Strong Moral Reasons Research Articles

The Deadly Serious Causes of Legitimate Rebellion: Between the Wrongs of Terrorism and the Crimes of War

This article challenges the tendency exhibited in arguments by Michael Ignatieff, Jeremy Waldron, and others to treat the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) as the only valid moral frame of reference for guiding (and judging) armed rebels with just cause. To succeed, normative language and principles must reflect not only the wrongs of ‘terrorism’ and war crimes, but also the rights of legitimate rebels. However, these do not always correspond to the legal privileges of combatants. Rebels are often unlikely to gain belligerent recognition and might sometimes have strong moral reasons to exceed the rights of regular combatants. Where this gives rise to tensions between morality and the LOAC, a decision is needed to determine which to follow. Setting aside the idea of (a) suppressing just war theory altogether in favour of a more purely regulatory approach to war and (b) reforming law in the direct light of moral theory, I question the attempt by Waldron (among others) (c) to argue that moral weight of the legal conventions at the heart of the LOAC trump any moral reasons there might be for breaching them. Even if non-combatant immunity is, as Waldron suggests, a deadly serious convention, I argue that war is justified only if pursued for the sake of deadly serious causes which may even be serious enough to oblige agents to break the law. A political theory of the ethics of war is needed (d) to mediate between the moral and legal in such cases where they cannot be reconciled directly.

A moral basis for prohibiting performance enhancing drug use in competitive sport

A strong moral reason for prohibiting doping in sport is to be found in the bad choices that would be faced by clean athletes in a sporting world that tolerated doping. The case against doping is not, however, to be grounded in the concept of coercion. Instead, it is grounded in a general duty of sport to afford fair opportunity to the goods that are distinctively within sport's sphere of control. The moral reason to prohibit doping need not be balanced against any autonomy claim of athletes who would prefer to dope because, upon closer examination, such claims have no force. The moral reason to prohibit doping does, however, need to be balanced against the enforcement costs imposed on all athletes by effective prohibition.

D’Holbach on self-esteem and the moral economy of oppression

ABSTRACTRecently, the idea that our desire for the esteem of others could function as a regulative principle of social life has been criticized because the economy of esteem could reinforce oppressive structures due to expressions of mutual esteem within oppressing groups with deviant group norms. This article discusses this problem from a historical point of view, focusing on the moral and political writings of the eighteenth-century French materialist Paul Thiry d’Holbach. D’Holbach’s thoughts are relevant in two respects: (1) For situations of extreme power and wealth differences within oppressing groups, he shows that the economy of esteem does not work in favour of the members of these groups. This is so because the conditions of esteem and self-esteem of the members with lower hierarchical standing tend to be precarious, while the members with higher standing cannot use the flatteries of their inferiors as credible sources of esteem. (2) D’Holbach concedes that self-esteem could be stabilized by refraining from self-reflection but argues that such a strategy comes at the price of an impaired capacity for protecting one’s natural needs. The upshot of his considerations is that our interest in esteem and self-esteem provides strong pragmatic and moral reasons for opposing oppression.

In Defense of Artificial Replacement.

If it is within our power to provide a significantly better world for future generations at a comparatively small cost to ourselves, we have a strong moral reason to do so. One way of providing a significantly better world may involve replacing our species with something better. It is plausible that in the not-too-distant future, we will be able to create artificially intelligent creatures with whatever physical and psychological traits we choose. Granted this assumption, it is argued that we should engineer our extinction so that our planet's resources can be devoted to making artificial creatures with better lives.

The Moral Insignificance of Self-consciousness.

In this paper, I examine the claim that self‐consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self‐conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best‐known arguments relevant to self‐consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions about self‐consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. I then consider the direct route to self‐consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self‐consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. I argue what intrinsic or final value self‐consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing.

A portable defense of the Procreation Asymmetry

AbstractThe Procreation Asymmetry holds that we have strong moral reasons not to create miserable people for their own sakes, but no moral reasons to create happy people for their own sakes. To defend this conjunction against an argument that it leads to inconsistency, I show how recognizing ‘creation’ as a temporally extended process allows us to revise the conjuncts in a way that preserves their intuitive force. This defense of the Procreation Asymmetry is preferable to others because it does not require us to take on controversial metaphysical or metaethical commitments – in other words, it has the theoretical virtue of portability.

