Strong Corporate Governance Research Articles

INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION, MANAGEMENT SUPPORT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC SECTOR

Having strong corporate governance (CG) in public sectors is very imperative. An effective CG may, to some extent, prevent mismanagement of public monies. Internal audit function might be a significant contributor to achieve this. However, little attention was given on the role of internal audit function within public sector’s CG subject. As such, this paper presents a conceptual discussion on the potential effects of internal audit function attributes on the Malaysian public sector’s CG, and the potential moderating effect of management support on this relationship. Institutional and agency theories were employed to synthesise relevant literature on internal audit function, management support, and CG in public sector setting. Subsequently, a conceptual framework was developed and ten propositions were established. The originality of this paper was in its comprehensive arguments on the possible association of internal audit function attributes on CG of the Malaysian public sector. Moreover, this paper attempted to examine the role of management support in this association. Additionally, the use of the institutional and agency theories offered essential insights pertaining to internal audit function attributes and management support subjects within the context of CG of the public sector. This study is timely in that it offers insights into how the internal audit function may improve the management of public financial resources.

Corporate derivatives use and firm value: conditional role of corporate governance

PurposeThis study aims to examine the effect of corporate derivatives use on firm value and how the corporate governance index modifies this relationship.Design/methodology/approachThe sample consists of 219 nonfinancial firms on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from 2011 to 2019. The study used ordinary least square regression with year and industry dummies for estimations. Multiple estimation models such as fixed/random effect, Fama–MacBeth and two-stage least squares (2SLS) are used for robustness. Finally, the PROCESS macro tool is used to estimate the effect of moderating the role of corporate governance (CG) as robustness.FindingsThe findings show that derivatives use has an inverse influence on firm value. The firms did not use derivatives as a risk management tool but for speculation motives. However, the corporate governance index significantly weakens this relationship. However, strong governance forces the managers to use derivatives for hedging purposes. The firm-specific factors, including size, age, leverage, cash, financial distress cost, dividend and growth opportunities, also significantly influence firm value. The findings are robust to the other estimation models.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings indicate that emerging economies like Pakistan are more prone to agency problems. The strong corporate governance structure helps firms turn the speculative motive of derivatives use into hedging purposes and mitigate the agency issues.Practical implicationsThis empirical evidence suggests that good governance structures can help improve the impact of derivative usage on firm value.Originality/valueTo the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study that examines the conditional role of corporate governance on the derivatives–value relationship from the viewpoint of agency problem/speculative motive.

Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.

How does air pollution affect corporate information environment?

AbstractIn this article I examine the causal impact of air pollution on the corporate information environment. My empirical findings indicate that firms located in cities with severe air pollution tend to experience higher information asymmetry. The economic mechanisms behind this casual association come from the negative impact of air pollution on corporate governance and managerial human capital. Specifically, the positive causal association between air pollution and corporate information asymmetry is less pronounced for firms with stronger corporate governance and better managerial ability. In addition, firms exposed to more severe air pollution tend to have fewer board meetings. All main empirical findings are robust to a system generalized method of moments estimation, two‐stage least squares tests using thermal inversions as an instrumental variable, regression discontinuity tests based on the Huai River policy, and difference‐in‐difference estimations based on the 2013 Clean Air Action Plan in China. Furthermore, all main findings are confirmed by robustness tests, such as alternative proxies of air pollution and information asymmetry, and the exclusion of first‐tier cities.

Corporate Governance Codes in Pakistan: A Review

This article examines the current corporate governance laws and rules in Pakistan. Strong corporate governance is crucial for market stability and investor confidence in any nation, developed or underdeveloped. In Pakistan, a Corporate Governance Code was first established in 2002. Later updates occurred in 2012, 2017 and finally in 2019. Although corporate governance practices and concepts are well established across most of the world, Pakistan's corporate governance literature is still limited, and the current rule, as it was enacted in September 2019, hasn't received any commentary or analysis. This research aims to bridge this gap by revealing the evolution of Pakistan’s corporate governance and contributing to the continuing discussion on the effect of the fresh legislation using a comparative methodology and a documentary analysis of the changes.

