Strikes Legislation Research Articles

California’s Three Strikes Law Revisited: Assessing the Long-Term Effects of the Law

Previous studies on the three strikes legislation in California draw conclusions based on data immediately following the passage of the law, which cannot account for the full deterrent effect of the law. Moreover, they do not account for the incapacitation effect. Distinguishing between deterrence and incapacitation is important for determining the efficacy of the law. Using data from 1991 to 2009, this paper is the first to examine the long-run effects. Our results show that the law had a significant deterrent effect on all crimes, including non-triggering offenses. Overall, the incapacitation effect is less significant. Further, enhanced penalties cause some felons to substitute between violent crimes and property crimes which carry a lower sentence. However, there is little evidence of substitution within crime categories. Surprisingly however, the added deterrent effect of the third strike is significantly smaller than for the second strike. The small marginal deterrence from the third strike also raises questions about the justification for such extreme severity of punishment.

Does Three Strikes Really Deter? A Statistical Analysis Of Its Impact On Crime Rates In California

This study uses California crime statistics for the years 1984-2004, to determine what effect, if any, the increased sentencing standards under the three-strikes legislation in California have had in deterring crime. This study follows a new approach in differentiating between the incapacitation effect and the deterrent effect of the law. Incapacitation is tested by tracking the change in prison population. Our results show that the three strikes legislation had a significant deterrent effect on total and property crime, but not so for violent crime. We find no support for incapacitation in the limited time period following the three-strikes legislation.

Punishment and democracy

Leading contemporary branches of punishment theory stemming from the traditional schools of consequentialism and retributivism support a role for public deliberation to secure core values communicated through punishment and to encourage greater accountability for punishment practices. Drawing on Habermas’s democratic theory to develop the ideal of public deliberation, this article explores how punishment policies might be subjected to public rational-critical debate. Two contrasting cases exemplify the importance of the deliberative standards stressed by Habermas. Neglecting standards of rational-critical debate results in mere opinion rather than public opinion, the shortcomings of which are illustrated by three strikes legislation where punishment policy emerged from the public but in an unreflective way. In contrast, recent innovations in the imposition of punishment represented by problem-solving courts, like the drug, domestic violence, mental health and community courts developing in jurisdictions around the United States, show how rational-critical public debate can flourish. Habermas’s procedural theory does not advocate particular principles, but shows how civic accountability for punishment reflecting multiple values can gain deeper roots in public culture.

Unfinished business – thereform of strike legislation in Britain

Employment legislation regulating industrial action introduced to Britain between 1980 and 1993 by Conservative governments has substantially endured under Britain’s New Labour administration. Re‐examining the legislation affirms that it restricts fundamental union purposes and traditional forms of action. A review of the case law and the legislation’s impact on strikes in the late 1990s suggests that its influence continues to be felt. The State and capital remain firmly opposed to the significant changes in the legislation which the TUC demands. Pursuing a strategy of social partnership that requires a posture of moderation, some union leaders aspire to a “strike‐free” Britain. This has substantially inhibited union campaigning for legislative change. Rejecting industrial action on which collective strength ultimately depends and the necessary legal protection may, in reality, sustain rather than transcend the unions’ present lack of power. Alternative approaches to power‐building, calculative militancy and membership mobilization demand attention from trade unionists.

Three Strikes Legislation and Sentencing Commission Objectives

Between 1993 and 1997, state legislatures across the country passed legislation popularly known as three strikes and you're out laws. These laws appeared at a time when sentencing commissions existed in many states, and the commissions were involved in the legislative debates leading to the votes on Three Strikes laws. Thus, the passage of Three Strikes laws can shed light on one type of interaction between sentencing commissions and legislatures. This article posits a variety of objectives for sentencing commissions during Three Strikes debates, each a response to the recurring pathologies that appear when legislative, judicial and executive branch officials create sentencing policy. A survey of states that have passed Three Strikes laws indicates that sentencing commissions have not made any systematic difference in the legislative debates on these statutes. Commissions have little reason to oppose these laws absolutely, and could lose political credibility by doing so. Commission have incentives instead to argue for limiting the scope of these statutes. Where commissions have been involved in the debates about habitual felon legislation, they have emphasized limits on judicial discretion, focused on the quality of legislative deliberations rather than on legislative outcomes, and devoted little attention to prosecutorial charging decisions.

Three Strikes Legislation and Sentencing Commission Objectives

Between 1993 and 1997, state legislatures across the country passed legislation popularly known as “three strikes and you’re out” laws. These laws appeared at a time when sentencing commissions existed in many states, and the commissions were involved in the legislative debates leading to the votes on three strikes laws. Thus, the passage of three strikes laws can shed light on one type of interaction between sentencing commissions and legislatures. This article posits a variety of objectives for sentencing commissions during three strikes debates, each a response to the recurring “pathologies” that appear when legislative, judicial, and executive branch officials create sentencing policy. A survey of states that have passed three strikes laws indicates that sentencing commissions have not made any systematic difference in the legislative debates on these statutes. Commissions have little reason to oppose these laws absolutely, and could lose political credibility by doing so. Commissions have incentives instead to argue for limiting the scope of these statutes. Where commissions have been involved in the debates about habitual felon legislation, they have emphasized limits on judicial discretion, focused on the quality of legislative deliberations rather than on legislative outcomes, and devoted little attention to prosecutorial charging decisions.

The Sentencing of Dangerous and Habitual Offenders in Canada

and control are based primarily on a perception of risk or fear of future crimes, rather than actual harm already caused. Preventive detention, by its very nature, raises what the late Judge David B?zelon described as profound moral and legal questions.1 The introduction of the Canadian provisions reflected experience in both the United States and Great Britain, countries which for reasons of both history and geography have had a gravitational pull on the Canadian criminal justice system. This article reviews the history and present structure of the Canadian provisions for the sentenc ing of dangerous and habitual offenders. The experience with Habitual Offender legislation in Canada shows that the offenders caught up in its net were not the most violent or serious offenders and yet served extremely lengthy sentences, totally dispro portionate to the harm they caused or the risk they posed. This experience has significance for the present American embrace of three strikes legisla tion and the issue of over-inclusiveness. The second

Three Strikes Legislation and a Sinking Fund Proposal

Three Strikes Legislation and a Sinking Fund Proposal

The Impact of Strike Legislation on the Earnings of Union Workers in the Private Sector

AbstractThis paper, using data from the survey of union membership and various provincial labour codes, examines the effects of strike legislative provisions on the earnings of union workers. The legislative provisions analyzed in this study include first‐stage conciliation, second‐stage conciliation, cooling‐off periods, the anti‐scab legislation, prohibition of strikes for first‐contract negotiations, mandatory strike vote, and strike vote majority based upon bargaining unit size. Overall, the results suggest that these provisions combined do have an effect on the earnings of union workers in the private sector.RésuméCet article a pour objet d'étudier les rapports entre les salaires des travailleurs syndiqués et les lois des grèves comme la première étape de la conciliation, la deuxième étape de la conciliation, le délai de réflexion, la législation contre les briseurs de grève, la législation sur la prévention des grèves durant la renégotiation du premier contrat, le vote de grève obligatoire et les votes de grève où la majorité est déterminée par l'unité de négotiation. Pour obtenir les données nécessaires, on a utilisé le sondage d'affiliation syndicate et le code du travail des provinces. Les résultats démontrent que, dans l'ensemble, les lois des grèves ont un effet sur les salaires des travailleurs syndiqués du secteur privé.

Experience with Strike Legislation Abroad

Experience with Strike Legislation Abroad