Rethinking the Asymmetry

According to the Asymmetry, we’ve strong moral reason to prevent miserable lives from coming into existence, but no moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. This procreative asymmetry is often thought to be part of commonsense morality, however theoretically puzzling it might prove to be. I argue that this is a mistake. The Asymmetry is merely prima facie intuitive, and loses its appeal on further reflection. Mature commonsense morality recognizes no fundamental procreative asymmetry. It may recognize some superficially similar theses, but we will see that they derive from more familiar principles, and are compatible with there being moral reason to bring happy lives into existence.

Human rights in youth sport

Paulo David has written this book from the viewpoint of someone who was once a member of the Swiss under 21 hockey team, later a sports journalist and now the Secretary of the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Based mainly on old research, facts and information David sets out his argument for looking at youth participation in sport from the new angle of rights as laid down in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).The focus of David’s book ‘is limited to the respect of rights and it therefore emphasises violation of those rights: consequently it reflects only one aspect of a wider, more positive context’ (p.5). However, while David may have strong moral and ethical reasons for sports individuals and organisations to follow the principles laid out in the CRC, his argument for the CRC to be legally binding on them appears to be flawed.

Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered

Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any coherent moral framework. I propose an impersonal population axiology to underpin the asymmetries, which sidesteps the problematic issue of whether or not people can be harmed or benefited by creation or non-creation. This axiology yields perfect asymmetry from a deliberative perspective, in terms of expected value. The axiology also yields substantial asymmetry for large and realistic populations in terms of their actual value, beyond deliberative relevance.

Time, Value, and Collective Immortality

Samuel Scheffler has recently defended what he calls the ‘afterlife conjecture’, the claim that many of our evaluative attitudes and practices rest on the assumption that human beings will continue to exist after we die. Scheffler contends that our endorsement of this claim reveals that our evaluative orientation has four features: non-experientialism, non-consequentialism, ‘conservatism,’ and future orientation. Here I argue that the connection between the afterlife conjecture and these four features is not as tight as Scheffler seems to suppose. In fact, those with an evaluative orientation that rejects these four features have equally strong moral reasons to endorse the existence of the collective afterlife.

Ética para matador. Savater, los toros y la ética.

En este artículo analizo los principales argumentos del libro Tauroética de Fernando Savater. Él afirma que existen argumentos morales a favor de las corridas de toros, por lo que ser taurino es una opción ética legítima. Aquí sostengo que está en un error y que los argumentos morales no tienen la fuerza que él les adjudica; puede haber razones económicas, políticas o de otro tipo a favor de las corridas, pero no hay razones morales. Afirmo, en cambio, que sí hay razones morales fuertes en contra de las corridas que se basan en que los toros son objeto de consideración moral, es decir, tienen un estatus moral independiente de nuestros intereses. A partir de esta premisa examino y objeto, bajo una perspectiva ética, otros argumentos de Savater.

A Critical Review on Civic Friendship andthe Liberal Theory of Justice : AnExploration of Self Identity and the Basis of Fair Share

Within modern liberal political philosophy, discussions on justice have been centered upon an individualism-based distributive justice and the ‘fair share’ due to each person. According to the liberal theory of justice, the individual is an entity of rational reason and moral autonomy and considers the interests of others and of the community from a viewpoint that is focused on one`s own interests. As practical principles of justice, the principle of desert has attempted to separate the individual`s natural and inherent abilities (merit) from the individual`s intentional efforts (desert); while the principle of needs has transmuted into a set of minimum exclusivity rights to protect the individual`s autonomy from serious harm and injury. Procedural justice theorists such as Rawls have attempted to invalidate the merit of the individual in an attempt to establish the identity of individuals whom are independent of the community, in the effort to promote their ideas on how to mitigate the social inequality that results from natural arbitrariness. The requirement to finalize this logical process is a strong moral reason equipped individual with the capacity of rational action. However, paradoxically, the logic of excessive reason has created an individual who is exclusive-rights-empowered but becomes ‘isolated and selfish’. The issues resulting from this situation are, first, the rational individual who is equipped with moral autonomy now becomes hidden behind a system-guaranteed set of exclusive rights; and second, the individual who should have been a rational actor and actively participating in cooperation and reciprocal relationships, does not find it easy to overcome the temptations of becoming a strategically located but passive and selfish actor within the mass market order. The result is that individuals easily relinquish their moral autonomy and exhibit a tendency to focus on personal gain. This has resulted in an increase in the polarization of society, and an increase of conflict between classes; and has engendered a crisis in the common good of the family and the political community. The true ‘good life’ and the ‘well-ordered community’ cannot be obtained by individuals who are only interested in their ‘share’, but requires ‘good citizens’ who are concerned about the happiness of others and of the society. When we are able to understand that the rational and selfish individual is necessarily non-self-sufficient; and acknowledge that there is a need for mutual philia with others, we will then be able to overcome rational reason and embrace civic friendship. The good citizen of a healthy community that is based on civic friendship, is an individual who has assimilated the virtue of justice, and will be able to aid in overcoming the limitations of modern liberalism, assist in the resolution of the pressing societal and individualistic crises and contribute to the establishment of a ‘well-ordered community’.