The influence of Corporate Governance on Credit Rating in Pakistan

Credit rating agencies have great significance in the growth of the financial industry by giving confidence to borrowers and lenders through expressing their opinion on the ability of the institution to meet its financial obligation through credit ratings. Therefore, if the governance structure is weak, credit rating agencies are likely to expect poor financial position and vulnerability of the stakeholders' interests. The purpose of this study is to determine whether the corporate governance characteristics of Islamic banks influence Islamic banks' credit ratings. Data is calculated from the annual reports of 22 banks in Pakistan for 14 years from 2007 to 2014. The results show that the board size, board members' independence, CEO tenure, blockholders, foreign investors, Shariah board size, education levels of Shariah supervisors, and Shariah board expertise negatively affect credit rating when bank-specific financial variables are used as the control variables. On the other hand, credit rating is positively correlated with board independence, foreign directors, women directors, board meetings, listing shares, size of audit committee members, audit committee meetings, changes in the structure of the shariah supervisory board, and foreign shariah experts. As a result, Islamic banks in Pakistan show strong corporate governance, leading to better credit ratings.

Corporate Governance by South African State-Owned Entities (SOEs) – Contributing to Achieving Agenda 2063

Following centuries of institutional colonization, Africa remains in dire need of development and has failed to realize its potential to drive sustainable economic growth and prosperity. Despite the residual contribution of Africa’s colonial legacy to this malaise, it is suggested that African states should stop blaming coloniality for their failure to develop and accept responsibility for their own socioeconomic development. To arrest the downward spiral and provide the platform necessary to drive sustainable development across the African continent, the African Union launched Agenda 2063. To claim its rightful place in the global economy with a renewed focus on accountability, African states must change their development trajectory and address the economic, environmental, social, and governance interests of their legitimate stakeholders as they strive for sustainable development and their beneficiaries with added value. African states can no longer afford to remain passive participants in the process, providing raw materials for beneficiation by the Global North. The findings of this paper are based on the assertion that effectively governed state-owned entities (SOEs) represent vehicles available to states to leverage their drive for socioeconomic development in their respective countries, thereby contributing to achieving the Agenda 2063 goals. Despite relying on quantitative data to inform a corporate governance conformance matrix, purposively developed from the OECD Guidelines, World Bank Toolkit, and Agenda 2063, the study adopts an interpretative approach to thematically analyze the content of the published annual reports of South African SOEs. While the relatively high conformance scores achieved by the South African SOEs appear to suggest conformance with strong corporate governance practices. It belies the fact that several of these highly compliant SOEs are currently under investigation in relation to numerous instances of serious fraud and corruption. The incongruence of these public disclosures with the de facto situation implies that they do not represent a meaningful attempt by SOEs to discharge their governance obligations effectively. Instead, they may simply be an attempt to placate stakeholders that these SOEs were being effectively governed rather than to account to stakeholders meaningfully. The study concludes that merely imposing a regulatory, corporate governance framework will not be sufficient to ensure the effectiveness of governance in SOEs, but rather that effective processes must be established to monitor and enforce compliance with these frameworks, together with effective consequence management for non-compliance.

IFRS adoption and real earnings management in Bangladesh: The role of board characteristics

The adoption of the international financial reporting standard (IFRS) has become an important research topic and received considerable attention from many empirical researchers worldwide. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it’s one of the very few efforts to examine the relationship between IFRS adoption and real earnings management (REM) with the moderating role of board characteristics (board size, independence, expertise, CEO duality, and gender diversity). The study employs 94 firms listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) for six years, i.e., 564 firm year’s observations, over two time periods as pre (2004–06) and post (2013/14-15/16) adoption of IFRS. The underpinning theory of the study is agency theory, which explains the relationship among variables. To perform regression analysis on balanced panel data, STATA was used with PCSE estimators. The results show that IFRS has a significant negative relationship with REM. Board expertise and gender diversity have a significant negative relationship with REM, whereas CEO duality has a significant positive association with REM. Moreover, it is documented that board size and CEO duality have a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between IFRS and REM. In contrast, board expertise, board independence, and gender diversity have significant positive moderation. It implies that a strong corporate governance mechanism may help to attain the objectives of IFRS adoption in Bangladesh. Thus, the findings of this study may persuade regulatory authorities in Bangladesh to make corporate governance compliance mandatory with punitive action, which would also act as a guideline for developing countries.

Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent

Abstract This paper studies how the nature of managerial skills affects firms’ governance decisions. As required skills shift from firm specific toward more general abilities, replacing an underperforming CEO with an outside hire becomes more profitable for shareholders. Therefore, firms adopt stronger governance arrangements to limit the entrenchment of incumbent CEOs and exploit the improved opportunities offered by the market for talent. The analysis rationalizes the observed trend toward stronger corporate governance and offers novel empirical predictions concerning the relationship between managerial entrenchment, firm size, and the nature of managerial skills. (JEL D83, D86, G34) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Corporate governance and financial distress: An endogenous switching regression model approach in vietnam

This study aims to determine the impact of Corporate Governance on the relationship between the macro and micro factors causing financial distress in 240 Vietnamese listed non-financial firms. The study also investigates the marginal benefits of different corporate governance practices by applying an endogenous switching regression model (ESRM). The research clarifies that a firm with strong corporate governance practice has a low probability of financial distress compared to a weak corporate governance firm. Moreover, the risk of financial distress is significantly reduced when improving the corporate governance practice. This paper contributes empirical evidence on the predominant benefit of strong corporate governance practices and marginal benefit in risk mitigation in enhancing corporate governance. The article suggests that Vietnamese firms should implement strong corporate governance to overcome the risk of financial distress.

An empirical evaluation of the impact of agency conflicts on the association between corporate governance and firm financial performance

PurposeThe study aims to predict and understand the conditions under which the association between corporate governance and a company's financial performance is positive or meaningful by empirically accounting for agency conflicts. This study is motivated by the fact that the separation between ownership and control creates agency conflicts between company owners and managers. Therefore, strong corporate governance systems are expected to align the interests of conflicting parties whereby companies become more likely to improve their financial performance. However, previous research did not yield consistent results in this regard.Design/methodology/approachGiven the latent nature of corporate governance and agency conflicts, this study uses principal component and exploratory factor analyses to proxy for corporate governance and agency conflicts, respectively. Using dynamic panel data modelling, the authors estimate the change in the relationship between corporate governance and a company's financial performance as a function of the change in the level of agency conflict using data from the UK on 78 non-financial companies listed in the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE100) index between 1999 and 2014.FindingsThe corporate governance quality of companies is significantly differed. Moreover, companies operating at high levels of agency conflict outperform the companies' counterparts operating in low levels of agency conflict only when the former improves the corporate governance quality. This implies that financial performance improves by approximately 11% if companies improve corporate governance quality due to an increase in the level of agency conflicts.Research limitations/implicationsLack of data on ownership structure for the study period (1999–2014) was the main reason the authors excluded it from the analysis. Additionally, the lack of reliable and quantifiable corporate governance data on small-medium sized enterprises limits findings on large non-financial companies.Practical implicationsThe authors propose a framework/tool for the impact of the level of corporate governance compliance on financial performance conditional upon the level of agency conflicts whose importance has largely been neglected by the empirical literature. By providing the right “lens” to de-fragmentise the corporate governance mechanisms and estimate empirically the unobserved agency conflicts, researchers, practitioners and investors are able to get further insights on the composing elements of financial performance and evaluate it more objectively. Managers can allocate companies' resources more efficiently and thus improve financial performance. The auditors can get further background information when they compile their report on company's directors. The study's findings offer valuable suggestions for accounting and corporate governance regulators to further put forward and improve accounting standards so as to enhance existing regulations and internal mechanisms which, in turn, could decrease the scope for managerial opportunistic behaviour as the latter can be empirically estimated through our framework.Social implicationsThe findings point out the need for a revised framework accounting for the principal-agent (mis)alignment and the engrained information asymmetries. By acknowledging the level of corporate governance compliance and agency conflict, managers and shareholders should actively strive for the effectiveness of companies, the efficiency of the stock markets and the minimisation of the agency costs. Furthermore, policymakers can look into the development of a code of corporate governance to effectively regulate firms rather than enforcing rigid laws that may not be value relevant. With all these settings in place, the likelihood of corporate failures, corporate scandals as well as corporate violations with the ensuing penalties is set to be reduced. Hence, valuable resources, social capital and effort can be directed into more productive activities.Originality/valueThis study adds to the existing literature by offering empirical and explicit evidence on the dynamic association between corporate governance, agency conflicts and financial performance against a backdrop of high demand for strong corporate governance practices/codes. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no study that has yet empirically examined the moderating effect of the level of agency conflicts, given the level of corporate governance compliance on financial performance for listed and internationally aligned companies.

