is a substantial body of research on coherence measures. However, there has been surprisingly little interaction between the two bodies of literature. The reason is that the existing formal literature on coherence measure operates with a notion of belief system that is very different from—what we argue is—a natural Bayesian formalisation of the concept of belief system from traditional epistemology. Therefore, formal epistemology has so far only been concerned with one particular—arguably not even very natural—way of formalising coherence of belief systems; it has by no means refuted the viability of coherentism. In contrast to the existing literature, we formalise belief systems as families of assignments of (conditional) degrees of belief (which may be compatible with several subjective probability measures). Within this framework, we propose a Bayesian formalisation of the thrust of BonJour’s coherence concept in The structure of empirical knowledge (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985), using a combination of Bayesian confirmation theory and basic graph theory. In excursions, we introduce graded notions for both logical and probabilistic consistency of belief systems—the latter being based on certain geometrical structures induced by probabilistic belief systems. For illustration, we reconsider BonJour’s “ravens” challenge (op. cit., p. 95f.). Finally, potential objections to our proposed formal coherence notion are explored.

Protocols, Affirmations, and Foundations: Reply to Oberdan

phy' [1996] I undertook to push out the Neurathian boat, namely, to explore how far the revisionist reading of the Vienna Circle as epistemological antifoundationalists may be extended from its natural base in the work of Otto Neurath not only to that of Rudolf Carnap, but also to that of Moritz Schlick, and to consider what Carnap' s and Neurath' s anti-foundationalism may come to in metaphilosophical terms. Oberdan only takes issue with my interpretative proposals concerning Schlick (though he also seems sceptical concerning the anti-foundationalist agenda of much recent Vienna Circle scholarship). Three questions need to be considered: first, whether the epistemologically antifoundationalist reading of Schlick I proposed is rendered untenable by Oberdan' s criticism, second, whether Oberdan' s reading of Schlick is plausible, third, why any of this matters. Oberdan' s central charge against my interpretation of Schlick' s theory of affirmations (outlined below) is that I conflate ' Schlick' s discussions of philosophical activity with his views on the structure of empirical knowledge' ([1998], p. 304), in so many words, that I confuse affirmations with ostensive definitions. Moreover, Oberdan claims that my interpretation of affirmations is based 'entirely' on a different essay of Schlick' s that dealt with metaphilosophical questions and left the structure of empirical knowledge unaddressed

Apriority and Metajustification in BonJour's Structure of Empirical Knowledge

In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,' Bonjour defends an internalist, coherentist view of empirical justification. He puts forward a new epistemological position. Internalist accounts of empirical knowledge, which require that justified beliefs be arrived at by a process of reasoning, have from the time of Descartes been primarily foundationalist. Accounts that are both internalist and coherentist tend to flounder in characterising the nature of empirical justification and in showing that coherence of belief is all that is required for justification. Bonjour devises his coherentist position so as to avoid such problems. It is, furthermore, Bonjour's contention that his own position has the least difficulties of any epistemological view, whether internalist or externalist, foundationalist or coherentist. Certainly, Bonjour is right to claim that there are serious difficulties with other epistemological approaches. Since he is offering something new, it is important to consider his position. I begin by explicating the constraints on an account of justification and knowledge which guide the formulation of Bonjour's position. It turns out that these constraints are shared by many epistemologists. This increases the interest in Bonjour's position. Then I argue that there is a serious internal difficulty with Bonjour's views which cannot be effectively addressed from within the position. Some of the constraints guiding

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.