Strong Enforcement Mechanisms Research Articles

The Impacts of State Growth Management Programmes: A Comparative Analysis

This paper examines the impact that alternative state planning frameworks have on five dimensions of urban development: density, the spatial extent of urbanised land area, property value, public expenditures on infrastructure and population change. The objectives of the analysis are threefold. First, the background discussion provides a brief overview of urban sprawl as a public policy problem and outlines how state growth management programmes attempt to respond to it. Secondly, the empirical analysis examines the effects of growth management in a cross-section of metropolitan counties during the 1982-97 time-period. The five outcome measures are modelled in a simultaneous equations framework in order to test several specific hypotheses about how state land-use policies affect the character of urban growth. Thirdly, the results of the empirical analysis are described within the context of previous research on the effectiveness of growth management. The findings suggest that state growth management programmes with strong consistency requirements and enforcement mechanisms hold much promise for reducing urban sprawl, while programmes that do not require consistency and/or have weak enforcement mechanisms may inadvertently contribute to it.

Les processus de normalisation comptable : un exemple de droit postmoderne

In 2000, the core set of international accounting standards developped by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) has been approved by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), following a deep restructuring of the IASC. Henceforward, such standards will be used in cross border capital raising and listing purposes in all global markets. At the same time, the European Union has decided that the international accounting standards (IAS) will be obligatory in 2005 at the latest. What changes do these decisions introduce in the accounting standards setting process ? This paper argues that international accounting regulation is an example of post-modern law or regulation, in three main aspects : first, the international standards setting process implies renouncing the hierarchical legitimization principle that used to ground european accounting harmonisation, for instance ; second, it is a complex and flexible mechanism of standards production and articulation; finally, the international accounting stan~dards are developped by a multi-representative structure, according to an open due~process that mainly relies on technical competence. However, such a process needs to be completed by strong enforcement mechanisms.

Seeds of Corruption: Do Market Institutions Matter?

Economists in the field of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation have long recognized certain factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior, corruption, and "capture" of government officials. Only now are these relationships becoming conventional wisdom among specialists in economies in transition. Ten years into the transition, corruption is so pervasive that it could jeopardize the best-intentioned reform efforts. Broadman and Recanatini present an analytical framework for examining the role market institutions play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. Using recently available data on the incidence of corruption and on institutional development, they provide preliminary evidence on the link between the development of market institutions and incentives for corruption. Virtually all of the indicators they examine appear to be important, but three are statistically significant: · The intensity of barriers to the entry of new business. · The effectiveness of the legal system. · The efficacy and competitiveness of services provided by infrastructure monopolies. The main lesson emerging from their analysis: a well established system of market institutions - clear and transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances (including strong enforcement mechanisms), and a robust competitive environment - reduces opportunities for rent-seeking and hence incentives for corruption. Both the design and effective implementation of such measures are important if a market system is to be effective. It is not enough, for example, to enact first-rate laws if they are not enforced. The local political economy greatly affects whether a given policy reform will curtail corruption. Especially important are the following factors in the political economy: · The credibility of the government's commitment to carrying out announced reforms. · The degree to which government officials are captured by the entities they regulate or oversee. · The stability of the government itself. · The political power of entrenched vested interests. Economists in the field of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation have long recognized these factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior, corruption, and "capture" of government officials. Only now are they becoming conventional wisdom among specialists in economies in transition. This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to analyze the determinants of corruption and develop remedies. The authors may be contacted at hbroadman@worldbank.org or frecanatini@worldbank.org.

Forest Management Problems in Cambodia : A Case Study of Forest Management of F Company

A fast growing population and the need for food and forest products coupled with the great demand for wood and rapid economic development in the developing world have brought sustainable forest management under continuous uncertainty. Deforestation in the developing world has been relatively high. But recently, it has been more widely recognized that over-exploitation of forest products and non-forest products is prejudicing the sustainability of the world's forests. Cambodia has been chosen as a case study to test this hypothesis regarding sustainable forest management. There are two main types of forests in Cambodia, namely dryland and edaphic forests, covering a total area of 10.59 million ha or 58% of the total land area. It had been reduced from 12.32 million ha in 1973 as a result of wars and political instability over the last 25 years. Against a background of government instability, great domestic and foreign demands for wood in recent years have resulted in Cambodia's forests being over-exploited. To prove this, a selective 25-year felling cycle system used by F Company was analyzed with the aid of various statistical tools. The analysis shows that although the growing stock of F's evergreen forest is as low as 82 m3/ha due to illegal logging, the company has exploited 7m3/ha or 9% of the total stock. This was 6 percentage points higher than the sustainable cutting rate of Cambodia's evergreen forest. This supports the hypothesis of over-exploitation. The result also shows that there is still a large number of residual trees with diameter less than 45 cm, which are available for extracting over the next 25 years if they are properly managed. Strong enforcement mechanisms for forest monitoring and control are needed to stop illegal logging, to prevent over-exploitation and to manage the residual trees for long-term availability of forest resources. Keyword: Cambodia, forest management, selective felling, tree classification