Corporate Governance Mechanism – Financial Performance Nexus : Empirical Evidence from Indian Banks

This study empirically analyzed the corporate governance mechanism – financial performance nexus of banks in India. The analysis was based on balanced panel data over the period from 2010 – 11 to 2020 – 21 for 10 public and private sector banks, using a hierarchical multiple regression approach. The study investigated the three aspects of financial performance, namely return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q ratio. Based on previous studies, a conceptual model was developed by taking the financial performance of banks as a dependent variable, corporate governance attributes as independent variables, and age, size, growth, and financial leverage as control variables. Content analysis was applied to derive the Corporate Governance Index. The findings for accounting-based measures revealed that board attendance had a positive and significant impact on ROA and ROE of banks, while board expertise and CEO duality had a negative and significant impact on ROA and ROE. Moreover, board gender diversity had a positive and significant impact on ROE, and board committees had a negative and significant impact on ROE. A study for market-based measures found that board meetings had a positive and significant impact on TQR, whilst board committees and board expertise had a negative and significant impact on TQR. The study’s outcomes implied that banks, government, regulators, and policymakers should ensure and promote strong corporate governance mechanisms to compete in the global financial market.

Corporate social responsibility and future bankruptcy

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the cross-sectional differences on the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and future bankruptcy along the dimensions of political connection and corporate governance strength. This study intends to provide evidence on the tangible benefits for firms to invest in social capital of CSR activities and offer insights on what firms may benefit more from CSR expenditure.Design/methodology/approachRunning a logistic regression on the determinants of bankruptcy model after controlling for financial stress factors based on prior literature, this study examines the moderating effect of political connection and corporate governance on the association between corporate social responsibility and future bankruptcy.FindingsCurrent study documents that the negative association between corporate social responsibility and future bankruptcy is only significant for politically connected firms, but insignificant for non-politically connected firms. Specifically, the authors find that one standard deviation increase of CSR expenditure significantly reduces the propensity of future bankruptcy by 53.20% for politically-connected firms. Conversely, the negative relation between CSR only exits for firms with weak corporate governance but do not exit for firms with strong corporate governance.Research limitations/implicationsCurrent study provides evidence on the tangible benefits for firms to invest in social capital of CSR activities and offers additional insights on what firms may benefit more from CSR expenditure.Originality/valueCurrent study extends the research to examine the cross-sectional variations in the negative association between CSR performance and the propensity of bankruptcy. The positive moderating effect of political connection on CSR and bankruptcy suggests that political connection and CSR are complements in reducing the propensity of future bankruptcy. A more pronounced negative association between CSR and bankruptcy for firms with weaker governance suggests that firms with weak corporate governance benefits more in engaging CSR activities than firms with strong corporate governance.

Foreign investment horizons, corporate governance and payout policy

This paper examines whether long-term foreign investors may force firms to use a costly dividend to mitigate inefficient managerial behavior. The authors also hypothesize that the relation between foreign investment horizons and payout policy depends upon the extent of the corporate governance. The authors find that firms held by long-term foreign investors make dividend more often in the subsequent years. The authors also find that foreign investors with long-term investments do not cause firms to pay dividends when firms have strong corporate governance. It suggests that long-term foreign investors serve as a substitute for strong corporate governance with respect to controlling agency conflicts.