Technology and our epistemic situation: what ought our priorities to be?

PurposeThis paper seeks to argue that there are two distinct problems of ignorance: a problem of size and a problem of type. Both are more pressing today than ever before, given the extraordinary expansion of collective human knowledge, and both pertain to epistemic limitations intrinsic to evolved cognitive systems. After delineating these problems in detail, one possible way of overcoming “relative” and “absolute” ignorance about the universe – enhancement technologies – is to be examined. The paper then aims to argue that, given one's epistemic situation, resources currently being spent on normal research would be far better spent on developing cognition‐enhancing technologies – technologies that promise to help solve the size and type problems previously sketched.Design/methodology/approachThe paper identifies two important limitations on human knowledge, one deriving from the size or complexity of certain problems and the other from one's inability to access specific concepts necessary to understand them. It suggests that cognitive enhancements offer the best chance at overcoming these two limitations.FindingsThere are both strong practical and moral reasons for diverting more resources into the development of cognitive enhancement technologies.Originality/valueNo author has yet elaborated on the distinction, which is taken to be important, between the problems of “size” and “type.” Furthermore, no author has yet explored how cognitive enhancements may address the problem that Colin McGinn calls “cognitive closure” (the problem of type). Thus, cognitive enhancements may offer the only possibility of solving conundrums like conscious experience and free will.

The Permissibility of Aiding and Abetting Unjust Wars

Common sense suggests that if a war is unjust, then there is a strong moral reason not to contribute to it. I argue that this presumption is mistaken. It can be permissible to contribute to an unjust war because, in general, whether it is permissible to perform an act often depends on the alternatives available to the actor. The relevant alternatives available to a government waging a war differ systematically from the relevant alternatives available to individuals in a position to contribute to the war. Hence the conditions determining whether it is permissible for a government to wage a war often differ from the conditions determining whether it is permissible for others to promote that war. This difference is manifest most often in unjust wars with putatively humanitarian aims—an increasingly common type of war.

Happiness, morality, and politics

The idea that politics should promote the happiness of the population is rather common in the community of happiness researchers. This political view is sometimes based on the happiness principle, the fundamental ethical view that we have a strong moral reason to do what we can to maximize the happiness and minimize the suffering in the world. The first main purpose of this paper is to investigate (1) what role this principle play in ethics as a whole, how it should be weighed against other moral considerations, and (2) how exactly it should be understood, i.e. which possible version of the principle that is most plausible. This is the only way to arrive at well-founded theory of the fundamental moral (and political) significance of happiness and suffering (an “ethics of happiness and suffering”). The idea that politics should promote happiness is sometimes accompanied by the notion that we should introduce some kind of happiness index, and that it is a central goal of politics to maximize the value of this index. The second main purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion. I will first ask (3) how such an index should be constructed, assuming that it might be a good idea to construct an index in the first place. I assume that an index of this kind cannot be plausible unless it incorporates a number of moral considerations, and that (3) is very closely related to (2). I will then ask (4) whether the suggestion is plausible, or whether there are better ways to put a politics of happiness into practice, e.g. to simply apply the knowledge we have about the determinants of happiness.

