Apriority and Metajustification in BonJour's Structure of Empirical Knowledge

Abstract

In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,' Bonjour defends an internalist, coherentist view of empirical justification. He puts forward a new epistemological position. Internalist accounts of empirical knowledge, which require that justified beliefs be arrived at by a process of reasoning, have from the time of Descartes been primarily foundationalist. Accounts that are both internalist and coherentist tend to flounder in characterising the nature of empirical justification and in showing that coherence of belief is all that is required for justification. Bonjour devises his coherentist position so as to avoid such problems. It is, furthermore, Bonjour's contention that his own position has the least difficulties of any epistemological view, whether internalist or externalist, foundationalist or coherentist. Certainly, Bonjour is right to claim that there are serious difficulties with other epistemological approaches. Since he is offering something new, it is important to consider his position. I begin by explicating the constraints on an account of justification and knowledge which guide the formulation of Bonjour's position. It turns out that these constraints are shared by many epistemologists. This increases the interest in Bonjour's position. Then I argue that there is a serious internal difficulty with Bonjour's views which cannot be effectively addressed from within the position. Some of the constraints guiding