Foreign institutional ownership and corporate risk‐taking: International evidence

AbstractResearch Question/IssueThis study aims to investigate the role of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) on corporate risk‐taking in an international context. We conjecture that FIIs play a role in encouraging firms to take risks and can substitute country‐level corporate governance in determining corporate risk‐taking.Research Findings/InsightsEmploying a large sample of 17,698 firms across 42 economies, we show that foreign institutional ownership positively influences corporate risk‐taking. This positive relation is achieved through the monitoring channel and the insurance channel. Furthermore, we show that FIIs substitute country‐level corporate governance in determining corporate risk‐taking, indicating that FIIs play a significant role in promoting risk‐taking in economies with weaker governance. In addition, debtholders view FIIs' risk‐promoting role negatively and use more restrictive covenants to protect themselves.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study provides empirical support for the role of FIIs on corporate investment decisions, thus complementing the existing literature. In addition, our paper documents that country‐level corporate governance and FIIs are substitutes in determining corporate risk‐taking, thus shedding additional light not only on the role of country‐level corporate governance but also on its controversial joint role with FIIs.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsFIIs from economies with stronger corporate governance are particularly effective at promoting corporate risk‐taking in economies with weaker corporate governance, providing a new channel through which foreign investments can influence economic growth in developing economies. Therefore, policymakers should carefully consider and trade off the costs and benefits of foreign investment when proposing relevant policies.

CEO facial trustworthiness and corporate governance

PurposeIn this paper the authors aim to argue that the existence of a strong corporate governance mechanism (a formal credibility-enhancing mechanism) and the presence of a more trustworthy-looking CEO (an informal credibility-enhancing mechanism) are substitutes.Design/methodology/approachBy using machine-learning-based facial-feature-point detection technique, the authors construct a proprietary facial-trustworthiness database for a large-scale of CEOs in the US listed companies. First, the authors manually search for qualifying CEO image from websites and annual reports. Second, by following the neuroscience and psychology literature, the authors use the machine-learning-based face detector to identify the facial features in the CEO photos to calculate a rich and reliable set of facial-trustworthiness measures. The authors then construct a composite facial-trustworthiness index for each CEO. After obtaining accounting data, the authors’ final sample comprises 16,201 firm-year observations for 3,186 CEOs in the sample period of 2000-2018.FindingsThe results of the authors’ regression analyses show a negative association between board monitoring intensity and CEOs' facial trustworthiness, indicating that board directors may factor CEOs' facial trustworthiness into their monitoring decisions. Moreover, the authors find that these results are mainly driven by CEOs whose tenure is below the third quartile (i.e. eight years). The authors further find stronger results for externally hired CEOs than internally promoted CEOs. Finally, the authors’ results remain robust when using change models or subsample of CEO photos in recent years.Originality/valueFirst, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that adopts a large sample to provide systematic evidence on the directors' use of facial trustworthiness. This study extends the literature by documenting the impacts of CEOs' individual characteristics on the board monitoring intensity. Second, the results of this study emphasized the important role of perceptions based on executives' facial appearance in firm valuation, executive compensation and audit fee, and by presenting empirical evidence that CEOs' facial trustworthiness affects board monitoring intensity. Third, this study responds to the call for research on personalized trust by Hsiehet al.(2020).

How do local banks respond to natural disasters?

The increasing frequency and intensity of catastrophic natural disasters have the potential to stress and imperil banks to the point of compromised viability or even bankruptcy. Using data of approximately 907 domestic/local banks and Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States during the period 2010–2019, we explore how natural disasters impact bank stability. Our main findings support the aforementioned hypothesis that natural disasters decrease bank stability because total deposit and equity (capital) become more volatile and the bank is prone to increased lending margins, as well as a provision of loan loss. Thus, banks lose their competitiveness, ROA deteriorates, and Z-score becomes lower. Strong corporate governance and healthy financial strategy, nevertheless, assist bank recovery in the aftermath of these weather extreme events. Last but not least, we find a non-linear relationship between natural disasters and bank stability and posit the role of indemnity paid out from the Federal insurance programme (after natural hazards) in the high-damage group.