Donation by default? Examining feminist reservations about opt-out organ procurement

There is reason to believe that procuring organs from recently dead people who did not explicitly refuse to provide them—here referred to as “opt-out” arrangements—would ease growing shortages, thus extending the lives of many who otherwise would die soon. There is also a simple, apparently powerful argument—the “easy rescue requirement”—for believing that many people have strong moral reason to provide such life-extending support to others, thus bolstering the case for implementing optout systems. Here I consider two broad types of feminist reservations about opt-out arrangements, one concerning the motivating argument, the other concerning ways in which opt-out practices might disproportionately burden women. I conclude that both reservations can be answered sufficiently so as to encourage further feminist reflection on opt-out proposals and easy rescue arguments.

Disability, Work and Motivation

A common assumption in welfare reform debates is that a more generous benefit payment rate provides a disincentive for the unemployed to seek paid employment. In the Australian and international context this assumption has recently been applied to certain types of people with a disability. We argue in this paper that not only is the empirical evidence unconvincing, there are also strong moral reasons why the assumption and the policies based on it are misguided (Berkel and Moller 2002; Larsen 2005). We argue that, in fact, the reverse is more likely to be true; increasing benefits is likely to be a better way of helping people find a job and will avoid some of morally dubious outcomes associated with lowering payments. The article is in two parts. In section one, we describe some of the arrangements that are currently in place in Australia and overseas. We consider evidence from Australia and overseas on income support policies for people with a disability and qualitative accounts of barriers to employment for people with a disability. The international context challenges the idea that lowering income support payments increases the likelihood that people will secure paid work. In the second part we argue that not only is there little empirical evidence to support the policy of cutting benefits, it is morally dubious as well. What we call the ‘motivation model’ of welfare policy does not accurately reflect the situation of people with a disability who are unemployed. The motivation model focuses on one cause of disadvantage in particular – individual motivation – and then applies penalties where motivation is lacking, often with disastrous results. More fundamentally, we also claim that welfare policy, especially for the disabled, should not be guided by considerations of assigning blame and praise, especially where doing so may reduce benefits to groups who are already significantly disadvantaged.

Limits on Patient Responsibility

The medical profession and medical ethics currently place a greater emphasis on physician responsibility than patient responsibility. This imbalance is not due to accident or a mistake but, rather is motivated by strong moral reasons. As we debate the nature and extent of patient responsibility it is important to keep in mind the reasons for giving a relatively minimal role to patient responsibility in medical ethics. It is argued that the medical profession ought to be characterized by two moral asymmetries: (1) Even if some degree of responsible behavior from patients is called for, placing the dominant emphasis on professional responsibility over patient responsibility is largely correct. The value of protecting the right to refuse treatment and arguments against paternalism block a more expansive account of patient responsibility and support a strong notion of professional responsibility. (2) Insofar as we do want to encourage an increase in patient responsibility, we have good reasons to emphasize prospective rather than retrospective notions of responsibility in clinical practice. Concerns about patient vulnerability along with the determined factors in disease leave little room for blame at the bedside. These two asymmetries generate normative limits on any positive account of patient responsibility.

What's Wrong with Torture?

Why is torture morally wrong? This question has been neglected or avoided by recent moral philosophy, in part because torture is by its nature especially difficult to discuss. Torture involves degrees of pain and fear that are often said to be utterly indescribable; indeed, these experiences are sometimes said to destroy in their victims the very hope of any sort of communication or shared experience whatsoever. Torture has proved surprisingly difficult to define. There is no clear agreement on the distinction between torture, coercion, and manipulation, or whether such techniques as sleep and sensory deprivation, isolation, or prolonged questioning should count as forms of torture. In addition, we may be fearful of deriving some sort of perverse titillation from the subject, or of being able to dispassionately contemplate the agonies of real victims of torture. Those who have not suffered torture may well feel What’s Wrong with Torture? DAVID SUSSMAN

The ethics of resigning

Resigning from office is a critical ethical decision for individuals. Resignation also remains one of the basic moral resources for individuals of integrity. The option to resign reinforces integrity, buttresses responsibility, supports accountability, and can provide leverage and boundary drawing. I argue that the moral reasons to resign flow from three related moral dimensions of integrity. Individuals in office promise to live up to the obligation of the office. This promise presumes that individuals have the capacity to make and keep promises, the competence to do the tasks of office, and the ability to be effective. This article examines how failure in each of these areas generates strong moral reasons to resign. ©1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.