Board of directors and target price performance: evidence from Tunisia

PurposeThis article examines the link between the structure of the board of directors and target price accuracy using a sample of 51 listed firms on the Tunisian Stock Exchange over the period of 2011–2017.Design/methodology/approachIn this study, the authors used the generalised method of moments (GMM) model to control the endogeneity problem.FindingsAs a result, that model can serve as a signal in the forecasting process. The authors' results suggest that target price accuracy is negatively related to board independence, and dual Chief Executive officer (CEO). In addition, CEO compensation tends to exert a negative impact on target price error.Practical implicationsThe authors' findings are valuable for common investors because the findings can be useful in enhancing their capital allocation decisions by assigning higher weights to forecasts issued by firms with strong corporate governance systems. The authors' study also has practical implications for managers and policymakers. Specifically, the evidence provided herein suggests that firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms enhance the accuracy of market expectations, alleviate information asymmetry, and limit market surprises, especially in a context characterised by weak investor protection. The authors' results highlight the advantages of strong corporate governance in improving a firm's information environment and, therefore, are useful for the cost–benefit analysis of improving internal governance mechanisms. Additionally, the authors' results may prove useful to investors who can rely on the information provided by analysts for well-governed companies.Social implicationsThe authors' study contributes to the literature in both corporate governance and analysts' forecasts fields. The study provides additional evidence of the benefit of board quality attributes on target price accuracy in an emerging market characterised by high information asymmetry and weak investor protection. The authors' findings exhibit the effectiveness of board attributes in producing better financial information quality in Tunisia. This is useful for investors who may improve their capital allocation decisions by assigning greater weights to target price forecasts of companies with good governance quality, suggesting that good corporate governance is a credible signal of better financial information quality. These results have important implications for capital market regulators and corporate management in encouraging the implementation of good governance practices.Originality/valueThe authors attempted to assess whether corporate governance of listed firms are priced in the Tunisian context characterised by weak governance control and to highlight which mechanism is highly considered by independent financial analysts to build their forecasts.

The interplay of corporate tax planning and corporate governance on firm value: Evidence from listed NGX consumer goods firms

The study investigates the interactive impact of tax planning and CG on firm value of the listed Nigerian consumer goods firms by examining whether this relationship is further strengthened or weakened in the presence of strong corporate governance. From the population of the entire 21 consumer goods firms of the Nigerian Exchange (NGX), 19 firms with complete data were selected as a sample. Data were collected from the annual reports of these firms and both descriptive and inferential analyses were employed to estimate the relationship between the variables. Tax planning was measured using the effective tax rate and book-tax difference, firm value using Tobin’s q, while corporate governance was measured using board independence. The fixed effect panel regression was used to estimate the relationship. The study revealed a positive relationship between tax planning (for both proxies) and firm value although the relationship is statistically insignificant (p = 0.0981 and 0.387). Also, there is limited evidence to support the assertion that the interactive effect of tax planning and firm value is significantly moderated by corporate governance (p = 0.818). The combined implication is that evidence on the moderating effect of corporate governance on tax planning and firm value is limited and should be interpreted with caution suggesting that more empirical research should be carried out in this area. In addition, shareholders should demand more disclosure of tax-related matters as this will help prevent information asymmetry, improve monitoring, and increase the value effectiveness of tax planning.

The corporate governance consequences of small shareholdings: Evidence from sovereign wealth fund cross‐border investments

AbstractResearch Question/IssueExisting research on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) has largely explored how they affect target firm value, overlooking the role they play in corporate governance. This paper examines the impact of SWFs' cross‐border equity acquisitions on targets' corporate governance and the role the institutional environment of SWF countries plays in shaping this impact.Research Findings/InsightsWe use a difference‐in‐differences approach and find that, on average, SWF investments are negatively related to target firms' corporate governance. This impact holds for small SWF cross‐border equity investments only and is stronger for firms that are weakly governed and for those located in jurisdictions with weak shareholder protection. The negative relation is more pronounced when SWFs' home countries have lower‐quality investor protection, corruption control, governmental effectiveness, and law enforcement than their host countries. We find further that SWF investments are positively associated with target firms' earnings management and negatively associated with investment efficiency. Finally, target firm value is found to decrease after SWF investments.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThe evidence that SWFs' small equity investments are detrimental to target firms' corporate governance is broadly consistent with the view that SWFs are passive investors. Managers can exploit this passivity, as evidenced by higher earnings management, reduced investment efficiency, and lower firm value.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study has important policy implications for investors, SWF managers, and policymakers. The passive role of SWFs in corporate governance should prompt minority shareholders to look for alternative monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, SWF managers may realize the need to target firms with strong corporate governance at the outset to compensate for the post‐acquisition decline. Host country policymakers may need to condition SWF investments on commitments to improve the corporate governance of investee firms, which would be akin to the performance requirements imposed on inward foreign direct investment (FDI). This is particularly relevant for SWFs from countries with weak institutions that are targeting countries with strong institutions.